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In New York State in the 1910s and 1920s, two groups of political actors—largely 
female social work reformers from the settlement house tradition, and legislators from 
urban ethnic political machines—coalesced to develop a unique political amalgam: 
transitional progressivism.  Transitional progressivism brought together the common 
interests of these two groups, forging an agenda that sought to expand the role of the state 
in protecting industrial laborers, ensuring social welfare, and promoting cultural 
pluralism.  Through a complex process, this agenda became Democratic partisan 
dogma—first in New York and then nationally; and during both the implementation of 
this program and the articulation of the broader ideology of the transitional progressives 
in the context of state and national campaigns, transitional progressivism became the 
political platform of America’s urban ethnic working-class voters.  Through these voters 
and their political representatives, many priorities from the transitional progressive 
tradition became important facets of New Deal liberalism.  Thus, by way of transitional 
 
 
progressivism, key elements of Progressive Era reform evolved into hallmarks of the 
New Deal.  The foremost practitioner of this unique progressivism was Alfred E. Smith, a 
Democrat who served four terms as governor of New York and ran unsuccessfully for 
president in 1928.   
 Part I explores the rise of transitional progressivism and its implementation during 
the Smith governorship.  Part II presents a revisionist interpretation of the 1928 
presidential contest.  The conclusion follows the developments of 1928 into the 1930s, 
suggesting ways in which transitional progressivism exerted an important influence on 
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The Happy Warrior 
 
 
“I am sure you are whole-heartedly in accord with what seems inevitable—a life of hard, 
toilsome labor, harder than ever before, but always for the good of others.” 
 





In New York State in the 1910s and 1920s, two seemingly irreconcilable groups 
of political actors—largely female social work reformers from the settlement house 
tradition, and pragmatic legislators and bosses from urban ethnic political machines—
were able to coalesce and develop a unique political amalgam: transitional progressivism.  
Transitional progressivism brought together the common interests of these two groups, 
forging an agenda that sought to expand the role of the state in protecting industrial 
laborers, ensuring social welfare, and promoting cultural pluralism.  Through a complex 
process of negotiation, this agenda became Democratic partisan dogma—first in New 
York and then nationally; and during both the implementation of some of these 
progressive programs and the articulation of the broader ideology of the transitional 
progressives in the context of state and national campaigns, transitional progressivism 
became the political platform of America’s urban ethnic working-class voters.  Through 
these voters and their political representatives, many priorities from the transitional 
progressive tradition became important facets of New Deal liberalism.  Thus, by way of 
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 James Donohue to Alfred E. Smith, June 24, 1928, George Graves Papers, New York State Archives, 
Albany, New York (hereafter, George Graves Papers), Box 17, Folder “DONOHUE, JAMES,” p. 2. 
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transitional progressivism, key elements of Progressive Era reform evolved into 
hallmarks of the New Deal. 
Generations of scholars have produced a rich literature on the relationship 
between Progressivism and New Deal liberalism.  This work has not yielded a consensus 
as to whether the latter period of reform represented a continuation of the Progressive 
agenda or a shift in direction or focus.  One school has suggested that the New Deal 
marked a dramatic departure from the old Progressive tradition—that Franklin 
Roosevelt’s modern liberalism had little in common with the Progressive crusades of an 
earlier day; another has proposed continuity, suggesting either that the New Deal was the 
culmination of many decades of Progressive policy developments on the local, state, and 
national levels, or that the Great Depression offered a unique opportunity for American 
Progressives to enact an agenda that had been stifled by unfavorable domestic conditions 
since the close of the Great War.
2
   
This controversy has been exacerbated by the nebulous nature of Progressivism 
itself.  The striking diversity of Progressive Era reformers has led scholars to identify 
various and often incongruous groups and movements as “progressive.”  Naturally, 
historical determinations about the degree of continuity between Progressivism and New 
Deal liberalism are dependent on historians’ decisions regarding whom to include as a 
                                                 
2
 See chapter one.  To consider a few notable examples:  In his classic work The Age of Reform, Richard 
Hofstadter dubbed the New Deal “a drastic new departure.”  Buttressing this argument in 1967, Otis 
Graham, Jr., found that after “initial enthusiasm,” most of the “Old Progressives” decided “that the New 
Deal was destructive of their political and social hopes for America.”  On the other hand, Daniel Rodgers 
suggested in Atlantic Crossings that the New Deal was “a great, explosive release of the pent-up agenda of 
the progressive past.”  Scholars like Robyn Muncy have noted that with the coming of the New Deal, the 
progressive agenda that had grown out of the settlement house tradition was largely instituted as federal 
policy.  Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to FDR (New York: Vintage, 1955), p. 303; 
Otis Graham, Jr., An Encore for Reform: The Old Progressives and the New Deal (New York: Oxford, 
1967), pp. 166-167; Daniel T. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1998), p. 416; Robyn Muncy, Creating a Female Dominion in American 




Progressive.  If the Progressives were Richard Hofstadter’s status anxious mugwumps, 
or, more broadly, if their ambition was to check social change, then there is little to 
commend an interpretation connecting Progressive reforms to the upheavals of the New 
Deal years.
3
  Conversely, if the Progressives were figures who responded to those social 
changes by struggling to establish a state role in promoting public health and welfare, 
limiting the power of big business, or improving the lot of workers, then the liberalism of 
the 1930s does not represent a “drastic new departure” from the earlier reform tradition.   
This study recognizes that all of these groups may well have been Progressives—
certainly they considered themselves to be such and certainly they all exerted influence 
on policymaking in the Progressive Era.  Thus the project of drawing a straight line from 
Progressivism to the New Deal, already fraught with complexities and contradictions, 
becomes a Gordian knot for historians of United States politics.  Scholars can begin to 
disentangle this quandary with a slight adjustment of focus:  exploring how particular 
strands of the Progressive tradition came to influence specific facets of New Deal 
liberalism. 
With this work, I am engaging in such a project.  I demonstrate how transitional 
progressivism represented a key phase in the process of political evolution from 
Progressive policies and politics to those of the New Deal.  Recognizing that not all self-
described progressives would have approved of transitional progressivism—indeed, 
many were quite antagonistic toward the program and its sponsors—I am limiting the 
scope of my conclusions to specific progressives, who were able to overcome their 
differences in order to promote and implement a platform reflecting their common goals 
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 Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, p. 135.  On social control, see: Michael McGerr, A Fierce Discontent: The 




for society.  My ambition is not to end the debate over continuity versus change, for 
while this work leans heavily toward continuity, my conclusions are not sweeping.  
Nevertheless, I am presenting in transitional progressivism a new way of conceptualizing 
early twentieth century United States political history, an admittedly ambitious project in 
itself. 
 The foremost practitioner of this unique progressivism was Alfred E. Smith, a 
Democrat who served four terms as governor of New York and ran unsuccessfully for 
president in 1928.  Because of Smith’s leading role in the application of transitional 
progressivism, his governorship and his 1928 presidential campaign figure prominently 
in the pages that follow.  However, my interest is much less in Smith the man than in the 
issues and ideas that affected his policies and politics—and so this work is not intended 
as a comprehensive Smith biography.  Nonetheless, by centering the narrative on Smith’s 
role in developing, implementing, and nationalizing transitional progressivism, I present 
a fundamental reinterpretation of a major political figure.  
  
The Happy Warrior 
 
 In 1927, journalist Walter Lippmann delineated what would become the 
consensus view on the national significance of Al Smith, then in his fourth term as 
governor of New York.  “Smith is the first child of the new immigration who might be 
President of the United States.  He carries with him the hopes, the sense of self-respect, 
and the grievances of that great mass of newer Americans who feel that they have never 




Catholics, most of them are wet, most of them live in cities.  Those are all superficial 
facts as against the fundamental fact that they are all immigrants. . . .  he comes from a 
class of citizens who are felt to be alien to the historic American ideal.”
4
  In this passage, 
Lippmann set down many of the important tropes that continue to dominate the historical 
understanding of Alfred E. Smith.  
Indeed, these themes have retained their prominence with justification.  In 1928, 
Al Smith became the first Roman Catholic to secure a major party presidential 
nomination.  He openly opposed prohibition, rhetorically bludgeoned the Ku Klux Klan, 
and thoughtfully challenged immigration quotas that had been rooted in an Anglo-Saxon 
conception of Americanism.  His campaign theme song was “The Sidewalks of New 
York” and his trademark brown derby—along with his perpetual cigar—became a staple 
within contemporary political iconography.  His speeches were delivered, 
unapologetically, in the raspy tones, dubious pronunciation, and proletarian diction of the 
Bowery.   
All of this was a reflection of Smith’s background.  Indeed, in order to understand 
Al Smith’s personality and his politics, one must understand Manhattan’s Fourth Ward.  
A geographically small neighborhood on New York’s Lower East Side, it had absorbed 
thousands of Irish refugees during the mid-nineteenth century.
5
  It was filled with “a 
motley array of tenements, of converted warehouses, of dwellings in every stage of repair 
and decay, and of shacks and shanties” and, as a waterfront neighborhood, it acquired an 
                                                 
4
 Walter Lippmann, “The Sick Donkey: Democratic Prospects for 1928,” Harper’s Magazine, Vol. 155 
(September, 1927), pp. 415-421, p. 418.  
5
 The Fourth Ward was bordered on the west by the Bowery, on the east by the bustling East River, on the 
north by East Broadway and on the south by South Street.  Oscar Handlin, Al Smith and His America 




“unsavory” reputation as a den for rowdy sailors and various other ruffians.
6
  
Nevertheless, it was cheap to live near the wharves along the East River, and so the 
Fourth Ward’s population of impoverished, unskilled laborers continued to swell, all 
while these families struggled mightily to raise their children in an environment secluded 
from the surrounding vice.
7
  Born December 30, 1873, Alfred Emanuel Smith was one of 
those children. 
 The son and namesake of a Civil War veteran, Smith grew up on South Street, 
one of the Fourth Ward’s many narrow, bustling, cobblestone roads.
8
  Like the lion’s 
share of their neighbors, Smith’s family was Irish, Catholic, and poor.
9
  Young Al Smith 
started work at age eleven; the next year, he lost his father and was forced to leave school 
in the eighth grade and go to work full time.
10
  For several years he labored twelve-hour 
days (that began at 4:00 a.m.) as a checker at the Fulton Fish Market, and later moved on 
to a position at a pumping station in Brooklyn.
11
  In the decades that followed, Smith 
would often joke “that his only academic degree was F. F. M., standing for Fulton Fish 
Market.”
12
   
                                                 
6
 Ibid., p. 7. 
7
 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
8
 Robert A. Slayton, Empire Statesman: The Rise and Redemption of Al Smith (New York: Free Press, 
2001), p. 16; Handlin, Al Smith and His America, p. 12; Emily Smith Warner, with Hawthorne Daniel, The 
Happy Warrior: The Story of My Father, Alfred E. Smith (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956), p. 26. 
9
 Smith biographer Robert Slayton notes that the Fourth Ward did house an eclectic collection of ethnic 
groups, but that in the mid-nineteenth century, the ward was “one of the most Gaelic in the city.”  
Similarly, research by Frances Perkins has shown that Smith was in fact not 100 percent Irish, but rather of 
mixed Irish, Italian, English, and German extraction.  While a fascinating biographical point, Smith’s 
lineage is not as significant to this study as his professed heritage, which was, according to one grandson, 
“100% Irish.”  Slayton, Empire Statesman, pp. 9-13; Matthew and Hannah Josephson, Al Smith: Hero of 
the Cities: A Political Portrait Drawing on the Papers of Frances Perkins (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1969), pp. 8-18. 
10
 Handlin, Al Smith and His America, p. 12. 
11
 “National Affairs: The Brown Derby,” Time, April 30, 1928, pp. 9-11, p. 9; Handlin, Al Smith and His 
America, p. 12. 
12













 As with so many ethnic, working-class ghettos throughout Manhattan, another 
fundamental characteristic of the Fourth Ward was the omnipotence of Tammany Hall.  
The most notorious political machine in United States history, Tammany dominated New 
York City for eight decades, from the founding of the modern organization in 1854 to the 
election of Fiorello La Guardia as mayor in 1933.
14
  Its formula for success, according to 
Gilded Age district healer George Washington Plunkitt, lay in the organization’s ability 
to satisfy basic human needs: patronage—mostly in the form of municipal jobs; 
                                                 
13
 “Alfred E. Smith, bust portrait, facing right,” November 4, 1926, from a photograph taken in 1892, New 
York World-Telegram and the Sun Newspaper Photograph Collection, Library of Congress, Washington, 
DC. 
14
 Arthur Mann, “Introduction,” in William L. Riordan, Plunkitt of Tammany Hall: A Series of Very Plain 




benevolent acts to ease the daily burdens of constituents—a bucket of coal when money 
was tight, bailing a son out of jail after a night of hooliganism, and other such favors; as 
well as the provision of a sense of community.
15
  All of this forged a spirit of fealty 
between machine and constituent and secured generations of political loyalty.  These 
operations also required exorbitant sums of money—funds easily obtained over decades 
of looting the city treasury.   
 Such was the political school in which Al Smith was educated.  The Plunkitt of 
the Fourth Ward was “Big Tim” Sullivan, but for Smith, the most important political 
lessons were learned from saloonkeeper Tom Foley, considered the “real boss” by many 
in the neighborhood.
16
  As Time magazine would later note:  “His college was the Society 
of St. Tammany and his freshman courses were in addressing postcards to voters,” and 
“watching the polls,” until “Tammany promoted him to speechmaking in his district and 
his name began to get into the newspapers.”
17
  For several more years Smith 
“investigated jury panels,” and “worked for other men’s elections.”
18
  During this period 
the young Tammany man, who was also an aspiring actor, married Catherine Ann Dunn, 
and within a few years the couple moved to the Oliver Street home that would be forever 
associated with Al Smith.
19
  By 1903 Tom Foley had become frustrated with an 
assemblyman who “seemed to have forgotten his friends,” and decided to send the 
faithful Smith to Albany.
20
 
                                                 
15
 Plunkitt discusses these issues throughout his talks.  Riordan, Plunkitt of Tammany Hall: A Series of Very 
Plain Talks on Very Practical Politics, passim. 
16
 Handlin, Al Smith, pp. 20-21. 
17
 “National Affairs: The Brown Derby,” p. 10. 
18
 Ibid., p. 10. 
19
 Warner, The Happy Warrior, pp. 40-41; Handlin, Al Smith, pp. 12-17.  Indeed, the Smith residence at 25 
Oliver Street “became a Registered National Historic Landmark in 1973.”  Slayton, Empire Statesman, 
caption to illustration between pp. 224 and 225. 
20




 During his first legislative session, Al Smith did not make a single speech.
21
  He 
“found himself entirely disregarded and completely confused.”
22
  Amplifying Smith’s 
frustration was his total inability to comprehend the stack of bills that would arrive on his 
desk daily.
23
  The wording of these bills was often difficult even for the well-trained 
lawyer to decipher, but “it might have been designed to mock a man whose schooling had 
ended in the eighth grade.”
24
  Yet Al Smith was tenacious.  Each night, while other 
legislators caroused in local pubs, Smith would retire early and thoroughly dissect each 
bill—developing not only an understanding of specific pieces of legislation but also a 
critical eye for the mechanics of state government.
25
  With time, Smith earned a positive 
reputation among his colleagues; and in 1911, after revelations of corruption among 
legislative Republicans ushered in a Democratic majority, the young assemblyman was 
the logical choice for Tammany sachem Charles Francis “Silent Charlie” Murphy to 
promote for majority leader.
26
  After a brief foray into New York City politics as sheriff 
and then president of the board of aldermen, Smith was elected governor of the Empire 
State in 1918.  A decade later, his party nominated him for the White House. 
 Smith, who was dubbed “the Happy Warrior” by his ally and gubernatorial 
successor Franklin Delano Roosevelt, is rightly remembered as a progressive executive.
27
  
One study of his gubernatorial years goes as far as to suggest that “Smith represents a 
                                                 
21
 Robert A. Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York (New York: Vintage, 1975), 
p. 118. 
22
 Handlin, Al Smith, p. 27. 
23
 Caro, The Power Broker, p. 118; Handlin, Al Smith, p. 27. 
24
 Caro, The Power Broker, p. 119. 
25
 Ibid., pp. 119-20. 
26
 Ibid., p. 122. 
27
 E.g.: Slayton, Empire Statesman, pp. 125-233; Handlin, Al Smith and His America, pp. 90-111; Elisabeth 
Israels Perry, Belle Moskowitz: Feminine Politics and the Exercise of Power in the Age of Alfred E. Smith 
(Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992), pp. 122-183; Paula Eldot, Governor Alfred E. Smith: The 




transitional stage between progressivism and the New Deal.”
28
  However, historians have 
not understood Al Smith’s campaign for the presidency in the same way.  The study that 
recognized the “transitional” nature of his administration in New York did not consider 
his presidential run.  Those scholars who have tend to portray Smith’s national campaign 
in a different light than his years as governor.  Historian David Burner, in his crucial 
work on 1920s Democratic politics, suggested that Smith’s campaign was essentially 
conservative, and this position has proven the prevailing academic interpretation.
29
   
 Historians have thus determined that, as Smith biographer Robert Slayton 
suggests, 1928 saw “no substantial issue to differentiate the parties,” rendering the 
campaign “a contest between personalities.”
30
  Indeed, Smith’s personality has come to 
dominate the scholarly understanding of his presidential run.  A typical description in a 
recent academic work introduces the 1928 Democratic presidential nominee thus:  “Al 
Smith was as urban as the Brooklyn Bridge near which he had grown up, as Irish as the 
Blarney Stone, and as Catholic as St. Patrick’s Cathedral.”
31
  Such a cartoonish, if poetic 
and in some ways accurate description of the four-time New York governor, diverts 
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scholarly attention toward a total fixation upon the candidate’s personality, obscuring the 
important policy ideas of Smith and his closest associates.  In fact, Smith continued 
throughout his presidential campaign to argue doggedly for his progressive vision of the 
government’s responsibility to implement a broadly defined social welfare regime.  
With a focus on the political implications of policy ideas, my work seeks to revise 
the prevailing view of the Happy Warrior.  Understanding Smith as the leading exponent 
of transitional progressivism helps place him in proper perspective: squarely at the center 
of an evolutionary process that connected aspects of Progressivism with central portions 
of the New Deal.  The policies implemented during Smith’s governorship represented the 
fruition of the ongoing process of political negotiation and coalition between Democratic 
political machine operatives and social work activists.  Smith’s personal appeal to urban 
ethnic working-class voters enabled him to promote those same policies on the national 
level in 1928.  Thus, the 1928 Democratic campaign was the apogee of transitional 
progressivism, an ideology that imbued the emerging urban Democratic coalition with a 
set of values that anticipated many facets of the New Deal.   
The urban, ethnic, working-class voters who would soon comprise the backbone 
of the Roosevelt coalition embraced both the cultural symbolism of the Smith candidacy 
and the progressive initiatives the candidate expounded.  Smith’s Catholicism, his 
working-class roots, his disdain for prohibition and for the Ku Klux Klan—these 
attributes all had a clear influence on voters in 1928, and they benefited Smith greatly 
among urban workers, just as they would prove politically unpalatable among voters in 
other parts of the nation.  But leaving the story at that is superficial.  I have proceeded 




new Smith Democrats of 1928—the ones who did the working and praying and suffering 
and voting that historians have attempted to decipher—were complex beings with 
complicated motivations.  There is no question that there were many voters like 
Nazzareno Marconi of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, who wrote Smith (in Italian) to 
assure him that “we Catholic people do not get tired of working for your victory.”
32
  But 
there were others like Joseph F. Nolan of Westfield, New Jersey, an Irish-American first-
time voter who explained to the Newark Evening News that Smith’s gubernatorial résumé 
was “ample proof of his ability.  If that record is indicative of what is to be expected of 
him in the event of his election the United States is destined for one of the most 
distinguished administrations in its history.”
33
  In fact, this is not an “either or” 
proposition; most Smith voters were sophisticated enough to understand the Democratic 
candidate as representing both cultural pluralism and social and economic reform—and 
most of those voters were clamoring for both by 1928.  This combination of cultural 
empowerment with social welfare appeals had been the formula of Smith’s progressive 
governorship, and it was the platform from which he sought the presidency.  In 1928, Al 
Smith nationalized his unique brand of progressivism; and while he went down to a bitter 
defeat that year, the ideas he promoted were taken up by his enthusiastic supporters and, 
through their efforts, infused the reforms of the New Deal with the spirit of transitional 
progressivism.    
 
*  *  * 
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 It will be apparent that my understanding of this period necessarily builds upon 
the works of many past scholars.  Some of the most significant contributions to my 
thinking have come from the scholarship of J. Joseph Huthmacher and John D. Buenker 
on “urban liberalism”; Robyn Muncy and Elisabeth Perry, among others, on women’s 
social work progressivism; and William E. Leuchtenburg on the politics of the 1920s and 
of the New Deal.  I have also considered the works of numerous scholars of Alfred E. 
Smith, most significantly Oscar Handlin, who produced the first academic biography of 
the Happy Warrior in 1958.   
 However, it will be equally apparent that what I am proposing is a revisionist 
argument, and I intend to present points of strong disagreement both with those scholars 
mentioned and with a large number of other excellent historians of the period.  I have felt 
that many of my interventions required a preponderance of evidence in order to justify 
my divergent interpretations of actors and events.  This has therefore proven a rather long 
work; and while I do not intend to present an apologia for any moments of verbosity, I 
will suggest that there are often times when a thorough exploration of the richness of the 
human experience is the most potent mechanism for understanding our past.  
 Part I, comprised of the first three chapters of this work, explores the rise of 
transitional progressivism and its implementation during the Smith governorship.  In 
chapter one, I consider the relevant literature on Progressivism and introduce the concept 
of transitional progressivism, defining it both in terms of ideology and constituency.  I 
then explore how that “new progressivism” developed in the 1910s and 1920s in New 
York State.  In chapters two and three I interpret specific policy initiatives undertaken by 




of Smith’s unique progressivism.  Chapter two describes the establishment of a broadly 
defined social welfare regime, focusing on areas of health, education, recreation, and 
water power.  Chapter three considers Smith’s administrative reforms in New York State 
within the context of his transitional progressivism.  I argue as others have that he sought 
these structural reforms to expedite and enhance his social welfare agenda, while also 
using his fight for administrative reform to understand the political tactics of transitional 
progressivism. 
 Part II, consisting of chapters four through seven, presents my interpretation of 
the 1928 presidential contest.  Chapter four explores the major policy debates of 1928, 
presenting them as part of a revisionist narrative of the campaign.  Chapter five is a 
quantitative analysis of the electoral results and their significance.  Chapters six and 
seven are regional case studies, intended to explain the important political changes that 
took place in 1928.  Each is presented as an interpretive narrative:  chapter six is the story 
of southern New England, where Smith experienced his greatest triumphs; chapter seven 
considers 1928 in the Old South, the locale of some of the biggest—and most 
portentous—Democratic disappointments.  I conclude by following the developments of 
1928 into the 1930s, suggesting ways in which transitional progressivism exerted an 























Chapter I: A New Progressivism 
 
 
“You come into possession of the franchise after the battle for political independence is 
won.  The issues of the present hour are purely economic, and to meet them, women are 
equally qualified with men.”   
 
-State Senator Anthony Griffin, (D-Bronx), 1917 
 
 
* * * 
 
 
“The Tammany group is constantly jockeying with the Socialists to prove that they are 
the real ‘people’s friend’. . . . skillfully maneuvering ‘to beat them to it’. . . . it gained the 
appearance of a progressive party and left the reformers appearing as reactionaries.” 
 
-Henry Moskowitz,  




 The period between the unofficial close of the Progressive Era (sometime shortly 
after the Armistice and the precipitous decline of Wilsonianism) and the inauguration of 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt to the presidency was not simply an unchallenged 
conservative interregnum.
34
  To be sure, this “long 1920s” was marked by the cult of the 
businessman, cultural clashes, and laissez faire governance.  But even as Bruce Barton 
preached the virtues of corporate prowess, even while William Jennings Bryan delivered 
jeremiads on the decline of traditional values and Calvin Coolidge made laconic 
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indifference an heroic trait, a progressive ideology and style persisted that would serve to 
link the two periods of reform within a longer liberal tradition.    
 During the long 1920s, New York Democratic governor Alfred E. Smith, along 
with a motley group of reform-minded allies, practiced what I call transitional 
progressivism.  Transitional progressivism was both an ideological system and a 
rhetorical style; it affected both public policy and electoral politics in the Empire State.  
This new progressivism drew from various “progressivisms” of the past, arranging 
previously unrelated or even antagonistic elements within one consistent progressive 
agenda for the state and eventually the nation.  Of equal significance, transitional 
progressivism politicized this agenda in a radically new way, transposing the reform 
platform into Democratic partisan dogma.  The ways in which transitional progressivism 
was expressed in the 1920s are best explored through study of the executive career of its 
foremost practitioner, Al Smith.  But first one must understand the roots of that 
progressivism, in order to see how this unique phenomenon developed from long-




“The Progressives,” as one scholar put it, “were a diverse lot.”
35
  Progressivism 
has been defined as everything from a reactionary defense against a “status revolution” to 
a rationalization and bureaucratization of government in response to modernizing 
technological and economic forces; from a move to homogenize the citizenry and control 
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social conflict on the part of the middle class to a set of tools for dealing with industrial 
society imported from late-nineteenth century Europe by cosmopolitan intellectuals, to a 
drive to establish the political ascendancy of the “public interest” over interest group, 
class, or partisan goals.
36
  Studies have thus located the core progressive constituency 
variously, in the old-money men of the “Mugwump type,” the professional middle-class 
of the new industrial order, worldly scholars and social reformers, settlement house 
activists, and even urban machine politicians.
37
  Moreover, some scholars have 
questioned whether a “progressive movement” existed at all, and others have suggested 
that there was no ideological connection between the various political drives of the 
reputedly progressive decades, but merely a shared set of “clusters of ideas” and “social 
languages” that were drawn upon by sundry interest groups.
38
  Indeed, some studies have 
demonstrated that the rhetoric of progressivism was sometimes appropriated by partisans 
and injected into the public sphere toward non-reformist, highly divisive ends.
39
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 Amidst such academic ambivalence, it is necessary for any consideration of 
progressive politics to stake out its conceptualization of the subject.  The posture of the 
present study leaves room for a diversity of “progressives” or even “progressivisms” 
within the working definition of that idea; sharing with historians Arthur S. Link and 
Richard L. McCormick the belief that “in general, progressives sought to improve the 
conditions of life and labor and to create as much social stability as possible.  But each 
group of progressives had its own definitions of improvement and stability. . . .  Certainly 
there was no unified movement, but . . . progressivism [was] a real, vital, and significant 
phenomenon, one which contemporaries recognized and talked and fought about.”
40
  
Nevertheless, in attempting to define the specific ideology of a candidate, and to place 
that ideology within a longer process of political development, such an approach no 
longer suffices.  To discover how transitional progressivism represents a link between 
Progressivism and New Deal liberalism, it is imperative that the specific progressivisms 
that contributed to its development be isolated; and that the means by which those 
progressivisms were reconciled to develop a new political ideology be analyzed.   
 At its core, transitional progressivism was the confluence of two important 
streams of progressive ideology: urban liberalism and social welfare progressivism.  
Urban liberalism was a form of progressivism prevalent among machine politicians, who 
realized that ameliorative social and labor legislation was an increasingly effective way to 
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retain the political loyalties of their urban ethnic working-class constituents.
41
  It grew out 
of the pragmatic machine tradition of urban politics, and adopted reform and welfare 
legislation as means of securing power in lieu of the more traditional, feudalistic system 
of building fealty to the machine through personal favors.
42
   
 The introduction of the urban liberalism concept to the study of progressive 
politics by scholars like J. Joseph Huthmacher and John D. Buenker in the 1960s 
represented a significant shift in the analysis of early-twentieth century reform.  It 
directly challenged previous treatments, most of which portrayed the progressive 
reformer as “likely to be from urban, upper middle class backgrounds.  They were 
generally rather young, native-born Protestants of old Anglo-American stock.  Many of 
them were college graduates.  Most of them were either professional men, particularly 




 Urban liberalism scholars agreed with earlier analyses that the progressive period 
was one in which two competing political cultures were in conflict: the “sovereign 
individualist” culture of old-stock Anglo-America, represented by the progressive profile 
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quoted above, and the “organic network” culture largely retained by recent immigrants 
and central to the success of the urban political machine.
44
  However, they differed from 
their predecessors’ exclusive assignment of the label “progressive” within this cultural 
contest.  Indeed, the political disciples of the organic network culture often supported 
progressive reforms as strongly as the sovereign individualist politicians.
45
   
The reformist tendencies of the urban machines were often masked by their 
scandalous administration of city affairs and relentless plundering of the municipal 
treasury.  Indeed, many of the politicians who would later be recognized as urban liberals 
had benefited directly from the machines’ massive patronage operations—and since 
patronage was one of the most distressing targets of old-stock middle-class 
progressivism’s ire, these figures could at best be viewed by contemporaries as an ironic 
source of progress.  Nevertheless, urban liberalism analyses of progressive politics were 
able to sift through these incongruities; they rightly present the urban ethnic politician as 
at least an opportunistic reformer, and demonstrate how rank-and-file urban ethnic voters 
became increasingly aware of government’s potential to improve their living and working 
conditions.         
 Social welfare progressivism was a manifestation of the reform movement that 
grew largely out of the settlement house tradition, and was generally the progressivism of 
female social workers.
46
  It focused on improving the living and working conditions of 
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the urban poor, through settlement house work, education campaigns, and pressuring 
industry by way of protests and boycotts through organizations such as the National 
Consumers’ League, as well as through lobbying state legislatures for specific welfare 
and labor laws.  The social welfare progressives tended to fit the classic progressive 
profile rather well—they tended to be well-educated, middle-class, old-stock 
Protestants—except they were women.  As the large majority of the movement’s leaders 
were college graduates, a central aspect of the social welfare progressives’ modus 
operandi was the execution of scientific surveys of conditions in order to determine the 
best course of action.  Most essential to an understanding of social welfare progressivism 
is consideration of its development as a largely female reform movement.            
 The Progressive Era witnessed the entry of more women into public life than any 
previous period.
47
  But this influx of female activists did not occur unhindered, for 
Victorian ideas about “separate spheres” for the sexes persisted into the progressive age, 
often excluding female reformers from “professions traditionally dominated by men” and 
forcing these women “to create within the public realm a new territory they could rule 
themselves . . . that territory of policy and professional expertise which affected women 
and children exclusively.”
48
  Thus barred from established policy-making institutions, 
female reformers entered public life at the end of the nineteenth century by opening 
settlement houses, most notably Jane Addams’ Hull House in Chicago.
49
  Experiences 
like those at Hull House “supplied the values and strategies” that made it possible for 
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these women to create what historian Robyn Muncy has called “a female dominion 
within the larger empire of policymaking.”
50
  Critically, women within the progressive 
movement were not only building their own institutions, they were also developing their 
own unique reform ideology within those institutions—an ideology that heartily endorsed 
labor regulations and government social welfare action, particularly on behalf of children, 
mothers, and the unemployed.
51
   
 The alliance between the cigar-chomping, glad-handing, opportunistic ward 
healer and the college-educated, old-stock, often moralistic female reformer is a 
strikingly unnatural one at first glance.  The machine politician often benefited from (or 
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participated in) unsavory or illegal activities; was primarily interested in retaining power; 
and generally held chauvinistic attitudes toward female civic participation—fittingly 
summarized by the Boston boss Martin “Mahatma” Lomasney who declared that in 
politics, “you can’t trust these women, they are apt to blab everything they know.”
52
  
Meanwhile female reformers could at times be culturally insensitive toward immigrants; 
were generally in favor of prohibition; and often advocated the overthrow of the political 
machine.
53
  Nor was this alliance, once forged, unproblematic—for example, during a 
heated exchange, Al Smith once called National Consumers’ League founder Florence 
Kelley a “Protestant bigot.”
54
  Nonetheless, by the 1928 Smith presidential campaign, 
these two progressive traditions had come together to form a unique transitional 
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progressivism.  Analyzing the process by which these progressive strands negotiated their 
differences and formed a coherent national platform unearths significant trends in the 




 It would have seemed unlikely for Al Smith, who remained loyal to Tammany 
Hall throughout his political career, to become the gubernatorial embodiment of 
progressive reform.  Young Smith learned politics under the tutelage of saloonkeepers 
and worked his way up the hierarchy of the infamous New York machine until he was 
rewarded for his loyalty by ward boss Tom Foley with a seat representing Manhattan’s 
Lower East Side in the state assembly.
55
  While set apart from many of his machine 
brethren by what Franklin Roosevelt’s secretary of labor Frances Perkins described as “a 
receptive mind” that drew him to the progressive agenda and allowed him to function 
with a certain amount of ideological independence, he always remained true to the 
Democrats and to Tammany sachem “Silent Charlie” Murphy.
56
  As partisanship and 
machine politics were the very embodiment of the sort of corruption and civic vice the 
extermination of which was New York progressivism’s raison d’être, Al Smith was an 
offensive character to most reformers.  His early career in Albany was dismissed as 
hackery by most progressives, and in fact he did not make a single speech in his first 
term.
57
  Yet over time Smith grew as a legislator, and he slowly earned respect from 
members of the reform community.  Joseph Proskauer, a member of New York’s 
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progressive Citizens’ Union and an eventual Smith confidant, noted that his organization 
began to change its opinion of the Tammany assemblyman when they saw time and again 
“the whole high caliber of Smith’s service in the legislature” on behalf of reform.
58
 
Al Smith gained a forum to demonstrate his capabilities further in 1911, when his 
party took control of the state legislature.   Charlie Murphy had Smith elected majority 
leader of the assembly; Robert F. Wagner, a German immigrant representing the Upper 
East Side, was made majority leader of the state senate.
59
  Wagner and Smith’s 
relationship went back to 1905, when then-freshman assemblyman Wagner was 
roommate of second-term assemblyman Smith at Albany.
60
  Not only would the two 
Manhattan Democrats’ careers be inextricably linked over the ensuing decades, they 
would also develop a close friendship—Wagner even naming his son Alfred in honor of 
Smith.
61
   
During this period a tragedy occurred that would change the course of both men’s 
careers.  On March 25, 1911, a fire erupted in the tenth floor workroom of the Triangle 
Shirtwaist Company in Manhattan.
62
  One-hundred forty-six of the workers who toiled at 
the sewing machines—most of them Jewish immigrant girls from the Lower East Side—
died in the inferno.
63
  In response, a Committee on Safety was established, culminating 
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with Wagner and Smith’s sponsorship of legislation to form an investigative commission; 
Wagner served as chair and Smith as vice-chair of the body.
64
   
 The commission “was one of the first experiments in the utilization of the 
volunteer citizen in a governmental project to discover what was wrong and what to 
do.”
65
  Consequently, this was among the first opportunities for non-partisan reformers to 
participate directly in the process of governmental regulation.  Female reformers served 
crucial roles: Mary Dreier of the progressive Women’s Trade Union League was named 
one of the commissioners, while Frances Perkins, who had served as secretary of the 
Committee on Safety, was consistently called as an expert witness on factory conditions, 
having established her credentials as an investigator with the National Consumers’ 
League.
66
   
 After repeatedly testifying before the commission, Perkins became one of its 
investigators, and later reminisced that she soon “became kind of in charge of 
investigations.”
67
  In this capacity, Perkins made it her mission to “educate” Smith and 
Wagner on the abhorrent working conditions prevalent across the Empire State.  Perkins 
later recalled that “Alfred Smith said it was the greatest education he’d ever had.  He had 
no idea life was like that.  He’d grown up in the slums of New York, but he didn’t know 
what factory life was like.  Neither did any of them.  It was an astonishment for them to 
see the frightfully filthy conditions, the obvious fire hazards and the very great accident 
hazards.  We took them to everything before we got through.”
68
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Perkins has written that she and her fellow investigators “[made] it our business to 
take Al Smith . . . to see the women, thousands of them, coming off the ten-hour night-
shift on the rope walks in Auburn.”
69
  They “made sure that Robert Wagner personally 
crawled through the tiny hole in the wall that gave egress to a steep iron ladder covered 
with ice and ending twelve feet from the ground, which was euphemistically labeled ‘Fire 
Escape.’”
70
  Wagner and Smith and other legislators witnessed “five-, six-, and seven-
year-olds, snipping beans and shelling peas,” and saw “the machinery that would scalp a 
girl or cut off a man’s arm.”
71
  Huthmacher has argued that for Wagner (and the same can 
certainly be said of Smith), “service on the commission was the most important event in 
his public life up to that time, for it focused and made impregnable the reformist leanings 
he had exhibited earlier.  It also made him, and the political organization he represented, 
essential links in the chain of reform that spanned the Progressive Era and marked the 
emergence of modern, urban liberalism on the American scene.”
72
      
Through investigations and interrogation of experts—experts hand-picked by 
Perkins—Smith and Wagner became “considerable fellows” on issues of industrial 
conditions.
73
  They heard testimony from such social work leaders as Jane Addams and 
Lillian Wald, and developed a reform program that gained the endorsement of “every 
important civic and social work organization in the city of New York.”
74
  The 
commission sponsored thirty-six bills on fire regulations, workplace safety, and working 
hours and conditions for women and children between 1912 and 1914, moving well 
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beyond the original scope of the investigation, into some of the labor and welfare crises 
that had been made so vivid through the Perkins-led field trips.
75
  Many of these bills 
were crafted by Smith and Wagner, along with reformers including Perkins and Louis 
Brandeis, in the law office of Abram Elkus, counsel to the commission.
76
  On the floors 
of the assembly and senate respectively, Smith and Wagner became the champions of the 
reform bills.
77
  Such issues came to dominate the agenda of the two Tammany leaders.  
By a conservative estimate, 47 percent of the bills introduced by the pair in the three 
sessions following the initiation of the factory investigations concerned labor reform and 
other questions of social welfare; in the two previous sessions, that figure had stood at 
just over 4.5 percent.
78
   
 
 
Fig. 1.1: Note the sharp increase in the percentage of Smith and Wagner bills that involved labor reforms. 
                                                 
75
 Perry, Belle Moskowitz, p. 83. 
76
 Frances Perkins Oral History, Book I, pp. 170-172. 
77
 Caro, The Power Broker, p. 124. 
78
 Figures calculated by the author from data published in the annual New York State Legislative Record 
and Index.  New York State Legislative Record and Index, 1910 (Albany, NY: Legislative Index Publishing 
Group, 1910), pp. 277-278, 290; New York State Legislative Record and Index, 1911 (Albany, NY: 
Legislative Index Publishing Group, 1911), pp. 352, 368; New York State Legislative Record and Index, 
1912 (Albany, NY: Legislative Index Publishing Group, 1912), pp. 303, 316-317; New York State 
Legislative Record and Index, 1913 (Albany, NY: Legislative Index Publishing Group, 1913), pp. 448-449; 
New York State Legislative Record and Index, 1914 (Albany, NY: Legislative Index Publishing Group, 








1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 






The Factory Investigating Commission experience certainly affected each 
legislator’s world view.  Nevertheless, they remained loyal party men, retaining their 
“profound affection for Tammany Hall and all that it stood for.”
79
  In the 1910s, being a 
Tammany stalwart was still often irreconcilable with favoring aggressive social welfare 
programs by an active state.  For example, in a 1912 campaign speech, Robert Wagner 
raged against Theodore Roosevelt’s New Nationalism, exclaiming “Whatever advance its 
adoption would bring is advance toward socialism. . . .  Such a ‘new nationalism’ would 
lay the meddling hand of bureaucracy upon every industry, increasing the burdens of 
taxation.”
80
  Worse, when Silent Charlie Murphy ordered his legislators in 1912 to block 
passage of Perkins’ fifty-four hour women’s work week, Wagner—while sympathetic to 
the bill—dutifully employed his powers as temporary president of the senate in an 
attempt to prevent a vote on final passage (he was ultimately out-maneuvered by a fellow 
Tammany man, Big Tim Sullivan, who had less to lose by flouting Murphy’s edict).
81
  
Over time, a combination of political expediency and genuine interest in the advance of 
social welfare policies would soften and eventually eliminate the opposition of Wagner, 
Smith, and other urban ethnic Democrats to the dynamic state.  The 1911 fire and the 
investigations in its wake initiated this process.   
 Providing further impetus for reform was the Democrats’ realization that their 
urban ethnic working-class constituents would reward them for taking strong positions in 
favor of ameliorative social welfare and labor legislation.  Throughout the 1910s, 
Tammany began to lose its stranglehold over new-immigrant neighborhoods, ceding 
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these wards—especially the Jewish ones—not to the conservative GOP but to 
Progressives and Socialists.
82
  The East Side of Manhattan thrice elected Socialist Meyer 
London to Congress (in 1914, 1916, and 1920), and in the 1917 municipal elections, 
seven Socialist aldermen were swept into office from “chiefly Jewish districts” on a wave 
of support for mayoral candidate Morris Hillquit.
83
  Over the decade, a series of nativist 
attacks by Republicans, as well as some social welfare initiatives by the Democrats 
(especially those championed by Al Smith and Robert Wagner as a result of the factory 
investigations), along with Smith’s large and visible group of progressive Jewish 
supporters in 1918, would help bring some of these voters back into the Democratic 
fold.
84
  The Democrats, pragmatists still, keenly interpreted and acted upon these trends.  
In a 1918 article in Outlook, former Progressive Party official Henry Moskowitz wrote in 
a rather pro-Socialist analysis of the politics of the East Side:  
The Tammany group is constantly jockeying with the Socialists to prove that they 
are the real ‘people’s friend’. . . . skillfully maneuvering ‘to beat them to it’. . . . In 
the recent city election [Tammany] advocated radical municipal reforms. . . . it 





Significantly, while Moskowitz remained skeptical of Tammany in general, he credited 
much of this strategy to the sincere reformist leanings of Robert Wagner and, especially, 
“Alfred E. Smith, a brilliant East Side product.”
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The new generation of urban ethnic working-class Democrats, the so-called 
“urban liberals” of the Progressive Era, with Smith and Wagner in the vanguard, was 
evolving to champion aggressive social welfare and labor reforms.  Thus, in these years 
the very nature of the urban Democracy was beginning, ever so slowly, to transform.  
Perhaps the most vivid example is that of the state senator who had supplanted the 
famous Tammany apologist George Washington Plunkitt in the fifteenth district.  Thomas 
J. McManus, better known simply as “The McManus,” whom Plunkitt had described as 
“my Brutus,” certainly inherited his predecessor’s propensity for graft, and reformers like 
Perkins saw him as “obviously very much of a roughneck and not too bright”; but he was 
also, with Tim Sullivan and others, “the hero” of the 1912 battle for the fifty-four hour 
law in the state senate, and was the chairman who was first able to recover that bill and 
others affecting workplace standards from the legislative purgatory of the Committee on 
Labor and Industry.
87
    
Thus, in the 1910s, machine politicians were beginning to evolve; employing their 
time-tested shenanigans not exclusively to line their own pockets, but also to promote 
social welfare and labor reforms.  As Moskowitz noted, the urban Democrats had tutors 
during this progression: “Settlement workers . . . have helped to modify the point of view 
of Tammany’s elementary neighborliness.”
88
  So too did the social welfare progressives 
have an evolutionary process to undergo before their reformist vision could be forged 
with the political aspirations of urban ethnic Democrats.   
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 In 1919, when Al Smith was inaugurated for his first term as governor, he named 
Frances Perkins to the State Industrial Commission.  After years of fighting side by side 
for reform legislation, Smith considered Perkins a good candidate to promote his vision 
of how the commission ought to operate, and in fact “the Governor looked upon [Perkins] 
as his member on the Industrial Commission.”
89
  Nevertheless, at this time, Perkins was 
not yet a Democrat.
90
  Although an ardent Smith supporter, she chose to remain a 
registered independent, free from partisan responsibilities.  “I voted for whom I thought 
was the right man and the right program.  I certainly didn’t call myself a thorough-going 
bona fide Democrat.  I would always vote for the right person.  I thought Al Smith was 




As with many female reformers, much of Perkins’ nonpartisanship resulted from 
the experiences of the pre-suffrage era.  She had attended the 1912 Democratic 
convention at Baltimore because “I’d never seen one. . . . I went for the show.”  And 
while she “also went because I was deeply interested in political principles,” the 
“convention didn’t make too much difference to me . . . . I was not . . . a Democrat.  
Woman didn’t have the vote, so women didn’t have to be anything.”  Furthermore, while 
admiring “the Wilsonites,” Perkins did not even favor the progressive Democrat in 1912, 
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considering herself “nearer a Bull Mooser,” and only missing the Progressive convention 
in Chicago due to a death in the family.
92
 
 When in the fall of 1919 Governor Smith became aware of Perkins’ 
nonpartisanship, he called on the commissioner to meet him at his suite in Manhattan’s 
Biltmore Hotel.  Smith inquired if Perkins considered herself a Democrat.  She responded 
that she did, insofar as in her time at Albany the Democrats had been much more 
amenable to the kinds of reform legislation she was promoting.
93
  Well, that makes you 
“a Democrat in theory at least,” responded the governor, but “they tell me you’re not an 
enrolled Democrat.”
94
  “I never enrolled, I wouldn’t think of enrolling in any party,” 
responded Perkins, “that sort of ties your hands.”
95
  Smith, who by this time greatly 
admired Perkins and many of her progressive associates, took the opportunity to 
articulate his vision of their place in the party, in a manner that combined their 
progressivism with old-fashioned machine politics.  “That’s the kind of mistake a lot of 
good people are likely to make,” he told his commissioner.
96
  To Smith, the party was 
necessary as a rallying point:  “Suppose you got some good ideas. . . .  You can’t go out 
and say that to the public because you just sound like a fool. . . .  [But] if your party is all 
ready set . . . . They’re all for it and they put it over.  They make it popular. It doesn’t 
seem like a one-man crank idea.”
97
      
 In Smith’s conceptualization, the Democratic Party could serve as an apparatus 
for mobilizing the reform movement.  But in order for this to occur,    
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Good people need to be in the party, not outside looking in. They don’t have any 
influence at all if they’re outside looking in. If they’re inside, doing their full duty 
by the party, voting, getting out the vote, helping with the campaigns, and making 
what they know available to everybody, then they have some influence. . . . Then 




 Perkins protested that she wanted to see who specifically she was voting for 
before she enrolled in a party.  But Smith responded that she and other progressives 
needed to enroll first, “so you have something to say inside the party”:  
These people who jump around from one party to another. . . . Have any of them 
ever accomplished anything?  No.  You’ve accomplished more in a couple of 
years than they have in twenty years by always being so independent.  But you 
won’t get far if you won’t line up with a party so that the Democrats know that 




Perkins, taken by this logic, recalls that she registered as a Democrat “as soon as they 
opened enrollment” and “never had any doubts about it afterwards.”
100




Fig. 1.2: Frances Perkins, ca. 1920.
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This is an extreme case.  It is doubtful that a significant number of social workers 
were proselytized for the Democracy through a colloquy with their state’s governor.  But 
this anecdote aptly demonstrates the initial philosophical discordance between the 
reformer and the partisan, as well as the thinking behind so many New York 
progressives’ abandoning their independent posture in favor of Al Smith and the 
Democrats.    
 Furthermore, speeches given by Perkins throughout the 1910s in her capacity as 
executive secretary of the New York Consumers’ League demonstrate an evolving 
concept of the role of politics in reform.  Earlier speeches focused upon women’s place in 
economic life as consumers: “Their duty in the life of family is purchases.  So after all it 
lies in their hands to . . . change conditions” through boycotts.
102
  As the factory 
investigations progressed and the commission’s work continued, Perkins would see 
“legislative work” as the “most important phase” in the reform movement.
103
  In 1912, 
Perkins declared that the “purpose of Gov[ernment] is to make things better for the 
children,” and later that year she called for government studies of industries and imitation 
of German and English “social measures” to fight unemployment.
104
  Perkins had begun 
legislative lobbying activities prior to developing relationships with Albany politicians, 
but through her work on the factory investigating commission she was increasingly 
crafting bills not only for the Consumers’ League but for legislators like Smith and 
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Wagner.  By 1919 she was a total insider, appointed by Governor Smith to the State 
Industrial Commission.
105
   
Certainly social welfare progressives had petitioned the government prior to 
1911—perhaps most famously in the National Consumers’ League’s central role in the 
1908 Supreme Court case Muller v. Oregon.  While much of the focus of such efforts was 
on the ostensibly non-political courts, it was through the NCL’s legislative lobbying that 
such landmark cases were precipitated.
106
  Clearly, social welfare progressives had been 
committed to legislative action long before the Perkins-Smith alliance was forged—Hull 
House activists had succeeded in getting labor legislation passed in Illinois as early as the 
1890s.  Moreover, Perkins was not the first social worker to gain a position within 
government; she was preceded in this by notables including Florence Kelley as chief 
factory inspector in Illinois and Julia Lathrop as head of the federal Children’s Bureau.
107
  
In fact, settlement activists had been lobbying for local and state ordinances, pressuring 
local politicians, sponsoring reform candidacies, and advising municipal governments for 
decades before Al Smith met Frances Perkins.
108
   
Yet these very real political drives operated outside of traditional partisan divides 
and did not serve to inculcate the old parties with reformist zeal.  The social progressives 
tended to gravitate toward government service under reform and “fusion” 
administrations, and certainly not under machine politicians, with whom they instead 
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battled tenaciously and only occasionally struck a reluctant détente (Addams finally gave 
up trying to upend the political organization in her Chicago neighborhood only after her 
candidates were twice defeated by local kingpin Johnny Powers).
109
  The closest these 
reformers came to concerted partisanship was in 1912, when many from the settlement 
community “flocked” to Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Party; but that 
campaign would ultimately produce nothing in the way of long term partisan alignment, 
and in retrospect appeared “in some ways more like a crusade than politics.”
110
  Thus, 
despite their record of political activity and the inherently political nature of their work, 
most social work progressives adopted the posture of Mary Simkhovitch from the 
Greenwich House settlement in New York, another future Smith partisan, who wrote that 
“in political action the settlement has held aloof . . . because of the conviction that 
political parties do not express in any vital way the desires of the people of the 
neighborhoods where settlements are situated,” leaving reformers with “an inability to 
regard existing forms as adequate to meet the real situation.”
111
   
So while the story of Perkins’ evolution is telling, what begins to make it diverge 
from past experiences is that the desire to work within government to implement a 
progressive social vision now translated into partisan political activity.  By 1920 Perkins 
was an active Democrat, and promoted her social welfare vision within the context of 
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Democratic politics, articulating her progressive beliefs in speeches on behalf of Smith 
throughout his governorship.
112
  As Smith had suggested, this further promoted Perkins’ 
ambitions.  In 1923, the governor appointed Perkins to the State Industrial Board, and in 
1926 he made her the board’s chairperson.
113
  Meanwhile, Perkins continued her political 
activities, helping craft Democratic strategy and composing materials for “a good many 
of Governor Smith’s speeches.”
114
  Her star would of course ascend further still under 
Smith’s successor and fellow Democrat, Franklin Roosevelt.   
The case of Perkins’ politicization—or, better, her increasing partisanship—helps 
illustrate the female side of the development of a new, transitional progressivism; but 
hers is hardly the only story to be told.  Lillian Wald, who ran the Henry Street 
Settlement on Manhattan’s Lower East Side and was a particularly strong advocate for 
public health nursing services and other pieces of the social welfare progressive agenda, 
underwent a similar transformation in the 1910s and 1920s.    
As with Perkins, the more established Wald came out of the settlement house 
tradition and was lobbying Albany for social welfare measures long before the factory 
commission produced its blizzard of reform bills.
115
  Like many progressives, she was 
drawn to “Governor Wilson’s splendid record in social reform” during the 1912 
                                                 
112
 E.g.: Frances Perkins, “Notes for campaign address, for Al Smith, NY, 1920,” Frances Perkins Papers, 
Box 43; Frances Perkins, “Notes for campaign speech for Al Smith, Troy, NY, 11/3/22,” Frances Perkins 
Papers, Box 43; Frances Perkins, “Campaign Speech for Governor Alfred E. Smith, NY, 10/15/24,” 
Frances Perkins Papers, Box 43, pp. 1-2; Frances Perkins, “Notes for campaign speech, to reelect Gov. 
Smith and to elect Senator Wagner, Troy, NY, 10/29/26,” Frances Perkins Papers, Box 43. 
113
 James Malcolm, ed., The New York Red Book: An Illustrated Legislative Manual of the State (Albany, 
NY: J.B. Lyon, 1928), p. 165. 
114
 Frances Perkins Oral History, Book II, p. 574. 
115
 E.g.: Lillian Wald to Alfred E. Smith, May 20, 1911, Lillian Wald Papers, New York Public Library, 
New York, NY (hereafter, Lillian Wald Papers), Reel 1.  Indeed, Wald had been active in electoral politics, 
fighting against Tammany as a member of the “Woman’s Municipal League” of New York City.  S. Sara 
Monoson, “The Lady and the Tiger: Women’s Electoral Activism in New York City before Suffrage,” 






  But when members of the Democratic National Committee 
solicited Wald’s official support they were rebuffed.   “As a suffragist,” she explained, “I 
find it illogical to assume even a minor responsibility for a platform that has no suffrage 
plank.”
117
  Here again the influence of women’s exclusion from the franchise by the 
traditional parties foreclosed the potential for partisanship by politically active social 
welfare progressives; not only technically, through the legal denial of votes, but also 







Fig. 1.3: Lillian Wald (left) and Jane Addams (right) address reporters, 1916.
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Even after gaining suffrage, Wald was not involved in Smith’s first campaign for 
the governorship, instead continuing to offer her services to the new governor just as she 
had to legislators, aldermen, and mayors for decades.
120
  By 1920, she was increasingly 
enthusiastic over the governor’s agenda, assuring Smith of her “whole-hearted support 
for your admirable, progressive administration.”
121
  In that year, Smith was turning to 
Wald for advice in specific policy areas that had defined her career—especially public 
health.
122
  By the fall, she was no longer only an interested progressive or an enthusiastic 
observer; she was now a Smith partisan.  In October, she promised the Citizens’ 
Committee for Alfred E. Smith that she would “be very glad indeed to do what I can,” to 
aid the campaign, adding that “the residents of the Settlement agree with me in that the 
Governor has given us an admirable administration.  Appreciation of voters should 
enable him to continue his good work.”
123
  Three days later she fulfilled this pledge by 
writing a more formal letter for the campaign which noted that Smith “should be re-
elected and that voters irrespective of party affiliations should keep in office one who has 
served the state so well.”
124




In spite of Smith’s defeat that year, Wald’s commitment to him in both politics 
and policy abided.  Upon Smith’s return to Albany in 1923, Wald served on the 
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governor’s committee to study rural health.
126
  She also continued her political activities 
for Smith, giving a speech on the governor’s behalf at Nyack in August.
127
  Furthermore, 
Wald’s activism spread beyond a personal attachment to the governor: Smith allies (and 
partisan Democrats) like Joseph Proskauer and Herbert Lehman would soon gain the 
endorsement of the noted social work leader.
128
  By the time Smith ran for president in 
1928, Wald undertook a furious letter-writing campaign on his behalf, penning 
correspondences both public and private in the hopes of winning social workers’ votes 
for the Democrat while “working all the time” for his election.
129
  
A most striking example of a female social work progressive turning to politics is 
that of Belle Moskowitz.  Moskowitz spent the first two decades of the century struggling 
for social reforms in New York City, with a particular interest in dance halls and other 
working-class recreational outlets.
130
  In this mission she looked to the government, for as 
historian Elisabeth Israels Perry notes, “she wanted the state to act as a beneficent parent, 
sheltering the weak and leading the strong to serve society as a whole.”
131
  Like many 
reformers, Moskowitz was wary of the major political parties and of Tammany Hall, and 
like Frances Perkins she was a supporter of Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressives in 
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  Over the course of the 1910s Moskowitz remained a non-partisan reformer, but 
she was drawn increasingly toward political activities both by the nature of her work and 
by her new husband, Henry Moskowitz (whose interest in electoral politics had included 
a 1912 congressional campaign on the Progressive ticket).
133
  Also during that period, her 
apprehensions about Tammany politicians began to wane with exposure to Al Smith and 
the New York Democrats’ increasing commitment to social welfare measures.
134
   
Moskowitz joined with other prominent progressives to support Smith’s 
gubernatorial candidacy in 1918; the following year, she was appointed executive 
secretary of the State Reconstruction Commission.
135
  As “linchpin” of the commission, 
Moskowitz directed its work toward such social reforms as unemployment insurance, a 
state milk commission, a coordinated housing policy, state maternal and infant welfare 
campaigns, and compulsory health insurance for industrial workers.
136
  As Smith’s 
closest advisor throughout his governorship, Moskowitz crafted not only public policy 
but also Democratic partisan strategy.
137
  By 1928 she was a leading force within the 
party; at the same time she was gaining national recognition, with newspapers describing 
her as “Smith’s Colonel House.”
138
 
To talk of a “politicization” of female social work progressives provoking the 
development of transitional progressivism would be misleading, for these women’s 
project was itself a political one.  Through lobbying, lawsuits, public service, and at times 
support for progressive candidates, the social work progressives had led a thoroughly 
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political existence from the inception of the settlement house movement.  But what 
developed in New York in the late 1910s and the 1920s was something more.  The 
adoption of political partisanship by some of these progressive women represented a new 
threshold of politicization, one that could only be reached after much ideological 
negotiation between the old parties and these new voters.  Only after the Democrats 
embraced not only women’s suffrage but also the progressive women’s social welfare 
agenda, and only after they had demonstrated the utility of partisan politics and 
politicians to the achievement of social work’s broader goals, could these women be not 
only politicized but also evangelized for the party.   
The activities of politicians like Smith and Wagner—and even The McManus—in 
the 1910s show how the Democratic Party in New York was undergoing a 
transformation; and Smith’s ascension to the undisputed leadership of the state party by 
1920 signaled that this transformation would continue.  Through appointments, policy 
innovations, and some old-fashioned political haggling, the increasingly progressive New 
York Democracy made a strong appeal to the newly enfranchised social work women and 
their allies.  The outlook of many Democratic partisans had been adjusted to include a 
broad vision of state action for social welfare; adopting much of the progressive women’s 
agenda, Smith and his Democratic colleagues could challenge those women likewise to 
modify their outlook.   
In a speech before the Women’s State Democratic Forum at the Hotel Astor on 
November 22, 1917, Anthony Griffin, an Irish Catholic Tammany politician who the 
following year would begin a nine-term career representing parts of Harlem and the 




‘What are you going to do with it?’”
139
   A progressive as well as a Tammanyite, Griffin 
had his own suggestions as to the answer.  “You come into possession of the franchise 
after the battle for political independence is won.  The issues of the present hour are 
purely economic, and to meet them, women are equally qualified with men.”
140
  With 
ongoing clashes over tariff rates, struggles against trusts, and a rising cost of living, “the 
battles of the future for economic independence will be by the ballot.  We ought, 
therefore, to welcome the aid of women in this conflict.”
141
   
Moreover, the “we” that would fight economic inequality would be the 
Democratic Party, with the strong support of progressive women interested in such 
issues.  Like Smith, Griffin declared that it was not enough to profess these things and 
then shift mercurially between Democrats, Socialists, and independents.  Instead, women 
should sign on with the Democrats, because they had demonstrated the value of partisan 
political action for progressive advances.  After all, claimed Griffin, “the eight hour law; 
better working conditions for men, women and children in factories; the Workmen’s 
Compensation Law and the Widows Pension Law were all enacted by Democratic 
Legislatures without the aid of Socialist agitation.”
142
  In another speech two weeks later, 
Griffin made the case for a progressive alliance crossing lines of gender within the 
Democratic Party even more explicitly.  “Man and woman stand together in loyalty to our 
country at large and in their interest in community welfare.  In order to make her ballot 
most effectual, she must align herself politically in accordance with the cleavage of 
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political parties.  She must find her political home among the parties which have hitherto 
claimed only men among their membership.”
143
   
The following fall this alliance began to crystallize when the now unabashedly 
progressive Al Smith gained the Democratic nomination for governor.  By then, Smith’s 
progressive credentials were such that he enjoyed the solid support of New York’s reform 
community in his gubernatorial bid.  To help corral Smith’s non-Democratic admirers, 
Abram Elkus formed the Independent Citizens’ Committee for Alfred E. Smith, reviving 
the progressive coalition that had fought for reform after the Triangle fire.
144
  Many of the 
members of that committee, including the Moskowitzes, would become ardent Smith 







In New York, then, the 1910s into the early 1920s was a time of negotiation 
between the largely old-stock-female social welfare progressives and the largely ethnic-
male machine-Democrats-turned-urban-liberals.  As each side shed its inhibitions about 
coalition, as well as some of its own attributes that were anathema to the other party, they 
were able to coalesce to fuel the uniquely progressive governorship of Alfred E. Smith in 
the 1920s.  As is often the case, personalities also aided in this fusion.  Al Smith and 
Robert Wagner, unlike many of their Tammany brethren, were never associated with vice 
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or scandal, and Tammany sachem Charlie Murphy is known to have seen their promise 
and granted them a certain degree of ideological autonomy.
146
  Furthermore, reformers 
like Frances Perkins and Belle Moskowitz did not come off as culturally condescending 
in the way some social workers appeared, and unlike some within the reform sorority, did 
not prioritize prohibition over social welfare.
147
     
 The progressivism that developed through this confluence of traditions focused 
upon certain strains of the broader progressivism of the 1900s and 1910s; specifically 
those that concerned the urban laborer.  The one common denominator between the 
settlement house activist and the socially engaged ward boss was a desire to ameliorate 
the ills of the urban industrial order.  Transitional progressivism, then, was the adoption 
of the female social welfare agenda by enlightened urban ethnic politicians and savvy 
reformers, as well as the institutionalization of that agenda as Democratic partisan 
dogma.  The first fruits of this coalition were to be harvested during Al Smith’s 
remarkably progressive governorship.   
As might be expected, labor laws were promoted to build upon the foundation laid 
in the wake of the Triangle fire by the early transitional progressive alliance.  The number 
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of workers covered by the fifty-four hour work week was expanded in 1919 and again in 
1924, and a series of bills were passed to regulate conditions in specific industries.
148
  
The apogee of these efforts came in 1927 with the passage of the forty-eight hour week 
for women.  Mary Dreier, another female progressive leader and another crucial member 
of the New York coalition, recognized the important role Smith and the partisans had 
played in this achievement, cabling the governor that “had it not been for your 
courageous and generous support throughout all these years and your persistent effort in 
behalf of the forty eight hour week for the working women of this state this bill would 
never have gone through.”
149
  (Indeed, Dreier and others had been working with Smith 
since the early years of his governorship on a series of unsuccessful bids to pass similar 
legislation.)
150
  Smith retorted that Dreier gave “me too much of the credit for the final 
success of our forty-eight hour bill,” for “you . . . and the women associated with you 
have worked unselfishly for its success, and I feel that you are entitled to more credit than 
I.  However, we will not quarrel about it.”
151
  Smith was indeed sincere when he 
remarked that he considered the forty-eight hour bill “our bill”—he saved the pen used to 
sign the legislation and sent it to Dreier as a token of thanks.
152
  In the final year of his 
incumbency Smith declared: “It is a matter of record that I have had my strongest and 
most vigorous support from the women of my State.  They have a deep interest in the 
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human side of government.”
153
  He stressed that these progressive women had not 
necessarily come from the ranks of the Democratic Party, and yet:  
they fought side by side with me . . . in the struggle to obtain factory laws for 
safeguarding the lives, health and welfare of men, women and children in 
industry; to secure social legislation like widowed mothers’ pensions, designed to 
keep the orphaned child in its mother’s home; to protect society against the evils 
of child labor and the overwork and exploitation of women and children in 
industry; to improve the care of afflicted veterans, tubercular patients, of the 




In fact, this transitional progressivism influenced nearly every facet of Smith’s 
executive tenure, manifesting itself in a number of reform initiatives that placed New 
York in the forefront of social legislation in the United States.  During his four terms as 
governor, Smith championed unemployment insurance, better compensation for victims 
of industrial accidents, improved benefits for injured workers, and increased death 
benefits for widows of accident victims.
155
  He also pressed for labor measures including 
the eight-hour day and a minimum wage.
156
  In the realm of housing, which was the 
Smith initiative “most energetically attacked as socialistic,” the governor fought for state 
credit for builders of moderately priced homes, municipal development of low-cost 
housing, and the establishment of state and local housing boards.
157
   On recreation, the 
Smith administration battled for the development of state parks and beaches, and 
parkways to provide easy access from New York City to these facilities on Long 
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  On power, Smith fought tirelessly for the development of water power by the 
state, for the control of plants by the state and not private concerns, for the conservation 
against private development of those water resources left undeveloped, and for the 
formation of a state power authority.
159
  On public health, Smith and his administration 
fought for the development of a state milk commission to ensure the quality and 
availability of milk by making it a regulated public utility; pressed for maternity 
education and state grants for maternal and infant welfare, including participation in the 
federal program developed under the Sheppard-Towner Act; proposed increased child 
welfare services, hot lunch programs, and mandatory physical education; and promoted 
compulsory health insurance for industrial workers.
160
  Smith was not able to institute all 
of these programs during his governorship, largely because never in his four terms did he 
enjoy a Democratic senate and assembly simultaneously; nevertheless, much of this 
platform was achieved, and all of it was pursued doggedly by the Democrats and their 
newly minted social welfare progressive allies.   
 Throughout the 1920s, Governor Smith distinguished himself by pursuing an 
agenda driven by this new style of progressivism.  And it was indeed new.  Owing 
partially to its roots in the social work tradition and partially to its constituency within the 
urban ethnic working class, the transitional progressive agenda shifted the emphasis away 
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from the retention of small-town Yankee values, away from the veneration of American 
individualism or the fear of an overthrow of the social hierarchy, and applied all of its 
reformist pretensions to causes of social welfare, industrial justice, and a general 
improvement of the quality of working-class life.  Radically absent was the erstwhile 
obsession with personal behavior and cultural assimilation; lives would be uplifted not 
through forced temperance or compulsory Americanization, but through better working 
conditions, adequate healthcare, and ample recreation.  Here at last was a progressivism 
of which working-class immigrants and their progeny could imbibe; here as well was a 
progressivism that retained the women’s social work agenda and which offered pragmatic 
means of widespread implementation.  It was this transitional progressivism that 
informed the administration of Alfred E. Smith in New York, and it was on this 




While the nascent progressivism of up-and-coming Democrats like Wagner and 
Smith revolved around ameliorative labor and social welfare measures for the benefit of 
the urban working class, another facet of this progressivism was the promotion of public 
policies designed to benefit an increasingly heterogeneous society, in the interest of 
Tammany’s diverse constituency.  Historians have often assigned such issues as religious 
and racial tolerance, immigration restriction, and prohibition to a unique ethnocultural 
category of analysis, separating them from questions of economic justice.  Yet when 




representatives, such a bifurcation proves artificial.  Justice for these workers meant both 
industrial democracy and social respect.  Indeed, while transitional progressivism was 
centered on the social welfare agenda, the very nature of its intended beneficiaries 
compelled it also to denounce bigotry and cultural condescension. 
 Tammany’s constituents had always been the ethnic working classes of New York 
City.  For decades, this had meant the Irish, and as such Democratic candidates could 
succeed while maintaining a clannish insularity.  But as the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries brought waves of new immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, 
as well as a deluge of African American refugees from the Old South, wily Tammanyites 
modified their tactics not only to outflank Socialist challengers but also to avoid ethnic 
dissension.  In 1898, the “United Colored Democracy” was established by Tammany to 
distribute favors and jobs among New York’s growing African-American community in 
return for electoral support in much the same way the machine operated in predominantly 
white wards.
161
  This was a small advance and did not yet translate into black Democratic 
nominees for high office.  Within other communities, however, representation became an 
increasingly important tactic for securing partisan loyalties.   
 To give only a brief sampling:  Yorkville, on the Upper East Side, was 
represented not by an Irishman but by a German immigrant (Robert Wagner), reflecting 
its status as New York’s “Little Germany.”
162
  This was not particularly pathbreaking 
given Germans’ long history in the city, but many newer groups would slowly receive 
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similar treatment.  In the opening decade of the twentieth century, Tim Sullivan 
responded swiftly to demographic changes on the Lower East Side with ethnic 
outreach—“the Big Feller” was far ahead of his Tammany cohorts in extending “a 
welcome to Jewish advisors and captains” and “started many successful Jews in their 
careers.”
163
  While Sullivan outpaced the city-wide machine, this pragmatic inclusiveness 
would cease to be exceptional in the decades to follow.  In 1923, when seeking a 
congressional candidate for a previously Republican-dominated seat in a heavily Jewish 
district, the Democrats drafted Sol Bloom, who recalled that “I had been chosen because I 
was an amiable and solvent Jew.”
164
  Bloom, a colorful impresario and son of Polish 
immigrants, would go on to serve for nearly three decades in the House of 
Representatives.
165
  In East Harlem, Tammany survived both a party insurgency and a 
Republican challenge from the neighborhood’s burgeoning Italian community in 1911; in 
1912, twenty-eighth district boss Nick Hayes reluctantly but presciently acceded to 
community demands and nominated Salvatore Cotillo to stand for assemblyman as a 
Democrat.
166
  During a distinguished career in Albany, Cotillo would join Wagner and 
Smith as a leading advocate for labor and welfare reforms, and in 1923 he would become 
the first Italian-American elected to the State Supreme Court.
167
  The Democrats in New 
York were not the only political machine in the United States that appealed to a polyglot 
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constituency to insure its own survival.
168
  Yet while Tammany’s adoption of such 
pragmatism toward ethnicity seems almost too obvious to mention, it must be 
remembered that Irish political organizations in places like Boston and Providence had 
antagonized newer immigrants by excluding them from representation—to the extent that 
groups like the Italians, Poles, and especially the French Canadians tended to coalesce 
around the Yankee-dominated Republicans in New England.
169
 
 Nevertheless, Tammany’s small strides toward more diverse representation were 
only a minor piece of its ethnocultural agenda.  To serve their constituents, these 
Democrats fought strenuously against repressive social measures like prohibition and 
blue laws, while battling discriminatory policies such as literacy tests and immigration 
restriction.  The question of alcohol is a complex one.  It is true that aspiring politicians 
like Al Smith received much of the Tammany catechism at the saloon.  But many of the 
notorious bosses were teetotalers—perhaps most notably George Washington Plunkitt, 
who although “no fanatic” and a friend of saloonkeepers, made certain “as a matter of 
business I leave whisky and beer and the rest of that stuff alone.”
170
  Of equal 
significance, “as a matter of business, too, I take for my lieutenants in my district men 
who don’t drink.”
171
  According to Plunkitt, sachems like Richard Croker and Charlie 
Murphy were of the same disposition, the latter taking “a glass of wine at dinner 
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sometimes, but he don’t go beyond that.”
172
  The same even applied to Bowery leaders 
“Big Tim” and “Little Tim” Sullivan, neither of whom had “ever touched a drop of liquor 
in his life.”
173
  This is not to say that Tammany men had no stake in the issue:  Murphy 
and the Sullivans were saloonkeepers with an obvious financial interest in alcohol; these 
establishments provided a great deal of funding for the machine; and Plunkitt is noted for 
hyperbole and generalizations.  Still, the battle on behalf of the saloon ought not to be 
seen as a purely personal and emotional crusade by the Democrats.  If Plunkitt 
exaggerated, so did those who caricatured the ward boss as a souse (as much of the more 
scurrilous anti-Smith propaganda would do in 1928).  A more representative figure would 
probably be the real Al Smith.  Franklin Roosevelt testified that Smith had never been a 
“drunkard,” and biographer Robert Slayton reports that the Happy Warrior “was a light to 
moderate social drinker who enjoyed an occasional beer.”
174
  More significantly, Smith 
did not view prohibition as “a critical political issue.”
175
  With Smith, as with the earlier 
party leaders, standing up for the saloon was a way of standing up for the legitimacy of 
his constituents’ way of life.
176
  Fighting against prohibition was a way to fight against 
cultural domination of urban ethnic workers by élites, just as fighting for social welfare 
measures was a way of battling for economic justice for those workers.  Indeed, Plunkitt 
summarized Tammany’s position on alcohol succinctly: good political leaders “don’t 
make no pretenses of being better than anybody else.”
177
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 If transitional progressivism imbibed this democratic approach to drink, it adopted 
even more passionately the urban ethnic worker’s disdain for immigration restriction.  It 
is well known that political machines like Tammany Hall thrived on the votes of recent 
immigrants, providing newcomers with connections and social services in return for 
political loyalty.  In a new and often overwhelming setting the immigrant’s unfulfilled 
needs were satisfied and abstract democratic concepts were humanized.  Sociologist 
Robert King Merton thus acknowledged that “with a keen sociological intuition, the 
machine recognizes that the voter is a person living in a specific neighborhood, with 
specific personal problems and personal wants.”
178
  This in turn earned the machine 
votes, and enabled its operations to persist indefinitely.  Clearly there was strong 
incentive for urban machines to oppose immigration restrictions.  But in seeking to serve 
the interests of their constituents, the machines were also compelled to stand up for these 
newcomers’ legitimacy as citizens by opposing legislation that implicitly denied their 
social worth.   Thus Tammany politicians opposed literacy tests, national origins quotas, 
and other proposals founded on an Anglo-Saxon vision of the ideal American. 
In fact, transitional progressives framed these issues as questions of democratic 
justice.  In proposing a resolution that the state senate petition Congress in opposition to a 
literacy test in 1917, Robert Wagner proclaimed that “the question of a literacy test for 
immigrants does not belong to this day of toleration and liberal thought.  It is an echo 
sounding from the past, from a very brief period in the history of our country.”
179
  
Significantly, Wagner insisted that his vision—and that of his urban ethnic constituents—
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was the legitimate understanding of American democracy, concluding that “the 
imposition of a literacy test for admission to our shores is un-American.”
180
  After the 
passage of the Johnson-Reed Immigration Act in 1924 established national origins quotas 
based on the 1890 census, New York Democrats decried the “sinister” attempt to 
institutionalize ethnic hierarchies.
181
  Brooklyn congressman Emanuel Celler denounced 
it as discrimination against those “from Southern and Eastern Europe,” while New York-
born Meyer Jacobstein, a representative from Rochester, agreed that the act “arbitrarily 
and unfairly discriminates against certain nationalities.”
182
     
 The transitional progressives were devoted both to their party and to their 
inclusive vision of the United States polity.  This at least partly explains the debacle at 
the Democratic National Convention at Madison Square Garden in 1924, when Al Smith 
and his allies battled unsuccessfully for both the presidential nomination and a platform 
provision denouncing the Ku Klux Klan, while the Tammany-packed rafters repeatedly 
erupted into raucous choruses of heckling at opponents like William Gibbs McAdoo and 
William Jennings Bryan.
183
  The transitional progressives wished to depart from some of 
the most bigoted traditions of the Democratic Party while retaining an unconditional love 
for that party; they believed that their understanding of the party’s philosophy was rooted 
not only in their own aspirations but also in historical fact.
184
  Thus the cheerfully naïve 
and blatantly ahistorical sentiments of Congressman Celler, who declared in 1928 that 
“the clause of the Immigration Act of 1924 providing for immigration by ‘National 
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Origins’ should be repealed.  The Democratic Party, which has always been opposed to 
discrimination against races, should be the first to urge this repeal.”
185
   
This vision has been denounced as “provincial” by historian David Burner and 
others, who have assigned at least partial responsibility for the unsavory cultural battles 
of 1928 to Smith’s supposed myopic urbanism.
186
  This will be explored later; in any 
case, transitional progressivism, while mainly focused on the social welfare progressive 
agenda, also retained and even amplified the traditional urban push for a less rigid 
definition of Americanism.  Those female social work progressives who aligned with the 
Democrats to develop this new progressivism tended to be either those least inclined to 
press for measures such as prohibition (like Belle Moskowitz), or those who were willing 
to put such questions aside in favor of the social welfare and labor issues that they saw as 
much more significant (like Lillian Wald).  Indeed, these social welfare progressive 
women often shared the cultural positions of the Tammany Democrats outright:  In 1921, 
Mary Dreier berated President Warren G. Harding for remarks made by his secretary of 
state suggesting that “Armenians, Jews, Persians, and Russians cannot be regarded as 
desirable population. . . .”
187
  In both social welfare and cultural pluralism, the 
transitional progressives sought to represent their urban ethnic working-class 
constituents—to battle for both their economic welfare and their social dignity.  As 
Wagner saw it: “There are in America two schools of political thought . . . . one 
conception of government which believes that there should be a governing class and a 
class to be governed . . . the other . . . which holds that governments are created by the 
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Fig. 1.4: Al Smith (center-right, to the left of the two police officers), who had joined with other New York 
City legislators at Albany to fight the state’s proscription against Sunday baseball in 1907, preparing to 
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“Public health is purchasable.” 
 
—Dr. Herman Biggs, New York City Health Department, 1911 
 
 
* * * 
 
 
 “[H]owever great the cost and burdensome the tax . . . . We must be liberal in our 
treatment of the public schools.” 
 
—Governor Alfred E. Smith, Annual Message to the Legislature, 1924 
 
 
* * * 
 
 
“Let us battle it out right in the shadow of the Capitol itself and let us have a decision, 
and let us not permit the impression to go abroad in this State that wealth and power can 
palsy the arm of the State and stall the machinery of Government in the performance of a 
duty that has so much to do, now and in the future, with the health, happiness and the 
comfort of our ten million people, and of the millions more who will follow them.” 
 




By the time Al Smith became governor of New York in 1919 it was clear that his 
administration would be marked by a progressive ethos.  Fueled by a genuine interest in 
finding state solutions to social ills, informed by the progressive social welfare tradition, 
and championed through pragmatic politics, the transitional progressivism that had 
emerged during the 1910s would continue to develop over the next decade, expressing 
itself consistently throughout Smith’s executive tenure.  Careful consideration of Smith’s 




social welfare regime; attention both to these policies and to the governor’s 
accompanying political rhetoric sheds new light on the importance of Smith’s progressive 
ideas to his executive record, his presidential run, and the evolution of American politics 
in this period.  Health care, education, and conservation are but three of the many policy 
areas in which Smith’s transitional progressivism transformed life in New York State.  A 
thorough analysis of the advances made in these areas of social welfare reveals both the 
profundity and the breadth of Smith’s commitment to this style of progressivism during 
the 1920s.   
In the case of public health, the governor’s actions demonstrate transitional 
progressivism’s dual heritage in social work and machine politics.  The Smith 
administration envisioned near-universal access to health care in the state, and in order to 
achieve this goal the governor early on attached himself to the crusade for compulsory 
health insurance.  However, as insurance foundered on the shoals of Red Scare politics, 
Smith identified alternative means of extending health coverage.  By expanding the 
state’s health care infrastructure, and through profligate spending on state-run services, 
the governor was able to improve public health in New York tangibly and earned plaudits 
from public health workers—a key constituency within the social welfare progressive 
community.  To accomplish this, Smith relied on ideas and tactics that had been 
developed over decades by female social work progressives.  He also exercised his own 
political skills, as well as his keen understanding of state government and finances, 
allowing him to use innovative mechanisms for funding his ambitious health program.      
A surprising, but nonetheless quite important case study is Smith’s record with 




education more than 1,000 percent, increased teacher pay prodigiously and repeatedly, 
and, most significantly, set rural education in New York on a course bound for modernity 
that transplanted thousands of upstate children from antiquated one-room schoolhouses to 
modern facilities with qualified faculty, up-to-date curricula, and as much as possible, 
equal access to the broad opportunities available to students attending urban schools.  The 
education narrative not only demonstrates Smith’s commitment to progressive ideals and 
procedures, it also gives the lie to charges of urban provincialism against his 
gubernatorial regime.   
In the case of conservation, Smith directed the creation of the first comprehensive 
state program for parks and recreation, expanding parks and integrating them into a 
statewide network.  His administration also dramatically extended the state’s role in 
environmental protection, from massive reforestation projects to aggressive programs to 
defend the state against threats ranging from forest fires to gypsy moths.  Most 
significantly, Smith fought tenaciously to preserve state resources for public benefit—
best demonstrated by his passionate battle against private development of New York’s 
water power potential, arguing instead for a system that would be constructed, owned, 
and operated by the state.  The administration’s posture toward these issues demonstrates 
how broadly transitional progressivism defined social welfare, and how liberally its 










Ascending to the governorship of New York in 1919 after a brief break from state 
affairs as sheriff and then president of the board of aldermen for New York City, Al 
Smith was already widely known as a progressive reformer, and his administration was 
expected to reflect such an agenda.  These expectations were promoted further by the 
fortuitous timing of Smith’s ascension to the governorship.  Coming less than two months 
after the conclusion of the Great War, the first year of the Smith administration would be 
marked by the work of the State Reconstruction Commission, a body appointed by the 
governor to craft a response to the many public welfare crises made plain by the war 
mobilization.
190
  Smith elucidated the administration’s philosophy in his first inaugural 
address:  “The lessons of the war must not go unheeded.  We must benefit by the war as a 
nation and as a State.  It has taught us that more stringent and more universal laws are 
required for the protection of the health, comfort, welfare, and efficiency of all our 
people.”
191
     
The most embarrassing wartime lesson was learned when the state draft board had 
deemed “one-third of all the male population in the State of New York between the ages 
of twenty-one and thirty-one years . . . unfit to fight because of diseases or other physical 
unfitness.”
192
  The governor recognized a need for both temporary solutions (those which 
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would deal with immediate post-armistice crises) and permanent remedies (the 
aforementioned “universal” social welfare laws).
193
  Smith proposed two categories of 
solutions to this disgraceful situation, both of which would be addressed by the 
reconstruction commission and both of which would inspire legislative battles.  The first 
was legally reforming health policy in the state, most notably by supporting compulsory 
health insurance for all laborers.  The second was the expansion and modernization of the 




In his first inaugural address, Smith “strongly urge[d] . . . the enactment of a 
health insurance law,” to “remedy” the “unfair condition” in which “the worker and his 
family bear . . . alone” the “burden” of illness, injury, and incapacitation.
194
  The 
governor believed that this plan would “result in greater precautions being taken to 
prevent illness and disease, and . . . eliminate the consequent waste to the State therefrom.  
It will lead to the adoption of wider measures of public health and hygiene, and it will 
operate to conserve human life.”
195
  Smith also called for the adoption of a maternity 
insurance program “in the interest of posterity and of the race.”
196
  For a model, he 
looked overseas, lecturing the legislature that “Other countries are far ahead of us in this 
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respect, and their experience has demonstrated the practical value and economic 
soundness of these principles.”
197
 
As with much of his agenda, Smith was not creating this program himself.  As he 
noted, programs for compulsory insurance or national sickness insurance had been 
implemented in a number of European countries, including Great Britain and 
Germany.
198
  Domestically, the American Association for Labor Legislation (AALL) had 
drafted a “standard bill” that was promoted in numerous state legislatures beginning in 
1915.
199
  This bill called for a system of local mutual funds administered by a state health 
insurance commission, to be financed by contributions from workers (two-fifths), 
employers (two-fifths), and the state (one-fifth).
200
  A program based on the bill had been 
proposed in California but was defeated soundly in a 1918 referendum.
201
  Meanwhile in 
New York, Republican state senator Ogden L. Mills had proposed a compulsory health 
insurance bill modeled on the AALL program during the 1916 and 1917 legislative 
sessions, with the senate agreeing to create a commission to study the question.
202
  As 
Smith took office promoting state health insurance, another iteration of the standard bill 
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began meandering through the legislature which would become tied to the rest of the 
governor’s welfare agenda.
203
   
The 1919 bill was introduced by Frederick Morgan Davenport, a Republican state 
senator from Clinton who had run unsuccessfully for governor on the Progressive ticket 
in 1914.
204
  In the assembly the bill was sponsored by Charles D. Donohue, a Manhattan 
representative and the leader of the Democratic caucus, further indicating Smith’s 
support.  Based on the AALL’s model bill, the proposal would create a system in which 
employers and employees would contribute equally to a fund to cover health care costs in 
times of illness, as well as promoting preventative care; but unlike the model bill or the 
earlier Mills proposal, Davenport’s bill did not include state contributions, only state 
management of the program.
205
  “Local mutual funds” would be administered by boards 
of directors comprised of equal numbers of employers and employees, and each board 
would set premium rates and manage health care in its region.  “Special provision” was 
made for medical, surgical, and nursing care for mothers and their babies, and working 
women were provided a cash benefit for two weeks before the birth of the child and six 
weeks thereafter.
206
   In addition, Davenport’s plan would provide “minimum benefits” to 
cover costs associated with medical, surgical, sanitarium, and dental treatment, and cash 
benefits would be provided for sickness and funerals, as well as maternity.
207
  The 
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program was projected to cost employers 24¢ per week per employee and cost each 
worker the same.
208
  Like the AALL model, the New York bill explicitly excluded 
agricultural workers, domestic servants, and government employees from the program.
209
  
The bill was amended by its sponsors in March, “in an endeavor to meet objections 
advanced by physicians” by retaining beneficiaries’ ability to choose their own doctor, 
rather than having one assigned by the local board, and by placing all of the boards under 
more strict supervision by the State Industrial Commission.
210
  The amendments were 
also designed to mollify businessmen by narrowly defining what sort of “employe [sic]” 
would be covered by the program: under the final wording, the bill would cover “a 
mechanic, workingman, laborer, clerk, bookkeeper, or person of similar grade of 
employment, including foreman, but not including superintendents, managers, and 
officers.”
211
  This failed to impress the opposition however, and a mere two days after the 
changes were made a coalition of manufacturers, merchants, physicians, and fraternal 




While compulsory health insurance became a key piece of Smith’s welfare 
agenda, it quickly earned denunciations from numerous professional organizations and 
interest groups.  The New York City Bar Association denounced the Davenport-Donohue 
Bill as “socialistic,” the New York State Coal Merchants’ Association strongly 
disapproved, the Associated Manufacturers and Merchants of New York State expressed 
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alarm at the burdensome costs to business associated with the program, the International 
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers opposed the bill fearing “the espionage that 
accompanies it,” and other groups of manufacturers, merchants, and physicians wrote 
letters, made speeches, and testified before legislative committees in an attempt to derail 
compulsory health insurance.
213
  Encouraged by these developments, legislative 
Republicans snuffed out the bill, as well as the entire Smith program; not allowing 
insurance or other welfare proposals to escape committee.  
Davenport, however, was undeterred.  While the GOP held a 29 to 21 advantage 
in the state senate, the progressive from Oneida County led a revolt by “radical” 
Republicans against the dilatory tactics of President Pro Tempore J. Henry Walters and 
by extension assembly speaker Thaddeus Sweet.   Davenport led the charge, based on the 
question of health insurance; he was joined by Ross Graves of Erie, who sought state-run 
hydroelectric development, Samuel Fowler of Chautauqua, who sought a municipal 
ownership bill, and George F. Thompson of Niagara, who sought to compel “bone-dry” 
prohibition enforcement as demanded by the Anti-Saloon League.
214
  All but the last of 
these were important planks in Smith’s platform.   
The insurgent Republicans, allied with the entire Democratic caucus and a 
shifting coalition of other GOP senators, were able to pass the Davenport Health 
Insurance Bill 30 to 20 (as well as passing the Fowler municipal ownership bill 28 to 
22).
215
  However, in the assembly Sweet was able by one vote to pass a motion allowing 
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for adjournment, and in the ensuing days the lower house voted down a motion to take 
the insurance bill out of the Rules Committee by a healthy 84 to 58 margin, “indicating 
that insurgent Republican Assemblymen had been whipped back into line.”
216
  At the 
governor’s mansion on Eagle Street, Smith still held the constitutional option to compel 
the legislature to remain in session for “at least another week,” but with Davenport 
striking a deal to end his rebellion in return for Walters’ support of a progressive income 
tax bill, such a maneuver would have been futile; and so health insurance was dead for 
1919 in New York.
217
  With the crumbling of the insurgency and the suffocation of the 
Smith reconstruction program, that year’s session would be aptly summarized by the New 
York Times with the headline: “Legislature Noted for Little it Did.”
218
  
But this was not the end of the battle.  Late that summer, Smith addressed the 
convention of the State Federation of Labor at Syracuse and promised to demand health 
insurance, a minimum wage, and an eight-hour day for women from the 1920 legislature; 
the governor charged that “reactionaries,” who “are men of little foresight” had blocked 
his industrial reforms, including health insurance, and threatened that these politicians 
“must see the light or they will be replaced by men of our modern day.”
219
  Senator 
Davenport also appeared before the convention, telling the delegates of a growing 
consensus for insurance, “even among employers who opposed it at the outset.”
220
  The 
AALL shared Smith and Davenport’s optimism, declaring their encouragement at “the 
impetus given to the movement for compulsory workmen’s health insurance,” by the 
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success in the New York State Senate, as well as by a favorable legislative report issued 
in Ohio.
221
  The very support of the New York Federation of Labor, expressed at the 
summer convention, was quite significant, for the American Federation of Labor opposed 
compulsory health insurance, and AF of L president Samuel Gompers had resigned from 
the AALL over the “socialistic stuff” he felt the organization was producing.
222
  
Nevertheless, it was clear that health insurance for New York workers would not sail to 
easy passage in 1920: in October, yet another organization, the New York County 
Medical Society, announced its opposition to the program.
223
    
At the opening of the following legislative session, Smith was as good as his 
word, and in his message to the legislature of January 7, 1920, the governor made a point 
to ask for swift action on his welfare agenda, noting in particular maternity insurance, 
workmen’s compensation insurance, and health insurance for workers, as well as an 
expansion of the state’s public health activities.
224
  These remarks were received 
enthusiastically by New York’s social welfare progressives.  From Henry Street, Lillian 
Wald wrote the governor:  “I am . . . very much interested in your recommendations for 
reform in the health protection of the state, and naturally personally interested in your 
recognition of the need of the public health Nursing Service,” while pledging her 
personal support for his agenda.
225
   
In March, Davenport once again introduced a bill for compulsory health 
insurance.
226
  But this time the senator was less optimistic, suggesting that he would “not 
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press for final passage of the bill until there was an intelligent public opinion back of 
it.”
227
  Indeed, only days earlier a potential ally—Warren Stone, chairman of the social 
insurance committee of the National Civic Federation and grand chief of the International 
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers—had written a letter to several state legislatures, 
including New York’s, asking that they delay creating compulsory health insurance 
programs until a commission had studied its possible effects.
228
  Stone’s committee 
argued that disease prevention was “not a function of insurance,” citing the “failure” of 
the compulsory health insurance law in Britain.
229
   
Davenport linked this loss of momentum to the Red Scare, citing “a subtle and 
organized propagandism” against social welfare measures in the context of the New York 
State Legislature’s anti-Bolshevik Lusk Committee investigations of socialist politicians 
and educators and the federal Justice Department’s ongoing hunt for subversives under 
Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer.
230
  In fact, only three weeks after this 
announcement, the bill was “bitterly denounced as ‘pernicious and un-American’ by 
opponents . . . at a hearing before the Senate Labor and Industrial Committee.”
231
  The 
National Association of Manufacturers assured the committee that the bill was 
“unsound,” while the Women’s Betterment League of the Lady Maccabees of America 
denounced not only the bill but also its supporters within the League of Women Voters, 
whom they skewered as a socialist cabal.
232
  Not everyone agreed with these sentiments; 
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the same day, a group of progressive Republican women “bearded Speaker Sweet in his 
den” and upbraided him over his stifling of Smith’s welfare agenda, arguing that such 
actions were “more fertile of Bolshevist propaganda and of disloyalty toward 
Government than a thousand radical schools and soap-box orators.”
233
  In any case, it was 
clear by April that the insurance bill would not pass the 1920 legislature—its momentum 
one of innumerable casualties of the Red Scare. 
Any lingering hopes for compulsory health insurance in New York died that 
November with Smith’s electoral defeat at the hands of Republican Nathan Miller.  
Restored to office two years later, Smith continued to push his welfare agenda, and he 
ultimately succeeded in getting much of it passed.  However, health insurance advocates 
would never again come as close to victory as they had in 1919.   
By the time Smith’s wider program began gaining traction in the mid-1920s, 
Davenport had been elected to Congress, and Donohue had been elected to the state 
judiciary.  The primary mover behind health insurance for the duration of the Smith years 
would be Assemblyman Louis Cuvillier, a Democrat from New York County’s twentieth 
district who introduced a bill establishing a “system of compulsory insurance for 
employees in case of old age, unemployment, death, sickness and accident, not covered 
by Compensation Law, and for dependents and to furnish maternity benefits, and 
creat[ing] [a] health insurance commission and appropriat[ing] $200,000” during the 
1926, 1927, and 1928 legislative sessions.
234
  Cuvillier is an interesting character:  a 
veteran of the Spanish-American War and the Great War who would be remembered 
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upon his death as something of a maverick, “whose independence in voicing his opinions 
frequently caused embarrassment for his Democratic colleagues.”
235
  He had sponsored 
legislation as diverse as abolition of motion picture censorship and establishment of the 
death penalty for arsonists; the creation of a “new State of Manhattan, including 
Westchester, New York, Kings, Queens, Richmond, Suffolk, Nassau and Bronx 
Counties,” and state protection for labor unions; he was a vehement opponent of 
prohibition and of women’s suffrage; his enemies included several assembly speakers as 
well as the American Society for the Protection and Care of Animals (he cited their 
cruelty to animals); and he had led the charge both for the expulsion of five socialist 
legislators in 1920 (exclaiming in an assembly-floor tirade that they “ought to be shot”) 
and for compulsory health insurance for all laborers in New York State.
236
  So while 
Cuvillier openly expressed his admiration for Smith, there is little correspondence 
between the two and it is difficult to gauge Smith’s—or anyone’s—involvement in the 
Cuvillier scheme, except to say that it reflected the governor’s earlier efforts and met 
with his approval.
237
  Nevertheless, the Cuvillier plan suffered a similar fate to the plan 
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proffered by the more ideologically concrete Davenport: each year it died 
unceremoniously in the assembly’s Committee on Labor and Industries.
238




Fig. 2.1: Assemblyman Louis Cuvillier, the primary legislative advocate for compulsory health insurance in  




While compulsory insurance appeared moribund by the spring of 1920, 
Republican leaders in the legislature proposed another health care plan as a compromise 
with the program of Smith and Davenport.  Henry M. Sage, chairman of the Senate 
Finance Committee, and his assembly counterpart H. Edmund Machold, proposed a bill 
to establish “a system of statewide health centres, supported in part by State funds”—a 
program that had already been urged by the governor, who had called for “a law 
extending a State subsidy to localities which would establish health centers in order that 
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doctors and nurses might be available for the entire population.”
240
  The bill’s supporters 
claimed that it would allow “persons of small means and dwellers in rural and industrial 
communities [to] have access to the best that modern medicine provides.”
241
   
This was especially critical given the failure of compulsory health insurance, for 
the advocates of that bill had long recognized that uninsured laborers in New York’s 
cities had been inundating charitable dispensary clinics and public health centers 
originally meant for the very poor.
242
  Accordingly, one motive behind insuring laborers 
was easing the increasing burden on these clinics wrought by growing numbers of 
working-class sick seeking free treatment.
243
  If these workers could not be insured, at 
least their access to care at public clinics could be expanded.  Furthermore, the program 
would be especially advantageous to rural areas of the state, where thirty-seven 
communities were “entirely without the services of a physician,” according to a study by 
State Health Commissioner Dr. Hermann M. Biggs.
244
  In spite of this apparent incentive 
for Republican cooperation, Smith’s health program, like his entire welfare agenda, went 
down in flames in the 1920 legislature—during which, the New York Times announced 
with indignation, the “long trial of [the] socialists delayed important measures until [the] 
last minute.”
245
  Despite its failure, the nature of this compromise semaphored the new 
direction that Smith’s health program would take in the wake of the defeat of insurance:  
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a focus on heavy spending to improve the state’s public health infrastructure and thus 
open access to care for the entire population.   
 
II 
         
It will be recalled that one of the most important periods of reform in New York 
history was spurred by the infamous Triangle Shirtwaist Fire of March, 1911:  in the 
wake of this horror, protective labor legislation was passed at a frenzied pace, informed 
by the State Factory Investigating Commission and shepherded through the legislature by 
Al Smith and Bob Wagner.  It is a tragic, even shameful irony that the Empire State’s 
major initiative for improving one aspect of its health care infrastructure was to be 
inspired by another, less well known conflagration.  On February 18, 1923, only seven 
weeks after Smith was inaugurated for his second tenure as governor, a fire at a hospital 




The blaze caused a sensation in the media and scandalized the New York public.  
It was revealed that there had been warnings of a possible cataclysm by a series of fires at 
the facility in the past; the antiquated fire apparatus on the island was lambasted; a slew 
of investigations into various aspects of the tragedy commenced almost instantaneously; 
and the Times editorialized that “responsibility for the failure to provide a fireproof 
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building for the insane must be assumed by the State authorities.”
247
  The fire had a 
significant effect on the psyche of New Yorkers well after the flames were extinguished:  
for example, in June a grand jury in Brooklyn admonished Mayor John F. Hylan’s 
administration over conditions at Greenpoint Hospital and Kings County Hospital, 
fearing “a repetition of the Ward’s Island disaster.”
248
 
At Albany, Assemblyman Cuvillier demanded immediate consideration of his 
proposal for a “tri-borough” bridge, which had been approved the previous year but 
blocked by Hylan, and which acting mayor Murray Hulbert claimed would have allowed 
fire vehicles access to Ward’s Island.
249
  Meanwhile, the governor dispatched the director 
of the State Hospital Commission, Dr. Floyd Haviland, and the state architect, Lewis W. 
Pilcher, to Manhattan to investigate the tragedy.  Smith immediately launched an 
offensive, declaring from Albany the day after the fire that “the overcrowded condition of 
the Manhattan Hospital, to my mind, was the main cause for the great loss of life.  The 
only remedy seems to me to be new buildings, or additions to those already in use.  No 
amount of fire apparatus could have prevented what has occurred, I am told.”
250
  
Since 1916 the state had been moving to remedy its “acute hospital problem” with 
a program of construction and repair; but “the exigencies of war halted the program until 
1920,” and after Smith’s defeat that November, the Miller administration “slowed up that 
program.”
251
  The renewed scrutiny of conditions in hospitals for the state’s dependents 
offered Smith an unparalleled opportunity for action.  It would be too much to suggest 
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that he was simply playing politics (genuinely moved, he pressed the legislature to 
provide a year’s salary to the survivors of each of the state workers killed), but he did see 
the fire as a graphic case in his larger point that the state needed to expand and modernize 
its health care infrastructure.  Swiftly, the point was made.  Within twenty-four hours of 
the fire, officials in New York were warning of “death trap” conditions at Bellevue 
Hospital and at the City Home on Welfare Island.
252
  Within seventy-two hours, the 
governor had sent a special message to the legislature urging approval for submission to 
the voters of at least $50 million in bonds “for the erection of new State hospital 
buildings to check overcrowding, as well as an immediate appropriation of $1,438,950 
for urgent repairs and removal of fire hazards at these institutions.”
253
   
When the State Hospital Commission submitted its final report to the legislature 
in mid-March, they confirmed Smith’s theory, declaring overcrowding the primary 
culprit in the holocaust.
254
  The revelations bolstered Smith and by April it appeared that 
his bond proposal, sponsored in the assembly by his insurance war ally Charles Donohue, 
would pass the legislature and face a November referendum.
255
  That fall, the governor 
campaigned vigorously for the bond issue, reminding voters of the Ward’s Island tragedy 
and the looming threat of further devastation due to poor conditions in state facilities.   
At Yonkers on October 11, Smith stated that he could “think of no more sacred 
duty resting on the State today than the proper care of the unfortunate sick and afflicted 
whom we promised to care for, and we are not doing it.”
256
  Smith noted that “the 
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structures themselves are too old.”
257
  Thus it was of fundamental importance to develop 
these facilities not only because of overcrowding but also because of dilapidation.  
Indeed, a report issued to the governor days after the Ward’s Island fire illustrated this 
point.  The youngest of the state hospitals had been constructed in the late nineteenth 
century.
258
  Binghamton State Hospital had been opened as an inebriate asylum in 1860; 
Brooklyn State Hospital was a reincarnation of the Kings County Asylum, which had 
been built in 1855; Manhattan State Hospital had been in use since 1855 and had gone 
through phases as a homeopathic hospital, a holding facility for immigrants, and an 
insane asylum before its ultimate conversion to a hospital in 1896.
259
  Construction on 
Utica State Hospital had been completed in 1843—three years before the first shots were 
fired in the Mexican War.
260
   
If humanitarianism obliged the state to rebuild these facilities, “good sound 
business principles” demanded that the state finance these operations with long-term 
debt, for “hospitals built to-day on modern plans, built of steel and concrete, are destined 
to last for a hundred years at least to come, and why should the taxpayers of to-day pay 
for them?”
261
  This was not a sinister attempt to disguise reckless spending, but rather a 
maneuver for circumventing the politics of the legislature which had so often stifled 
Smith’s program in past sessions.  Smith had seen how the election of a new governor in 
1920 had led to a substantial cut in construction spending the following year, and feared 
that when annual appropriations were used to finance these projects they would be 
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subject to political whims.
262
  “When you don’t pay for them as the result of bonds they 
fall into the politics of the State once in a while when there is a wave of alleged economy 
and there is a cut down in the building and in the construction so that we have an 
overcrowding to-day in State hospitals throughout the whole State of very nearly 35%.  
37,000 people are in these institutions alone and 35% of them are not being properly 
cared for.”
263
  Smith sought further to ease voters’ anxieties by suggesting costs would be 
minimal:  repaid over twenty-five years, the ostensibly large deficit “would mean, for 
each individual, a debt of [$]4.65, and each individual would have 25 years in which to 
pay that debt, or about 19¢ a year. . . .  Now, tell me, what citizen of this State would not 
pay 19¢ a year, or a good many times that amount, for the sake of knowing that the 
unfortunate dependents upon the State were cared for safely and properly.”
264
         
  Independent organizations echoed these sentiments.  In October, the State 
Federation of Women’s Clubs issued an endorsement of the proposed bond, citing the fire 
and noting that “there are very many buildings as old and as dangerous at the other State 
hospitals and institutions.”
265
  The Citizens Committee on Protection of the State’s 
Unfortunates, an umbrella group representing a motley array of organizations including 
the American Legion, the State Federation of Labor, the Grand Lodge of Masons of New 
York, the League of Women Voters, the Federal Council of Churches, the Federation for 
the Support of Jewish Philanthropic Societies of New York City, the Women’s Christian 
Temperance Union, the Knights of Columbus, the New York State Nurses’ Association, 
the Woman’s City Club, the New York City Conference of Charities and Correction, and 
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the New York State Association, also issued a set of strong endorsements for the Smith 
hospital bond, calling it “a humanitarian measure” and a way to help prevent a repeat of 
“the disastrous fire on Ward’s Island.”
266
  Edward E. Spafford, commander of the 
American Legion for the Department of New York, went further, declaring that “Any 
man or woman who votes against the proposition is, in my opinion, asking that a funeral 
pile be erected and on that be sacrificed those who are not in all ways able to care for and 
protect themselves.”
267
  Three days before the vote, the Catholic Archbishop of New 
York, Patrick J. Hayes, wrote a letter discussing the “imperative urgency of replacing 
many of our State institutions by modern structures in order that the State may perform 
its duty toward its public charges according to the highest standards of safety, sanitation, 
and humanity.”
268
  Perhaps the most powerful appeal came the next day, from the 
families of twenty-five of the victims of the Ward’s Island fire, who implored voters “not 
to let such a thing happen again in any State institution.”
269
  The bond issue was widely 
approved, and so the governor could now set about the mission of modernizing the state’s 
hospitals.  
It is one thing to win a political victory (and if the Smith literature is conclusive 
on anything it is unequivocal on the question of his prowess as a political tactician); but a 
more profound understanding of Smith’s governorship demands investigation into how 
that victory was translated into public policy.  In the case of the $50 million bond issue 
approved in 1923, one must discover where the money went. 
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Fig. 2.2: Map showing allotment of Schedule A funds in 1924 and 1925.  Note the geographic dispersion of 
projects. 
 
Spending was bifurcated into two programs, Schedule A, which was solely for 
hospital and accommodation construction, and Schedule B, consisting of “certain 
essential utilities and services required for the new patient accommodations, such as 
power houses, laundries, bakeries, cold storage plants, water supply, kitchens, etc.”
270
  
Twenty-five months after the bond was approved, Schedule A had spurred a spending 
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and building spree, with robust projects breaking ground in all corners of the state.  In 
Binghamton, work began on a one hundred fifty bed tuberculosis pavilion and housing 
for fifty employees; in Buffalo, a one hundred bed reception hospital and housing for one 
hundred nurses.
271
  On Long Island, five hundred beds of new buildings for an inpatient 
colony at Central Islip; in Gowanda, a two hundred bed reception hospital and additional 
accommodations.
272
  Three hundred beds worth of rooms at Hudson River Hospital in 
Poughkeepsie, 764 at Kings Park on Long Island, 200 at Manhattan, 873 at Rochester, 
550 at St. Lawrence, and so forth.
273
  
The Schedule A program—construction to provide more beds to alleviate 
overcrowding—was prioritized dramatically over the miscellaneous improvements 
included in Schedule B.  This had been the original intent of the bond issue, and so some 
plans were changed to reflect such priorities (for example, at Willard State Hospital, 
plans for a new powerhouse were scrapped in favor of “a psychopathic unit or reception 
service”).
274
  By 1927, bond funds had provided accommodations for 12,691 additional 
patients in the state’s hospitals, schools for “mental defectives,” and charitable facilities, 
as well as room for 2,846 doctors, nurses, and staff.
275
  In the decade preceding this 
growth spurt, the state had provided for a total of 7,060 new patients—an average 
addition of 706 beds per year; from 1924 through 1927, the state added 3,173 beds per 
year. 
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Fig. 2.3: Chart showing the rate of hospital construction, measured in number of beds added per year, 1914-
1927, demonstrating the precipitous leap in construction in the Smith years. 
 
While delighting in these advances, the governor was far from satisfied.  In 1925, 
advisor Belle Moskowitz had calculated that plans were in place for 13,275 new patient 
beds for state hospitals and charitable institutions.  But when overcrowding figures from 
1923 (9,900 for hospitals; 1,175 for special schools) and increases in the population of 
the system in the intervening years (approximately 2,100) were considered, the addition 
of these accommodations yielded a statewide surplus of only 100 beds—hardly enough to 
assure long-term adequacy of the hospitals.
276
  Moskowitz concluded that “if provision . . 
. is not made by appropriations from current revenues year by year to take care of the 
reconstruction items and to provide new accommodations for the annual increases it is 
only a question of time when the State will be again confronted with the problem of 
overcrowding and face the need of another bond issue to ‘catch up.’”
277
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Smith’s solution was to double down: to seek further bond revenue to allow the 
state to keep pace with demand for hospitals and all other public works.  In 1925, only 
two years after the $50 million was approved specifically for hospitals, the governor 
pushed an even more ambitious debt scheme: an amendment to permit the legislature to 
bond $10 million a year for the next ten years “without further reference to the 
people.”
278
  Smith had arrived at this plan the previous year after a conference with 
legislative leaders, seeking a way to avoid “the temptation that looms in front of every 
man . . . that the way to gain popular favor is to have low appropriations bills,” as well as 
a means of circumventing the constitutional prohibition against holding referenda on 
multiple bonds at a single election.
279
  Smith reflected again on the hospital experience, 
detailing how the State Hospital Commission had requested $49 million for construction 
between 1919 and 1923 but had received only $15 million, “because every succeeding 
Legislature and most of the Executives had in mind low appropriation bills as an 
indication of their ability to economize in the government of the State.”
280
  When faced 
with criticism from conservatives for pushing a “blank check amendment,” the governor 
suggested that the legislature already held a blank check against the state’s general 
fund.
281
  In any case, Smith understood that this ten-year bond scheme was a radical 
departure from the legislative and constitutional traditions of the Empire State—but he 
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  He proclaimed that he and his allies were “not thinking of some holy 
economic law,” nor were they particularly interested in “what Silas Wright said in 
1846.”
283
  His interest was not orthodoxy, but that “what the State of New York is doing 
tonight and today with regard to tubercular patients is a crime and a disgrace.”
284
  His 
interest was in the fact that “we have in this State the greatest group of dilapidated, worn 




The $100 million bond carried with bipartisan support, and the Smith 
administration was able to cooperate with the legislature to direct funds to projects 
ranging from government offices in Albany to major construction at Sing Sing Prison to 
land acquisitions for the Taconic State Park to improvements at state hospitals like 
Brooklyn, Creedmoor, Harlem Valley, and Rockland.
286
  Even still, Moskowitz’s 
prophecy would prove all too accurate as the decade progressed.  In 1927, with the last of 
the $50 million bond now appropriated, Smith informed constituents that “demand for 
additional patient beds in the state hospitals for the insane increases every year.  For the 
fiscal year ending June 30
th
 last, the net increase was 1,891.  That alone calls for one-half 
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of a 3,600-bed hospital like the new Rockland State Hospital or one such new hospital 
every two years.  The State cannot stop building and meet its legal and moral obligations 
to care for those of its citizens who become afflicted with mental disorder.”
287




Fig. 2.4: Projects funded with the 1923 bond, pictured in 1927.  Clockwise, from the upper left: aerial view 
of construction at Creedmoor State Hospital, Queens; construction at Rockland State Hospital, Orangeburg; 





The next governor, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, recognized the need for further 
revenue, and sought to follow the same methods as his predecessor, calling for another 
$50 million bond for improvements at state hospitals and state prisons.  However, the 
1929 legislature rebuffed the Democrat, not allowing his proposed bond amendment to 
face a fall referendum.  In 1930, with the legislature acquiescing, Smith again threw 
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himself into the campaign for bonds and public works.  Nominating FDR for reelection at 
the state Democratic convention, Smith railed against Republican “insincerity” in killing 
Roosevelt’s construction plan and then, “to save face,” appropriating “$18,000,000 in 
cold cash out of the current revenues of the State in early January, 1930, for the Pilgrim 
Hospital on Long Island.”
289
  To Smith this was as irresponsible as it was cynical, for 
“they took from the taxpayers of a single year $18,000,000 instead of spreading it over 
the generations for 100 years to come for the proceeds of a bond issue.”
290
  By 
November, this was a bipartisan endeavor, with both parties, as well as hundreds of civic 
groups and clergymen from all faiths and denominations urging public approval of the 
bond.
291
  On November 4, as part of a Roosevelt landslide, the bond question carried five 
to one statewide—and almost fifteen to one in New York City.
292
  In Smith’s wake, the 
means by which he had revolutionized state finances and shifted New York’s priorities 
toward human welfare had been ratified and crystallized by policymakers and voters 




Smith’s massive building program for State Hospitals is a particularly striking 
example of his move to expand and modernize New York’s health care infrastructure, 
both because of the dozens of structures and thousands of accommodations created 
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during his tenure and because of the way his approach to financing the endeavor would 
affect New York state governance forevermore.  But this was in fact only one portion of 
his broader agenda.  Of equal significance is the way in which his administration 
expanded health clinics, research facilities, and access to medical personnel statewide. 
In his 1920 message to the legislature, Smith had urged a redistricting of the state 
in health matters “so that each community could support proper public health 
administration,” in addition to “establishing throughout the State” an “adequate system of 
public health centers in conjunction with local health activities,” and providing state help 
in “subsidizing local health efforts.”
293
  Alongside these administrative reforms and 
generous subsidies, the governor called for “good salaries to get good people.”
294
   
Smith accomplished none of this in his first term.  Returning to Albany in 1923, 
he began again to push this public health program.  In February he called a group of 
physicians and experts to the executive chamber to craft a plan for improving health care 
in the rural reaches of the state.
295
  The Conference on Rural Health and Medical Practice 
found that many of these places lacked adequate services not because of poverty but due 
to the inaccessibility of existing facilities.
296
  They recommended against state subsidies 
for country doctors, calling instead for development of small, centralized rural hospitals 
to be created by the counties.
297
  In a message to the legislature on April 11, 1923, the 
governor summarized the need for rural health reform, declaring, “Sickness is no 
respecter of geographical location, and tragic conditions prevail in the more sparsely 
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settled areas of the State where, especially in the winter months, it is difficult for 
physicians to go.”
298
  This was in contrast to the city, where citizens, “however poor or 
unfortunate, [have] hospitals and nursing services at hand and never need experience the 
suffering that now falls on the lot of some parts of our farm population.”
299
  Echoing the 
physicians’ conference, Smith prescribed the establishment of “small community 
hospitals to serve rural districts where . . . physicians would have the advantages of being 
able to take care of several patients at a time, and thus avoid the long rides in the winter 
time over difficult roads to scattered homes.”
300
  The governor asked counties to establish 
such hospitals, but promised that the state would match all expenditures “dollar for 
dollar,” reasoning that “it is sometimes necessary to apply a stimulus to secure local 
activity.”
301
  The program passed the legislature that spring.
302
   
The administration’s rural health initiative went beyond stimulating hospital 
development.  By 1925, Smith could also point to an increase in the availability of nurses 
in rural communities.  Through January of that year, $26,000 had been granted in aid to 
sixteen counties, and fourteen of those grants went directly to provision of nurses.
303
  By 
1927 he could claim credit for “twenty-four counties of New York State receiv[ing] a 
total of $91,732.00 for aid in providing public health nursing services and other urgently 
                                                 
298
 Alfred E. Smith, “Legislative Document No. 87, Message from the Governor relative to Public Health in 
Rural Districts and Narcotic Drug Evil” (Albany, NY: J.B. Lyon Company, 1923), Lillian Wald Papers, 
Reel 33, p. 3.    
299
 Ibid., p. 3. 
300
 Ibid., p. 4. 
301
 Smith, “Legislative Document No. 87,” p. 4; “Smith Asks for Act to Meet Drug Evil,” The New York 
Times, April 12, 1923, p. 4. 
302
 “Governor Smith Gives Legislative Chart of His Proposals and the Action Taken,” The New York Times, 
May 7, 1923, p. 2. 
303
 “Report of Governor Smith’s Public Health Program,” p. 3; “Text of Gov. Smith’s Annual Message to 




needed public health activities that would not otherwise have been available to these 
communities.”
304
   
Also approved in 1923 was Smith’s proposal to extend the Health Department’s 
laboratory system.
305
  The rural health bill included state aid for laboratory work 
undertaken by counties and municipalities, and more generous appropriations continued 
to be made for state laboratory services.
306
  By 1925, Smith boasted to the legislature that 
the Empire State’s facilities were recognized for their “value and efficiency” throughout 
the world, with 230 visitors, including 25 from foreign nations, coming for weeks at a 
time to observe the state’s labs in action.
307
  The following year, funding had been 
approved for 106 laboratories around the state through this program.
308
 
Perhaps most significantly in 1923, Smith pushed successfully for New York’s 
participation in the federal Sheppard-Towner maternity education and health program—a 
reform which had been blocked by Governor Miller.
309
  Smith credited generous state 
appropriations for public health, along with participation in Sheppard-Towner, with 
providing a quick return.  “The decrease in the death rate of infants is especially 
remarkable.  For the first ten months of 1924, sixty deaths per 1,000 infants under 1 year 
of age is much the lowest ever recorded in the State.  If we compare it with the average 
annual death rate of infants for the five-year period of 1917-1921, it would mean that 
3,455 infants now living would have died.”
310
  These programs were also effective in 
promoting maternal welfare, producing a “most gratifying decrease in deaths among 
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women from causes directly connected to childbirth” of about forty-five per year since 
the organization of the Division of Maternity, Infancy, and Child Hygiene in 1921.
311
  
All three of these major initiatives of 1923—aid to local public health programs, 
increased funding for laboratories, and participation in Sheppard-Towner—allowed the 
Smith administration to devote increasing sums to its public health agenda.  By 1927, the 
state was granting counties $91,000 for public health work, $80,000 for laboratories, and 
$62,000 for maternity programs.
312
  The administration’s lavish spending on public 
health extended well beyond such aid.  In 1917, the State Health Department spent 
$732,095; by 1927, that figure stood at $1,748,477.18.
313
  The state had created a 
travelling pre-school children’s health unit which featured two pediatricians, two nurses, 
a dental hygienist, and a chauffeur; by 1927 this mobile care center was performing 220 
clinics in twenty-three counties.
314
  Two obstetrical units, each with an obstetrician and a 
nurse, travelled the state performing 284 clinics in twenty-two counties in 1927.
315
  Also 
that year, ninety-two orthopedic clinics had examined 1,935 patients, with five hundred 
additional exams by the unit’s orthopedic surgeons and over seven thousand home visits 
by orthopedic nurses.
316
  Meanwhile, a tuberculosis consultation unit comprised of two 
physicians, one nurse, an x-ray operator, and a chauffeur, travelled to twenty-seven 
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counties, performing 132 clinics for 3,249 patients.
317
  Funds for hospital improvements 
continued to flow, and salaries for state nurses and attendants were raised.
318
   
Similarly, the administration was doing more for the state’s mentally ill than just 
constructing new hospital buildings.  By the end of 1927, the newly created Department 
of Mental Hygiene had established outpatient mental health clinics in fifty-nine villages 
and cities and occasional clinics were held in thirty-three other locations.
319
  Children’s 
mental health clinics, which had previously served as forums to deal with severely 
disturbed or limited children, had become “child guidance clinics . . . examining and 
helping all types of problem children.”
320
  “An active social service” unit was maintained 
by the department, providing speakers for talks on mental health to parent teacher 
associations and luncheon clubs.
321
     
Smith argued that the results of this largesse were reflected in the state’s health 
statistics.  Vaccinations and children’s clinics had led to a reduction in childhood illness; 
prenatal care translated to lower infant and maternal mortality rates; better facilities and 
better-paid staff would allow better patient care; preventative mental hygiene promised 
“far-reaching influence on the character and mental health of these cases.”
322
  The 
governor could cite specific instances of success.  The state had initiated a major 
campaign against diphtheria, and by 1926 the number of deaths from that disease had 
                                                 
317
 Ibid., p. 3. 
318
 “Report of Governor Smith’s Public Health Program,” p. 6. 
319
 “Report of the Department of Mental Hygiene for the Calendar Year, 1927,” Alfred E. Smith 
Correspondences, New York State Archives, Albany, NY (hereafter Alfred E. Smith Correspondences), 
Reel 45, p. 16. 
320
 Ibid., p. 16. 
321
 Ibid., p. 16. 
322
 “Report of the Governor’s Public Health Program,” p. 6; “Report of the Department of Mental Hygiene 




fallen below 700—an all-time low from the high of 6,500 in 1888.
323
  Scarlet fever had 
“almost ceased to be a factor in childhood mortality,” while tuberculosis had fallen to a 
record low, halved from the number of cases two decades earlier.
324
  Within three years 
of commencing participation in the Sheppard-Towner program, maternal mortality rates 
reached an all-time low in 1926, beginning to parallel the fantastic successes in infant 
health noted in previous years.
325
   
“Public health is purchasable,” was the favorite saying of Dr. Hermann M. Biggs, 
who served as New York State health commissioner in the early years of the Smith 
administration, until his death in the summer of 1923.
326
  In a 1911 editorial for the 
monthly bulletin of the New York City Health Department, Biggs had explained this 
belief: 
Disease is a largely removable evil. It continues to afflict humanity, not only 
because of incomplete knowledge of its causes and lack of individual and public 
hygiene, but also because it is extensively fostered by harsh economic and 
industrial conditions and by wretched housing in congested communities. These 
conditions and consequently the disease[s] which spring from them can be 
removed by better social organization. No duty of society, acting through its 
government agencies, is paramount to this obligation to attack the removable 
cause[s] of disease. . . .  the provision of more and better facilities for the 
protection of the public health must come in the last analysis through the 
education of public opinion so that the community shall vividly realize both its 
needs and its powers. . . .  The reduction of the death rate is the principal 
statistical expression and index of human and social progress. It means the saving 
and lengthening of the lives of thousands of citizens, the extension of the vigorous 
working period into old age, and the prevention of inefficiency, misery, and 
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 Al Smith was fond of Biggs’ saw, to the extent that he quoted it in his annual 
message to the legislature in 1925, 1926, and 1927, and included it in policy speeches 
long after his tenure as governor had concluded.
328
  Smith believed whole-heartedly that 
public health, within natural limits, was indeed purchasable, as reflected not only in his 
rhetoric but also his policies.  Public health spending more than doubled in the Smith 
years, and spending on new facilities reached unprecedented levels through 
unprecedented means.  In 1925, as his program began to gain momentum, Smith alluded 
to the former commissioner and the enduring credibility of his ideas:  “the late Dr. Biggs, 







 Al Smith himself was not well educated, having been forced to withdraw from 
school after the eighth grade to support his family following the death of his father.  He 
often noted this when arguing for expanded—indeed universal—educational opportunity 
in New York, explaining that as a result of this deprivation, “no one would have a better 
appreciation of the value of education than I have.”
330
  This, he claimed, was the reason 
that he had “struggled all during my public career to put the State in the strongest position 
in which it could possibly be placed to extend the full benefits of education to all the 
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children of the State.”
331
  Additionally, Smith saw high quality education as central to the 
democratic project, and key to the political, economic, and social success both of the 
individual and the community.
332
  Thus, like much of his program, Smith’s attitude 
toward public education was informed by a strong belief that the state had a fundamental 
responsibility to provide its citizens with the security and tools necessary to lead 
successful and dignified lives in modern society; public education was part of Smith’s 




 When Smith assumed the governorship in 1919, public education in New York 
was in utter disrepair.  Increasing numbers of vacant teaching positions left classrooms 
unstaffed in the cities, while an archaic adherence to a community-based system of one-
room schoolhouses left the countryside with inadequate facilities and outdated curricula.  
Smith’s inaugural address made it clear that the new administration would make public 
schools a top priority.  “The industrial efficiency, the economic soundness, and the civic 
righteousness of the State very largely depend upon our educational system,” warned the 
governor.
333
  Accordingly, “it should be the objective of the State that no person who can 
be brought under our influence, should be without ability to read and write, or without a 
clear conception of our American institutions and ideals.”
334
  To achieve such lofty goals, 
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Smith was willing to spend prodigally.  “I strongly recommend that whatever curtailment 
may be necessary elsewhere, full and adequate provision be made for the education and 
training of our children.”
335
   
 The first front in Smith’s battle to modernize education in the Empire State was 
New York City.  Across the metropolis, hundreds of classes went without teachers.   A 
New York Times exposé revealed on the day of its city-wide investigation 1,178 classes 
forced either to “double-up” with other classes or to be taught by substitutes.
336
  Worse, 
“32,097 students were deprived of the benefit even of these expedients and had no 
instruction.  On another day the number rose to 50,000.”
337
  This appallingly inadequate 
staffing was blamed on the poor salaries offered to educators in the city.  “The situation . 
. . in New York . . . is acute.  The number of new applicants for teachers’ positions falls 
far short of the demand.   Those who do apply are of inferior quality, and the best of 




 From 1900 to 1919, teachers’ salaries increased a meager 11 percent, and 
principals saw no increase.  From 1908 to 1918, the number of pupils in New York City 
schools rose by twenty-five thousand, while the number of applicants for teaching 
positions fell 47 percent.  And of those who did apply, the number rejected as unqualified 
increased from more than 25 percent in 1908 to more than 31 percent in 1918.  Further, 
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of those who applied and were accepted, an increasing number opted to forgo service in 
the schools—9 percent declined positions in 1915; nearly a quarter declined in 1918.
339
 
 Although the situation in New York City had become critical by the time Smith 
assumed office in 1919, not all parties favored increased salaries for teachers.  Strong 
opposition came from the city’s real estate interests, who opposed any tax increase to 
provide for higher pay.  Salaries were said to be “adequate” by United Real Estate 
Owners’ Association spokesman Dr. Henry Bird, who contended that “the increased rent 
which a teacher will have to pay will absorb the increase in salary she may get under this 
bill.”
340
  Indeed, it was due to such concerns that Mayor John F. Hylan had blocked a bill 
to amend the City Charter to raise teachers’ salaries in New York City alone:  “If this bill 
to raise salaries indiscriminately becomes a law, it will pile from ten to twenty million 
dollars a year on the already heavy tax burden which is now carried by the rent 
payers.”
341
   
 The alternative to a bill that would ostensibly have overburdened New York 
City’s tax base was a bill to increase teachers’ salaries state-wide with a significant 
contribution from the state toward pay raises in each jurisdiction.  This second bill called 
for a state appropriation of $3.5 million for this purpose; nevertheless, it would still 
require a contribution from the city treasury of $15 million over three years.
342
  Because 
this bill dealt with the entire state, Hylan had no say in the matter, and the measure was 
signed into law by Governor Smith on May 19, 1919.
343
  The state contribution did 
nothing to assuage the fears of anti-tax groups, and Smith’s approval of the bill provoked 
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“open warfare” between the mayor and the governor, with the former continuing to cite 
pecuniary concerns in his increasingly hostile denunciations of the latter.
344
  To Smith, 
however, investment in education, even if it meant increasing the tax burden, was socially 
necessary money well spent:  “If we can stand $150,000,000 for a canal and 
$100,000,000 for good roads, we certainly ought to be able to spend money for 
education, without which neither canal nor roads would be worth a quarter.”
345
 
 Given the choice between immediate fiscal prudence and long-term social benefit, 
Smith chose to spend.  In the process, he aggrandized the role of the state in local 
education, a move that would presage his administration’s approach to rural schools (and 
countless other outlets of social welfare, broadly defined) in the years to come.  
Meanwhile, in a little less than six months in office, Smith had helped push bills to 
increase inadequate salaries, provide equal pay for female teachers, and fight adult 
illiteracy across the state.
346
  During the school year in which Smith took office, state 
contributions in aid of localities for public schools stood at $7,424,440; at the end of his 
first term, that figure was $33,856,117—an almost five-fold increase.
347
  As Smith began 
his second term in 1923, the New York Times reflected with satisfaction on this 
development, editorializing that it had “made possible the increase of teachers’ salaries 
throughout the State at a time when the higher cost of living made the old salaries 
shamefully low.”
348
  Higher salaries would attract more applicants, the Times opined, and 
lead to adequate staffing.  Upon signing the pay bill, Smith optimistically boasted that 
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“the vacancies in teaching staffs will be filled because of the raised salaries.”
349
  The 
following year, with Smith’s “urgent support,” the legislature mandated a minimum 
salary for teachers within the state’s several jurisdictions, and buttressed this decree with 






 The salary increase passed in the spring of 1920 would be Smith’s last major 
achievement in education policy during his first term.  However, prior to his defeat in that 
year’s election, Smith had overseen the appointment of a “Committee of Twenty-One” to 
investigate the problems of public education in the rural sections of New York.  While 
the group’s endeavors quickly became a point of controversy between educators and 
agrarian organizations, with time the two sides were able to come “together in united 
effort to promote such legislation as would assure the country child educational 
advantages in every corner of the State.”
351
  In late 1922 the committee published its 
findings, and they became widely available in early 1923, just as Smith was restored to 
the governorship.  The debate over rural schooling that followed unveiled the most 
egregious failures of public education in New York, demonstrated the sharp contrasts 
between Al Smith’s beliefs about government spending and those of his conservative 
opponents, and provided a forum whereby the governor’s ideas about the positive role of 
government in promoting the public welfare could be applied in creative ways upon 
unfamiliar territory.       
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 Throughout the Progressive Era, academics, activists, and social workers turned 
new weapons such as the social survey and the neighborhood study upon the perils of an 
unfamiliar urban industrial order.  This work exposed the misery of the cities and 
provided a foundation upon which reformers—especially female social work 
progressives—would construct the first rudiments of a welfare state.
352
  Smith had of 
course been exposed to these progressives as a state legislator and had enlisted their 
service as governor; in general however, these past experiences had focused on the 
problems of the industrial city.
353
  Having learned the value of such methods, Smith now 
applied similar tactics to the countryside, focusing on rural education.  Under this 
professional scrutiny, the venerable “little red schoolhouse” began to appear dangerously 
anachronistic. 
 In 1812, the New York State Legislature created the district system of public 
schools.
354
  Under this system, each locality was the administrative unit for its own 
schools, and each of these units was responsible for funding its schools through local 
taxation.
355
  This system survived over a century in the Empire State, so that by the time 
Al Smith began his second term as governor in 1923, there existed “more than eight 
thousand single room schools.”
356
  Of these, 3,600 had an average daily attendance of ten 
or less, 400 had five or less, and 15 schools operated for the benefit of a single pupil.
357
  
It seemed to many observers that under the current system there was “no possibility of 
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giving these marooned pupils such educational advantages as city or village children 
have, without inordinate expense.”
358
 
 Aside from the fiscal extravagance involved in running a local school for the 
profit of a single child, the committee of twenty-one (officially called the Joint 
Committee on Rural Schools), under the chairmanship of George A. Works of the State 
College of Agriculture, found numerous deficiencies in the district system.  
“Undoubtedly the most serious handicap that the rural child encounters in his education,” 
stated the group’s report, “is to be found in the teaching personnel of the rural 
schools.”
359
  Rural teachers were found to be “more immature, far more inexperienced, 
less well educated, less well prepared professionally for their work, and very much less 
well supervised than . . . city teachers as a group.”
360
  The median age of a teacher in a 
one-room schoolhouse was 23.7, the median service time was four years, and 22 percent 
of these teachers were in their first year on the job.
361
  “Mature teachers,” concluded the 
report, likely eschewed careers in one- and two-room schoolhouses because of the 
“professional isolation” involved in such assignments.
362
  Furthermore, these country 
teachers were not only inexperienced, they were largely untrained.  A “negligible” 
number of rural schoolteachers had attended college, and college graduates accounted for 
“less than one-third of 1 percent of the rural school personnel”; a less negligible 
number—10 percent of all rural school teachers—had received no schooling beyond the 
elementary level.
363
  By way of comparison, 80 percent and 62 percent of teachers in 
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New York cities of the third and second class, respectively, had attended at least two 
years at a normal school.
364
 
 Rural high schools were a point of particular embarrassment for the state, where 
“the percentage of pupils reaching the third and fourth years [was] considerably lower 
than that for the rural high schools of the United States as a whole.”
365
  The average rural 
high school teacher was found “young and inexperienced.”
366
  In all but the largest of 
these schools, the principal was “regarded primarily as a class-room instructor,” with his 
administrative capacity “indefinite and vague,” and often not recognized by other 
teachers.
367
  This lack of an executive resulted in administrative anarchy; obstructing 
adjustments in the teaching load, leaving “insufficient attention . . . to the organization of 
the school,” and hampering professional conferences of educators.
368
             
 Moreover, rural high schools lacked modern facilities.  Some 80 percent had no 
gymnasium; 75 percent lacked an auditorium.
369
  Laboratories and libraries were found 
“inadequate for the work of the high school of to-day.”
370
  Finally, there was a general 




 While a gymnasium or an auditorium for the local high school might be dismissed 
as extravagancies by proponents of an austere but frugal vision of the rural school, some 
deficiencies of the physical plant could not be excused.  This was particularly 
problematic in the one- and two-teacher schools.  The committee found that “the typical 
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school does not have enough window area to give sufficient light.”
372
  Heating systems 
were ineffective and inefficient.
373
  Among one- and two-teacher schools, 74 percent had 
no water system and were dependent on a neighbor’s well; while the majority of these 
arrangements were found to be sanitary and within a reasonable proximity of the school, 
a full quarter were not.
374
  Only 10 percent of the schools had adequate first aid 
supplies.
375
  A third lacked a satisfactory blackboard.
376
  Almost two-thirds of the one-
teacher schools had outdoor bathroom facilities, and of these, only 25 percent were well-
ventilated, only 30 percent were well-lit, and a full 42 percent did not offer students 
“sufficient seclusion.”
377
  In general, the study found that all of these conditions were 
worst in the one-teacher schools, and improved relative to the size of the faculty.
378
    
 It was not merely these spartan conditions which were offensive to the 
sensibilities of modern observers.  Obsolete facilities coalesced with a feeble faculty and 
administrative chaos to condemn rural students to academic disadvantage.  In the 
elementary years, students at one- and two-teacher schools read a full grade level behind 
the average, with students at larger rural elementary schools faring about a half-grade 
better.
379
  Among high school students, 27 percent were unable to read accurately from 
the prose of standard English writers, half did not know the meaning of words like 
“patriarch,” “dexterity,” and “intrigue,” and a quarter misidentified words like 
“obstacles,” “nocturnal,” and “spherical.”
380
  In American History, rural eighth-graders 
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scored well below urban students.
381
  New York’s larger rural elementary schools fared 
slightly better in arithmetic, where they out-paced schools in Pittsburgh and Denver; 
nevertheless, they fell uniformly below modern standards.
382
  Rural students also fell well 
below state standards in Latin, a failure that, in the 1920s, would have significantly 
hindered any collegiate aspirations of the country child.
383
  In all subjects, rural students 
at one- and two-teacher elementary and high schools scored significantly lower than rural 
students attending larger schools.
384
   
 The Rural School Survey made sweeping recommendations, including 
consideration of district consolidation by the current administrative units, local studies of 
school buildings and grounds to elucidate for the community the urgency of present 
conditions, clarification of standards for school buildings, dramatically heightened 
qualifications for acceptance into the teaching corps, provision for the training of more 
qualified educators, universal availability of four-year high schools, revision of high 
school curricula, and greater attention to extra-curricular activities.
385
  Significantly, the 
study concluded that “many communities have so little wealth that, unaided, it is 
practically impossible for them to make all the changes . . . desired.   Where this is true 
the state should give financial assistance.  This is only a matter of fairness.”
386
   
 Calls for reform began as the committee’s findings were made public in 1923, and 
in 1924 these demands became increasingly intense.  The condition of rural schools 
became a state-wide issue, with editorialists in New York demanding that legislators in 
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Albany heed the prescriptions of experts in Ithaca.
387
  During the 1923 legislative session, 
a bill to institute many of the reforms called for by the Report gained some traction but 
failed to escape the state assembly.
388
  In 1924, as Smith pushed again for a rural schools 
bill, parents and educators began to lobby the legislature on behalf of reform.
389
  “The 
trouble with the little red schoolhouse in my district is that the paint is all off,” Mrs. 
Willis G. Mitchell told assembly speaker Edmund Machold; “I have visited between 
thirty and forty rural schools in my country and found them in deplorable condition.”
390
   
 Governor Smith lent his considerable persuasive abilities to the cause.  He 
insisted that “the people who don’t care to have schools any better today than the ones 
they themselves attended certainly cannot be credited with a great deal of interest in their 
children.”
391
  In his annual message to the legislature on January 2, 1924, the governor 
denounced those who had worked to obstruct rural school reform “upon the ground that 
the rural schools are well enough as they are and that they should be let alone,” stating 
unambiguously that “this type of opposition is not entitled to consideration.”
392
  During 
the course of the debate over the expense of the program, Smith was cavalier in his 
insistence on the importance of fully funding education: “Whatever other public function 
may have to bow to political expediency, education should never be compelled to do so.  
It must be maintained 100 per cent. efficient.”
393
  Furthermore, the governor laid 
responsibility for any delay in reform squarely upon his legislative rivals, the rural 
Republicans who dominated the state assembly:   
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The Democratic majority in the Senate . . . passed this bill last year and I believe 
they are ready to do so again this year.  The question remaining, therefore, is 
whether or not representatives of sections of the State where our children are not 
getting the full benefits of our educational system are ready to come to their 
rescue and extend the relief this bill calls for and which, in the opinion of our 




 After the Republican majority in the state assembly again derailed reform 
legislation, Smith made the proposals for rural schools an important issue in his 1924 
reelection bid.  As he formally opened his campaign at Schenectady on October 4, the 
governor cited both his record of “increasing the state’s contribution to education . . . by 
more than $36,000,000,” and the need for further reform.
395
  At a luncheon of Democratic 
women’s organizations in New York in late October, Smith decried the status quo, 
declaring that “the state of New York is not giving to the children in the country parts of 
the State the same opportunity for an education that we are giving to the children in the 
cities.”
396
  The governor gained applause when he warned that “if we are going to keep 
our people in the country sections,” the state must endeavor to make rural life “attractive 
to them from the standpoint of giving them an opportunity to give their children an 
education.”
397
  The incumbent also used the issue to lampoon his opponent, Theodore 
Roosevelt, Jr., for his lack of familiarity with the subject.
398
  Smith even spent time on the 
question of rural schools at an election-eve rally at Carnegie Hall with Democratic 
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presidential nominee John W. Davis, a forum that focused upon national issues and only 
allowed the governor to highlight his foremost state-level priorities.
399
   
 Returning to Albany the following year (by which time there were three thousand 
school districts in New York that had either no school or an average daily attendance of 
fewer than ten students), Smith again pursued rural school reform, calling for larger 
administrative and tax units and for more generous state aid to local schools.
400
  In his 
third attempt, the governor was able to achieve these goals with the Central Rural School 
Act of 1925.
401
  Significantly, the bill was designed to be “entirely permissive in 
character,” allowing localities to consolidate and opt in to the state program—mollifying 
some cantankerous country legislators, and simultaneously “challeng[ing] the local 
initiative of the community,” much like the Rural School Survey had recommended.
402
  In 
1927, as some rural districts began to coalesce into central school districts, the University 
of the State of New York further aided this movement by formally interpreting the 1925 
rural school bill and identifying some key aspects of the consolidation process.  
Consolidated districts should “consist of a group of existing districts around a natural and 
logical center,” and they “must possess resources in population and taxation sufficient to 
insure well-organized graded instruction in both elementary and high school subjects.”
403
  
Consolidated districts were also obliged to provide “transportation of a standard 
satisfactory to the Commissioner of Education.”
404
  Reflecting a sustained sensitivity for 
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local autonomy, it was further recommended that district superintendents file petitions 
showing “the attitude of the legal voters in the common school districts relative to the 
establishment of the proposed central district.”
405
   
 This last point is important, because the voluntary feature of the consolidation bill 
made local opinion relevant to the success of any central school district proposal.  Many 
rural voters looked upon the new scheme with skepticism, often fearing that burdensome 
property taxes would be the immediate result.  However, with the success of some central 
districts, many farmers saw their tax bills decrease (partially because the new system was 
more efficient, and partially due to significant state aid).  Furthermore, the improvement 
in educational facilities and opportunities was so drastic that, for many farmers, the 
results of consolidation spoke for themselves. 
 This process of waning skepticism and waxing enthusiasm played out in a letter 
written to Bureau of Rural Education chief Ray P. Snyder by L. H. McCluen, a self-
described “dirt farmer” from Trumansburg:   
My school taxes before centralization were $7.50 per thousand valuation.  I 
believed that in case of centralization my taxes would be more than doubled, that 
they would be so high that I could not afford to pay them.  In fact when I was told 
that a $225,000 school building could be erected and equipped and run without a 
material increase in my taxes . . . .  I thought those who said it were fit subjects 
for Willard Asylum.  Our central school has now been running five years. . . .  
Our tax rate has averaged a little over eight dollars per thousand.  It is five dollars 
on the assessed valuation this year and I doubt that it will ever be over five dollars 




 Indeed, farmer McCluen’s initial concern about the potential tax burden 
threatened by the new school plan was supplanted by elation over the many benefits 
derived from the change by local youths:   
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After five years of experience, during which time I have made a careful study of 
the question, I am fully convinced that the central rural school is a great 
improvement over the old type of school for our country boys and girls.  Through 
transportation the school is brought to our very doors.  Our children are getting 
the same privileges and opportunities in music, drawing, physical training, 
vocational training and social training as the village boys and girls and at no 
increase in cost and they are home at night.
407
   
 




 By 1928, “about forty of these large central districts [had] already been 
formed.”
409
  In December of that year, the University of the State of New York, the State 
Department of Education, and the Rural Education Bureau hosted the First Conference of 
Central District Boards of Education.  When J. Cayce Morrison, assistant commissioner 
for elementary education, asked the 130 rural educators assembled at Syracuse’s 
Onondaga Hotel, “What do you have in the way of educational facilities that you did not 
have in that same district before the central district was formed?” the meeting 
transformed into something of a pep rally for the new system, with each locality 
announcing with justifiable pride its recent achievements.
410
  Adams Center now offered 
four years of high school instead of three; Forestport now offered four instead of two; 
West Leyden and Hague both offered four instead of none.
411
  Richburg now had a staff 
of fifteen instead of six; Pine Island had a staff of eight instead of one.
412
  Chappaqua had 
constructed a $360,000 school building, boasting stone construction, an auditorium, and a 
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  Along with Brockport, Chappaqua had also added a school nurse, and the 
former had developed a “homemaking department.”
414
  Hamilton, Buchanan, and Adams 
Center all offered their students transportation for the first time.
415
  Shrub Oak had added 
an auditorium and a gymnasium, as well as a “fine cafeteria.”
416
  Schroon Lake now 
boasted a high school orchestra, and Trumansburg had organized a soccer team and a 
track team.
417
  Georgetown anticipated the completion of its new gymnasium, a 
particularly exciting prospect for a town where “no boy has ever before had room enough 
to play a good game of basketball.”
418
  North Rose had established “a little school paper 
which is something new and of which we are very proud.”
419
  Two years later, at the 
second such conference, again at Syracuse and now with 275 educators present, the 
hosannas were amplified, with towns like Trumansburg, New Lebanon, and Sharon 
Springs announcing new construction; Hamilton, Milford, and Gilboa bragging of their 
new music programs; and Newark Valley suggesting that since consolidation, “farms are 
selling better.”
420
  During the proceedings one delegate inquired, “Are there any 
representatives here who are sorry they centralized?”   After a few seconds of silence, the 
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 The accolades for the new central school districts of rural New York were not 
confined to the Empire State.  In 1930, five years after the initiation of consolidation, the 
periodical Farmer’s Wife made a study of the central school district in Lewis.  The article 
noted that the district had added “better teachers,” library books, and improved 
buildings—some of which had enjoyed “more repairs . . . in one year than in twenty years 
previous.”
422
  The most significant change the magazine found in Lewis was the 
provision of a high school.  “Formerly there was none and any farm boy or girl who 
wanted more than an eighth grade education had to go to Boonville, an average distance 
of fifteen miles away, live there most of the week, pay tuition and board, and make long 
trips to and from home every week-end.  It was so discouraging that only one in twenty 
children ever went to high school.”
423
  But with the introduction of a central district high 
school with transportation, “fifteen in twenty children go.”
424
  At the new school, “the 
teachers are all college graduates,” and the students had the benefit of “well-lighted, well-
equipped class rooms and laboratories,” an auditorium, and a gymnasium.
425
  Children in 
Lewis were now “getting as good an education as that offered in most small cities.”
426
   
 Farmer’s Wife concluded that “all the advantages which have resulted from the 
central school plan . . . are possible because of two developments.  One is the change 
from the small school district to a larger unit of administration . . . . The other is state 
support.”
427
  Further, “what farmers in the Lewis district have done, others in South 
Carolina, South Dakota, South Fork Township, Missouri, or anywhere else could do if 
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they had a similar plan.”
428
  In an accompanying editorial, the publication suggested that 
“the New York plan is deserving of careful study by our FARMER’S WIFE readers.”
429
  
 Smith’s achievements in rural education demonstrated to his agrarian supporters 
that his social welfare vision was not confined to the five boroughs.  Smith made no 
excuse for his urban heritage, joking that “they don’t raise many crops on the ‘sidewalks 
of New York’”; but he applied to the country the same fundamental principle that he held 
for the city: a willingness to employ the power of the state expansively in order to ensure 
human welfare.
430
  As governor, Al Smith believed that the state government could be a 
positive force for social welfare, particularly where the modern order had wrought what 
he saw as poverty, humiliation, and chaos.  This belief did not apply exclusively to the 
huddled masses of immigrant laborers in Manhattan, Brooklyn, Rochester, and Buffalo; it 
also applied to the thousands of farmers across the Empire State—and, as American 
Agriculturalist publisher and future secretary of the treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., 
suggested, Smith’s devotion to these principles in the rural context was demonstrated in 
state aid to farmers, cooperative dairy marketing initiatives, proposals for provision of 
cheap hydroelectric power, development of rural health care facilities, and aid to rural 
schools.  Reviewing this record, Morgenthau aphoristically summarized Smith’s 
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 If the battle to use state funds to raise teachers’ salaries marked the opening act of 
Smith’s education policy, and his initiatives on rural school reform its climax, the fight to 
appropriate generously for the advancement of education was the dramatic conclusion to 
this aspect of his gubernatorial regime.  Built upon the recommendations of another 
executive commission, and codified through controversial legislation, the coup de grâce 
for the ancient, miserly approach to public education in New York State was delivered by 
Smith during his fourth term in the governor’s mansion. 
 In his 1924 message to the legislature, Smith articulated his basic attitude toward 
public education: “The stability of the State and its institutions depends upon the 
enlightenment of its people, and this can only be attained by the effective maintenance of 
a system of public schools in which all the children of the State may receive educational 
opportunity.”
432
  This vision of democratic citizenship was to be buttressed through 
generous appropriations: “however great the cost and burdensome the tax . . . . We must 
be liberal in our treatment of the public schools.”
433
  However, circumstances were such 
that “the cost of maintaining our public schools is, like the cost of everything else, 
increasing greatly.”
434
  This was creating a fiscal nightmare for the many local units of 
administration, including the anachronistically localized rural districts, but also including 
“the several cities” of the state—for example, by the mid-1920s, Buffalo faced a deficit 
of $7 million, and Rochester faced a $1.5 million shortfall, each precipitated by school 
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  Smith’s initial response was twofold: he demanded that the state “cannot . . . 
withhold its full support” of the local districts, and he committed to initiating “a study of 
the problem of financing of city public schools” which he would then submit to 
municipal governments and state educational authorities.
436
 
 The political battles over rural schools dominated education-related legislation in 
the 1924 and 1925 legislative sessions.  However, in October of 1925 Governor Smith 
called for a conference “to discuss sources of taxation and problems of financing 
education in [the] large cities of [the] State dealt with in [his] message to [the] 1924 
Legislature.”
437
  On November 6, that conference was held in the executive chamber at 
Albany, producing a resolution for the governor to appoint a “Commission of Fifteen” 
charged with studying financing and administration of public education in the cities, 
cooperating with appropriate legislative committees, and reporting to the governor.
438
   
 During the 1926 legislative session, the commission, headed by Colonel Michael 
Friedsam (and thus known as the “Friedsam Commission”) made its report, concluding 
that local funds could not “provide the necessary revenues for maintaining the public 
schools,” and that as such, “the main reliance for their support must rest in the State.”
439
  
The commission admonished the state to raise its contribution to local schools from the 
$54 million budgeted for fiscal year 1926 to a more robust $89 million by fiscal year 
1929.
440
  Moreover, it rather audaciously counseled the state to pay for this largesse 
through increased inheritance taxes, a tax on gasoline, a tax on unincorporated 
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businesses, increased franchise taxes on corporations, or an increase in the personal 
income tax.
441
  While the commission’s conclusions were bold and controversial, Smith 
embraced the report unequivocally, stating in a press release:  “I recommend the adoption 
of the legislation it suggests at this Session.”
442
  Smith’s hearty endorsement of the 
commission’s proposals (“the report . . . will for many years be a standard of guidance for 
Legislative action on educational finance and administration”), as well as the vigorous 
support of state education officials, was not enough to overcome the skepticism of the 
Republican legislature, and the measures failed to pass the assembly in 1926.
443
   
 The defeat of the Friedsam legislation in 1926 did not spell doom for the 
commission’s proposals.  Rural school reforms had of course failed twice prior to the 
1924 gubernatorial election, during which Smith made the question a campaign issue, 
painted his opponents as obstructionists and reactionaries, won a decisive reelection, and 
attained his legislative druthers in the succeeding assembly.  The same general pattern 
emerged for the finance bills, which failed in the spring of 1926, on the eve of Smith’s 
final campaign for governor. 
 During a major speech at Utica on October 20, 1926, Al Smith, campaigning for 
an historic fourth term as governor of the nation’s most populous and powerful state, 
boasted of his record of lavish financing for education.
444
  But Smith, “not entirely 
satisfied” with legislative allotments to the localities for schools, maintained that the 
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proposals of the Friedsam Commission must be enacted to continue the progress he had 
initiated with his teachers’ pay raises of 1919 and 1920.
445
  Furthermore, he dared his 
Republican challenger, Congressman Ogden Mills, to articulate his position on the 
commission’s proposals, asking him for “a plain ‘yes’ or ‘no.’”
446
  The next day, at Troy, 
Smith continued this line of attack, stating:  “I have stood behind the Board of Regents, 
and the Commissioner of Education, in every single suggestion that they have made for 
the up-building of what I believe to be the greatest educational system that any 
commonwealth in the country can boast of”; and contrasting this support with the 
frugality of legislative Republicans and the reticence of Congressman Mills.
447
  Mills 
retorted by calling Smith a liar (“the Governor could never have delivered the speech he 
did last night with one hand on the Bible”), and avoided taking a position on the 
Friedsam recommendations by suggesting, accurately enough, that the proposals were 
made late in the legislative session, implying that this was the reason for their demise.
448
  
 As in 1924, the voters sided with Smith.  At the following assembly session, the 
finance program, in the form of the Dick-Rice Bill of 1927, was approved, adding $16.5 
million to the state’s education budget.
449
  Smith proudly compared the $82.5 million 
appropriation by the state for education in 1927 to the $9 million for the same purpose in 
his first year in office, cautioning the press, “When you hear our political friends talking 
about ‘the great spender at Albany,’ let’s stop and study the amount of money the State is 
spending for education.”
450
  For Al Smith, these statistics represented the fulfillment of 
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his basic principle that the state must promote the welfare of its citizens through universal 




The story of Al Smith’s conservation policies provides great insight into his 
broader political ideology.
451
  It suggests a genuine desire to protect wilderness areas and 
to provide citizens with recreation, linking Smith with a long progressive conservationist 
tradition.
452
  It also demonstrates the breadth of Smith’s social welfare vision—one which 
encompassed things like recreation and cheap electricity.  Furthermore, it shows how 




On April 18, 1923, in a special message to the New York State Legislature, 
Governor Smith advocated the development of a statewide system of parks with a 
centralized administrative apparatus.
453
  Smith presented a number of reasons for the 
request.  He argued that “there is undoubtedly great need of large open spaces outside of 
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our cities for camping and recreation,” pointing out that “the cheap automobile has 
brought the country and the forests and lakes to the doors of hundreds of thousands of 
people,” who had never ventured “more than a mile or two away from their homes 
before.”
454
  With these developments, “people in great numbers, not the rich, but the great 
rank and file of citizens and particularly the children visit our forest playgrounds, even 
going as far as the Adirondacks to do so.”  This “enthusiasm for outdoor life” represented 
“one of the healthiest developments of recent years”; and as such, “the State ought to do 
everything in its power to provide forests and streams and parks to satisfy not only this 
generation but future generations who must live in even more crowded places.”
455
  Along 
with recreation, there was an underlying conservationism that influenced Smith’s 
thinking.  “Our water supply, the protection of watersheds, and the flow of streams, the 
protection of trees which are being cut four times as fast as they are grown, the wild life 
of the forests, the rainfall and the very temperature of the State depend upon our forest 
preserves . . . .  I am convinced that timely expenditures for the extension of our forests 
and parks is a real economy.”
456
 
 Smith understood that his proposal would be quite expensive; yet under Article 
VII, Section 4 of the state constitution he was prohibited from seeking a bond issue for 
his parks program in 1923 because he was already campaigning for the $50 million 
hospital bond.
457
  Nevertheless, the pace of ecological destruction and the rising costs of 
lands that the state might wish to purchase in the future necessitated quick action, so the 
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governor requested, and received, $850,000 in immediate appropriations.
458
  
Additionally, Smith proposed the issuance of a $15 million bond in 1924, so that the 
program might be funded more robustly.
459
  The bond, argued Smith and other 
proponents, would help meet the demands of a growing population by providing funds 
for a unified park system, camp site development, and extensions of the forest 
preserve.
460
  It would allow for the development of existing holdings like the Palisades 
Interstate Park on the New Jersey border, the Niagara reservation on the falls at the 
Canadian border, and Letchworth Park along the Genesee River; as well as the creation 
of new parks—proposed projects like an Allegany state park in the west, a Taconic tri-




Prior to this, the state had never established a definite program for the acquisition 
or supervision of parks—as Smith put it, “the largest State in the union, showing the 
greatest increase in population, leading all the states in point of wealth, value of property, 
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commerce and everything that goes to make up a good commonwealth, was entirely 
without any program.”
462
  New York had been actively preserving the Adirondacks since 
the nineteenth century, several scattered state park systems had been established, and a 
$10 million bond issue in 1916 for the development of the Palisades Park had been the 
largest in American history.  Yet there existed neither a coordinated administration of 
these lands nor a vision for the extension or even the maintenance of such holdings.
463
  
Although Smith received the funds he requested in 1923, he did not yet win the 
overarching parks commission necessary to implement his broader vision.  
The following year, Smith called again for a unified parks system in his annual 
message to the legislature.
464
  Responding with surprising alacrity, the legislature created 
the State Parks Council, consisting of the heads of various park commissions, the state 
conservation commissioner, and the head of the state museum.  The council was 
empowered to act as the central advisory agency for all parks except the forest 
preserve.
465
  The legislature further gladdened the governor by approving the $15 million 
bond proposal for referendum, appropriating an additional $850,000 for immediate use, 
and creating two new agencies: the Finger Lakes State Park Commission and the Long 
Island State Park Commission.
466
  Smith’s winning streak rolled into the fall, when voters 
approved the bond issue by a vote of nearly three to one.  Smith noted that nearly nine-
tenths of this majority came from the larger cities of the state, claiming that this 
demonstrated “the desire of the congested populations for summer breathing spaces 
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  It might be added that these jurisdictions were also the source of much of 
Smith’s strength in his reelection bid, and so his influence likely affected the outcome in 
the urban districts.   
 Armed with $15 million and bolstered by a countercurrent reelection victory, 
Smith returned to Albany in 1925 intent on developing his coveted parks system.  On 
January 26, in another special message to the legislature, he requested the immediate 
appropriation of the $15 million to the sundry park commissions; he also called for an 
amendment to the 1924 law to permit each county to create its own commission for parks 
and parkways (as Westchester and Erie had already done), asked for legislation 
permitting construction of roads to the new state parks, and proposed a number of 
technical alterations to the 1924 law.
468
  Among the modifications Smith demanded was a 
new, quicker method of condemnation for park purposes.  Here however the governor’s 
year-long rally reached its conclusion—the Republican legislature suddenly turned 
against the Smith agenda.  The administration would later reflect that these developments 
were due to the planned development of parks on Long Island.
469
      
 The battle of Long Island has been masterfully rendered by Robert Caro in his 
biography of Smith parks prefect Robert Moses.
470
  The legal chicanery and clever 
methods of funding whereby the Island’s parks gained a foothold in the 1920s need only 
be reviewed here insofar as they elucidate Smith’s ideology on the question.  What the 
entire episode demonstrates is that one motive behind the governor’s strong push for state 
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parks was his belief in the value of the outdoors to the welfare of the urban working class 
that had produced him, along with a related belief that the power of the state ought to be 
used to wrest control of potential recreation destinations from the rich and open them up 
to the masses—a sort of redistribution of environmental wealth. 
 Groups of Long Island residents vocally opposed the Northern State Parkway, 
intended as a thoroughfare for New York City residents to the emerging parks on Long 
Island—“unwilling,” in the administration’s analysis, “to have the people of the city drive 
along this parkway and enjoy the scenic effects and beneficial air which they claimed as 
their ‘heritage.’”
471
  Meanwhile, on the South Shore, the members of the Timber Point 
Golf Club filibustered plans for a state park on a tract known as the Taylor Estate.  “The 
officers of the Club stated that they themselves wanted the Taylor estate in order to break 
it up into large plots of land to be used by millionaires who were to become members of 
their club.”
472
   
Under pressure from North and South Shore residents, the Republican assembly 
proposed an appropriations bill that included a series of amendments intended to thwart 
the activities of Moses and the Long Island Park Commission.  The legislation, dubbed 
the Thayer Bill after its sponsor, a Republican senator from Franklin County, drew a 
forceful rebuke from Smith; the governor responded on March 19, 1925, with a message 
outlining his objections, which included the addition of several layers of bureaucracy to 
the condemnation process and a cumbersome mechanism for approving park 
expenditures that would feature the Republican-dominated State Board of Estimate and 
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  The now-defiant legislature passed the bill over the governor’s protests, and 
although Smith vetoed the Thayer Bill, another burdensome method of appropriations 
was eventually established.
474
    
With Long Island at the root of this legislative pertinacity, Smith took to the 
airwaves on June 11 to discuss the controversy over funding that region’s park projects.  
The speech is an astounding document that demonstrates a strongly class-based 
motivation behind the governor’s actions, and a willingness to politicize class on behalf 
of his policy proposals.  Smith told his radio audience:  
As soon as it became known that the State intended to acquire [the Taylor Estate] 
for a park, several of the wealthy residents and golf club members of this region 
started an agitation and some local lawyer and real estate man made a speck about 
the hordes of people from New York that would come down tramping over the 
country and leaving empty sardine and cracker boxes behind them, giving thereby 
the impression that a public park to serve all the people was not desirable in that 
section of Long Island.  Immediately thereafter pressure was exerted by a small 





In an attempt to ease the conflict Smith had held a hearing at which the State 
Parks Commission “declared that they desired this large acreage to find a breathing spot 
on the south shore of Long Island for the millions of people living . . . throughout the 
Greater City and metropolitan section” while “their opponents, a very few wealthy men . 
. . reduced their entire argument against the State to the bare statement that they desired 
                                                 
473
 “Minutes For the Second Hearing before Committee Consisting of the Governor, the Chairman of the 
Senate Finance Committee and the Chairman of the Assembly Ways and Means Committee on the 
Estimates and Maps submitted by the State Council of Parks in accordance with the Provisions of Chapter 
16 of the Laws of 1926,” p. 1, Alfred E. Smith Correspondences, Reel 88; “Governor Smith’s Record on 
Conservation Parks and Recreation in New York State, PART I: ‘PARKS,’” pp. 11-13. 
474
 “Minutes For the Second Hearing before Committee Consisting of the Governor, the Chairman of the 
Senate Finance Committee and the Chairman of the Assembly Ways and Means Committee,” p. 1; 
“Governor Smith’s Record on Conservation Parks and Recreation in New York State, PART I: ‘PARKS,’” 
p. 13. 
475
 “Speech of Governor Smith to the People of the State on the Park Situation Delivered Over the Radio, 
Thursday, June 11
th




to get control of the property for themselves in order that they might develop it to help 
their golf club and bring in about fifty millionaires who would have a kind of exclusive 
community there with the golf club as the center of attraction.”  For Smith, the choice 
was clear:  “As between the few and the many to be benefited, I cast my lot with the 
many and I signed the papers necessary to acquire the property by entry and 
appropriation.”
476
   
In response, “high-priced legal talent was brought in,” because, as Smith saw it, 
“this small group of Long Island people desired that great playground to themselves and 
wanted to keep the people from it.”
477
  So the question according to the governor was: 
“will the law of this State be so shaped to give power and influence to a small group of 
selfish men as against the best interests of the great mass of our people?”
478
  Concluding, 
Smith unleashed a Theodore Roosevelt-like tirade against privilege and on behalf of state 
action:  “Let us battle it out right in the shadow of the Capitol itself and let us have a 
decision, and let us not permit the impression to go abroad in this State that wealth and 
power can palsy the arm of the State and stall the machinery of Government in the 
performance of a duty that has so much to do, now and in the future, with the health, 




This speech is not important because it convinced legislators to abandon their 
protests—it did not.  A special session was called the following week, and the same bill 
was passed, again to be vetoed by the governor.  But the speech, and the entire episode, 
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gives important insight into Smith’s beliefs about parks and about state action more 
broadly.  It demonstrates that an important part of his motivation was the provision of 
what he considered to be a key welfare service—recreation—by the state to the masses of 
crowded workers in New York City and throughout the state.  It also demonstrates his 
willingness to arouse class antagonism on behalf of what he considered a progressive 
cause. 
It is worth completing the story of Long Island.  Because the legislature held firm 
in June, there was no money to purchase the Taylor Estate.  This might have ended in 
victory for the golf club had it not been for the donation of $262,000 by philanthropist 
August Heckscher to the state for the purpose of purchasing the property.
480
  The estate 
became Deer Range State Park, named originally for the great numbers of white-tailed 
deer residing in the area, but quickly was renamed Heckscher State Park in honor of its 
benefactor.  In 1926, 1927, and 1928, the legislature appropriated requested portions of 
the $15 million bond to the parks council, but each year it excluded most of the funds for 
Long Island.
481
  Yet Smith did not surrender: even in the midst of his presidential 
campaign, the governor took a strong position on the Long Island question, declaring, “I 
do not intend to leave the office of governor without at least providing the skeleton of a 
great park and parkway system with land needed in the hands of the State.”
482
  Decrying 
Republican opponents of his program for “attempt[ing] to block every single park and 
parkway project on Long Island since 1924,”  Smith recalled that, “the park program has 
gone on in spite of them and in every battle the State has been the victor,” predicting that 
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the same would happen in 1928.  In fact, it did happen—courtesy of August Heckscher, 
who again donated the needed sums to keep the Long Island program moving, in this 
instance, on the North Shore.
483
  Smith’s successor, Franklin Delano Roosevelt (who had, 
before ascending to the governorship, served as commissioner of the Taconic State Park) 
would preside over the opening of Long Island parks like Jones Beach as well as the 




Fig. 2.5: Long Island State Park Commission president and avid swimmer Robert Moses (arms crossed, 
front of group) prepares to enter the ocean at Jones Beach State Park, Nassau County,  
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Fig. 2.6: Jones Beach State Park, Nassau County, Long Island, New York.  Among the numerous park 
projects initiated on Long Island under Smith to provide for “the health, happiness and the comfort of our 
ten million people, and of the millions more who will follow them.”  (Photo by author.) 
 
By 1928, the State Council of Parks administered 2,218,993 acres divided into 
about seventy parks and reservations.
485
  Such a widely dispersed and expensive system 
was made possible largely by the centralized administrative apparatus that Smith had 
envisioned, as well as by the use of bonds, rather than annual appropriations, to fund 
condemnations and improvements.  Bonds were vital to the project for two related 
reasons: first, because legislative appropriations for all sorts of public works always 
tended to suffer delays, so that in the pay-as-you-go system, “we do not ‘pay’ and 
therefore we do not ‘go’”; and second, because swiftness was key in the interest of 
economy, since “prices for land are continually rising.”
486
  As with his hospitals program, 
Smith justified incurring long-term debt for these projects by reasoning that they were 
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undertaken not simply for immediate needs but with an eye toward the future.
487
  
Moreover, this did not leave the state under the ominous cloud of a particularly onerous 
bond obligation:  in 1927, the per capita debt of New York State was $21.80, while for 
the federal government it was $165.92.
488
  
This massive statewide project reflected the governor’s understanding of 
recreation as an important facet of the welfare services of the progressive state.  But it 
also reflected a genuine interest in preserving the state’s natural heritage from 
destruction.
489
  This is particularly striking, for while Smith’s interest in the welfare of 
the urban worker has been well-chronicled, his interest in conservation has not. 
The list of conservation achievements during the Smith administration is an 
impressive one which transcends parks and recreation.  Under Smith, the area protected 
from the devastation of forest fires increased from 7,270,324 acres in 1918 to 16,424,324 
acres in 1928.
490
  The annual output of the state’s nurseries for reforestation trebled from 
7,236,785 trees in 1918 to 23,375,502 trees in 1927.
491
  In response to a request in his 
1925 annual message for increased funding to expedite reforestation, Smith received a 
$120,000 appropriation for enlarging the capacity of state nurseries; a year later, output at 
these facilities had swelled from 10.5 million trees to 20.5 million trees, and by 1928 it 
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stood at 25 million trees.
492
  Under Smith, more than three hundred thousand acres were 
added to the state forest preserve.
493
  During his tenure, 190 municipal and community 
forests were started in the state as compared with 79 over the preceding eighteen years.
494
  
More than three hundred thousand acres were cleared of ribes to protect white pines from 
blister rust.
495
  A five thousand square mile “barrier zone” was established along the 
state’s eastern border and on Long Island’s North Shore to prevent the advance of the 
gypsy moth, which had done millions of dollars of damage in New England and by 1922 
had begun “invading [the] state from Massachusetts.”
496
  In 1928 the administration 
could boast that “since the establishment of the barriers there has been no further advance 
of this pest which destroys fruit, shade and forest trees.”
497
   
New York became a national leader in reforestation during the 1920s:  “In the 
planting of new forests for the reclamation of idle, non-agricultural land, New York State 
. . . led all the states in the country, a conservation achievement of the very first 
importance.”
498
  By 1928, idle land was “being planted to forests at the rate of about 
25,000 acres,—or 25,000,000 trees,—a year, an increase of 500 per cent over the average 
annual planting for the ten years prior to [Smith’s] incumbency.”
499
 
 If forests were planted and preserved with enthusiasm, so were they made 
available to the citizenry.  State parks were expanded greatly—and not only on Long 
Island for quick weekend escapes by residents of Manhattan and Brooklyn, but 
throughout the state for excursions by all the people.  Six hundred miles of trails were 
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established in the Catskills and in the Adirondacks.
500
  Campsites were established in 
these places with a capacity for two million—a figure which they attracted annually.
501
  
Hundreds of islands on Lake George were purchased and preserved by the state, and of 





Fig. 2.7: Tongue Mountain in Lake George, Warren County, New York. 
One of the areas added to the Adirondack Preserve during the Smith administration.  (Photo by author.) 
  
 All of this demonstrates the Smith administration’s commitment to the 
conservation of New York’s forest and wildlife resources and the governor’s willingness 
to employ the power of the state expansively for such purposes.  Indeed, Smith and his 
circle did not see the issue merely as a political game—they felt passionately and 
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sincerely that this was something that must be done for both current and future 
generations.  Wrote one top Democrat:  “No person can have seen the interstate park 
along the Hudson River or the Adirondacks, or Allegany Park . . . without realizing what 
an enormous help they are to all the people. . . .  Throughout the State, poor and rich, 
country and city derive great benefit from our parks . . . .  it is something to all to know 
that the most beautiful natural scenery in the country is available to all the people.”
503
  
Smith concurred, saying of Lake George that there was not a “lake in Switzerland that 
matches it in natural beauty,” while warning that if the lake should become “open to 
private development you can bid it goodby [sic].”
504
    
These initiatives gained Smith effusive praise and enthusiastic support from 
scores of outdoorsmen.  A Long Islander thanked the governor for the new bridle path at 
Hempstead State Park, which he was able to ride “almost every morning.”
505
  The Vice 
Commodore of the American Canoe Association’s Delaware-Chesapeake Division noted 
Smith’s “real personal interest in the Lake George park program,” and remarked that 
“every citizen who becomes acquainted with the value of this work is a great booster for 
the present administration that brought it about.”
506
  The Southern New York Fish and 
Game Association named the governor an honorary member, remarking that his 
administration had been conducted in accord with their motto: “For the Good of All.”
507
  
Across the state, interested citizens encouraged the governor to acquire idyllic tracts that 
were yet unprotected—from glens near the Finger Lakes, to Dome Island in Lake 
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George, to Montauk Point on Long Island.
508
  From Iowa, the Dubuque Herald noted the 




On another level, then, the experience of the Smith conservation program helps 
debunk charges of urban provincialism against his gubernatorial administration.  While it 
is clear that the parks program, particularly on Long Island, was primarily inspired by the 
governor’s expansive program for improving the lives of urban workers, it is equally 
clear that overall the Smith conservation program was designed for the benefit of, and 
had great appeal to, diverse segments of New York’s population.  There is even evidence 
that Smith’s program gained him electoral favor among some voters in the counties of the 
Adirondack preserve.  In every county of that region except for Warren, Smith 
consistently outperformed down-ballot Democrats; and in all but two counties—
Herkimer and Warren (along with Saratoga the most urbanized counties in the region)—
Smith’s electoral performance beat his statewide performance when weighted for a 
county’s percent rural.
510
  Moreover, Smith’s success in the North Country tended to 
increase over his tenure, suggesting a positive reaction to his program; and beyond 
outpacing the local Democrats, Smith actually carried Clinton County in 1926 and carried 
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both Clinton and Franklin Counties when he ran for President in 1928.  This may or may 
not have been based on Smith’s expansion and protection of the Adirondack park—but it 
does help diminish the argument for urban provincialism.  In any case, people who had 
been hunting and fishing, hiking and riding, camping and boating the Empire State for 
decades, and not only refugees from the sidewalks of New York, were drawn to the 
governor’s program because of its very real benefits and protections for the state’s natural 





If the twin impulses to assuage the condition of the poor New Yorker and to 
preserve the state’s natural heritage can be recognized in alternating degrees among the 
sundry parks and conservation initiatives of the Smith administration, these impulses can 
be seen to have converged in what was to become not only one of Smith’s signature 
initiatives as governor, but also one of the fundamental issues of his national campaign: 
water power.  The experience of water power development in New York State prior to 
Smith’s tenure as governor was a haphazard comedy of errors marked by a deficit of 
foresight and an absence of coordination.  At the turn of the century, the legislature had 
granted charters for development on the Niagara River so prodigally that in 1905 the 
federal government, “fearing the ultimate destruction of the Falls themselves, reached its 
hand into the State” through the Burton Act, which initiated negotiations with the 






  Within two years, the St. Lawrence was in similar jeopardy, as the 
Long Sault Development Corporation was established to develop power projects on that 
river.
512
  This however was short-lived: in 1913, the reform-minded Democratic 
legislature of Al Smith and Robert F. Wagner repealed Long Sault’s incorporation.
513
  
Partially in response to the Long Sault giveaway, progressive Republican governor 
Charles Evans Hughes had called for public development of state water resources in 
1907, but his program was met with a legislative blockade.  Similarly, in 1912 some 
legislative Democrats—including Smith—called for state ownership of water power 
projects—to no avail.
514
  The 1912 legislature was able to establish a conservation 
commission to replace the feeble water commission, but this body’s work was 
encumbered in bureaucracy in 1915 when Republicans, led by Governor Charles 
Whitman, enacted a provision to require all of the commission’s plans to gain approval 
from the attorney general and the state engineer.
515
 
As Smith took office for the first time as governor at the end of the decade, he 
began urging state development of water power.  When the 1919 legislature responded 
with a bill for private development, Smith vetoed their program, reiterating that he 
favored water power’s “development, its ownership, and its control by the State itself for 
the benefit of all the people,” rather than permitting these resources to be leased away to 
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  This program passed in a “hostile” senate, but failed to escape 
the assembly’s Rules Committee.
517
  Smith explicitly urged his policy again in his 1920 
message to the legislature, but they “flatly rejected this recommendation.”
518
  As with so 
many of his early proposals, public hydroelectric development was held in check by 
obdurate legislative Republicans; and as with so many of those proposals, Smith opted to 
present his case directly to the voters. 
Running for reelection, Smith proclaimed at Elmira his stand for water power’s 
“public ownership, public development, and public control in the interest of all our 
people.”
519
  A week later, the governor explained before four thousand at the Wieting 
Opera House in Syracuse that experience had demonstrated the dangers of private 
control.  “I am for State development, State ownership and State control because I am 
sure that is the only way in which the people themselves will get any benefit from this 
God-given resource, because under private development the price of electricity is exactly 
the same in Buffalo, where it is developed from the falls, as it is in the City of New York, 
where every bit of it is developed from coal which is dragged all the way from 
Pennsylvania.”
520
  Smith believed that hydroelectricity should be cheaper than coal power 
once developed, and that if the profit margins of private capital were removed from the 
price of this energy, electricity rates for New Yorkers would decline significantly.  He 
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criticized his challenger, Syracuse’s own Nathan Miller, for demurring on the issue, and 
lambasted the Republican platform for declaring “in cold blooded, plain, ordinary, 
everyday type for private ownership and private development.”
521
  Smith also dismissed 
Miller’s opposition to state development on the grounds that such projects would require 
international treaties, arguing that “we have water power here running to waste, day in 
and day out,” on domestic rivers like the Genesee, Black, Sacandaga, upper Hudson, and 
even the barge canal—claiming as an example that there was enough hydroelectric 




 Smith reiterated his stance October 30, before ten thousand supporters at Madison 
Square Garden:  “The great natural water power resources of this State must be 
developed by the State itself under State ownership and State control. . . .  that is the only 
way that the rank and file of the people can ever get any distinct benefit from the property 
that belongs to themselves.”
523
  Smith distinguished his stand from that of the 
Republicans, whom he claimed were controlled by “a small and an influential and a rich 
and a very powerful group” who intended “that the great water power resources of this 
State should be developed for private interests and by private capital.”
524
  Defeated, 
Smith exited the political stage for what would prove a brief Republican intermission.  
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Now a private citizen, he watched as many of his fears about private power development 
were confirmed.       
During his first year in office, Governor Miller was asked his view on public 
water power development, and he responded by citing the lubberly pace of state work on 
the barge canal (it was approved in 1903, construction began in 1905, and, at the time the 
question was posed in 1921, it had not yet been completed) as a cautionary tale on the 
hazards of state building projects.  By his second year in office, however, some observers 
believed that the Republican was coming to hold a similar view of the possibilities of 
public power programs and the perils of private projects as had his predecessor.  During a 
hearing on a bill to extend a one million dollar appropriation for continued state 
development of power sites on the barge canal, Miller said that “the experience of years 
shows that every private water-power development plant put on the canal means further 
subordination of the canal’s purposes.  I have come to the definite conclusion that I 
would rather have no development than private development.”
525
 
Yet if Miller was pondering a shift toward the Smith view, it was not coming fast 
enough for the former governor.  Accepting re-nomination to challenge the incumbent, 
the Democrat assailed Miller as “a reactionary Governor of the old-fashioned Republican 
school” whose reign benefited the “water power interests,” among other nefarious 
plutocrats (this attack was in fact tame by the standards of the evening, during which 
Albany mayor William Stormont Hackett denounced Miller as a “dictator”).
526
  While 
this was a night for political histrionics, the underlying assumptions of Smith’s broadside 
were factual, for although Miller had at times hinted at a personal skepticism toward 
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private power, he also created a new water power commission authorized to grant 
licenses for development to private persons and corporations—reversing what had been 
state policy since the Hughes administration.
527
  At Troy on October 16, Smith outlined 
the long history of the power struggle, from federal intervention on the Niagara, through 
Hughes’ stand against private exploitation, to the creation of the new power board under 
the Republican incumbent.
528
  The challenger concluded that on the question of water 
power, Miller had taken “a decidedly backward step,” and had turned “back the hands of 
the clock more than fifteen years.”
529
  On this and many other points, the voters 
ostensibly agreed with the challenger, and Smith won in the greatest landslide of his 
career.
530
     
 Yet the Democrat’s victory was far from the deathblow for private power 
interests.  Prior to Smith’s restoration, in early 1922, an amendment to Article VII, 
Section 7 of the state constitution was passed by both houses of the legislature.  Because 
the 1894 New York State Constitution required any amendment to gain approval during 
two consecutive sessions before being submitted for referendum, the proposal of 
Mortimer Ferris, a Republican state senator from the Clinton-Essex-Warren district, 
underwent a second test in 1923, now facing a Democratic-controlled senate.  The bill 
again passed the assembly and was “railroaded” through the senate with enough 
bipartisan support that the Democratic leader, Smith protégé Jimmy Walker, was left 
utterly impotent.  Resigned to legislative futility, the future Gotham mayor declared:   
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“We will refer this resolution to the people and let them defeat it.”
531
  Walker’s 
confidence was influenced by his awareness of the governor’s campaigning prowess; the 
senator understood that with the battle now taken to the public, Smith would be the most 
formidable contestant in the arena. 
 The Ferris Amendment, which would quickly earn the epithet “the Adirondack 
Raid,” would alter the section of the state charter dealing with conditions under which 
portions of the forest preserve could be flooded.  The original language had allowed up to 
3 percent of the preserve to be flooded “for the construction and maintenance of 
reservoirs for municipal water supply, for the canals of the state and to regulate the flow 
of streams.”
532
  To this, the Republican from Ticonderoga sought to add a fourth purpose 
for which the state forests could be exploited: water power development.
533
  The proposal 
would have allowed the legislature to grant fifty-year leases to private power developers, 
at as low a price as legislators found agreeable.
534
   
Across the Empire State, a torrent of objections was unleashed in response to the 
legislative ascent given the Ferris Amendment.  Groups began to organize in protest, 
most notably the Committee to Prevent the Exploitation of the Adirondacks, chaired by 
John G. Agar, a prominent lawyer and progressive Democrat noted for his reformist 
stands on issues including education, political corruption, and conservation.
535
  The 
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committee warned of “the disfiguring of beautiful lakes and streams, the cutting down of 
wide swaths of trees, and the gridironing of the state forest preserve with transmission 
lines.”
536
   
An even graver threat, editorialized the New York Times, was that the amendment 
would “give the water-power and lumber interests a foothold upon the people’s 
preserve,” as well as “the fact that it would allow the private monopoly of the principle 
sources of New York City’s future water supply.”
537
  At Saranac Lake, one opponent of 
the amendment warned residents that the bill, and Ferris’ broader program for a Raquette 
River regulation district to promote regional development (a scheme that would have 
been unshackled by the constitutional alteration), would result in the “loss of every 
island” in the upper portion of the lake, as well as “every tributary and bay in the section 
involved.”
538
  Another opponent queried why this hydroelectric “white coal” should be 
handed over to private exploitation when it could be sold by the state at a profit that could 
then be used for the benefit of war veterans.
539
  In New Rochelle, the local Chamber of 
Commerce denounced the amendment as a giveaway to private power interests.
540
  The 
progressive New York State Association implored voters to reject the amendment, 
shuddering at the notion of allowing “the erection of private power plants on State lands,” 
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while a Long Islander lamented that, should the amendment be ratified, “the ruggedness 
of the country, its wild grandeur, solitude and wild life, the peace, recreation and joy I 
with thousands of others have experienced who have climbed its mountains, fished in its 
trout streams and lakes and hunted in its forests, will remain but a memory instead of a 
priceless heritage to benefit posterity.”
541
  The editor of Farm and Home charged “that a 
gigantic conspiracy is on foot to impose forever upon all the people of New York an 
onerous tax from which they can never escape,” by creating a monopolistic multi-state 
“super-power combine.”
542
   
To all of these voices was added that of the governor, who abhorred both the 
denuding of the forest preserve and the invasion of the region by rapacious private 
developers.  In an open letter of support to Agar and his organization, Smith wrote that he 
feared the Ferris proposal represented a “departure from [the] wise policy” of 
“protect[ing] our forest preserve by constitutional safeguards” and asserted that he would 
“deplore the adoption of this amendment . . . because I believe that it would be putting 
public approval upon private exploitation of water powers located on State lands.”
543
  
Smith further cautioned that the amendment offered no benefit to the public, but instead 
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represented an aggressive action on behalf of “well-known exploiters of public resources 
. . . eager to get their grips on the people’s lands.”
544
   
Determined to scuttle the Ferris measure, Smith took to the campaign trail in 
opposition to ratification.
545
  In doing so, the state’s chief executive became its chief 
crusader for the protection of state lands and the retention of public water properties.  At 
Yonkers, Smith railed against the “raid” while making sure to tie the whole program of 
private exploitation of public resources to its Republican supporters—anticipating a key 
strategy of his reelection campaigns in 1924 and especially 1926.
546
  But beyond 
exemplifying Smith’s skills as a political tactician, the speech elucidates his genuinely 
passionate convictions about the value of natural resources as well as the role of the state 
in preserving them and using them for the general welfare: 
They say that the Republican party favors the development of the water power of 
the State by private owners. . . . They are at least frank and honest about it.  They 
believe in the development of the water power of the State by private owners; but 
to whom does the water power belong?  It belongs to the people of the State. . . . 
this proposed amendment to the Constitution would permit the flooding of the 
Adirondack Preserve for power development, the power proposed being in the 
hands of private owners.
  
Now that great big natural park is the property of the 
people of the State and if water power is going to be developed from it, it should 
be developed for the people themselves, and not for the private owners that are 
spoken of in the water power plank of the Republican declaration of principle.”
547
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Ultimately, the episode would yield one of Smith’s few total victories on the issue: voters 
overwhelmingly sided with the governor: 965,777 to 470,251.
548
 
The aggressiveness of the Ferris amendment demonstrated that the state GOP no 
longer suffered from the ambivalence Nathan Miller had once voiced; henceforth the 
party would unabashedly champion private development of water resources.  With 
Republican power in the legislature and large sums of money backing private 
development, the governor and his allies realized that the defeat of the Adirondack Raid 
did not assure victory for public hydroelectricity.  Given these realities, Smith needed to 
recalibrate his political tactics in order to promote his public power agenda.   
 A little over a month after defeating the Ferris amendment, Smith sent a special 
message to the legislature outlining in the most specific terms yet his alternative to the 
Republican private development plan; and for this plan, the governor looked northward:   
The two chief beneficiaries of future development on the Niagara and St. 
Lawrence should be the Province of Ontario and the State of New York.  So far 
the State of New York has hesitated as between practically unregulated 
development and public control at the source.  The Province of Ontario, on the 
other hand, has boldly developed a successful policy of control by a public agency 
representing the municipalities of the Province. . . .  It has supplied cheap power 
to the small consumer; it has supplied this power on the basis of plans made in the 
interests of the community and not in the interests of profits.
549
   
 
For Smith, the Ontario system suggested the possibility of a “middle way” for his 
own jurisdiction.  Furthermore, it was a way that appeared to function well:  the previous 
year it was estimated by former Troy mayor William F. Burns that electricity in Ontario 
cost $16 to $20 per horsepower, while in New York it cost $60 to $90; and more 
palpably, in Toronto, Hamilton, and London, Ontario, the average cost of household 
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energy was 2¢ to 4¢ per kilowatt hour, while in New York’s cities, power cost from 8¢ to 
15¢ per kilowatt hour.
550
   
Offering tangible benefits, Smith also sought to assuage popular fears.  He 
suggested that a total state takeover of the entire power system would not be necessary, 
“provided that the State controls the situation at the source, from which it can direct 
where the power derived from public sources can go and at what rates it can be sold.”
551
   
Accordingly, Smith declared his advocacy of a public corporation—a state power 
authority.
552
   
 That same month at a conference on water power development, Robert Moses 
fumed, “it is to the everlasting discredit of the corporations which have engaged in the 
electric light and gas business that, generally speaking, they have been interested 
primarily—almost exclusively—in development for profit.”
553
  Although the 
prioritization of profits was a perfectly reasonable position to be taken by these capitalist 
outfits, it was nevertheless a threat to the governor’s alternative view of the use of state 
resources.  Recent events had served to alert the administration to the continuing perils of 
private development, and had caused Smith and his allies to become entrenched in their 
opposition to private exploitation of New York’s untapped rivers.  The administration 
believed that, once established, corporate developments would prove difficult to bring 
under public control.  Sounding the tocsin, Moses declared that “once you take . . . . the 
Niagara and St. Lawrence—and throw them into private hands . . . the possibility of 
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regulation as a solution of this whole question becomes somewhat dubious.”
554
  Given all 
of this, the solution for Moses, as for Smith, was to institute a power authority.
555
   
 The idea of a power authority emerged during this first year of Smith’s return to 
Albany as an alternative to the privatized system instituted by Miller.  Within the broader 
national context, it seems only natural that Smith’s thinking on water power would reach 
maturity in these years, taking the form it would hold essentially for the duration of his 
public life.  As historian Richard White notes, the Great War had “bared the weakness of 
the existing energy system,” and provided “new impetus to conservation, to efficiency, 
and to production of electricity on a grand scale.”  From Pennsylvania to the Pacific 
Northwest to the halls of Congress, interest in hydroelectric development—whether 
public or private—grew tremendously in this period.
556
  Some of this occurred in 
response to the Federal Water Power Act of 1920, and some in response to state 
initiatives.  By 1925, one economist wrote of the “romance” surrounding hydroelectricity 
in which “the popular imagination has been caught in recent years.”
557
  Thus, when Smith 
returned to office in 1923, the subject had come to the center of the national political 
conversation, with organizations including the American Federation of Labor calling for 
an increased government role in development.
558
    
During the 1923 legislative session, Smith urged a policy of state development, 
ownership, and control, and sent a special message to the legislature requesting the repeal 
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of Miller’s program.  These requests were ignored.
559
  In preparation for 1924, the 
governor worked with advisors like Moses to find ways to make his power program more 
concrete as well as more acceptable to the hostile legislature.  
 At the opening of that session, in the wake of the battle of the Adirondacks, the 
governor announced a “definite policy of development of the State’s water power 
resources by a so-called ‘Power Authority.’”
560
  He sought to create a commission like 
the Port of New York Authority which “would have no private stockholders, would be 
municipal in character, and would derive its powers from the State and have placed upon 
it the duty to take over and develop the State’s power resources,” with the prerogative to 
issue its own bonds for such purposes.
561
  Smith forecast that the principal of the bonds 
could be paid by the profits from the sale of electricity, and in any case this was a fiscally 
safe undertaking for the state, which would not use any of its own money on the 
projects.
562
  The Democratic-controlled senate approved this program, but the Republican 
assembly passed its own bill creating only an investigatory body.
563
  The senate 
attempted to retool the assembly’s dilatory legislation by amending it to include the 
provisions the governor had called for, but this new bill was rejected outright by the 
lower house, and so no progress was made in 1924.
564
  In June, an angry Smith declared 
that “the Assembly majority deliberately, willfully and defiantly said to the People of the 
State of New York that they would not subscribe to the principle that what we now own 
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  Reelected in 1924 despite the second of three quadrennial triumphs by 
the national Republicans, the governor returned in 1925 and 1926 with the same power 
program—with similar results.  After sustaining repeated frustrations, Smith made this 
struggle the signature issue of his 1926 reelection campaign.
566
  
 In fact, Smith did not need to go out of his way to make water power a major 
point of contention in 1926; the Republicans reaffirmed their intention to lease 
development rights to private companies in their state party platform.
567
  This, along with 
the legislature’s recalcitrance, demonstrated that in 1926 there would be no surrender on 
the issue by the GOP.  Nor was Smith going to capitulate after the series of defeats.  In 
March of that year, the governor sent yet another message to the legislature outlining his 
proposal and demanding action.  But this message also showed increasing resentment 
toward the ossifying Republicans, and at times adopted an aggressively political tone.  
The message once again called for state control of power plants, while presenting the 
governor’s economic reasoning—that the state’s water resources, properly administered, 
could be used to ease the household costs of New Yorkers:  “We start with the promise 
that the ownership . . . by a public corporation rather than by a private one, is a very 
material factor in cheapening the cost of developing the energy.”
568
  Smith then went on 
to denounce his opponents as unreasonable, concluding that their “foolish talk about 
Socialism is an insult to the intelligence of the people of the State.”
569
  Smith went further 
still, attacking directly Congressman Ogden Mills, a virulent critic of the Smith program 
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who was emerging as a likely challenger in the fall campaign.  “No wonder Mr. Ogden 
Mills has the point of view of a well-intrenched [sic] advocate of private interests.  Mr. 
Mills, who is shrieking so loudly about Socialism, was a director in this power company 
in 1923 and in all probability is still interested.”
570
  
If Smith’s message was that of a frustrated politician, it nevertheless portrayed 
accurately the nature of Mills’ opposition by mentioning the charges of socialism.  Mills 
was indeed the Republican gubernatorial nominee in 1926, and along with blaming the 
governor for a milk crisis in several cities (in a maneuver reminiscent of Smith’s arch-
nemesis William Randolph Hearst), his major critique of Smith was to attach the epithet 
“socialism” to the proposed power authority.  While Smith had repeatedly called for 
“perpetual ownership and control by the people of the State of the State-owned water-
power resources,” in contrast to development “by private capital,” the governor was no 
doctrinaire socialist.
571
  Like other progressives, he sought within reasonable limits the 
decommodification of life’s basic necessities—healthcare, milk, housing, education, and 
in this case, electricity.
572
  As a pragmatist, when he recognized that the private sector 
could not adequately or responsibly perform one of these social functions, the governor 
had no qualms with state intervention.   
Thus Smith had no particular objection to socialistic solutions to the failures of 
the market.  In defense of his plan, the governor looked to precedents for state 
involvement in public works projects to encourage economic development, pointing to 
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the case of the Erie Canal and querying:  “Does Congressman Mills suggest that DeWitt 
Clinton was a socialist?”
573
  He later became blunter:  “The Congressman’s talk about 
Socialism is, using a mild term, stupid.”
574
 
 Indeed, with charges of plutocracy and bolshevism flying about, the 1926 contest 
became a particularly bellicose affair.  One Smith stalwart declared Mills “unqualified to 
be governor of New York” because of his recent directorship of an energy combine in 
New England and because of his noble family’s vast holdings in power concerns.
575
  
Smith himself produced one of the most hotly classist speeches of his career on behalf of 
his plan at Flushing that October:  “Here we have a service promised by the Republican 
party but promised to whom?  To the people of the State of New York?  No.  Promised to 
the water barons of the State, to the group of millionaires who now control practically all 
the water power resources in the northern and northwestern part of the State.”
576
  Such 
attacks were common throughout the campaign.
577
   
And if Democratic supporters of state power could count on such spellbinders, the 
Republican opposition could rely, at least indirectly, on anti-Smith propaganda 
bankrolled by the very power interests Mills and the GOP were being accused of 
supporting.  In 1928 a Federal Trade Commission investigation revealed that power 
interests had, since 1922, invested more than $227,000 into printing pamphlets against 
the Smith power scheme.  The materials distributed included 196,000 copies of a 
pamphlet entitled “Water Power in New York State,” given to newspapers, public 
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officials, college professors, libraries, commercial and banking institutions, and civic 
organizations; another entitled “River Regulation in New York State,” of which 40,000 
copies were dispersed among similar groups; and, most egregiously, 106,000 copies of 
two propagandistic textbooks, disbursed to students at 491 high schools, entitled Know 
New York State and Servants of Progress.  Furthermore, utilities were estimated to have 
spent between $28 and $38 million on public relations annually—sponsoring in one six-
month period 3,479 speeches.  Significantly, Fred W. Crone of the New York State 
Commission on Public Utility Information “testified that the private power companies of 
the State opposed Governor Smith’s power development plans, and admitted, upon close 
questioning . . . that the object of the literature was to oppose the movement.”
578
 
Even after Smith was reelected, the fight persisted.  An overhaul to Governor 
Miller’s power commission was scheduled to take effect January 1, 1927, as part of a 
broader reorganization of the executive branch of state government.
579
  In response to the 
looming threat of a new, Smith-dominated commission, several firms petitioned the lame 
duck board in the late fall of 1926 for power development leases.
580
  Over the governor’s 
protests, the commissioners declared their intent to proceed in December.  Seeking to halt 
this advance, Smith considered state legal action against the state’s own commission; but 
this was even more complicated than it already sounds, since the attorney general was a 
member of the outgoing board.  Charging forward, Smith appointed a special counsel—
Samuel Untermyer, the very public power proponent who only a month earlier had called 
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Ogden Mills unqualified to be governor.
581
  With the belligerents taking the field, the 
public was aroused to the flag of the governor; under growing pressure, the applicants 
dropped their proposal and conceded defeat.
582
  
 As another legislative session began, Smith penned an article for the periodical 
Survey Graphic in which he explored the obstacles his program had theretofore endured.  
“You know as well as I do that in democratic government you can get too many blocks 
ahead of the parade.  You have got to be able to look around and see whether all of the 
members of your regiment are with you or not.”
583
  The governor now recognized that 
public ownership was a difficult proposition, for it left proponents open to the toxic 
charge of socialism.  Yet he saw a way around this:  “We found out that it is possible to 
create . . . an agency of the state for the purpose of progressive public development 
without any public responsibility . . . beyond the point that a commission establishes the 
economic soundness of the development before they proceed with it.  Now, how any man 
who voted for the New York Port Authority or to set up the Port of Albany can talk about 
a power authority as a socialistic proceeding is more than I can understand.”
584
   
Smith’s ports analogy won the strong endorsement of New York Port Authority 
general counsel Julius Henry Cohen, who functioned as a key strategist for the Smith 
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forces throughout 1926 and 1927.
585
  Like Smith, Cohen was optimistic that the authority 
would be a financial success.  “Water Power Authority bonds would find a much easier 
market than our own Port Authority bonds,” he predicted, “for I believe that prior to the 
offering of an issue the Power Authority would have made contracts in advance for the 
disposal of the power with responsible distributers and could have definite proposals 
which would fix the upset price of the cost of the plant.”
586
 
In making the Port Authority analogy, Smith was able to use the tangible example 
of the Holland Tunnel, which would open later that year as the first of a number of 
Hudson River crossings constructed under the auspices of the authority (in fact, 
construction on the Outerbridge Crossing, the Goethals Bridge, and the George 
Washington Bridge was well underway by the end of Smith’s administration):  
How many of us know how much we really cut from our annual tax roll for this 
tunnel?  Between 1919 and 1926 we put twenty-one million dollars in cash into 
it—and nobody knows anything about it because we just put it up . . . .  Now that 
we are satisfied with it, everybody is going to go down when it opens and ride out 
into Jersey and sing ‘Three cheers for the red, white and blue.’  Yet it was just as 
much of a risk as would be the pledging of the credit of the state in the 




Despite his reelection triumph, his public relations victory over the outgoing 
power board, and his increasingly tangible rhetoric on the issue, Smith would not win the 
power fight during his fourth and final term.  In fact, while he saw it as an improvement 
over Miller’s defunct power commission, Smith could not claim satisfaction with the 
refurbished board either:  like its predecessor, the new body included the attorney 
general, the conservation commissioner, and the director of public works—individuals, 
                                                 
585
 Samuel Untermyer to Julius Henry Cohen, October 17, 1927, Alfred E. Smith Papers, Box 23, Folder 
228. 
586
 Julius Henry Cohen to Samuel Untermyer, October 11, 1927, Alfred E. Smith Papers, Box 23, Folder 
228. 
587




according to Smith, who were all preoccupied with the work of their own departments 
and who were not qualified to devise a water power plan for the state.  Frustrated again, 
Smith vetoed their appropriation.
588
   
 Smith would never succeed in creating a state power authority.  Indeed, such a 
body would not be inaugurated until the second term of Franklin Roosevelt, and real 
work on state power projects would not commence for another two decades.
589
  So 
hydroelectricity does not fit with the usual pattern of Smith initiatives, whereby a 
proposal would fail several times, the governor would make it a campaign issue, and 
then, after a reelection or two (as well as some legislative cajoling and compromise), the 
governor’s program would be adopted.  Such was the pattern with Smith’s public school 
reforms, with much of his health care agenda, and with the development of many of the 
new state parks and parkways.  But this was not the case with water power, where 
emotions continued to run high for the duration of Smith’s incumbency (for example, in 
1927 Attorney General Albert Ottinger, a Republican, claimed the Democrat’s 
mulishness was costing New York manufacturing jobs, while Smith continued to fight 
charges of state socialism with counter-charges of corporate rapacity).
590
  Thus the lesson 
from the water power fight is not about Smith’s tactics as much as it is about his 
fundamental beliefs.  State hydroelectric development represents the confluence of two of 
them: the belief in the inviolability of public resources and the belief that, when 
necessary, the government must be employed in full to assuage the hardships of modern 
                                                 
588
 Ibid., pp. 422-423. 
589
 New York State Power Authority [Web site], “NYPA’s History,” Site address: 
http://www.nypa.gov/about/history1.htm. 
590
 “Ottinger Attacks Smith Power Plan,” The New York Times, September 28, 1927; “Smith Will Evade 
Water Power Issue, Ottinger Declares,” New York Tribune, September 28, 1927; “Ottinger Hits Smith’s 
Water Power Stand,” The New York World, September 28, 1927 (clippings in Alfred E. Smith Papers, Box 




life—even to the point of “socialistic” policies.  Al Smith’s militant rhetoric, teetering as 
it did on the brink of class warfare, was but a manifestation of his interest in preserving 
the tranquility of the Adirondacks, asserting the state’s riparian rights, and providing 
cheap energy to the working class.  By the mid-1920s, Smith’s political activities were 
driven by his policy ambitions. 
 This demonstrates a great deal about Smith as an executive, and it also elucidates 
much about his national agenda.  His eventual plunge into the fracas over the federal 
power project at Muscle Shoals, Alabama in 1928 was not the first time Smith weighed 
the benefits of government-run hydroelectricity.  Nor was it the first time the Democratic 
candidate joined the debate over national power issues.  In fact, during his tenure as 
governor, Smith engaged in a series of skirmishes with the national administration over 
questions of authority and of economics. 
 In June 1920, during Smith’s first term, Congress enacted the Federal Water 
Power Act, or “Esch Law,” a bill intended to bring hydroelectric development under the 
control of the national government.  Although the implications of the act might not have 
seemed so pernicious to the governor when executed by the relatively friendly Wilson 
administration, upon his return to office in 1923 Smith would find water power policy 
being piloted by the Harding and then the Coolidge administration.
591
  Smith fought 
against the federal authority granted by the act on the grounds that “for years it has been 
our understanding that Federal control over navigable streams was only and solely for the 
purpose of regulating navigation.  In other words, we believe that the bed of the stream is 
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the property of the State and over it flows the water that generates the electrical 
energy.”
592
  New York pressed a suit against the federal government challenging the Esch 
Law that was to be heard by the Supreme Court of the United States, with Smith rejecting 
the entreaties of another progressive conservationist governor, Pennsylvania Republican 
Gifford Pinchot, to abandon the case, saying that the streams were “the property of the 
State and should be preserved for the benefit of the people of the State.”
593
  To avoid the 
spectacle of The State of New York v. Warren G. Harding, a conference was held on May 
10, 1923, between federal and state authorities, at which the federal government ceded to 
the New Yorkers exclusive jurisdiction over water power development in the Empire 
State.
594
  The litigation was dropped in response. 
 This arbitration did not end the quarrel between Washington and Albany, and in 
fact the episode only masked the most crucial issue behind the rhetoric of states’ rights.  
Smith remained openly critical of the national administration, warning New Yorkers in 
1924:  “If Republicans are the same in the State as they are nationally, bid good-bye to 
your water power resources.  Say a farewell to the Adirondack Preserve, be prepared to 
deliver the inland streams and rivers to the power combine.”
595
  The White House was no 
more impressed with the direction being taken in New York.  Watching the critical events 
of 1926 unfold, the Coolidge administration decided to push back against Smith’s drive 
for state-run hydroelectric plants.  Private communications between the parties 
demonstrate that economic, rather than constitutional questions had become the real 
points of contention.  In a memorandum for the New York governor summarizing the 
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position of the White House, dated December 22, 1926, the president’s very different 
philosophy on the purpose of electrical power production was set forth—a philosophy 
much more in tune with the polity of 1920s America.  State regulations that encumbered 
the freewheeling development of power by private capital were called “illegitimate items 
of cost” which “must be eliminated.”
596
  Furthermore, argued the national administration:  
It is important to bear in mind that, in addition to the promoters’ profits charged 
up as an initial cost, the constitutional return on the investment, which the United 
States Supreme Court says must be protected, is a constitutional return on the 
entire investment, that is to say, taking simple figures:  Assume an actual cash 
capitalization of one hundred million dollars.  At least 75 of these millions can be 
secured on a 5% basis; the balance surely on an 8% basis.  That means that 25 
millions cost at the rate of 2%, and 75 millions cost at the rate of 3¾%, or a total 
cost of the money of 5¾%, or an interest charge against the entire 100 millions of 
$5,350,000 per annum.  On an 8% return on the entire 100 millions, the net 
revenues will be $8,000,000.  The interest charges, i.e., 5% on 75 millions, are 
$3,750,000.  Deducting from the eight millions gives you the profit which the 
stockholders make on their 25 millions—$4,250,000 on an investment of 25 
millions or approximately 16% return to the common stockholders.  When you 
realize that the actual cash capital figure of 100 millions is very often made into 
200 million through the inclusion of the factors of franchise value, good will, cost 
of reproduction, etc., you can see how the consumers are being taxed in order to 
make for these large profits for investors.  IT IS THESE PROMOTERS’ 
PROFITS WHICH ARE SENDING UTILITY STOCKS BOOMING AND 
WHICH GIVE TO STOCKHOLDERS A RETURN ON THE GRANT OF 
SOVEREIGN POWER OR GRANT OF SOVEREIGN RESOURCES WHICH 
THE CONSUMERS OR USERS ARE PAYING FOR.
597
     
 
 After this revealing dissertation, the administration suggested that such economic 
dynamism would be impossible under a scheme similar to that governing the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey, where tolls were charged only to cover costs, 
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and thus profits were not accumulated.
598
  Julius Cohen, who compiled these 
administration arguments for the governor, reiterated their meaning in a less favorable 
light:  “All these profits are made under legal sanction.  In the last analysis, it means 
consumers are paying in their light and power rates huge dividends to the owners of 
common stock in power and light securities.  Of course the Insulls and the Carlisles know 
it . . . .  That is why the fight against the governor’s plan is so intense and so bitter.  He 
has touched a delicate pocket nerve.”
599
    
Nevertheless, there is evidence that even within the Coolidge administration there 
was some sentiment toward Smith’s philosophy on water power.  In 1927, the Federal 
Power Commission, consisting of Secretary of the Interior Hubert Work, Secretary of 
Agriculture William Jardine, and Secretary of War Dwight Davis (who served as chair of 
the commission) issued its annual report, which Cohen deemed “a perfect gold mine of 
paragraphs in support of [Smith’s] Water Power Authority policy.”
600
  The commission 
declared that the old government policy of transferring resources from public to private 
hands as swiftly as possible had “resulted in an era of reckless exploitation, during which 
our resources . . . were wasted and destroyed as if the supply were inexhaustible.”
601
  In 
light of this lesson, it was asserted that in the future, “values inherent in a public resource 
developed and used in the performance of an essential public service by an agency 
created by law for that purpose shall not be capitalized for purposes of sale, of 
establishment of rates, or of issuances of securities, in an amount in excess of actual 
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  Furthermore, “one way in which this principle can be maintained 
with certainty is for the public to retain in perpetuity the ownership of these resources to 
which it has title, and to retain it through that public agency which has the title.”
603
  
Finally, assenting to Smith’s position in the constitutional controversy of 1923, the 
commission determined that the question was “primarily a State problem over which the 
States should assume the major responsibility.”
604
 
 Not among those cabinet members sympathetic to the Smith position was 
Secretary of Commerce Hoover, chairman of the Joint Federal Commission on the St. 
Lawrence Waterway Project and the man to whom engineers investigating power 
possibilities in that region were responsible.
605
  In fact, as was the case with most policy 
questions, the Hoover position within the administration was the dominant one—the one 
that denounced state control of water power development as a hindrance to the booming 
market in utilities securities and supported the “taxing” of working-class rate-payers in 
order to bankroll the investors’ bonanza.
606
  The leading proponents of these two 
positions would engage on the national stage in 1928 as the nominees of the two major 
parties for the presidency of the United States.   
 
*  *  * 
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The history of Alfred E. Smith’s conservation policies elucidates several key 
themes central to a broader understanding of the governor’s political ideology.  His fiery, 
often class-based rhetoric in the battles to expand state parks and to prevent private 
exploitation of state resources demonstrates his strongly progressive mindset, as do his 
administration’s expansive projects for resource preservation.  Smith was enthusiastic to 
mobilize the power of the state on behalf of his conservationist agenda.  He was also 
willing to spend liberally on these conservation initiatives, denouncing the “kind of false 
economy that means a weakening of our efforts to preserve forests and streams, the great 
gifts of nature herself.”
607
  His genuine interest in a variety of preservation and wildlife 
protection projects—not only on Long Island but throughout New York State—as well as 
the approbation and cooperation he received from numerous sportsmen, clubs, and 
upstate interest groups as a result of these actions, helps to discredit the suggestion that 
Smith was a myopic urbanite who knew—and cared—nothing for the world beyond the 
five boroughs. 
Furthermore, his understanding of parks and recreation as an important facet of 
social welfare, especially for urban workers who lacked regular access to such facilities, 
expands the academic understanding of 1920s urban liberalism.  The welfare state was 
defined not only as laws to protect workers, to shelter the poor, or to extend health 
services, but also to provide ample recreation, fresh air, and open space to those citizens.  
Moreover, access to recreation was recognized not as a privilege that was doled out by a 
generous caretaker state, but as a fundamental right of all people in a modern industrial 
society. 
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In the water power debate, Smith simultaneously took stands for the preservation 
of the people’s natural inheritance and for responsible state development of power 
resources to ease the burdensome cost of energy.  Smith’s battles over water power 
development provide important insight into his expansive view of the appropriate role of 
the state, while foreshadowing his approach to the question of federal development of the 
hydroelectric potential of Muscle Shoals and other sites as a national candidate.  If his 
scheme for state run hydroelectricity teetered on socialism, it did so out of a pragmatic 
willingness to experiment in order to improve the lives of all citizens—particularly the 
working class. 
In all areas of conservation policy, Smith believed that the state should play an 
important part in retaining New York’s forests and streams for future generations and in 
ensuring that all citizens were able to derive benefits from those resources, whether 
through preservation, access to recreation, or cheaper electricity rates.  In both parks and 
power, there was a socioeconomic element to his thinking—the state needed to keep 
resources from being monopolized by the influential and the wealthy, whether they be 
buccaneering power trusts or Long Island barons.  In both cases there was also a 
surprisingly strong undercurrent of conservationism, a traditional progressive virtue.  
This was colored by Smith’s larger welfare vision to develop a working-class policy of 
conservation for future benefit as well as in the interest of social justice.  
The case of Smith’s treatment of education in New York provides further 
evidence of his belief in a robust and broadly defined social welfare regime.  Indeed, the 
ways in which the administration implemented its policies in this area demonstrate 




phase of Smith’s education reforms, boosting New York City and other urban schools by 
raising teachers’ salaries in response to the troubles of those jurisdictions, fit with the 
governor’s initial priorities as a long-time representative of Manhattan’s Fourth Ward.  It 
also reflected his personal experience as a New York resident who recognized, through 
his own deprivation, the value of a quality education to urban youth.  It can be seen as 
part of the broader sweep of Smith’s early governorship, characterized by his 
reconstruction commission, which dealt mainly with the problems of urban industrial 
society that the transitional progressives understood best and that had been made all the 
more conspicuous by the Great War.   
The second phase, Smith’s program for rural schools, demonstrated the 
broadening of Smith’s understanding of the problems of the state, and the application of 
his urban progressivism to the problems of rural life.  In adopting the cause of rural 
school reform as his own, Smith shed any so-called “provincialism” and successfully 
applied his city-inspired social welfare vision to the plight of the countryside.  
 In the final phase, Smith continued his customary progressive reliance on studies 
by expert commissions in order to address the problem of financing the modern schools 
he envisaged.  Smith’s fervent political support for the proposals of the Friedsam 
Commission revealed the extent of his commitment to an active government role in 
improving people’s lives.  The governor’s dedication to these progressive beliefs was 
exemplified in his endorsement of two particularly controversial mechanisms for the 
adequate funding of public schools:  a dramatically enhanced role for the state in an 




The Smith record also demonstrates a belief in the necessity of public health work 
and a willingness to appropriate generously for such purposes, reflecting an adherence to 
the Biggs maxim “public health is purchasable.”  Smith clearly understood his efforts to 
“purchase” public health as an essential part of his platform (and one which he would be 
proud to highlight during his national campaign).  Yet this was only half of the 
governor’s initial program for improving health care in New York.  The other part was 
legal reform, reflected in the failed attempts to institute a compulsory health insurance 
law, as well as other initiatives, including a repeatedly rejected plan to ensure the purity 
and availability of milk by making it a state-regulated utility, and Smith’s push to 
consolidate local health efforts at the county level (which was partially achieved by 
granting the lion’s share of state aid for local public health work to county officials).   
 Smith never fully abandoned his hopes for compulsory health insurance, but after 
the proposal was killed in committee in 1920 by a militantly anti-Smith Republican 
majority inflated by Red Scare atmospherics, it would not regain its place as a central 
piece of Smith’s welfare agenda.  Instead, the governor’s focus would shift away from 
insurance and toward an alternative means of providing wider access to quality health 
care: modernization and expansion of the state’s health care infrastructure.  Like 
insurance, this proposal had been stifled by conservative legislators for years; but unlike 
insurance, Smith was able to devise a scheme for circumventing the politics of the 
legislature in pursuit of this policy.  Through an administrative innovation—promoting 
the profligate issuance of bonds to pay for his hospitals program and other construction 
initiatives—Smith was able to put the choice directly to the voters of New York State, 




Furthermore, by taking these projects out of the conventional appropriations process, he 
had defanged the legislature, reducing their opportunities to make political gains by 
blocking funds, and sapping their ability to reject the program outright.  Once he had the 
money, Smith’s executive capacity enabled him to push a public health program that 
went far beyond the hospital bond, expanding annual state spending on public health 
clinics, laboratories, and aid to counties and municipalities.   
 Smith’s use of a large bonded debt for social welfare purposes enabled him to 
accomplish much of this agenda in his own time.  Moreover, it set a two-pronged 
precedent for those who would follow in his wake.  First, it claimed for the state a 
legitimately expansive role in public welfare.  Second, it blazed a path for the heavy use 
of bonds for public works.  The ramifications of this double-legacy would become 
immediately apparent under Smith’s successor, Franklin Roosevelt, who like Smith 
expanded the state’s role in public welfare and like Smith sought to finance many of his 
public works projects using bonded debt.  Over the succeeding administrations of Smith, 
Roosevelt, and Herbert Lehman, the state’s role in public welfare was legitimized both 
through repeated use and—eventually—through the desperation of the Depression years.  
But it must be noted that long before the Great Depression compelled the state and 
eventually the nation to expand services and endure debt, Smith was already pressing 
such an agenda, urging that New York fulfill its obligation to the well-being of its 











“Inefficiency is simply waste of public money; taxation to supply waste is simply 
extortion.” 
   
-Governor Charles Evans Hughes,  
Conditions of Progress in Democratic Government, 1910  
 
 
* * * 
 
 
“I shall have . . . the prayers of my successor—because he will talk to seventeen men.  I 
have been trying to talk to nearer 17,000 for four years.” 
 
-Governor Alfred E. Smith, Speech, 1926 
 
 
Transitional progressivism, as practiced by Governor Smith, called for the swift 
implementation of a broadly defined and generously funded social welfare regime.  As 
the story of Smith’s ardent labor on behalf of this agenda demonstrates, these initiatives 
were often frustrated—not only by conservative politics, but also by technical and 
constitutional hurdles.  Thus, in order to promote hospital construction, for example, the 
governor needed to improvise new administrative tactics—in that case, a redefinition of 
the appropriate use of the state’s bonded debt.  The bond innovation was a remarkable 
one that would be of fundamental significance to the future of New York state 
governance, and it elucidates Smith’s priorities as well as his mastery as an executive 
tactician.  These themes are demonstrated even more profoundly in the governor’s battle 
for administrative reorganization and the executive budget.  Like partisan blockades and 




hobble and halt many of the governor’s social welfare initiatives.  Therefore, the 
transitional progressive agenda, as well as traditional concerns over “good government,” 
compelled Smith to take up the mantle of administrative reform in the name of efficiency 
and economy.   
Numerous studies have agreed that Smith’s pursuit of executive reform was 
intertwined with his social welfare agenda; as historian Elisabeth Israels Perry put it, 
Smith quickly “discovered” that “a powerless governor presiding over an array of 
uncoordinated agencies staffed by political hacks could never implement the reforms the 
Reconstruction Commission was proposing.”
608
 Of equal significance, the episode is 
instructive regarding strategy.  Smith pioneered a political style to accompany transitional 
progressivism, and he employed those tactics liberally throughout the reorganization 
fight:  The byzantine machinations of state government were made plain to uninitiated 
voters; abstract reforms were promoted in palpable terms; and a long-standing objective 




Following his service on the Factory Investigating Commission and his legislative 
campaigns for labor reforms from 1912 to 1914, the next major step in Al Smith’s rise to 
progressive legitimacy was taken at the State Constitutional Convention of 1915.  By the 
end of that gathering, the nationally renowned New York Republican Elihu Root was 
lauding “Mr. A. E. Smith, the member of this convention whose personality has so 
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impressed itself upon every member.”
609
  Not only did these events confirm Smith’s 
emerging reputation as a progressive, they also sparked his interest in administrative 
reform.    
It was at the 1915 convention that Al Smith first joined the battle for 
reorganization, the issue having been raised by Senator Root.
610
  There the debate was 
centered much more around the “short ballot” than questions of administrative 
reorganization or the executive budget.
611
  Simply put, the ballot reform would reduce the 
number of elected state officers; rather than electing a state treasurer or a state engineer 
or a secretary of state, these officers would be appointed by the governor.
612
  
Furthermore, those state officials who would continue to be elected, such as the governor, 
attorney general, and comptroller, would gain stronger appointive power over their own 
departments—in the case of the governor, appointive power over the entire cabinet.
613
   
 Although the rhetoric of reform was framed by the question of the short ballot, the 
larger goal was increasing efficiency and economy through administrative reorganization.  
Root affirmed this shortly after the convention, remarking that “the short ballot feature of 
the bill was but an incident to this great work of putting the executive and administrative 
business of the state upon a sound business basis of accountability and responsibility, and 
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  Thus the short ballot was but one manifestation of the larger push for 
dramatic consolidation in state government.   
Proposing reorganization before the constitutional assembly, Senator Root 
eloquently decried the state of the state, declaring:  “Anybody can see that all these one 
hundred and fifty-two outlying agencies, big and little, lying around loose, accountable to 
nobody, spending all the money they can get, violate every principle of economy, of 
efficiency, of the proper transaction of business.”
615
  In response, the convention adopted 
several key provisions designed to remedy New York’s chaotic administration.  The 
delegates “undertook to condense all those one hundred and fifty-two agencies of the 
state into seventeen departments.”
616
  Furthermore, they “undertook to require that the 
overlapping and the interference, and the useless expenditure of money should be done 
away with, by putting all those agencies into a limited number of departments, under one 
head that . . . could be held responsible by the governor of the state who himself can be 
held responsible by the people of the state because they will have given him power upon 
which they can hold him responsible.”
617
  These measures, encapsulated within the 
executive reorganization proposal, were approved by the convention with a majority of 
more than four to one.
618
   
The new document required that the seventeen heads of the newly consolidated 
state departments “furnish the governor in ample time a statement of the needs of their 
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departments, to arrange them in the order of their importance, [and] to be responsible for 
that statement.”
619
  The document then charged the governor to “revise these statements 
and cut them down, or hold himself responsible for the amounts. . . [and] to lay the 
statements of the needs of the executive departments of the whole state government 
before the legislature side by side with a statement of the resources from which the 
appropriations are to be paid.”
620
  Thus, the convention established within its new 
constitution the executive budget.  This provision was approved by a majority of “more 
than thirty-four to one.”
621
 
At the close of the convention, the delegates felt that they had taken the state’s 
executive branch, which had been “ill-compacted, confused, extravagant, subject to no 
effective control,” and “sought to apply the rule of responsibility.”
622
  The convention 
had proposed that New York’s tangled web of 169 state agencies, boards, and 
commissions, be consolidated into 17 departments.
623
  All executive functions would be 
run through the new departments of Law, Accounts, Finance, Treasury, Taxation, State, 
Public Works, Health, Agriculture, Charities and Correction, Banking, Insurance, Labor 
and Industry, Education, Public Utilities, Conservation, and Civil Service.
624
  With the 
short ballot provision, ten departments would now have their leaders appointed by the 
governor, while only two would retain elective constitutional officers—the comptroller 
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and attorney general at the heads of the Departments of Accounts and Law, 
respectively.
625
   
Al Smith had been an important supporter of these reforms during the convention, 
adopting the traditional progressive interest in efficient government.  However, the new 
constitution was submitted to delegates for approval in toto rather than in individual 
sections; and New York City Democrats like Smith voted against the document, largely 
because the proposed charter did not remedy the gross underrepresentation of the City in 
the state legislature—an injustice resulting from decades of upstate gerrymandering.
626
  
While the new constitution limped out of the convention, it was rejected at the polls in 
November, with reformers like Smith actually campaigning against the document that 
contained administrative innovations for which they had fought.
627
  While the proposals 
for reorganization and the short ballot were “generally well received,” there was too 
much “cumulative opposition to the document” for it to be ratified by a majority of New 
Yorkers.
628
  The result spelled doom for reorganization; and while Republican governor 
Charles Whitman would make some attempts at pursuing administrative reforms during 
his two terms (attempts which were blocked by his own party in the legislature), such 
proposals would not again enjoy even a near-miss like 1915 until Smith became governor 
four years later.
629
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Smith’s gubernatorial pursuit of administrative reform originated in the proposals 
of his State Reconstruction Commission.   The executive secretary of this body was the 
governor’s close advisor Belle Moskowitz, on whose advice Smith had called upon 
Robert Moses, a young reformer whose Oxford thesis had explored administrative 
reorganization as a means of promoting government efficiency, to help write the 
commission’s final report.
630
  The findings were organized into a series of twelve reports 
published in 1919 and 1920.
631
  A chief concern was the question of administrative 
reform.  Because of the failure of the 1915 constitution, reorganization would now have 
to be undertaken by constitutional amendment, which required approval in two 
consecutive legislatures and then ratification by the voters.
632
  The proposal, while 
favored by Smith, was not originally a priority of the new governor—he was much more 
anxious to bring about many of the social reforms endorsed by the commission.
633
  But 
Smith soon came to understand that the executive’s ability to endeavor for reforms of any 
kind would be handicapped without administrative reorganization.  An enlightening 
episode occurred when the head of the Department of Farms and Markets was cited for 
corruption, and yet Smith had no authority to remove him from office.
634
  More 
significantly, Smith could not set the state agenda without crafting his own budget 
proposals, yet the governor of New York lacked such authority.
635
  During Smith’s first 
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year in office, the Republican legislature, motivated by party antagonism, refused to 
move on any of the governor’s proposals, capping what was widely decried as a do-
nothing legislative session.
636
  At the end of his first term, a frustrated Smith accurately 
grumbled that it had become “notorious throughout the State that much of my 
administration so far as constructive suggestions requiring legislation were concerned 
was fought by a Republican majority in the state legislature with no regard whatever to 
the merit of my proposals.”
637
         
Those proposals, largely the fruits of Smith’s reconstruction commission, were an 
early manifestation of the Democrat’s developing transitional progressivism.  Influenced 
both by the urgent conditions identified by social workers and the Tammany pragmatism 
of politicians like Al Smith, this progressivism had departed the realm of the abstract.  
When Smith became governor and initiated the reconstruction commission, he made it 
clear that he was not interested in a theoretical exercise, barking:  “Is this commission 
going to do something or is it just going to offer a report?  Are you going to have 
something definite that can be put into effect to benefit the state?  Because if you are not, 
the sooner you report and go out of existence the better.”
638
  It will be recalled that, with 
these marching orders, the commission did seek to “do something definite to benefit the 
state,” proposing a catalogue of social initiatives in areas like housing, recreation, and 
public health.  The programs that were introduced by the commission and championed by 
Smith reflected much of the social work agenda, and spoke to the governor’s unique 
progressive sensibilities.   
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Yet it also will be recalled that while the governor and his forces fought doggedly 
for these and other reforms, they lost the first round of each bout.  It took three years to 
create a housing board.
639
  This triumph came comparatively briskly, as most of the 
reconstruction programs would not be adopted until Smith’s third term.  The 
development of state parks on Long Island did not begin in earnest until Smith’s fourth 
term, and only after a protracted court battle that was won chiefly by the maneuvering of 
Robert Moses.
640
  Approval for a milk commission and for workers’ health insurance 
initiatives would never be secured in the Smith era.
641
 
It was through such frustrations and failures that Al Smith came to embrace 
administrative reorganization.  He had already supported it conceptually during the 
constitutional convention of 1915; yet in the midst of that debate Smith switched sides, 
and during the state-wide campaign for ratification, he fought against the reorganized 
constitution—as Moses biographer Robert Caro has noted, for Al Smith partisan loyalty 
and regional interests had trumped good theory.
642
  Partisanship did not trump theory, 
however, when Smith realized that the social reforms he knew would help the people of 
his beloved Lower East Side—and workers all over New York—were more likely to 
succeed under a progressive reorganization scheme.
643
   
Thus Smith became the foremost champion of administrative reorganization in 
New York.  To him, it was more than a progressive reform a long time in coming, more 
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than just making state government more scientific.  By consolidating budget-making 
authority and executive powers in the governor, the proposed reorganization enhanced 
the governor’s ability to set the agenda for the entire state government.  By increasing the 
efficiency of state administration, these reforms would provide resources for aggressive 
social programs and increase the efficacy of existing welfare initiatives.  
During the second legislative session of Smith’s first term, the governor was able 
to “bludgeon” the legislature into passing the reorganization amendment.
644
  The New 
York Times, criticizing the bloated state budget, editorialized in favor of the 
reorganization program as it lay before the legislature, declaring:  
There must be a halt to this extravagance.  There can be none until the machinery 
of government is simplified, until there is a responsible and effective 
administrative control, and by means of an executive budget, responsible and 





During that autumn’s gubernatorial race, the incumbent made the need for 
reorganization a central theme of his campaign.  Smith lamented the inefficient 
stewardship of state funds by legislative Republicans, laying the foundation for his 
argument in favor of an executive budget.
646
  In a speech at Brooklyn, the governor 
countered charges by his opponent, Judge Nathan Miller, that Smith’s “paternalistic” 
programs were a drain on the state treasury:   
The Judge well knows that the real solution of the cost of government in this state 
is a change in the present method of making appropriations, and well knows that 
the cost of this government is made necessary because of its cumbersome 
organization. . . .  I have declared for an executive budget at Albany, in the 
interest of economy. . . .  I have declared in favor of reorganization and 
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consolidation of the state departments, not only in the interest of economy, but to 




There was no question that New York’s government was wasteful.  Actors on all 
sides sought to remedy this in a variety of ways.  Smith sought to do so not by scaling 
back social welfare programs, but by making government run more efficiently.  The 
governor rhetorically asked his opponent just which of his “paternalistic” initiatives he 
would cut—would it be care for orphans?
648
  Or would he reduce hospital funding?
649
  Or 
would he eliminate care for the mentally ill?
650
  To Smith, a miserly campaign of 
whittling necessary social programs down to austerity—or eliminating them outright—




Although Smith lost in November, it was clear that his message had taken root in 
reform circles.  The incumbent had retained the backing of many “old-line reformers, 
independents and Republicans who normally would have supported his opponent,” and 
managed to run well ahead of the national Democratic ticket in New York.
652
  In New 
York City, Republican presidential nominee Warren G. Harding won by 443,000 votes; 
simultaneously, the Democrat Smith won the city by 325,000 ballots.
653
  Moreover, there 
was a “record vote for Smith in districts normally Republican,” and many considered his 
showing “a great personal triumph.”
654
  Meanwhile, Miller’s allies expressed 
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disappointment with the judge’s relatively weak showing in the midst of a national 
Republican landslide.
655
   
 Nevertheless, the election of Nathan Miller put the reorganization program in 
peril.  In order to appear on the ballot, the amendment was required to pass in two 
consecutive legislatures—it had thus far only progressed half way.  Under Miller’s 
direction, the legislature failed to approve the amendment a second time.  The new 
governor made clear his opposition to the reorganization and executive budget bills, and 
in response the Republican legislature did not even let them out of committee.
656
  For 
now, reorganization appeared moribund. 
 Defeat did not equate to a withdrawal from public life for Al Smith, nor did it 
terminate his interest in reorganization.  In a 1921 speech before the New York State 
Association, the former governor lectured his progressive audience on the virtues of the 
still unfinished fight: 
I think it is agreed by everybody that we are struggling along in this State under a 
constitution we have grown away from.  We are trying to fit the activities of a 
great State into constitutional machinery that was manufactured before anybody 
in the room was born. . . .  I am taking a good, cold, practical common-sense view 
of it, and if there is any man in this State who can give me a good reason why the 
people of this State should elect a State Engineer I should like to hear it. . . .  The 
same thing applies to Secretary of State.  The same thing applies to State 
Treasurer.  Still we go on in solemn fashion every two years putting forth 
candidates for all of these State offices.  Is there any reason we should have in this 
State five or six different tax-collecting agencies? . . .  What man can give us any 
reason for having four or five commissions dealing with prison matters in this 





 Smith continued with a telling anecdote that illustrated the results of such 
administrative inefficiency:  
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The commission on prisons after the plans had been drawn for the new death 
house at Sing Sing found a provision in the law that gave them power to say 
whether or not it was to be built, and they decided to hold it up.  I summoned 
them to the Executive Chamber and discussed it with them in the presence of the 
State architect and the superintendent of prisons.  We all agreed that the building 
should be built, as long as the plans were all drawn, and were about to submit 
them for public letting, but the commission on prisons changed its mind about it, 
and there we are.  We have the death trap down on the Hudson River years after 
the Legislature has declared its purpose, years after the State speaking through its 





After further haranguing against the lumbering and disorganized status quo, Smith 
presented his remedies.  He reaffirmed his commitment to “a constitutional amendment 
to reduce the number of elective offices and provide for the creation of . . . eighteen 
departments of government.”
659
  Smith also denounced the existing budget-making 
process, remarking that “every governor has come to regard the present budget system as 
a kind of joke.”
660
  He continued to assert the need for an executive budget system, like 
that proposed by the convention of 1915.
661
  Smith also tried to allay the fears of those 
who worried that this was simply an executive power grab, stating somewhat 
disingenuously that “nobody would want to take away policy-making from the 
legislature. . . .  Don’t let anybody talk to you about the executive budget system 




 Smith’s appearance at the New York State Association was one of the few major 
policy speeches he delivered during his two year hiatus from office.
663
  Nevertheless, the 
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address, and discussions Smith had with his old reformer-colleagues, indicated that he 
was ready to make another run for governor, and that reorganization was now at the top 
of the agenda. 
 In a speech at the Lexington Opera House on November 4, 1922, just days before 
the election, challenger Al Smith accused incumbent Nathan Miller of exacerbating 
statewide dysfunction by killing reorganization.  “By his action he continued the 
disorganized and disjointed government that he claims he was able to make run, although 
nobody, not even the progressive members of his own party, believes that to be 
possible.”
664
  In their rematch, Smith cruised to victory over Miller, winning by 387,000 




 Back in office, Smith pushed with renewed vehemence for his reorganization 
program.  In his inaugural address on New Year’s Day 1923, Smith briefly touched on 
the question of increasing efficiency, and implored the legislature to cooperate with him 
during his new term.
666
  He began making allusions to his famous Republican forerunner, 
Charles Evans Hughes, and analogizing his difficulties with the Republican legislature to 
those faced by Hughes when he tried to take on party bosses fifteen years earlier.
667
  
Smith did have political capital to spend, having won the most decisive victory in New 
York gubernatorial history, and he increased this advantage both through his political 
cunning and his ability to garner the support (and invoke the legacy) of progressive 
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Republicans.  Meanwhile, the administration continued to concentrate on the question 
behind the scenes at cabinet meetings.
668
  That year, the assembly did pass the 
reorganization amendment, setting the program back on track for a chance at referendum.  
A triumphant Smith crowed that “passing the consolidation amendment has lifted this 
important issue out of the realm of controversy.”
669
   
The next year, Smith once again called for an executive budget, which had 
theretofore floundered in the legislature.  In his 1924 message to that body, he lectured 
that “hand in hand with reorganization of the Government itself should go a fundamental 
and permanent reform in the State’s financial structure.  Throughout the country there is 
an insistent demand for a greater degree of Executive responsibility for the appropriation 
of public moneys.”
670
  By October, the governor could announce that “the Constitutional 
amendments providing for the reorganization of the Government were passed by both 
houses and are now awaiting passage by the new Senate to be elected this Fall.”
671
  
However, Smith, again a candidate for reelection, retained significant grievances with 
legislative Republicans:  “They refused absolutely to provide by constitutional 
amendment for an executive budget, and in place of it they put forth the dishonest 
proposal that a budget bureau be created by statute.”
672
  This would not suffice, because 
“the laws governing the appropriation of money today are fixed in the constitution, and 
no modern method can be adopted without amendment to that document.  They know 
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that just as well as I do, and their proposal for a statutory budget commission is a smoke 
screen to hide their opposition to honest, straightforward budget reform.”
673
        
By now, the momentum of the reorganization movement was almost certain to 
force legislators to acquiesce.  It was becoming increasingly clear that 1925 would be the 
year in which the battle over these reforms would leave the halls of Albany and be taken 
to the voting public.  Thus, that year would be one in which Al Smith’s talents as a 
speaker, debater, and campaigner would become vital.   
Smith received a major opportunity to apply those talents to the reorganization 
cause on March 7, 1925, at a debate sponsored by the Women’s City Club.  Thanks in 
large part to the work of Belle Moskowitz, a member of the group’s board since 1922, the 
club had energetically backed Smith’s executive reform proposals for several years.
674
  
Now they decided to host a debate on the issue.  Molly Dewson, the organization’s civic 
secretary, sent invitations to Lieutenant Governor Seymour Lowman and State Senator 
Jimmy Walker to represent the Republican and Democratic viewpoints, respectively.
675
  
Sensing an opportunity to rally support before a friendly audience, Smith announced his 
intention to take Walker’s place.
676
  Smith’s flair for debate was so “legendary” in New 
York that when it was learned that the governor intended to engage Lowman personally, 
Dewson and club president Ethel Dreier traveled to Albany to inform the lieutenant 
governor of the change—and to give him the opportunity to withdraw.
677
  Dewson 
recalled that “it was in the winter yet great drops of persperation [sic] came out on his 
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forehead”; but although visibly nervous at the prospect of jousting Smith in public 
debate, Lowman “was a sport and did not back out.”
678
   
The event was an oratorical tour-de-force for a politician already notorious for his 
prowess in debate.  Lowman fired the opening salvo the afternoon of the event, 
distributing a press release in which he referred to Smith as taking “his usual holier-than-
thou” stance and stating that “no twisted vision of intoxication can be more arbitrary and 
more dangerous than the mind of an ambitious man who is drunk with power.”
679
  While 
taking a slightly more amicable posture in face-to-face debate, the lieutenant governor 
nevertheless accused Smith of engaging in an unabashed power grab.  He also insinuated 
that Smith was merely the front man for other progressives’ ideas, claiming that “very 
rarely does [Governor Smith] advance a plan or policy that is original with him.”
680
  On 
making these accusations, Lowman was “roundly hissed” by the largely pro-
reorganization (and pro-Smith) audience.
681
  As the crowd continued to exhibit hostility 
toward the lieutenant governor, Smith genially applauded, both “staving off 
embarrassment” and “giving the outburst against his opponent a friendly turn.”
682
  
Despite being granted by his adversary a temporary reprieve from the antagonism of the 
audience, Lowman continued to pursue an aggressive indictment of the Smith agenda:   
Governor Smith . . . is the first ruler of an Anglo-Saxon State to demand executive 
power over the purse since the days when the English yeomen on the field of 
battle overthrew the right of the King to levy taxes and appropriate money.  
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Revolutions . . . rocked kingdoms to take away from Kings and Emperors the 
power of raising and spending money.
683
              
 
Rising to open his remarks, Smith approached a table and arranged several 
exhibits that he intended to use throughout his response.  Addressing the irony of 
Lowman’s analogy between the wealthy, well-born King John and Al Smith, a poor 
grandson of immigrants who grew up in the slums of the Lower East Side, the governor 
began by proclaiming himself the “king from Oliver Street.”
684
  Lowman, having 
reconsidered the situation, fled the hall. 
 During his remarks, Smith attempted to answer the argument that the executive 
budget and administrative reorganization programs were aimed at reducing the influence 
of the legislature:  “After the appropriation bill becomes a law, the legislator is as free as 
he can be to get up and build all the bridges and all the roads, to dig all the canals and to 
do any God’s thing he wants, but the terrible thing is that he must show where the money 
is coming from.”
685
  He also noted support for his plan among a group of Republican 
legislators, also citing the general support for reorganization by Elihu Root, the former 
senator and secretary of state who had played such a key role in promoting constitutional 
reorganization at the 1915 convention.  Smith referenced Lieutenant Governor Lowman’s 
prior support for the so-called “Root Plan,” and repeatedly quoted Root’s 1915 speeches 
on the subject.
686
  This tactic of invoking the names of prominent New York Republicans 
would yield nearly continuous benefits to Smith throughout the duration of the 
reorganization battle.     
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The governor went on to discuss other important issues of the day in his 
comments, including the enforcement of prohibition and the state’s apportionment 
system, but it was the issue of reorganization that dominated the night—and it was on 
that issue that Smith triumphed in the debate.  The headline in the next morning’s New 
York Times read:  
GOVERNOR CHEERED, LOWMAN IS HISSED IN BUDGET DEBATE 




 This episode is demonstrative of Smith’s ability to apply his talents as a 
politician—working an audience, telling compelling anecdotes to illustrate a point, 
reaching “across the aisle” for support—to the battle over his reorganization plan.  In the 
following months, the governor continued to speak out vigorously on behalf of the 
proposal.  Addressing the Economic Club of New York on May 18, Smith expressed his 
wish “to have the people of the State put a little check on the Legislative procedure to try 
to stop them from seeking, year after year as they have been doing for the last ten years, a 
certain control over the administrative departments of the government through the 
appropriation bill.”
688
  In a July debate with former governor Miller, Smith blamed 
Republican procrastination on reorganization and the administrative chaos that ensued 
with causing overcrowding in state hospitals that, by Smith’s first term, “constituted a 
disgrace to the State of New York.”
689
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Thus, for Smith the March debate with Lowman was the opening skirmish in a 
very public battle over administrative reorganization.  The governor’s decision to take the 
battle to the public is noteworthy on its own merits, for as historian C. K. Yearley notes, 
proponents of administrative reform had always eschewed appeals “to the masses,” partly 
as “a matter of style” and partly because “they could rarely count on much from the 
general public except indifference.”
690
  Contrastingly, Smith’s argument for 
reorganization, crafted in layman’s terms by a well-liked politician, effectively 
popularized the subject.   
Furthermore, the Lowman debate is particularly significant because it suggests the 
importance of invoking the names, words, and deeds of respected Republicans—a tactic 
which Smith and his allies would use to great effect in the proceeding months.  A 
Democratic executive who was consistently confronted with Republican legislative 
majorities, Al Smith understood that bipartisanship would be fundamental to achieving 
administrative reorganization.  His experiences as a caucus leader in Albany had taught 
him the art of bipartisan negotiation; his upbringing in the culture of Tammany by 
wheeler-dealers like Tom Foley had taught him the importance of offering extreme 
generosity to secure political loyalties.  In his protracted battle with the legislature, Smith 
would offer progressive Republicans both the reforms they sincerely coveted and the 
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By 1925, the governor enjoyed public support from prominent Republicans 
including Elihu Root and Henry L. Stimson, secretary of war under William Howard 
Taft; but he still struggled to convince his partisan rivals in the state legislature to back 
his reorganization program.  For example, early in 1925 legislative Republicans 
disingenuously introduced an ersatz budget reform known as the Hewitt-Hutchinson 
Bill.
691
  The proposal was patterned somewhat after the Federal Budget and Accounting 
Act of 1921, which gave the president the duty to produce a “recommended budget”—a 
budget that could then be ignored by Congress.
692
   
Simultaneously, Smith was increasingly able to count on his progressive 
Republican allies to break party ranks and speak out against the obdurate posture of the 
legislature.  At a luncheon of the New York’s Banker’s Club on March 5, reorganization 
proponents Root and Stimson criticized Hewitt-Hutchinson, which had been amended by 
the GOP to permit the legislature to increase and strike out budget items.
693
  In a 
document released by the Democrats, noted Republican lawyer Richard S. Childs, editor 
of the National Municipal Review and treasurer of the New York State Association, 
decried the legislative budget system, where, in his view, department heads “become 
lobbyists, dealing with legislators who are eager for patronage for their constituents.”
694
  
(Childs, who had spent years calling for consolidated executive leadership whose 
“legislation would be scientific,” joined forces with Smith after being impressed, like 
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other progressives, by the conviction this unlikely ally brought to the reorganization 
fight.)
695
    
Through these Republicans, the Smith camp began to make overtures to the man 
who could without exaggeration be considered the crown jewel of New York’s 
Republican Party: Charles Evans Hughes.  By now a former governor, United States 
Supreme Court justice, secretary of state, and presidential nominee who happened to be 
an erstwhile spokesman-in-chief for administrative reorganization in New York, Hughes 
seemed both a natural and powerful potential ally for the reform movement.  Based on his 




Fig. 3.1: A number of prominent New York Republicans supported Smith’s endeavors at administrative 




Indeed, the issues of reorganization and the short ballot had first been raised in 
New York by Governor Hughes during his 1910 message to the legislature, in which he 
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called for “administrative reorganization and consolidation.”
697
  Laying much of the 
intellectual groundwork for later battles over the issue, Hughes suggested that 
reorganization would “tend to promote efficiency in public office by increasing the 
effectiveness of the voter and by diminishing the opportunities of the political 
manipulators who take advantage of the multiplicity of elective officers to perfect their 
schemes at public expense.”
698
   
 As early as his first year on the job, Hughes had encountered some of the 
administrative difficulties that later would inspire his vigorous support for reform.  In 
1907, Hughes was forced to endure an affair in which a “bungling” state official, Otto 
Kelsey, could not be removed from his post due to the governor’s administrative 
weakness.
699
  Kelsey, the superintendent of insurance, had failed to make changes in his 
department after several major scandals, and was deemed incompetent by Hughes.
700
  
However, at that time leaders of state agencies could only be removed by the state senate, 
so there was no official action that Hughes could take to remove Kelsey from his post.  
After a long and turbulent public battle between Hughes and Kelsey (the latter backed by 
powerful interests who desired that the embattled bureaucrat’s régime continue), the 
senate refused to unseat the superintendent.
701
 
 The Kelsey case is an important anecdote in understanding the basic rationale for 
the style of administrative reorganization that Hughes and other reformers embraced.  At 
the center of such reforms must be increased gubernatorial control over the state’s 
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executive bureaucracy.  As it stood, the governor could not discipline department heads:   
Many antedated the governor, having been appointed by previous executives to terms that 
insured their tenure would persist long after their appointer-patron had left office.  Others 
were elected on the same ballot as the governor, and thus were responsible only to the 
voting public.
702
  Still others were installed by the legislature.  None served at the 
pleasure of the governor; Hughes, or any other chief executive, was powerless to remove 
department heads, or any of their subordinates.  Thus the Kelsey affair was a distressing 
illustration of the need for reform.  The governor was incapable of controlling the 
personnel within his branch of government—indeed, many of them served in spite of the 
governor’s wishes.  The state senate was the only body empowered to remove such 
individuals from office, and there the political spoils of patronage and the power of 
political machines and corporate interests trumped any impulse toward reform.  The 
entire matter led Hughes and other reform-minded politicians to believe that effective 
administration would require “a concentration of executive powers in the hands of the 
governor.”
703
       
 Not only the Kelsey experience but the larger question of executive reform helped 
to inform Hughes’ actions.  In setting up public service commissions, Hughes was 
steadfast in his demand that the governor must have power to remove their members.
704
  
Hughes’ speeches across the state made increasing reference to the need for a stronger 
executive in the battle for statewide reform.
705
  Meanwhile, Republican bosses and other 
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party men had found Hughes’ crusading temperament so obnoxious that many believed 
the party might not even re-nominate the sitting governor.
706
 
 Of course Charles Evans Hughes was both re-nominated and reelected.  In his 
second inaugural address, Hughes argued for more efficient state government—to be 
accomplished, in part, by establishing gubernatorial control over executive department 
heads.
707
  To make the case, Hughes drew an analogy between his proposed system and 
the president’s cabinet—perhaps the first, but certainly not the last time this reference 
was made during the reorganization fight.
708
  By 1910, the governor was calling 
specifically for administrative reorganization and the short ballot.
709
  That same year, 
Hughes partnered with Comptroller Clark Williams to study the idea of an executive 
rather than legislative budget-making system.
710
  
 These were to be the last advances in the march toward administrative 
reorganization made under the governor who had initiated the struggle.  Although 
Hughes continued to speak on behalf of such reforms during and after his second and 
final term as governor—delivering a series of lectures at Yale University in which he 
turned his attention to the question of “Administrative Efficiency”—his gaze became 
increasingly fixed on national issues.
711
  Moving forward, the fight for reorganization 
would be without its pioneer and original champion.  
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More than a decade later, Smith and his allies saw the former governor as the 
ideal field marshal in the rekindled battle over reorganization.  Hughes gubernatorial 
activities demonstrated that he was ideologically committed to the reform program—
indeed it was Hughes who had laid much of the groundwork for the movement.  
Moreover, Hughes’ Republican bona fides were not to be questioned.  Here was a 
credible Republican who had been a trailblazer for reorganization and, significantly, was 
completely trusted by Smith’s progressive Republican allies.
712
  But Hughes was 
reluctant to involve himself in the issue, due to the partisan nature of the contemporary 
debate.
713
  It was only a series of Republican misfires and Democratic entreaties that 
prompted the former governor to reenter the battle for administrative reform. 
The first move was made by the legislative Republicans.  Smith’s forces had 
planned to announce the formation of a commission that would be charged with crafting 
the final proposals for reorganization should the necessary amendment be approved at the 
impending referendum.  The Republicans, having caught wind of this strategy, struck 
first, announcing the formation of their own commission on reorganization—even 
furnishing an impressive list of names to fill it.  The proposed commission would involve 
such notables as former governor (and Smith nemesis) Nathan Miller, former speaker H. 
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Edmund Machold, and of course Charles Evans Hughes.
714
  It appeared as though the 
legislative Republicans had outfoxed Smith and the Democrats.   
But this was in fact a Pyrrhic victory for the Republicans.  In their haste to beat 
the governor out of the box with a commission proposal, they had made the “clumsy” 
error of “not finding out if appointments are willing to serve” on their commission.
715
  
Many of these notables were not even aware that they were being considered as 
appointments.  Wrote Hughes:  “I know nothing of the matter except what I have seen in 
the newspapers, and so far my appointment on the Commission has not been brought 
before me in a manner requiring any decision on my part.”
716
  The acerbic Robert Moses 
declared that the confused responses of Hughes and others demonstrated “how crudely 
the whole thing was done.”
717
  Some even feared that the possibility of Hughes’ 
participation had been jeopardized by the “infantile” manner in which the legislative 
Republicans issued their invitation to the celebrated New Yorker.
718
     
 The chaos generated by the Republican maneuver created a prime opportunity for 
the Smith forces.  According to Richard Childs, “Gov. Smith, although taken by surprise, 
promptly welcomed this move since it implied Republican support for the amendment 
and an expectation that it will be passed in November.”
719
  Rather than fight the 
Republicans, Smith chose to persuade them to modify their proposal to meet his 
requirements.  The governor convinced the legislators to allow him to “repair some of 
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their omissions” by appointing fifteen additional members to their commission.
720
  
Furthermore, an open letter from Smith suggested the installation of Hughes as 
commission chairman.
721
  Childs wrote several letters to Hughes, imploring him, with a 
mix of flattery and alarmism, to accept the post.  He praised Hughes as the obvious 
choice to lead the commission, stating that “it seemed particularly appropriate inasmuch 
as it was you who opened the fight for the short ballot idea in 1910. . . .  It was our hope 
that your name and your interest in the amendment would dignify it as good Republican 
doctrine and make it harder for the [upstate Republican] machine to oppose.”
722
  
At the same time, Childs outlined the dire consequences that could befall their 
shared reform ambitions should Hughes abstain:  “It is . . . important that ex Gov. Miller 
shall not be chosen as he is hopelessly wrong-headed on this subject and defeated it one 
year by a wink to legislators when he was Governor.  If you were not made chairman, it 
would be dangerously logical for the Commission to turn to him!”
723
  The possibility of a 
Nathan Miller chairmanship, as well as the rumored Republican intention to hand the 
gavel to former speaker Machold, were in fact frightening possibilities to those, including 
Hughes, who favored comprehensive reform.
724
  Furthermore, without the clout that 
Hughes would bring to the commission, reformers were “far from certain that the up-state 
machine would refrain from knifing” reorganization.
725
    
 Hughes’ legitimate concern that the administrative reorganization program for 
which he had spent years fighting might be in peril, as well as the prestige offered to him 
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by Smith and other advocates of reform, encouraged the former governor to put an end to 
his recent quiescence on the issue.  The once-reluctant Hughes did agree publicly to serve 
on the commission, and while “there had been some speculation as to the chairmanship,” 
the suggestion of Hughes “practically ended the discussion.”
726
  As reformers had hoped, 
the voters ratified a constitutional amendment which stated that “‘all the civil, 
administrative, and executive functions of the State government’ shall be assigned to 
twenty departments . . . and provide[d] that, while no new department shall be created, 
the Legislature may reduce the number of departments by consolidation or otherwise.”
727
 






 The ratification of the reorganization amendment was but a single step—now the 
commission needed to make concrete proposals.  Under Hughes’ chairmanship, the 
commission set about its task of preparing a report in time for the 1926 legislative 
session.
729
  Subcommittees were authorized, each charged with investigating and 
developing reorganization plans for specific arms of the state bureaucracy.
730
  The 
chairmanships of these committees were distributed among a diverse group of important 
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New Yorkers: Colonel Stimson chaired the committee on executive and state 
departments; former speaker Machold chaired audit, taxation and finance; former 
Republican governors Charles Whitman and Nathan Miller chaired public works and 
banking and insurance, respectively; and former Democratic presidential nominee John 
W. Davis chaired civil service.
731
  These sub-committees were then to report their 
findings to Hughes’ executive committee, which in turn would author the commission’s 
final report.
732
  The group was noted for its intense sessions, long hours, and relentless 
schedule—all driven by the zeal and determination of its newly revitalized chairman.
733
   
 The commission’s proposals, dubbed the “Hughes Report on the Consolidation of 
State Departments,” were submitted to both houses of the legislature on March 1, 1926.  
The report began by dealing with the issue of department executives, recommending:   
The heads of the various departments shall be individuals and not boards or 
commissions. . . .  the tenure of heads of the departments shall be the same as that 
of the Governor who appoints them. . . .  heads of departments [shall be] 
appointed by the Governor and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate 
[and] may be removed by the Governor in a manner to be prescribed by law.
734
    
 
 After dealing with the question of appointment and removal of department heads, 
the report outlined sixteen proposed new departments under the consolidated system: 
Executive, Audit and Control, Taxation and Finance, Law, State, Public Works, 
Conservation, Agriculture and Markets, Labor, Education, Health, Mental Hygiene and 
Charities, Correction, Public Service, Banking and Insurance, and Civil Service.
735
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Collapsing 187 state agencies into these 16 executive departments was only half the job: 
it was also vital to define specifically the jurisdiction and operating procedures of the 
realigned bureaucracy.   
Perhaps the most dramatic changes proposed by the Hughes report were those 
involving the executive department—an entity without precedent in other reorganized 
states.
736
  It was in this department that many of the most important reforms that Smith 
and others had desired were realized.  Hughes’ executive department was to be headed by 
the governor, a move expressly designed to “increase [the governor’s] power of 
supervision and to make him exercise the necessary duty of coordinating the activities of 
these departments which in the future will constitute the executive branch of the State 
Government.”
737
  The department was to be divided into five divisions, including one to 
oversee the state budget.
738
  In that body, the commission took steps toward establishing 
the long-coveted executive budget system.  Responsibility for “formulating the budget 
and exercising supervision and control over the estimates, requests and expenditures of 
the various departments of the State” was now placed unequivocally upon the 
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  The Division of Budget was thus to “assist the governor in performance of 
his fiscal functions.”
740
       
 While pressing forward with the controversial executive budget, the commission 
went to some lengths to relieve fears that New York was embarking on an unprecedented 
systemic overhaul that would lead to an imbalance of state power.  The report explained 
that unlike the executive department proposal, the executive budget was not original to 
New York.  “In thirty States,” the commissioners reassured, “the budget is now 
formulated by the Governor alone.  In ten more States it is formulated by a board 
composed either of a group of executive officers, which includes the Governor, or are 
nominated by him.”
741
  Furthermore, the Republican-dominated federal government had 
moved toward such a system as well, “thus reversing a Congressional practice of over 
one hundred and thirty years.”
742
  Significantly, the commission pointed to New York’s 
tardiness in embracing reform:  “[I]n only two states, Arkansas and Rhode Island, is [the 
budget] still formulated by the Legislature.”
743
 
 No longer would the Empire State be noted for its archaic budget system.  Under 
the new method, the heads of the concurrently overhauled departments would be 
emancipated from their annual pilgrimage to the legislature.  This was to be the end of 
department chiefs groveling before legislative committees, their budget requests honored 
only after they had paid tribute in the form of patronage to powerful chairmen.  Instead, 
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these officers, most of whom were to be appointed by the governor, would bring their 
requests directly to the executive.  As prescribed by the Hughes Report:  
The head of each department of the state government except the legislature and 
judiciary, shall submit to the governor itemized estimates of appropriations to 
meet the financial needs of such department. . . .  The Governor, after public 
hearing thereon . . . shall revise such estimates according to his judgment. . . .  
[and then] shall submit to the legislature a budget containing a complete plan of 




The plan also allowed the governor to submit supplemental budget requests and 
amendments to the original budget, although explicitly prohibited from vetoing the 
original executive budget proposals once they were approved by the legislature.
745
   
 Besides granting the chief executive more appointment power over department 
heads, defining for those officers tenures simultaneous to that of the governor, and 
establishing the long-overdue executive budget system, the Hughes Report also took on 
the herculean task of streamlining the state government by eliminating redundancy and 
consolidating agencies.  Reorganization was not pursued exclusively “in the interest of 
economy, but [also] to promote efficiency.”
746
  This was to be the beginning of the end 
for the anachronistic hodgepodge of 187 boards and commissions operating throughout 
the state.  New York would no longer have “five or six tax-collecting agencies,” nor 
would it continue to abide “four or five commissions dealing with prison matters.”
747
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Entities such as the Department of Narcotic Drug Control, established for the sole 
purpose of “enforcing three sections of the Public Health Law” independently of the 
Department of Health, would be eliminated—their functions absorbed into more 
accountable overarching state departments.
748
  This consolidated system would curb 
redundancy, cut costs, and alleviate the governor’s reaffirmed duty of coordinating the 
functions of the various state agencies.
749
  Proclaimed Smith: “I shall have the prayers—
at least the prayers of my successor—because he will talk to seventeen men.  I have been 
trying to talk to nearer 17,000 for four years.”
750
  Furthermore, by calling specifically for 
gubernatorial appointment of most department heads, the Hughes Commission’s report 
finally established the short ballot in New York.
751
     
By December of 1925, with the reorganization amendment ratified a month prior 
and the Hughes Commission deeply absorbed in its efforts to consolidate state 
government, Al Smith was beginning to see victory within reach.  Colonel Stimson wrote 
that in a meeting with the governor, Smith had told him “emphatically” that “no man or 
men could induce him to become Governor for another term . . . he was only anxious to 
finish up this work for the state.”
752
  This issue had come to define much of Smith’s 
executive tenure, and it would be a major piece of his legacy to the Empire State.
753
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 The conclusion of the decade-and-a-half long struggle seems anticlimactic.  The 
Hughes Commission’s prestige was so great that the legislature “hastened to accept not 
only the organizational pattern but also the recommended changes in the law.”
754
  The 
Hughes Report had stipulated that the changes go into effect January 1, 1927.
755
  The 
legislature voted to enact the proposals and referred those necessitating further 
constitutional alterations to the people for approval; in the fall of 1927 amendments were 
ratified establishing the governor as head of the executive department and instituting the 
executive budget.
756
  Smith, who of course did stay on for one more term as governor, 
was able to oversee the implementation of the consolidation program, and was the first 
governor of New York to produce his own budget.
757
   
 
*  *  * 
 
 To declare this long episode a success for Smith and the progressives simply on 
the merits of their having won the political battle over reorganization would be 
irresponsible.  Yes, after more than fifteen years of political maneuvering, administrative 
consolidation and the executive budget were now constitutionally mandated.  But this 
fact was not a progressive triumph on its own.  In order to assess the success or failure of 
Smith and his allies, one must analyze whether they were able to achieve any of the 
governmental virtues that they believed reorganization would promote.  
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 The most obvious measures of reorganization’s effectiveness are figures like the 
number of state agencies, the number of state employees, and the overall size of the 
budget.  Looking exclusively at the cost of running the state, in search of a reduced 
budget, suggests that reorganization failed.  In 1925, the total cost of operating the state 
was $169,719,834.33.
758
  In 1926, that figure stood at $185,896,833.36; an increase of 
$16,176,999.03.
759
  These were two typical consecutive years in the heart of Smith’s 
administration, and the last two budgets prior to the passage of reorganization.  In 1928, 
Smith’s executive budget message estimated state needs at $229,269,065—an increase 
over two years averaging $21,686,115.82 per year.
760
  In 1929, when Smith’s heir 
Franklin Roosevelt submitted his first budget—an executive budget for a reorganized 
state government and the first budget created under the new constitutional provisions—
the estimated cost of operating the state was $256,418,774.58.
761
  This was an increase of 
$27,149,709.58 over 1928.  Thus, from 1926 to 1929, the state budget increased by 
$70,521,941.22.  If, for the purposes of simplification, this increase is averaged over the 
first three years under reorganization (in fact it increased even more rapidly as time 
progressed), then it amounts to an annual increase in the budget of $23,507,313.74.  The 
budget increased by over $8 million more per year in the first three years after 
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reorganization.  Comparing these two sets of consecutive years, two before and two after 
reorganization, it is clear that not only did the reforms fail to rein in the growth of the 
state budget, but indeed the budget increased even more after reorganization.
762
 
Nor did reorganization succeed in truly reducing the number of state entities and 
their employees.  Ostensibly, the Hughes Commission collapsed the 187 state agencies, 
bureaus, and commissions into 16 executive departments; in reality, the commissioners 
did not eliminate many of these bodies so much as they organized them within 16 
umbrella departments.  While some redundant entities were absorbed by others or 
eliminated outright, many more were placed under the control of the new departments.  
This promoted better organization and communication and established a clear chain of 
command with authority vested in the governor.  It did not necessarily reduce the size or 
complexity of government.  Indeed, Roosevelt’s 1929 budget was longer than any 
previous budget in New York history.
763
    
Reorganization did not dramatically slash bureaucracy.  Not that Smith had really 
set out to do so.  While many progressives, including Smith, engaged in the rhetoric of 
promoting economy through reducing bureaucracy, organization to foster more effective 
administration was much more important to the governor.  What was to be gained by 
eliminating “unnecessary personnel” anyway, Belle Moskowitz is reported to have asked 




 Thus, reorganization did not reduce the size of government, either in cost or in 
number of employees.  The traditional progressive goal of promoting economy had not 
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  But what about efficiency?  After all, it was efficiency that Smith’s 
transitional progressivism truly required, for by promoting efficient administration, the 
needs of the citizens could be met by good government.  To assess this, one must 
consider whether the governor’s new budget-making power held up or was usurped by 
powerful legislative committee chairs.  If legislators once again seized control over the 
design of the budget, then the governor’s ability to set the state agenda and administer 
state policy efficiently would be severely compromised.  One must also assess whether 
this change really promoted Smith’s ultimate ambition of using a streamlined executive 
system to promote social welfare. 
 Early in the administration of Franklin Roosevelt, attempts were made to 
circumvent the governor’s budget-making authority.  The legislature sought to give two 
committee chairmen “power to control and dictate the expenditure of lump sums 
appropriated for certain departments of the state . . . without the executive having the 
power to approve or disapprove of their actions.”
766
  Roosevelt refused to acquiesce to 
this assault upon the nascent executive budget.  Furthermore, the legislature had struck 
out several of Roosevelt’s appropriations measures, substituting their own lump sum 
appropriations, and the governor maintained that under the new system the legislature 
could not segregate items within the budget and substitute for them itself, that rather it 
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could only strike out or reduce items.
767
  Late in 1929, the New York State Court of 
Appeals decided in favor of the governor, declaring that the legislature had overstepped 
the powers conferred upon it by the state constitution as amended.
768
  This case affirmed 
the executive budget system; the governor’s ability to set the state agenda through the 
budget-making power was fortified.   
This power quickly proved crucial to the governor’s ability to direct the state 
efficiently in promoting social welfare.  By the end of Roosevelt’s first year in office, the 
nation was embroiled in the Great Depression.  The executive budget gave him “some 
flexibility in initiating . . . programs,” and so Roosevelt was able to mobilize the state 
government in response to the economic catastrophe.
769
  With this gubernatorial action, 
the transitional progressive understanding of efficient government was realized.  The 
state was able to respond to the social tumult wrought by mass-unemployment thanks in 
part to reorganization.   
Al Smith had argued that the government had a responsibility to improve the lives 
of its citizens through social welfare programs.  Frustration at the de facto inability to 
fulfill this promise had led him to crusade for administrative reorganization.  Now 
reorganization had helped the government respond to desperate social problems.  For 
Smith it was this goal, rather than reducing the cost or size of government, that was 
paramount.
770
  To this end, the reforms were a success. 
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This episode provides another example of Smith’s agenda pressing traditional 
progressive ideas toward a more modern liberalism—here the governor sought classic 
progressive reforms (efficiency, economy, accountability), but did so largely out of truly 
liberal motives (the desire effectively to provide necessary welfare services).  In the field 
of administration, the progressives championed a professional, rational, scientific 
administrative structure.  But this in itself is not a liberal initiative.  For example, one 
could favor reorganization in order to ensure domination of government by the educated 
élite.  Indeed, many adherents of the “cult of efficiency” were hostile toward “a 
democracy more plural than they preferred.”
771
  Moreover, the push for economy could 
just as easily cause one to decry social programs as unnecessary extravagancies.  For 
example, Smith’s reorganization ally Elihu Root once lamented of social welfare 
programs:  “We are setting our steps now in the pathway which through the protection of 
a paternal government brought the mighty power of Rome to its fall.”
772
  Smith pursued 
reorganization to enable government to engage in the sort of programs that Root would 
have censured as “paternal.”  The reorganization narrative elucidates the distinctive 
nature of Al Smith’s progressive sensibilities by revealing his zeal for, and intended use 
of, a quintessentially progressive reform; it sets Smith’s progressivism apart from that of 
many of his contemporaries, placing him at the crossroads of Progressivism and modern 
liberalism.   
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 Of equal significance is what this history demonstrates about Smith’s progressive 
style.  Many who had pressed for executive reorganization, as well as other progressive 
reforms, had intentionally avoided popular political crusades in favor of more academic 
or legalistic exercises.  And why not?—after all, when presented to the voters, the 
reformist 1915 constitution was roundly rejected.  Yet rather than being theoretical and 
even élitist, the reform program proffered by Smith, while often esoteric, was 
transformed by its sponsor into a people’s initiative.  This was in fact the essence of 
Smith’s progressivism.  According to Robert Moses, the governor “had a way of getting 
at the heart of things and popularizing very abstruse questions so that the average fellow 
could understand them.”
773
  Others shared this evaluation:  future New York City mayor 
Robert F. Wagner, Jr., opined that his father’s long-time ally “could get people, the rank 
and file of America, to understand what the problems were—make complicated issues 
plain to them, so they could understand,” while future New York governor Charles 
Poletti “liked [Smith’s] mind because he was able to as I say strip any problem into 
simple terms and get those simple terms over to the people.”
774
  Even Franklin Roosevelt 
concurred, writing that “Governor Smith reminds me of Theodore Roosevelt in his 
instinctive method of stripping the shell of verbiage and extraneous matter from any 
problem and of then presenting it as a definite programme which any one can 
understand.”
775
  Thus, the Happy Warrior’s battle for administrative reorganization, 
perhaps the most arcane of progressive initiatives, demonstrates one of the most 
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important qualities that Smith brought to the development of transitional progressivism:  
the ability to “popularize the abstruse.”      
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Chapter IV: The Campaign of the Decade 
 
 
“Dominant in the Republican Party today is the element which proclaims and executes 
the political theories against which the party liberals like Roosevelt and La Follette and 
their party insurgents have rebelled.  This reactionary element seeks to validate the theory 
of benevolent oligarchy.  It assumes that a material prosperity, the very existence of 
which is challenged, is an excuse for political inequality.  It makes the concern of the 
government, not people, but material things.  I have fought this spirit in my own State. . . 
.  in order to place upon the statute books every one of the progressive, humane laws for 
whose enactment I assumed responsibility in my legislative and executive career.  I shall 
know how to fight it in the nation.” 
 
-Alfred E. Smith, Address of Acceptance, August 22, 1928 
 
 
* * * 
 
 
“There has been revived in this campaign . . . a series of proposals which, if adopted, 
would be a long step toward the abandonment of our American system and a surrender to 
the destructive operation of governmental conduct of commercial business. . . .  In effect, 
they abandon the tenets of their own party and turn to State socialism.” 
 
-Herbert C. Hoover, Address at Madison Square Garden, October 22, 1928 
 
 
* * * 
 
 
“Governor Alfred Smith has stood by us, has put the women’s social welfare problems 
into effect . . . .  Will they recognize their duty to be loyal, not only to the man and his 
service, but to the program of industrial progress and of social welfare, of equality of 
women, and the protection of the weak, which he represents and on which his public 
career rests today?” 
 
-Frances Perkins, Radio Speech, September 24, 1928 
 
 
As governor of New York State, Al Smith earned a reputation as an efficient 




executive, Smith’s progressivism was distilled into a unique, discernible cluster of policy 
initiatives and political beliefs; the transitional progressivism which had been born of his 
and other machine men’s interaction with female social welfare activists had matured into 
a coherent reform agenda.  Moreover, the governor’s political skills had been refined 
over a decade of communicating that agenda to his constituents.  Therefore it should 
come as no surprise that Smith’s 1928 campaign for the presidency featured the 
nationalization of his transitional progressivism. 
The historical significance of the 1928 presidential contest has been a topic of 
lively debate within the literature on United States politics.  Most scholars focus on 
cultural questions including prohibition, Smith’s Roman Catholicism, and the urban-rural 
divide.  Such interpretations often suggest a recognizable shift within the electorate:  the 
forging of a new Democratic alliance of urban-dwelling recent immigrants, Catholics, 
Jews, and to a lesser extent African-Americans, in the crucible of a decade of mounting 
native Protestant chauvinism that in many ways climaxed with the scurrilous whispering 
campaign waged against Smith.  This new, heterogeneous coalition was to provide the 
electoral muscle behind New Deal liberalism.  Hence, Samuel Lubell declared 1928 “an 
Al Smith revolution,” and V. O. Key labeled it a “critical election.”
777
 
 The literature has made little allowance for consideration of major policy debates.  
Studies that have deemed Smith’s campaign critical or even revolutionary have been 
cautious about assigning any political-philosophical dynamic to the cleavages that 
emerged.  For their part, works that have challenged the transformative significance of 
the election have been no more charitable to the candidates’ convictions, usually either 
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ignoring them altogether or declaring, as did one noted study, that “on most important 




 The myopic gaze which the literature has fixed upon the cultural issues of 1928 
has obscured the significant policy debates that occurred in that year.  In fact, the 
campaign represented the apogee of Smith’s transitional progressivism, which imbued 
the emerging urban Democratic coalition with a set of values that anticipated many facets 
of the New Deal.  Considering the events of 1928 with an acknowledgment of the 
Democrat’s peculiar style of progressivism places the election squarely at the center of an 
evolutionary process that connected portions of the progressive tradition to key facets of 
New Deal liberalism.   
 It is clear that cultural battles over alcohol and urbanism and particularly over 
Smith’s Catholicism were of great significance to the candidates and voters of 1928.  But 
far from monopolizing the debate, these questions were often relegated to the periphery 
by Smith and his allies in favor of issues that, in the context of their time, represented 
important ideological divisions between the parties and the nominees.  Smith went into 
great detail enunciating and defending his positions on fundamental problems including 
farm relief, water power policy, economic justice, social welfare, and administrative 
efficiency.  On all of these questions he challenged, in some cases very profoundly, the 
Harding-Coolidge status quo.
779
  Smith’s opponent Herbert Hoover had engineered much 
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of that status quo from his powerful post as secretary of commerce for the previous two 
administrations, and in his campaign for the White House the Republican nominee 
proudly became the chief exponent of the virtues of the political economy of the 1920s.  
Smith never sought the total destruction or even the dramatic reconstruction of that 
political economy—to expect such things from a mainstream candidate in a period of 
general economic strength would be absurd.  Nevertheless, the Democrat shone a critical 
light upon the neglected corners of Calvin Coolidge’s America, challenged many 
accepted policy doctrines, and presented in the form of his transitional progressive 
governorship the blueprints of an alternative approach to national administration. 
 Not only were there serious policy disputes between the candidates and among 
their lieutenants; these debates also transcended the realm of high politics and were taken 
up in the nation’s press and even by rank and file citizens.  Al Smith and Herbert Hoover 
offered contrasting visions of the state’s role in promoting a just society, and these 
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distinctions were taken seriously by the press and the public.  Far from drowning out the 
other issues of the campaign, the question of Smith’s religion and the broader debate that 
ensued over sundry cultural questions served to invigorate all sides of the contest and 
awaken many quiescent citizens to the importance of national affairs.  For those voters 
who were initially attracted to Smith because of his faith or his friendliness toward drink 
there became evident a robust agenda that spoke to their isolation from mainstream 
American society on cultural and economic levels.  For these voters as well as those who 
cast a skeptical eye upon Smith’s famous brown derby, these questions added another 
layer of complexity to a labyrinthine political-economic landscape that exhibited very 
real challenges to which the candidates proposed very different remedies. 
  
Toward the Nomination 
 
During what could be called the “long Gilded Age,” being governor of the Empire 
State made one an ex officio contender for a presidential nomination.  From the end of the 
Civil War through the election of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932, New Yorkers secured 
major party nominations for the presidency no less than eleven times, including six sitting 
or former governors and three men who would eventually reside in the White House.  By 
1928, Alfred E. Smith was the four-term governor of the wealthiest, most populous, and 
arguably the most politically significant state in the union, with an impressive catalog of 
achievements and a considerable national following.  Moreover, there was not in the 




that year.  At least as early as 1927, it was clear that the last election of the “Roaring 




 Smith’s name had already been placed before Democratic delegates twice that 
decade: in 1920, in a largely ceremonial “favorite son” nomination by noted orator and 
sometimes congressman Bourke Cockran; and in 1924, when he was introduced by 
former vice presidential nominee Franklin Delano Roosevelt as “the Happy Warrior.”  At 
the latter convention, the New York governor and other northeastern progressives waged 
a fierce if unsuccessful battle to wrest the party away from southern and western 
domination by thwarting the presidential ambitions of William Gibbs McAdoo and 
calling for a direct rebuke of the Ku Klux Klan.   
While McAdoo, the son-in-law and treasury secretary of Woodrow Wilson, was 
considered the front-runner, Smith enjoyed the benefit of home court for the 1924 
contest, which was held at Madison Square Garden.  Seeking to exaggerate this 
advantage, Tammany operatives packed the rafters with their constituents, whose bawdy 
taunts of the speakers and constant bickering with the delegates transformed the 
proceedings into a burlesque of the decade’s culture wars.
780
  Sectional antagonisms 
raged, especially over the Klan issue.  Oklahoma senator Robert Owen was hissed from 
the bleachers when he suggested that “a large number” of Klansmen “joined the order to 
protect the Constitution and the law.”
781
  When delegate Andrew C. Erwin, “a tall young 
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Georgian” and veteran of the World War, implored the nation to help the South put down 
the Invisible Empire and denounced his fellow Southerners as “unworthy of their 
ancestry” if they refused to join the fight, he was jeered by McAdoo’s forces and ignored 
by his fellows.
782
  He was not ignored however by representatives from twenty-three 
other states, who paraded and then mobbed in celebration of Erwin’s righteousness, 
“pushing in so hard that police had to protect the Georgians.”
783
  Isabella Ahearn O’Neill, 
an actress from Providence and the only woman in the Rhode Island delegation, “rushed 
up to the youthful orator and kissed him on the lips.”
784
  Dixie delegates reacted with 
indignation as the house band struck up the popular Sherman tribute “Marching Through 
Georgia” in the midst of the brouhaha.
785
  Fistfights were rampant.
786
  When a North 
Dakotan gave a speech endorsing McAdoo that included the line “I condemn the order 
known as the Ku Klux Klan,” only the New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island 
contingents marched in approval; McAdoo’s own California delegation refused even to 
applaud.
787
  An Ohio jurist was shouted down (“Oh, shut up!”), and the audience laughed 
openly at the governor of North Carolina.
788
    
After more than a week of balloting, McAdoo, whose name was consistently met 
with acrid chants of “oil, oil” (a reference to his past legal work for Teapot Dome 
offender Edward Doheny), was indeed denied the nomination; so too was Al Smith.
789
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Meanwhile, the proposal to denounce the Klan by name had been rejected by a single 
vote out of over a thousand cast.
790
  In the sweltering July heat, in the exhaustingly heavy 
air, with the delegates’ lethargy checked only by the cacophonous anarchy within the 
hall, decades of Democratic contradictions were betrayed and the party was torn asunder.  
Even a three-time presidential nominee was not immune from the infectious disrespect.  
In the midst of the chaos William Jennings Bryan, a year away from his grave, had taken 
to the podium.  Portions of the Commoner’s speech were “met with such a storm of 
hisses and booing that it was impossible for him to make himself heard.”
791
  
Reprimanding the rowdy Tammanyites and their northeastern allies on the convention 
floor for their indecorous conduct, Bryan forecast that if the present Democracy failed in 
its historical mission against privilege, “some other party will grow up to carry those 
issues and take our place.  But, that new party will never find the leaders of a noble cause 
in the gallery.”  The progressivism of Wilson, Bryan’s own populism, these would surely 
be carried on—but not by these New York hooligans.
792
  
Al Smith had other ideas.  The crude shenanigans of the galleries aside, historians 
have allowed that within the mêlée the Smith forces “had represented the good fight . . . 
had stood before the most powerful politicians the Klan could muster and never backed 
down.”
793
  Many ordinary New Yorkers, like John Vincent Donohue, a postal employee 
and low-level Tammany operative, thought by 1924 that “the poor little boy from 
Chatham Square and Fulton Fish Market is without doubt the Moses who is going to lead 
                                                                                                                                                 
not realize the full impact the Klan vote would have on the convention. . . .  Brennan had by his own 
strategy killed all hope of nominating Al Smith.”   Burner, The Politics of Provincialism, p. 120. 
790
 Davis, “Georgia Beats Klan Plank,” p. 1. 
791
 Ibid., p. 5. 
792
 Ibid., p. 5. 
793




the masses of this country out of the wilderness of the rottenness created by the present 
situation in Washington.”
794
  Nor had all of the visiting delegates been as disgusted with 
the antics of their hosts as had Bryan.  A Texan wrote to Brooklyn congressman Loring 
Black that he had been impressed by “the great demonstration given [Smith] at that 
memorable Convention . . . because of the great love the common people manifested for 
him. . . . the spontaneous explosion of sincere devotion by a people in admiration of their 
great leader.”
795




Fig. 4.1: Contenders for the 1924 Democratic Nomination: Alfred E. Smith of New York (left), William 
Gibbs McAdoo of California (right); and the eventual nominee, John W. Davis of West Virginia (center).
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It should further be noted that Smith’s campaign was only partly aimed at making 
an ethnocultural point.  Prior to the convention, Smith suggested that his candidacy was 
rooted in his record as a progressive governor; he directed those interested in his ideology 
to his ambitious annual messages to the legislature; he reproached those “progressives 
who only talk about progress in government,” but “never do anything about it,” (a gibe 
almost certainly directed toward McAdoo); and demanded that his “stand on the ‘wet’ 
issue . . . not be stressed,” but rather that it be “left alone.”
797
  This might be dismissed as 
political posturing if it were not for Smith’s address to the final night of the convention, 
in which he boasted of the greatness of his home town but then guided delegates through 
an extended tour of his progressive achievements and ambitious agenda—highlighting 
hospital construction, administrative reforms, liberal appropriations for education, the 
water power fight, protective labor legislation, parks development, and public health 
programs—along with a number of other important state initiatives.
798
  He did not discuss 
the KKK, prohibition, or any other contemporary cultural controversies.
799
  Responding 
to the New Yorker’s disposition throughout the convention, journalist Walter Lippmann, 
a friend and advisor of the governor, wrote Smith that “working for the best things in 
sight meant working for you. . . .  let me thank you.”
800
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Indeed, despite his loss at the convention, 1924 was a good year for Al Smith:  
while the national Democratic ticket of John W. Davis and Charles W. Bryan went down 
to ignominious defeat, Smith was reelected governor, vanquishing Theodore Roosevelt, 
Jr., by one hundred thousand votes in spite of New York’s going to Calvin Coolidge by a 
margin of almost one million ballots.
801
  The following summer, during a debate at 
Carnegie Hall over the ten year $100 million bond proposal, Smith’s opponent Nathan 
Miller received what was probably his most enthusiastic applause of the evening when he 
asserted:  “I do not suppose the Governor intends to stay in Albany all of the next ten 
years. . . .  I have heard that he had ambitions to go somewhere else.”
802
  As the Newark 
News proclaimed, Smith had “emerge[d] from the Democratic wreck a bigger figure than 
ever before”; from 1924 forward, the governor was a serious contender for the 1928 
Democratic presidential nomination.
803
   
Significantly, as Smith’s reputation grew, so too did his emphasis on his 
progressive agenda.  The governor marked his return to national prominence on 
September 27, 1925 in Chicago, at a picnic event dubbed “Al Smith Day” by the Cook 
County Democratic Party.
804
  With an estimated one hundred thousand people present, he 
refrained from discussing issues popular with this largely ethnic audience—namely “his 
well-known views on prohibition” which “could have set the crowd . . . aflame”—and 
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instead chose to use the venue to promote his progressive ideas.
805
  Before what was 
described as an attentive audience, Smith outlined his battles for workmen’s 
compensation and widows’ pensions, and outlined the need for reorganization of both 
state and federal government to meet the demands of modern society.
806
  By that 
December, Lippmann was writing in Vanity Fair that for those following Smith, it had 
become “impossible any longer to ignore the signs of an impending fate.  For with each 
new proof of his power in New York the tension throughout the country becomes more 
ominous.  His victories have ceased to be victories merely; they are premonitions.”
807
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 Smith’s national progressive advocacy took him to Pennsylvania the following 
May, where he spoke on behalf of a proposed bond issue for hospital construction in that 
state similar to the one he had championed in New York in 1923.  Before a mass meeting 
held at the Philadelphia Academy of Music under the auspices of the Public Charities 
Association of Pennsylvania, the New Yorker told an enthusiastic crowd that although 
“people don’t like to roll up against the Commonwealth . . . any burden of debt,” the 
majority of citizens “are ready and prepared to carry the burden of indebtedness,” when 
they “have a thorough understanding of just what the money is to be used for.”
808
  In that 
spirit, Smith challenged Pennsylvanians:  “Does it not occur to the individual that every 
now and then there is expected some offering in the nature of gratitude or in the nature of 
thanksgiving?”
809
  If so, the hospital bond offered an ideal opportunity “for every man 
and every woman in Pennsylvania to be able to say to the ruler of the Universe Himself, 
‘Inasmuch as the poor, the weak, the sick and the afflicted were special charges of Thy 
Divine Son during His life on earth, their care, their proper and adequate care, will be 
given by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.”
810
  This was an important moment for 
Smith; not only because he received “prolonged applause” for presenting the sort of 
progressive arguments he had enlisted at home before citizens of another state, but also 
because he was introduced that night by George W. Norris, the Nebraska Republican 
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widely considered “the accepted leader of the Progressives in the Senate.”
811
  Norris’ 
respect for Smith’s progressivism would grow in the years that followed, but it is 
significant that already in 1926 the Nebraskan was introducing the New Yorker as a 
“forceful and brilliant Governor” who had successfully “met and corrected” the sort of 
public health crises rampant in contemporary Pennsylvania.
812
 
As the next presidential contest drew closer and the press focused increasing 
scrutiny on the frontrunner’s every public pronouncement, Smith continued to call for 
active government on behalf of progressive reform.  He also sought out forums in which 
to profess these beliefs.  Appearing before the Child Welfare Committee of America in 
early 1928, Smith declared to “great applause” his belief that since “we have been 
particularly blessed. . . . we owe something . . . to take care of the poor, of the sick, the 
afflicted and particularly of the children.”
813
   
 In these years Smith’s national following continued to grow.  Loring Black 
reported that Dubuque, Iowa was “quite enthusiastic” for the New Yorker by 1926; the 
next year congressman William Cohen, another New York Democrat, sent similar news 
from Dallas and from Miami.
814
  In Tampa, Florida, the city fire department followed 
Smith’s 1926 reelection campaign, and cabled his Republican challenger: “straw vote 
here Smith ninety eight and you nothing.”
815
  On March 10, 1927, the wife of an 
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 By 1927, speculation about Smith’s presidential ambitions routinely appeared in 
newspapers and magazines.
817
  The candidate’s religion remained an albatross during 
these discussions.  Anticipating a Smith presidential bid, Alabama senator Thomas 
Heflin, a fellow Democrat and a noted anti-Catholic, “assailed” the governor of New 
York in March of 1927 (such tirades would become banal by the end of the campaign).
818
  
On a more sophisticated plane, an essay was published in the April 1927 issue of Atlantic 
Monthly by New York attorney Charles C. Marshall.  The piece questioned whether a 
Roman Catholic president could uphold the constitution, respect religious freedom, 
maintain military neutrality, and support public education.
819
  Walter Lippmann wrote 
Smith that the article “offers you a tremendous opportunity . . . . to answer not only for 
yourself but for this whole generation in a way that would be final and conclusive.”
820
  
Smith concurred.  The following month he composed a rejoinder with the help of Father 
Francis P. Duffy, a Catholic priest, and Joseph Proskauer, a Jewish progressive and long-
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  The essay presented episodes from his career as well as writings by 
Catholic theologians in an attempt to confirm both he and his co-communicants’ 
patriotism and fidelity to democratic government.  Unlike any candidate before him, the 
Catholic Smith was forced to defend openly his faith and to declare that “I recognize no 
power in the institutions of my Church to interfere with the operations of the Constitution 
of the United States.”
822
  Smith would later discover that his response on the religious 
question was neither final nor conclusive; but believing it was he continued to base his 
presidential ambitions on his progressive agenda and his gubernatorial résumé. 
 Clearly then, by the fall of 1927 Al Smith’s career plans were the talk of the 
nation.  It was in that context that the governor released an important document entitled 
Progress of Public Improvements: A Report to the People of the State of New York by 
Governor Alfred E. Smith.  The report was a sort of capstone to the Smith years; an 
apologia on the transitional progressive view that generous expenditures and bonded 
indebtedness on behalf of massive public works projects were warranted in the name of 
social welfare and civic progress.  In his introductory statement, the governor reasserted 
the principle that it was necessary to issue bonds and increase appropriations in order to 
allow the government to finance projects for the social good.  Rejecting the narrow 
reading of the appropriate use of bonds employed by his conservative opponents, he 
touted his record of fighting recalcitrant legislators in order to secure public funds for 
hospitals, parks, parkways, conservation projects, prisons, civic centers, and schools.
823
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Then, with his characteristic talent for popularizing the abstruse, Smith presented almost 
a hundred pages of captioned photographs demonstrating just where these public funds 
were being spent—many of them before-and-after shots of bridges, grade-crossings, 
parks, beaches, roadways, hospitals, asylums, schools, and government buildings.
824
  
Here was the increasingly scrutinized governor of New York, boasting of his liberal use 
of state funds for the purpose of active government on behalf of social welfare and 
demonstrating the real-life benefits attained through such activities.  This 127-page 
advertisement for the virtues of Smith’s executive temperament, issued on the eve of his 
campaign for the White House, was “eagerly sought after and got very good mention.”
825
  
More than ten thousand copies were issued to the public.
826
  Smith did not intend to 
present himself as anything but a progressive. 
 As Smith continued to prepare for a national campaign, another important event 
occurred which was seen at the time as linked to the presidential ambitions of the New 
Yorker.  In 1926, Governor Smith had strongly supported his friend Robert F. Wagner’s 
bid to unseat Republican United States senator James Wadsworth.  Wagner, like Smith, 
had been among the most influential members of the original transitional progressive 
alliance, and in 1926 he ran for the senate as a sort of “Al Smith candidate.”
827
  Having 
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won a close election, Wagner went to Washington intent on continuing his work on 
behalf of progressive labor and social welfare legislation, and committed to serving the 
interests of the working-class voters who were largely responsible for his narrow victory.  
With these goals, as well as the memory of the factory commission’s methods of 
scientific study of industry in mind, Wagner took to the senate floor on March 5, 1928, 
giving his maiden speech on behalf of a bill he had proposed which would compel the 
secretary of labor to investigate thoroughly unemployment conditions.
828
  In the face of 
continuing claims of general prosperity and a “full dinner pail,” Wagner cited the 
“growing bread lines . . . the larger number of men and women seeking work . . . a 
constantly decreasing return for the worker . . . a lowered standard of living for a large 
portion of our people” that he witnessed among his urban, working-class neighbors; and 
he demanded federal action.
829
  In his remarks, Wagner charged that “four million people 
. . . is a conservative estimate of the number of those out of work . . . . one in every ten of 
our wage earners is in idleness”; he mocked President Calvin Coolidge’s persistently 
sanguine reports of high wages and “plentiful” employment as not supported by any 
realistic study of the situation; and he censured Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover 
for looking “all across the Nation, to discover not a single idle man.”
830
   
 Wagner’s speech was given from the perspective of the urban worker, for 
whom—in many cases—the 1929 stock market crash would not mark a sudden onset of 
poverty.  It was a broadside against the Republican administration on behalf of such 
workers, and it was framed in progressive terms, viewing systematic surveys as the first 
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step toward ameliorative legislation.  Significantly, the speech was widely viewed in the 
press as an opening salvo by the forces of Alfred E. Smith against the Republican 
administration in anticipation of an imminent conflict between the governor and either 
Coolidge or one of his lieutenants.
831
  Furthermore, there is evidence that Smith was 
aware of some of the details of Wagner’s speech in advance of March 5; and regardless, 
he was so excited by the news from Washington that he cabled the senator, “because I 
could not wait long enough to write a letter.”
832
  Just four months in advance of Smith’s 
nomination for the presidency, his close friend and strong political ally Robert Wagner 
was attacking the Republican administration in progressive terms from a working-class 




 Columnist Mark Sullivan wrote that for the Democrats to nominate anyone but Al 
Smith for the presidency in 1928 “would be an act so calling for explanation as to weaken 
them in the country.”
833
  The party obliged.  The convention, held at Houston in late June, 
was “rather dull,” particularly as a sequel to the pandemonium at Madison Square 
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Garden; Smith was nominated “handily,” as was Joseph T. Robinson, a senator from 
Arkansas and the party’s choice for vice president.
834
  
 The Republicans nominated Herbert Clark Hoover, the ambitious and imperious 
secretary of commerce under the Harding and Coolidge administrations.  Hoover had 
been a prominent engineer, a successful businessman, and a noted humanitarian: his 
administration of relief efforts in post-World War Europe earned him universal applause 
for saving the lives of hungry millions.
835
  By the end of that effort, his name was part of 
the national lexicon: to “Hooverize” meant “to economize in the national interest.”
836
  His 
reputation was such that Woodrow Wilson’s assistant secretary of the navy, Franklin 
Roosevelt, coveted Hoover as the Democratic presidential candidate for 1920.
837
  Instead, 
Hoover became the leading force in the next two Republican administrations, earning 
him some of the credit for the economic successes of the 1920s, and allowing him to 
dominate federal policies on everything from air travel to farm relief to radio 
broadcasting.
838
  All of this culminated with his coordination of recovery work in the 
wake of the 1927 Mississippi River flood.  By 1928 Hoover, like Smith, had emerged as 
his party’s clear choice for the presidency.
839
 
 Officially Al Smith was running against Herbert Hoover, but in fact he was also 
running against the accumulated legacies of eight years of Republican rule.  His 
acceptance address, delivered to a rain-soaked crowd in Albany as well as a national 
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radio audience on August 22, demonstrated that the Democrat intended to assault the 
status quo on progressive grounds: 
Dominant in the Republican Party today is the element which proclaims and 
executes the political theories against which the party liberals like Roosevelt and 
La Follette and their party insurgents have rebelled.  This reactionary element 
seeks to validate the theory of benevolent oligarchy.  It assumes that a material 
prosperity, the very existence of which is challenged, is an excuse for political 
inequality.  It makes the concern of the government, not people, but material 
things.  I have fought this spirit in my own State.  I have had to fight it and to beat 
it, in order to place upon the statute books every one of the progressive, humane 
laws for whose enactment I assumed responsibility in my legislative and 
executive career.  I shall know how to fight it in the nation.
840
   
 
 Smith critiqued Republican stewardship of the economy, calling the idea of 
general prosperity under the GOP a “myth”:   
When four million men, desirous to work and support their families, are unable to 
secure employment there is very little in the picture of prosperity to attract them 
and the millions dependent upon them. . . .  Specific industries are wholly 
prostrate and there is widespread business difficulty . . . .  Prosperity to the extent 
that we have it is unduly concentrated and has not equitably touched the lives of 




These sentiments contrasted sharply with those of Smith’s opponent.  Historians 
have long recognized in Hoover’s ideology a tepid rebuff of free-market orthodoxy; but 
as William Leuchtenburg points out, this was “much less germane than his 
rationalizations of the status quo.”
842
  Indeed, as he began his campaign for the White 
House, the secretary of commerce hoisted the banner of Harding-Coolidge prosperity, 
promising that if elected he would “go forward with the policies of the last eight years,” 
and if “given this chance” Republican economic policies would ensure that “poverty will 
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be banished from this nation.”
843
  Hoover may have once declared that fairness “can only 
be obtained by certain restrictions on the strong and the dominant,” but by 1928 he 




 In his acceptance, Smith outlined a number of key differences between himself 
and the GOP, including water power development, farm relief, tariff policies, 
immigration restriction, prohibition, and labor relations.  The lines between the 
candidates’ ideologies were sharply drawn, and the Democrat intended to persist in this 
approach throughout the campaign.  It was to be a national debate about issues of 
fundamental significance to the American polity of 1928.  Believing this, Smith asserted:  
The people can and do grasp the problems of the government. . . .  I have seen 
legislation won by the pressure of popular demand, exerted after the people had 
had an honest, frank and complete explanation of the issues.  Great questions of 
finance, the issuance of millions of dollars of bonds for public projects, the 
complete reconstruction of the machinery of the State government, the institution 
of an executive budget, these are but a few of the complicated questions which I, 
myself, have taken to the electorate.  Every citizen has thus learned the nature of 











 In late September, the Smith campaign locomotive barreled across the Great 
Plains with the Happy Warrior and his entourage of family, New Yorkers, national party 
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figures, and a growing press corps, in tow.  En route to St. Paul, Minnesota, Smith made 
a stop in Bismarck, North Dakota, for a meeting with that state’s new governor, Walter 
Maddock.  After meeting privately, the two governors emerged for a brief press 
conference that descended into an opera buffa on Smith’s relationship with the Corn Belt. 
 Maddock, a farmer who had been elected lieutenant governor as a member of 
North Dakota’s radical-populist Non-Partisan League (NPL), had inherited the 
governorship on August 28 upon the death of Arthur G. Sorlie.  He opened his remarks 
with a broadside against the Republican Party (of which he had been a nominal member 
until two weeks prior).
847
  “I went to Kansas City as a delegate, a Republican delegate, to 
the national convention, hoping we could put [former Illinois governor Frank] Lowden 
over.  We were unable to put Lowden over and we were unable to get our agricultural 
plank written into the platform.  I made the statement then that it was impossible for 
Hoover as a candidate to carry North Dakota.  I have not changed my mind in the least.  
The farm organizations which I felt I was representing there . . . were turned down at the 
convention.”
848
  In contrast, the Democrats—whom Maddock had joined on September 
13 in his bid to secure the governorship in his own right—had afforded “the farm 
interests . . . better treatment at Houston.”
849
  As “one of the original Non-Partisan 
Leaguers,” the governor understood the break with precedent involved in his flight from 
the GOP, recalling that “we have operated principally through the Republican Party,” but 
noting also that the league had maintained its “right at any time to operate through the 
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Democratic or any other party as we saw fit.”
850
  Now appeared such a time, for Maddock 
estimated that Smith’s further expounding on the Democratic platform had secured “80 
per cent. of the farmers of North Dakota to his support.”
851
  Furthermore, Maddock 
reckoned that this “sentiment . . . rings true in Minnesota and South Dakota also”; states, 
like North Dakota, where the tradition of radical agrarian non-partisanship (embodied in 
Minnesota by the Farmer-Laborites) was quite strong.
852
 
This ought to have been a great boon to the Democratic candidate, coming as it 
did on the heels of his well-received policy speech on agriculture and from the mouth of a 
serious leader on farm issues.  Yet the whole event was confounded by the hesitant 
behavior of the North Dakotan.  He insisted that “I am not speaking and do not want to 
speak as an individual,” and refused “to declare outright that he would support” Smith’s 
candidacy.
853
  This instigated “a cross-fire of questions,” to which Maddock responded 
with obstinate equivocation.
854
  Ultimately, the governor was at his most direct when he 
delivered this triangular head-scratcher:  “I am for the best-interests of agriculture and the 
agricultural organizations of this State are 80 per cent. for Smith.”
855
  A reporter pointed 
out that given Maddock’s professed sympathy for the farm organizations and their 
approval of the New Yorker, the “natural conclusion” was that the governor supported 
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  Unable to evade this transitive logic, Maddock responded brusquely: “I 






Fig. 4.2: North Dakota governor Walter Maddock (third from right, between Smith and the two women) 
appearing with the Democratic candidate for president after delivering a series of indirect endorsements.  
(Author’s collection). 
 
 The situation in North Dakota had local complications.  Maddock was pressured 
from both flanks: the two NPL United States senators from North Dakota were 
supporting Hoover,  while a vocal group of North Dakota “regular” Democrats had come 
out in opposition to Maddock’s nomination for governor.
858
  (Ultimately, he would not be 
reelected.)
859
  Meanwhile, there were reports that Maddock’s religion was making things 
even less comfortable: an anonymous friend told the press that “the reason Governor 
Maddock himself was so reluctant to announce his personal support for Governor Smith 
was because both were Catholics.”
860
  These intricacies aside, the Bismarck episode 
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encapsulates the complicated relationship that developed between Al Smith and the 




Having opened his campaign with a promise to speak directly to the voters on 
problems of fundamental importance, Smith dedicated each of his campaign speeches to 
one or two major issues, outlining his views and attacking those of the Republican 
administration and the Republican nominee.  For his first speech, the Democrat travelled 
to Omaha, Nebraska, and spoke on agriculture.  While governor of New York, Smith had 
in fact dealt with farm problems, but such questions were not central to the transitional 
progressivism that he and his circle had developed in the Empire State.  Nevertheless, 
Smith’s approach to the issue demonstrates the ways in which the candidate chose to 
apply his progressive sensibilities to alien problems; while the response to that approach 
by farmer-statesmen like Walter Maddock suggests the complex political economy into 
which the candidate gingerly wandered. 
  In spite of Smith’s personal background, it was fitting that the Democrat should 
commence his critique of the sitting administration with a speech on agriculture.  For 
America’s farmers, depression did not wait until late 1929 to set in; rather, the crash in 
agricultural prices after the close of the Great War left most farmers desperate for relief 
throughout the 1920s.
861
  In 1928, the Democrats called this “the most noteworthy flaw in 
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  Moreover, the issue offered an opportunity for partisan 
differentiation since many farm progressives believed, with Robert La Follette, Jr., that 
“President Coolidge with his cabinet ministers Mellon, Hoover and Jardine, has fought 
bitterly and desperately against all effective measures for the relief of agriculture.”
863
   
In order to assuage the suffering of American husbandry, Congress repeatedly 
considered a set of measures known as the McNary-Haugen bills, which called for the 
federal government to purchase agricultural surplus and sell it abroad at the world market 
price, segregating this crop from the domestic market (which would be protected by 
tariffs), thus boosting prices within the United States.
864
  The cost to the government 
would be recovered by a fee imposed on the agricultural commodities benefited.  This 
program encountered resistance within the Republican administration that Calvin 
Coolidge had inherited from Warren G. Harding.  While strongly supported by Secretary 
of Agriculture Henry C. Wallace, the bill suffered the staunch opposition of commerce 
secretary Herbert Hoover, who “feared for the souls of farmers if the government 
intervened further.”
865
  (This was only one of many clashes between Wallace, whom 
Hoover found “a dour Scotsman with a temperament inherited from some ancestor who 
had been touched by exposure to infant damnation and predestination,” and Hoover, 
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whom Wallace judged “‘bloodless,’ ‘stuffy,’ and ‘opinionated.’”)
866
  Wallace was dead 
by the time Coolidge began his own full term in the White House, and the president 
followed Hoover’s council to the order of two vetoes—each accompanied by a message 
that the commerce secretary had helped compose.
867
   
By 1928, the debate over the McNary-Haugen bill was central to farm politics.  In 
response, Smith followed the pattern he had established in New York by calling on 
conferences of experts to help craft state policy, and the Democrats hired George Peek, a 
leading exponent of McNary-Haugenism, as well as General Hugh Johnson and Professor 
Rexford Tugwell, to make a survey of the farm situation and help develop the governor’s 
agricultural policy.
868
  Tugwell later recalled that the team had devised a strategy to raise 
farm prices that candidly would have raised the price of food, but the plan had been 
discarded by the time of Smith’s nomination because urban advisors like Belle 
Moskowitz thought these living expenses were already too high.
869
  However, Peek, “the 
man who was most instrumental in developing and promoting” the concept of farm parity 
in the 1920s, remained a key advisor to the Smith campaign, energetically coordinating 
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“independent agricultural leagues . . . in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Iowa, 
Nebraska, Wisconsin, Minnesota, the Dakotas, and Montana for the sole purpose of 
electing” the Democrat.
870
  Moreover, by September 18, when Smith delivered his 
Omaha speech, the Democratic nominee was explicit in his approval of “the principle” of 
McNary-Haugenism:    
As I read the McNary-Haugen Bill, its fundamental purpose is to establish an 
 effective control of the sale of exportable surplus with the cost imposed 
 directly upon the commodity benefited.  For that principle the Democratic 
 platform squarely stands, and for that principle I squarely stand.  Mr. Hoover 
 stands squarely opposed to this principle by which the farmer could get the 
 benefit of the tariff.  What remains of the McNary-Haugen Bill is a mere matter 
 of method, and I do not limit myself to the exact mechanics and method 




 The “mere matter of method” to which Smith would not commit was the proposal 
to fund the scheme using an “equalization fee,” a detail seen as crucial by many in the 
Corn Belt.  The Democrat’s attempt to finesse this point caused consternation among 
many farm progressives and served to temper enthusiasm for his candidacy in some 
quarters.  In spite of this, Smith saw in McNary-Haugenism “a clean-cut issue which the 
farmers and the voters of this country must decide.”
872
   
The Democrat asserted that Republicans had been promising farm relief for nearly 
two full terms and had delivered only expressions of sympathy; this had been exacerbated 
by the “hostility” toward farm relief expressed at the Kansas City convention, wherein, 
according to Republican senator George Norris, “a direct slap [was] administered to the 
farmers of the country” with a platform that proved “a sad disappointment to every 
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progressive citizen of the United States.”
873
  While Republicans refused to act, farm debt 
was ballooning, rural banks were failing, and agricultural prices continued to plummet in 
the face of a rising cost of living.
874
  To Smith, all of this meant that Hoover was no 
friend of the farmer:  “Mr. Hoover, as the chief adviser of the last two administrations 
upon the subject of agriculture, assumed a direct responsibility for the hostility and 
inaction of the administration and continues to assume that responsibility by his fulsome 
indorsement of the record of Coolidge policies.”
875
  
Smith’s running mate Joe Robinson reinforced this message with a Nebraska visit 
of his own.  Unlike the presidential nominee, Robinson came from an agrarian 
background, and the Democrats sought to make the most of this fact, describing the 
senator as “Born on a farm in the Ozarks, reared among struggling farmers and 
conversant with the problems of distribution and marketing.”
876
  Already in his 
acceptance address, Robinson had declared farm relief the “most important” of the “big 
issues” of 1928.
877
  Traveling to Lincoln in October, he charged that “there was never a 
time when reactionary influences were more dominant in the United States than at 
present,” particularly given the Republican farm relief policy of “insincerity and 
indecision.”
878
  The next day, at Sioux City, Iowa, the Arkansan took to the airwaves to 
denounce again the “reactionary” posture of Hoover and his running mate, Senator 
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Charles Curtis of Kansas, in what was interpreted by the press as an attempt to “woo” 
farm progressives.
879




Historians including David Burner and Alan Lichtman have criticized the Smith 
campaign, particularly the candidate himself, for running an operation marked by 
confusion over the problems of agriculture and obfuscation regarding potential 
remedies.
880
  Given Smith’s ambivalence over the equalization fee, this critique is not 
without merit.  Contemporary opponents often made such attacks; and at times they were 
expressed by friendlier observers like Henry A. Wallace, editor of Wallace’s Farmer and 
son of Hoover’s late nemesis at the Department of Agriculture.  The junior Wallace wrote 
to Democratic congressman Meyer Jacobstein that although he was “personally . . . quite 
sure that I shall vote for Smith in the coming election,” because he had a “record which is 
somewhat sympathetic to the common man,” he was troubled because he found the 
governor “colossally ignorant of the agriculture problem.”
881
  These doubts were 
especially prevalent during the early stages of the campaign (Wallace wrote his letter in 
June), and Smith’s pronouncements on agricultural issues tended to improve his 
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reputation amongst farm progressives.  Wallace himself “threw his support to Smith” 
after hearing the Omaha speech.
882
   
In fact, while Smith is often charged with evasion on the farm question, the 
popular response to his Omaha address was positive—except among Republican 
spellbinders.  Secretary of Agriculture William Jardine denounced Smith in Riverhead, 
Long Island, sneering that his hosts’ governor was “either . . . grossly ignorant in the field 
of practical economics or . . . deliberately misrepresenting the truth.”
883
  The Democratic 
New Orleans Times-Picayune, on the other hand, cheered the speech as a “bold 
offensive” in which the candidate’s “definition of the farm issue given in plain ‘Park 
Row’ talk . . . caught the fancy of western crowds,” and Smith aide Joseph Proskauer 
observed that “people throughout Nebraska and Kansas are wildly enthusiastic about the 
speech.”
884
  After Smith spoke further on agriculture at St. Paul, the St. Louis Post-
Dispatch declared that “if the farmers sincerely believe in the McNary-Haugen scheme of 
relief . . . they have found a man who would, if he were president, co-operate with them 
to give such a plan the effect of law.”
885
  While these partisan reactions were to be 
expected, the enthusiasm of the progressive Republican governor of Nebraska could 
claim more neutral origins.  After the Omaha speech Smith shuttled to Lincoln and met 
with Governor Adam McMullen, who released a statement to the press “crediting his 
visitor with more understanding of the agricultural problem than he had shown 
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  While desiring further explanation of Smith’s position on the equalization 
fee, the governor gave a favorable review:  “From what I gathered, listening to Governor 
Smith’s speech, he gave an unequivocal endorsement of the McNary-Haugen bill. . . .  It 
is quite evident that the governor has been giving further study to the agricultural 
question since he delivered his speech of acceptance.  He seems to have a better 
understanding of the problem and is more in accord with the legislation the farmers have 
been seeking than he was some time ago.”
887
   
 Indeed, Smith’s campaign, which historians claim failed to capture the loyalties of 
disheartened Corn Belt Republicans, made significant inroads in the region in the weeks 
following the Omaha speech.
888
  Besides the kind words of Governor McMullen, Smith 
would eventually secure the endorsements of two leading Midwestern progressive 
Republicans—Nebraska’s Senator Norris, and Senator John J. Blaine of Wisconsin.  
Blaine decried Hoover as “opposed to practically all of the policies of the great mass of 
progressive Republicans and independent forward-thinking people of America.”
889
  
Norris, whose support was largely based on Smith’s water power stand, was of particular 
significance.  Speaking on the Democrat’s behalf in late October, the Republican 
attributed the demise of Congress’ farm relief proposals to Hoover’s influence in the 
cabinet.
890
  In contrast, “the farmers and those who depend on the farmers for their 
prosperity should support Mr. Smith.  His program, as he has announced in a number of 
his speeches, is to the great advantage of the nation, because it will give the farm sectors 
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the relief they are so much in need of at the present.  The Republicans offer nothing but a 
few kind words.”
891
  From Minnesota, the editor of Farm, Stock and Home wrote Norris 
that his endorsement was “the crowning act of a long and valuable service in the interest 
of the common people.”
892
  The Nebraskan was hailed in the Democratic Houston Post-
Dispatch for displaying “the strict intellectual integrity and moral courage, for which he 
is noted,” while the Republican Wall Street Journal speculated that Norris’ “plate from 
his new Democratic friends is expected to consist of at least thirty pieces of silver.”
893
    
The drift toward Smith by agrarian progressives went well beyond the two 
senators.
894
  A group of “several thousand . . . normally Republican. . . .  disgruntled Iowa 
farmers” organized the Agricultural Equality Voters’ League “for the purpose of 
‘spanking’ their party,” while the forty-five thousand member Iowa Farmers’ Union 
seemed to abandon its “theoretical non-partisanship” in favor of Smith.
895
  Also from the 
Hawkeye State, “notice was served that the 1,000,000 farmers behind the Corn Belt 
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Committee” (a nonpartisan organization formed earlier in the decade by a group that 
included radical farm leader Milo Reno) were for Smith.
896
  In Wisconsin, the 
progressive revolt became so problematic for the GOP that party regulars were compelled 
to apply the “party boot . . . to ‘Young Bob’” La Follette in order to thwart “the insurgent 
movement in the State.”
897
  Despite this crackdown, the Madison Capital-Times, “long 
known as the organ of the late Senator Robert M. La Follette and the voice of the western 
progressives,” endorsed Al Smith in early October.
898
  In Montana, progressive 
Democratic senator Burton Wheeler, the elder La Follette’s running mate from 1924, was 
reported to be “lining up the radicals of every ilk, in the endeavor to corral for Smith and 
himself the La Follette-Wheeler vote of four years ago” in that state; as such, “the old 
Nonpartisan League . . . has been revived by Senator Wheeler . . . .  to cast the farmer 
vote to Smith.”
899
  In South Dakota, former Populist governor Andrew E. Lee, former 
Populist congressman John E. Kelly, and a number of past NPL and Farmer-Labor 
candidates (including gubernatorial nominees from 1922 and 1924) supported Smith.
900
  
Washington Star columnist William Hard noted that along “the line from Chicago to 
Butte” Smith’s campaign was developing a new “formidable alignment” that would 
challenge Republican supremacy in the farm regions.  This was so because the Democrat 
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“has qualified, to La Follette and Farmer-Laborite eyes, as a ‘Progressive.’  He has 
qualified as a friend of the ‘principle’ of McNary-Haugenism and of the Northwestern 
farmer’s own conception of his own salvation.”
901
   
One of Smith’s Corn Belt supporters literally worked himself to death on the 
Democrat’s behalf.  Charles A. Towne was another venerable Midwestern activist who 
was attracted to Smith’s cause; he had served in Congress as a Republican from 
Minnesota in the late nineteenth century and had been offered the vice presidential 
nomination of the Populist Party and the Silver Republican Party in 1900 (he declined), 
later moving to New York and again securing a term in the House of Representatives—
this time as a Democrat.
902
  After two decades out of office, Towne embarked on an 
ambitious tour of the West on behalf of Al Smith.  Despite catching a cold during an open 
car parade in North Dakota, Towne persisted in his efforts, taking to the stump in 
Oklahoma, Missouri, South Dakota, and Arizona; with a speech planned for New Mexico 
before a return to the Breadbasket for more campaigning.
903
  Instead, the former 
congressman’s strenuous schedule got the best of him:  he took a turn for the worse and 
succumbed to pneumonia at a hospital in Tucson.
904
  
In spite of this passion and these newly won allies, Smith never inspired a 
stampede of agrarian progressives to his cause.  In Minnesota, Farmer-Laborite Henrik 
Shipstead met Democratic entreaties with Coolidge-like reticence.
905
  Equally silent was 
former Illinois governor Frank Lowden, Walter Maddock’s first choice for the presidency 
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and a recognized leader on agricultural issues.  While several of Lowden’s campaign 
staffers publicly endorsed Smith, the former contender himself denied rumors that he 
planned to support the Democrat in return for an appointment as secretary of agriculture, 
declaring instead:  “I do not contemplate making any statement with reference to the 
Presidency before the election.”
906
  In spite of the open revolt of La Follette Republicans 
like John Blaine in Wisconsin, “Young Bob” La Follette never explicitly joined his 
fellow senator.
907
  La Follette stated that he had “disassociated” himself “from the 
Republican national ticket and platform throughout the campaign,” and he lauded Smith’s 
“public declarations and definite commitments which are in substantial accord with the 
Progressives’ views on waterpower, farm relief, the injunction in labor disputes,” and 
other key issues; yet despite Democratic implications to the contrary, he withheld any 
definite imprimatur from the party’s nominee.
908
  While Young Bob’s words indicated 
even to Republicans that the progressive held a “slight preference . . . for Smith,” his 
ambiguity allowed the Hoover-boosting Los Angeles Times to infer that “La Follette’s 
‘Agin’ Everyone.”
909
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Fig. 4.3: Noted Midwestern farm progressives from the 1920s (clockwise, from top left): Senator John J. 
Blaine (R-WI) and Senator George W. Norris (R-NE), who endorsed Smith; former governor Frank O. 




Worse still, many progressive Republicans whose support Democrats had sought 
eventually came out for Hoover.  Governor McMullen, despite his praise for Smith in 
September, affirmed his loyalty to the Republican cause in October in response to Norris’ 
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party bolt.  McMullen assured farmers that Hoover was “contemplating” calling a special 
session of Congress to deal with agricultural problems; he then announced that although 
he agreed with Norris’ stance “on the agricultural and power questions . . . .  I believe in 
government by parties.  For that reason I will not follow him into the Democratic 
camp.”
911
  Despite professing his support for their plan, Smith was able to secure the 
loyalties of neither Charles McNary nor Gilbert Haugen (a Republican senator from 
Oregon and a Republican congressman from Iowa, respectively).
912
   
In another crucial blow, Iowa senator Smith Wildman Brookhart, along with 
Congressman Haugen, took to the radio on Hoover’s behalf in late October, declaring 
Smith agricultural advisor George Peek the “archenemy” of farmers and denouncing the 
candidate himself for embodying “things that I have been fighting my whole life.”
913
  If 
this was tough for Al Smith, it became awkward for Smith Brookhart once his fellow 
progressive George Norris fled the GOP.  Brookhart had “been describing Norris as a sort 
of demi-god among men,” making a speech in Fremont, Nebraska, where he emblazoned 
his fellow senator as “the biggest, soundest and most sensible man in Congress, and the 
farmer’s greatest friend.”
914
  He had even championed Norris for the presidency at 
Kansas City, and seemed to experience a minor personal crisis upon the Nebraskan’s 
endorsement of Smith, sullenly refusing to believe the news “until I see a telegram signed 
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  Within days, Brookhart’s former campaign manager had also 
endorsed the Democrat.
916




 Historian Gilbert Fite has noted that “contrary to popular belief, the Democratic 
appeal to farm voters in the Midwest was not entirely in vain.”
917
  Similarly, political 
scientist James L. Sundquist noted that Smith made significant inroads among voters in 
places like Iowa and North Dakota in 1928.
918
  Nevertheless, farmers shared the 
ambivalence toward the Democratic nominee exhibited by many Corn Belt politicians.   
 One major factor was the candidate and his campaign’s reluctance to embrace 
more fully the populist tradition.  In Minnesota, former North Dakota senator Henry Clay 
Hansbrough, an erstwhile Republican who had been the first person elected to the House 
of Representatives from his state and was now chair of the “Smith Independent League,” 
called on Hoover to withdraw from the race, attributing to the candidate a fabulous 
personal fortune, vast oil reserves, and imperialist tendencies.
919
  While Hansbrough’s 
charges were probably more paranoia than informed populism, the alacrity with which 
party chairman John Raskob “flayed” the North Dakotan revealed the DNC’s urgency to 
purge agrarian radicalism in favor of a détente with the barons of industry.
920
  While 
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Hansbrough was extreme and perhaps irresponsible, the episode speaks less to the 
temperance of the Democrats than to their eagerness to please big business.
921
      
If the party was uncomfortable with the most aggressive populists, the candidate 
himself was unwilling to commit to their most radical remedies.  Indeed, while Smith was 
praised by many agrarian progressives for his “unequivocal endorsement” of McNary-
Haugenism, he was less concrete on many of the details, and he continued to hedge on 
the specific question of the equalization fee.  Smith’s pledge to call a conference of 
experts to work out the problem comported with his transitional progressive 
administrative style from New York State, and seems to have been made in good faith; 
yet to the suffering farmer, this promise to “talk things over later” must have appeared 
less like a firm stand and more like a flailing Charleston.  
The point is trite, but it must be noted that there was also something foreign about 
the candidate from the Lower East Side to the western farmer, no matter the extent of 
their converging economic interests.  One Smith biographer reports that Texas 
congressman Sam Rayburn later opined, “I never thought the brown derby helped”; while 
Frances Perkins confessed that Smith “did not sound like a man who knew pigs and 
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  Hoover supporters of course agreed.  No less a figure than Jane Addams 
was absorbed by such reasoning; the settlement house pioneer told farmers that Hoover 
was the candidate who could be expected to recognize agriculture’s “deplorable 
conditions,” since his “childhood was spent in a farming community in the Mississippi 
Valley.”
923
  As much as anywhere, the Democrat’s pride in his urban heritage and his 
Tammany roots was a liability in the Heartland. 
Prohibition posed a similar problem.  The issue had been second only to the Klan 
plank in dividing Smith’s disciples from those of Bryan at Madison Square Garden in 
1924.  In 1928, a league of New York Bryanites, organized in 1900, announced their 
defection to the party of McKinley after seven presidential elections, largely on the 
question of prohibition—speculating that if the Great Commoner “were living he would 
do the same.”
924
  Meanwhile on Bryan’s dreaded Wall Street, the cocksure Journal 
quipped that “Demagogues have evidently failed to ‘sell’ farmers their panic-cea.”
925
  
From Boston, the Christian Science Monitor reported approvingly that farmers had 
chosen to “scorn promises of personal gain to defeat [the] liquor menace.”
926
  New York 
Times reporter Richard V. Oulihan noted in South Dakota that “Many Republican 
farmers who have no enthusiasm for Mr. Hoover and believe Governor Smith is more 
sympathetic to their complaints than Hoover, do not care for Smith’s wet stand and his 
Tammany connection, and large numbers who feel hostile to Hoover are said to be 
opposed to Smith’s candidacy on religious grounds.”
927
  The Washington Star found 
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Idaho’s progressives apprehensive about the New Yorker, partially because of his 
Tammany ties and his “lack of understanding of irrigation,” but also because of his “wet 
stand.”
928
  George Norris would later remark in frustration that “There are many 
prohibitionists who are cranks on the subject.  They would support a prohibitionist or a 




As was the case nationwide, Smith’s Catholicism presented another obstacle.  
Figures including Senator McNary were “unsettled by the urban, immigrant-Catholic 
constituency that Al Smith represented.”
930
  While only 15 percent of those who wrote to 
George Norris denouncing his endorsement of Smith explicitly discussed the religious 
question, the Nebraskan maintained that “thousands of American citizens were actuated 
by religious prejudice, without ever being conscious of the fact.”
931
  The senator may 
have developed this impression based on his correspondence with constituents including 




These objections were real and did indeed matter, but it would be a tremendous 
mistake to dismiss Smith’s economic appeal to Midwestern agriculture because of such 
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cultural divisions.  The story of Smith’s campaign for Corn Belt votes demonstrates that 
the Democrat, although hardly a Grange man, made a serious attempt to apply the 
technique of transitional progressivism (formulating progressive, state-sponsored 
remedies through consultation with panels of experts and then promoting those remedies 
through aggressive and direct interaction with the voting public) to the farm problem.  
This history also demonstrates that within the tumultuous context of 1920s farm politics, 
Smith’s ideas were taken seriously by many progressive leaders and an unprecedented 
number of new Democratic voters; it gives the lie to assertions that in this region voters 
scoffed at questions of political economy and focused wholly on ethnocultural factors.   
 Smith took the farm problem seriously, and voters—many of whom crossed over 
to the Democratic Party for the first time—took his ideas seriously.  But these significant 
events were partially occluded by a number of factors, including generations-old partisan 
loyalties, sectional antagonism, religion, and especially prohibition.  Like Walter 
Maddock, many progressive farmers moved cautiously toward the Democratic nominee 
in 1928, attracted to—if not overwhelmed by—his reformist pronouncements, but 
inhabiting a complex political world not fully understood by Belle Moskowitz, John 
Raskob, or the Happy Warrior.  One Smith backer, Harvard law professor Felix 
Frankfurter, awestruck by the “refreshing lesson in independence and intellectual 
integrity George Norris is giving us,” had ridiculed less adventuresome western 
progressive Republicans like Frank Lowden and Idaho senator William Borah:  “How 
pitiful [they] appear by contrast.”
933
  Frankfurter was right to recognize the audacity 
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summoned by Norris; but his remark betrays a lack of sensitivity to the intricacies of the 
region’s politics—an insensitivity which plagued Smith’s eastern supporters.   
Ultimately, the fact that Smith did not sweep the Corn Belt does not suggest that 
he failed to speak effectively to agricultural issues; nor does it demonstrate a lack of 
receptiveness to his message among suffering farmers.  As New York Times columnist 
Anne O’Hare McCormick noted perceptively:  
If there were a farmer vote in this country La Follette would have carried more 
than his own State four years ago. . . .  Discontented farmers cheered and thrilled 
to La Follette, yet in all the rebel States save one they cast more votes for the 
President, whose penny-wisdom they understood, than for the first regular leader 
who summoned them to political adventure.  If there were a farmer vote it would 
go today to Governor Smith, who has adopted the slogans of the insurgents and 
made his most effective appeal to the defeated hopes of the watchers on the grain 
elevators and the silo towers.
934
     
 
Yet “there is no such thing as a farmer vote.  The farmer asserts the right of all 
Americans to cast a wholly personal and irrelevant ballot.  The mid-Western plains were 
settled by men seeking escape from classification; one reason why they are still unsettled 
now is because the sons of pioneers still balk at action as communities.”
935
  From 
Lincoln, a Nebraskan observer shared similar sentiments: “This is a fight to the death 
between the Common people and the big interests.  The common people have the votes to 
win this election, but it is a question whether they have the voting sense to cast their 
ballot for their own interest.”
936
  Many people agreed, and voted accordingly; but not 
everyone votes purely on economics, and there were many others whose primary 
motivations were different.  There can be no single explanatory factor for political 
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behavior in such a complex world; appreciating that complexity requires recognizing that 




 Southward from Omaha, Smith traveled to Oklahoma City and delivered what is 
probably the most famous address of the campaign, a fierce denunciation of bigotry 
coupled with an unapologetic defense of his gubernatorial record.
937
  Afterward, the 
Democrat traveled to Denver and made another tremendously important speech that 
suggested very real divisions between Smith’s view of the role of government in 
promoting public welfare and that of Hoover.  For his Colorado address, Smith took up 




Felix Frankfurter wrote Belle Moskowitz that “the Governor has a trump card in 
water power.  He knows about that issue at first hand; he has fought a fight on it, and . . . 
‘the interests’ fear his stand on the issue.  Hoover has extremely conservative views on 
it.”
938
  Smith’s position did not change in any dramatic way as he transformed from 
governor to presidential candidate.  Referring to the nation’s many rivers as “the property 
of all the people of the country and of the different States wherein they lie,” Smith 
explained his belief that where these resources were owned by a single state, they ought 
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to remain the property of that state; where controlled by a group of states, those states 
should enter into a compact for developing the resources; and where nationally owned, 
the federal government should retain and develop the site.
939
  This may seem like a lot of 
qualification, but these nuances were the product of years of working through the 
intricacies of hydroelectric policy.  A potential power site along the barge canal in New 
York State should not be understood in the same way as the Boulder Dam project on the 
Colorado River, which affected seven states, or the project at Muscle Shoals, Alabama, 
which was federal property.  Yet despite these provisos, there was a unifying theme 
which differentiated Smith’s position from that of the Republicans: the people’s 
“absolute retention of the ownership of the power itself, by owning and controlling the 
site and the plant at the place of the generation.”
940
  Smith continued to believe that 
“Only in this way can the Government agency, State or Federal, as the case may be, find 
itself in a position to provide fair and reasonable rates to the ultimate consumer, and insist 




 This posture was far different from the status quo.  The Republican Party claimed 
also to stand for public retention of power sites, but called for them to be leased to private 
developers for intervals of fifty years.
942
  To Smith this was unacceptable, for “unless you 
provide for State or Federal development, there can be no control of the ultimate rates to 
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the consumer and no control of the power site itself.”
943
  Smith also sought to paint the 
Republican position as corrupted by the influence of big business.  Hoover had not 
elaborated on the GOP platform—dodging the issue of public ownership during a speech 
at Los Angeles—and the party had maintained a firm commitment to inaction over the 
course of two presidential terms.
944
  “I will leave it to your imagination,” the Democrat 
told his audience, but given the administration’s inaction and its fervent opposition to 
government development (manifested in Coolidge’s pocket veto of a bill providing for 
federal operation at Muscle Shoals), they “must have been in sympathy” with the 
National Electric Light Association’s push for private development and against public 
ownership.
945
  Indeed it did not take much imagination at all to make such connections, 
suggested Smith, when the president had just appointed Roy O. West, a figure with 
decades-long ties to the utilities industry, to be secretary of the interior.
946
  According to 
Smith’s notes, all of this indicated to the candidate “a spirit of unfriendliness, if not 
hostility, on the part of the Republican Party in the nation to those who stand for public 
ownership and control of the God-given resources of the nation . . . . [and] a leaning 
toward those seeking to exploit these resources for their own private gain and profit 
rather than in the interests of the people themselves.”
947
   
The question was a complex one, and Smith pledged to treat it as such.  In the 
regionally relevant case of the Boulder Dam, Smith again suggested deferring to expert 
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opinions on whether the operation should be controlled by a multi-state compact or the 
federal government.  “But however this dam shall be constructed,” he concluded, “one 
thing is sure: the site of the dam and the machinery generating this water power must be 
preserved in public ownership.”
948
  Meanwhile, the hydroelectric potential at Muscle 




The Democratic candidate saw this question as one of fundamental importance 
and one on which voters were presented with a definite choice.  He outlined both his 
record in New York and the record of his opponent, presenting the issue as a 
manifestation of the progressive archetype “the people” versus “the interests.”  Producing 
further allure for the progressive Republicans of the West, Smith pronounced that he 
himself was “follow[ing] another Republican idea,” quoting Theodore Roosevelt as 
warning that water power was “still in its infancy and unless it is controlled the history of 
the oil industry will be repeated in the hydraulic electric industry with results far more 
oppressive and disastrous for the people.”
950
 
 The candidate spoke persistently on the question of water power throughout the 
campaign.  At Nashville, in the face of “considerable sentiment for private operation” at 
Muscle Shoals, Smith affirmed his commitment to government ownership, and criticized 
Hoover’s “evasion” of the issue.
951
   The question received prominent consideration 
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during speeches at Chicago, Boston, Baltimore, and Brooklyn.
952
  Campaign literature 
highlighted Smith’s “consistent” advocacy as governor of “the absolute ownership and 
control by the State of water power resources.”
953
  At Reno, Nevada, Joe Robinson 
contrasted Coolidge’s foot-dragging and Hoover’s “vacillation” with Smith’s promise to 
undertake work “promptly.”
954
  Days later from Portland, Oregon, the Arkansan declared 
that “Republican victory will mean the triumph of a monopoly,” while “the success of the 
Democratic ticket means protection of the people against extortionist rates . . . .  It means 
conservation of the most valuable reserves remaining in the public ownership.”
955
  By 
November, Time declared: “Nominee Smith’s stand for government control of water 






Some of the literature has suggested that Smith’s stand on power was an 
ambivalent one, not sufficiently aggressive to render him a “progressive” on this national 
issue.  David Burner is a leading exponent of this argument.  For example, Burner cites 
Socialist presidential candidate Norman Thomas’ statement that Smith’s differences from 
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Hoover on power were “comparatively insignificant.”
957
  This argument has a number of 
flaws, including Smith’s gubernatorial record, the clear demarcation between the two 
parties’ proposals as enunciated by their nominees, and the national attention Smith’s 
stand garnered from those interested in the question, including Senator Norris, the driving 
force behind the Muscle Shoals plan in Congress, and Morris Cooke, director of 
Pennsylvania governor Gifford Pinchot’s “giant power” survey.
958
  Strong opponents of 
government control, such as Barron’s magazine, which had warned of “creeping state 
ownership” in January of 1928, also found Smith’s statements “interesting,” cautioning 
of the perils associated with transplanting the governor’s “obstructionist” water power 
policies from Albany to Washington.
959
  On both sides of the question, the New Yorker’s 
ideas were in fact taken quite seriously.
960
 
Indeed it was based largely on the Democrat’s water power stand, along with the 
question of farm relief, that Senator Norris chose to campaign actively for Smith, whom 
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he described as the “people’s champion” against the “power trust . . . an octopus with 
slimy fingers that levies tribute at every fireside.”
961
  Smith operatives like Robert Moses 
had been entreating the Nebraska progressive for a cross-party endorsement based on the 
governor’s support for public ownership from early in the campaign.
962
  While appeals 
from New Yorkers like Moses may have been easily ignored, pleas came also from 
fellow Corn Belt politicians like Henry Hansbrough, an erstwhile leader on public 
management of water resources who wrote Norris of his “hope that you approve of 
Governor Smith’s emphatic condemnation of the Public Utilities Lobby.”
963
  
Nevertheless, Norris had demonstrated a reluctance to support Smith in the opening 
months of the campaign, because while the Democrat “went further and did better than 
Hoover in his speech of acceptance . . . still it was far from satisfactory.”
964
  In early 
September, Norris wrote Paul Anderson of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch that he feared 
Smith’s calls for “government control” might be manipulated by “the power trust 
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representatives” to allow for privatization of Muscle Shoals.
965
  Instead, Smith “ought to 
have said . . . that he favored its ownership and ‘operation’ by the Government.”
966
  
While recognizing that “many Progressives seemed to think that [Smith’s] declaration 
was satisfactory and complete,” Norris expressed doubts to Lewis S. Gannett of The 
Nation, reiterating the need for a commitment to “the word ‘operation’” and concluding 
that Smith “may be alright, but . . . I hesitate to take the word of any man.”
967
  Perhaps 
this was all semantics, but Norris felt a deep obligation not “to mislead those who are 
placing their faith in me and my judgment” by prematurely endorsing the Democrat.
968
  
Eventually Smith would state unequivocally that the government should “own and build 
and operate the power house”; and in fact when he made this statement on October 31 at 
Newark, he was paraphrasing (he claimed to be quoting) what he had said a month earlier 
at Denver, which affirms the interpretation that the September 23 speech included an 
implicit call for government operation.
969
    
Meanwhile, what Norris saw as his responsibility to his followers was 
compounded by the pressure he was feeling from rank and file supporters of both sides.  
Responding to rumors that his senator favored the Democrat, a footwear salesman from 
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Fremont, Nebraska, warned that this “certainly would be a great disappointment to a 
great number of your life long supporters.”
970
  Norris received a great deal of mail 
expressing such sentiments after he did officially back Al Smith, but most of the lobbying 
prior to his announcement came from progressive admirers who supported the New 
Yorker.  A hardware salesman from Stuart, Nebraska, wrote Norris that “as a statesman 
you have been my ideal,” and that he felt “sure in my heart that you are still . . .  one 
hundred per cent my ideal statesman and support Alfred E. Smith.”
971
    
Most of the campaigning came from outside Nebraska—from Norris’ 
considerable national following.  In June a realtor from Newark, responding to an article 
from that morning’s New York Times which described Norris’ frustration with the 
Coolidge administration over Muscle Shoals, demanded that the only reasonable action 
now was for the Nebraskan to “walk out of the convention and the party,” goading the 
senator that “You men from the West, You, and Gov. McMullan [sic] and others talk a 
lot, but none of you seem to have the nerve to walk out . . . . Is there no man in the West 
who has the nerve of the Late Prs. Roosevelt?”
972
  An attorney from Providence wrote in 
early September that “Governor Smith’s declaration [on water power], which I have 
inclosed, stands foursquare with your own stand on this and other important issues and I 
suggest that you be as consistent in honesty now as you have been in the past, by 
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advocating the election of the greatest humanitarian and statesman America has had since 
Lincoln.”
973
  One of Smith’s fellow East-siders assured the Nebraskan that “the New 
York ‘Wonder Man,’” had “lambasted the reactionaries here . . . so that their lives are 
hardly worth living.”
974
   
It was not only Northeasterners who held such a view of the New Yorker.  An 
attorney from Denver wrote to express his antipathy for the “power and light trust,” 
suggesting to Norris that “The hope and safety of this Country today is in the hands of 
men like yourself and Gov. Smith of New York.”
975
  A Georgist from Wichita suggested 
“that Governor Smith’s speech at Denver is the high mark of all public utterances thus far 
by our Presidential candidates,” and that as a La Follette man he would be “ardently 
supporting” the Democrat.
976
  A Washingtonian was also impressed by Smith’s Denver 
address, sending Norris front-page coverage from the Seattle Daily Times and 
proclaiming:  “Here comes the line of attack which Gov. Smith has opened on Hoover 
that wins his battle.”
977
     
All of this shows just how seriously average citizens of the progressive persuasion 
took Smith’s water power stand—and just how much lobbying was being directed toward 
Senator Norris.  These efforts were rewarded in late October.
978
  During an Omaha 
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speech that was broadcast throughout the western farm states, the maverick Nebraskan 
eloquently lauded the Democratic nominee on the power issue, declaring that “Governor 
Smith’s attitude on this question places him side by side with that great father of national 
conservation, Theodore Roosevelt,” and proclaiming to “those who have sympathized 
with and given support to the little group of Progressives in Congress in their terrible 
struggle to preserve for all the people the great water power resources of the nation, that 
it seems to me we are led . . . logically and inevitably to the support of Governor 
Smith.”
979
  Norris’ support of Smith is astounding considering the daring it required to 
campaign for the wet, urban, Catholic candidate in his largely dry, rural, Protestant state.  
Outraged Nebraskans said as much:  An attorney from Nelson wrote that “Personally, I 
pray to be forgiven for having supported you, for I now realize that you are not a 
Republican, but a moonshine Democrat, spiked with Socialism and boot-legged into the 
United States Senate under a Republican label”; while a telegram “deplor[ing] your 
recent course of action” was attributed to “we the undersigned former friends.”
980
  For the 
rest of his career, Norris would be harassed by offended constituents, and during his 1930 
reelection campaign, the Republican National Committee flooded Nebraska with charges 
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that the incumbent was a drunkard and that his wife was a Catholic.
981
  David Burner and 
others rightly note Norris’ initial reluctance to support Smith; but the larger story 
demonstrates the diligence of the senator’s evaluation, the conviction behind his ultimate 
decision, and the serious consequences of his activities.
982
  As Norris himself wrote 
weeks after the election:  “One thing seems clear to me, and that is that if I was right in 
supporting the so-called Progressive Senators regardless of politics, then, for the same 
reason, I was right in taking the attitude I did in favor of Governor Smith as against Mr. 
Hoover.”
983
    
Smith’s position was sufficiently progressive—and unique from that of Herbert 
Hoover—to inspire such eventual boldness from George Norris.  So too was Smith bold 
when challenged on his stand.  After facing scathing criticism from Charles Evans 
Hughes, Smith held firm and indeed sharpened his stance, stating:  “I believe the agency, 
whether it be State or [Federal] Government, should not only own the site, but should 
own and build and operate the powerhouse.  It is the only way that you can guarantee 
equitable distribution of the power and fair and reasonable prices to the ultimate 
consumer . . . .  The whole thing is contained in the sentence: the Government must keep 
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Much of this occurred in the wake of the most scalding denunciation of Smith’s 
water power policy—delivered by Herbert Hoover himself at Madison Square Garden on 
October 22, where the Republican decried Smith’s proposals as “State socialism.”
985
  The 
assault was aimed mainly at Smith’s positions on water power, farm relief, and 
prohibition—all of which Hoover claimed “confronted” citizens “with a huge program of 
government in business.”
986
  Hoover asserted that wartime necessities had begotten an 
“organized despotism” under Wilson for the purposes of preserving the nation:  “To a 
large degree we regimented our whole people into a socialistic state.”
987
  This may have 
been “justified in time of war,” but “if continued in peace time it would destroy not only 
our American system but with it our progress and freedom as well.”
988
  It was therefore 
the recognition of this danger and the prompt return to normalcy under Harding and 
Coolidge—piloted in large part by Hoover—which had spurred economic growth and 
averted the dangers of bolshevism in the post-war period.  But now the destruction of the 
“American system” loomed again, in the ominous form of the Smith program:   
There has been revived in this campaign, however, a series of proposals which, if 
adopted, would be a long step toward the abandonment of our American system 
and a surrender to the destructive operation of governmental conduct of 
commercial business.  Because the country is faced with difficulty and doubt over 
certain national problems—that is, prohibition, farm relief, and electrical power—
our opponents propose that we must thrust government a long way into the 
businesses which give rise to these problems.  In effect, they abandon the tenets of 
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their own party and turn to State socialism as a solution for the difficulties 




“Emphasiz[ing] the seriousness of these [Democratic] proposals,” Hoover “submitted to 
the American people a question of fundamental principle.  That is: shall we depart from 
the principles of our American political and economic system, upon which we have 
advanced beyond all the rest of the world, in order to adopt methods based on principles 
destructive of its very foundations?”
990
 
Most Republicans enthusiastically accepted and repeatedly invoked Hoover’s line 
of attack.  When Smith attempted to respond, the Los Angeles Times announced:  “Smith 
Defends His Socialism.”
991
  Charles Evans Hughes, a progressive and former Smith ally, 
affirmed his belief that the Democratic nominee’s program was one of “State Socialism” 
at Buffalo.
992
  Of course not all Republicans were as impressed:  in Tacoma, Washington, 
Senator Norris responded directly to Hoover’s speech, stating that “he is repudiating . . . 
myself and all the other Progressives who have supported him in the past.”
993
  In fact, it 
was Hoover’s speech that provided the decisive nudge to Norris’ endorsement:  “How 
any progressive in America can support him now, after his Madison Square Garden 
address, in which he slapped every progressive-minded man and woman in America in 
the face, my God, I cannot conceive it.”
994
   
Not everyone took Hoover’s remarks this seriously.  Socialist Jacob Panken, a 
former New York Municipal Court justice who had challenged Smith for governor in 
1926, “ridiculed” the speech, deeming the assertion that Smith’s policies were socialistic 
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  “Hoover’s attempt to pin the charge of socialism on Governor Smith is an 
illegitimate child which I wouldn’t want placed on my doorstep,” he scoffed.
996
  “The 
Democratic nominee wants the Government to develop Muscle Shoals and then to turn it 
over to private agencies for exploitation.  That’s not socialism. . . .  We favor the 
development, ownership, and operation of our water power resources.”
997
  Here Panken 
was either disingenuous or obtuse, for Smith had quite literally called for “absolute 
retention of the ownership of the power itself, by owning and controlling the site and the 
plant at the place of the generation” during his speech at Denver.
998
  There were serious 
differences between Smith’s plan and that of the Socialists: the Democrat would not 
necessarily have the government delivering the power to consumers, instead favoring a 
system featuring government generation for sale to private distributors; moreover, 
Smith’s calls for public ownership did not extend to areas like railroads and mines in the 
manner of the Socialist platform.
999
  Yet in spite of Norman Thomas, Jacob Panken, and 
others’ assertions to the contrary, Smith’s position on hydroelectricity was far different 
from that of Hoover, who opposed such government involvement as a matter of principle; 
and indeed when placed side by side with the Republicans and Socialists it is with the 
latter that differences in the Democrat’s position on water power appear, using Thomas’ 
phrase, “comparatively insignificant.”   
Some Socialists had recognized this from early on:  in January, Thomas Duncan 
of Milwaukee, state assembly leader of Wisconsin’s Socialist Party, lauded Smith, 
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predicting that “he will get about half the Socialist vote because of his stand on the public 
utility question.”
1000
  A socialist from Kansas wrote to George Norris that “the way to 
socialism seems to lie in working through the old parties; and Governor Smith’s policies . 
. . are steps toward socialism & a possible ultimate solution to our economic woes.”
1001
  
Hoping to evaluate the virtues of the two left-leaning candidates, the Community Church 
on Park Avenue in New York City hosted a debate entitled “Smith or Thomas: Which 
Should Progressives Vote For?”
1002
  Moreover, on the same day that Hoover addressed 
Madison Square Garden, Norman Thomas himself implicitly acknowledged a genuine 
qualitative difference in the philosophies of Hoover and Smith.  “Everything Hoover has 
said and done makes it clear that he will be on the side of special privilege.  
Contemplating this spectacle, some of our progressives are ready to throw their votes to 
the Democratic party.”
1003
  This was a fruitless venture not because of alleged 
conservatism on Smith’s part, but rather because “Almost certainly they can’t elect 
Smith. . . . [or] rehabilitate the Democratic party.”
1004
        
Hoover’s remarks had served to exacerbate the confusion already clouding 
partisan alignments in the closing weeks of the 1928 election; the speech drew praise 
from conservatives and instigated panic among moderate Democrats, while antagonizing 
progressive Republicans—a number of whom defected to the Smith banner.  In many 
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ways, the speech served to clarify real differences between the two candidates:  Joe 
Robinson suggested that it provided any voter who “possesses sufficient intelligence” 
great insight into “the reactionary spirit which animates the Republican candidate for 
President.”
1005
  Nevertheless, Smith was not running as a socialist, and he certainly was 
not running in a political environment friendly to socialistic proposals.  For the 
Democrats, the Madison Square Garden speech could not be the last word.  Hoover’s 
criticism of Smith’s “state socialism” compelled and drew a response—one which, when 
coupled with the Republican’s remarks, clearly delineates the significant philosophical 





The rejoinder to Hoover came forty-eight hours later at Boston.  In the speech, 
Smith famously denounced the “socialism” charge as “the cry of special interests,” and as 
“subterfuge and camouflage” for “groups who either want to stop you or who want to get 
something for themselves.”
1006
  It was an attack, claimed Smith, with which he had been 
grappling for his entire career—“the only argument in twenty-five years that they have 
been able to advance against the constructive policy of the Democratic Party” in New 
York.
1007
  As Oscar Handlin notes, the candidate “refused to hedge when Hoover charged 
that Smith was taking a road to Socialism.  In his reply in Boston, Al reaffirmed his 
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conviction of the importance of his program and pointed out that the accusation of 




Others, like Democratic Party chair John Raskob, denied Smith’s interest in 
placing the “government in business,” demanding that “if there ever was a candidate who 
was opposed to that principle it was Governor Smith.”
1009
  Raskob’s role in the party 
amounted to that of CEO rather than architect; he was an excellent fundraiser whose 
importance to the 1928 campaign has been greatly exaggerated in the literature—a false 
prominence roundly debunked by Smith biographer Robert Slayton.
1010
  In fact, the 
General Motors vice president had been brought into the Democratic campaign 
specifically to mollify the business community, and indeed his early assurances of 
Smith’s soundness on economic matters had “caused such a flurry of buying that on Wall 
Street it was called a ‘Smith Market.’”
1011
  While it is true that Smith had been “taken 
with Raskob, the kind of self-made successful man he admired,” the chairman’s 
comments, which also included a brief diatribe on “states’ rights,” provide little insight 
into the beliefs of the nominee.
1012
  It was not Raskob, but Belle Moskowitz who directed 
Smith’s “personal campaign.”
1013
  Indeed, Raskob was a relative newcomer to the Smith 
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circle, and had not witnessed his candidate fending off charges of socialism for a decade 
as governor; but then neither had most of the nation.  For their benefit, Smith engaged the 
charge at Boston, not only as it pertained to hydroelectricity, but to his entire platform 
and indeed his entire career.  The Democrat used Hoover’s socialism offensive to 
broaden the debate, engaging his opponent in a wider ideological conflict over the role of 
government in economic life.      
“Take the workmen’s compensation act,” he implored his Boston audience, which 
cramped an overcrowded arena and spilled out “for blocks around”:  
What was the argument against that?  Because it set up an insurance company 
under State ownership and State operation, it was referred to as socialism.  Take 
all the factory code.  Take the night work law for women, the law prohibiting 
manufacturing in tenements, the [law] prohibiting the working of children in the 
tanneries of the State, the bill prohibiting the working of women in the core rooms 
of foundries.  That great factory code in New York, designed to protect the health, 
the welfare and the well-being of men, women and children at some time or the 
other in the last twenty-five years has been referred to as paternalistic and 
socialistic.
1014
   
 
Smith denied Hoover’s charge that these programs constituted a socialist agenda.  But he 
seconded the Republican’s assertion that the campaign involved “a question of 
fundamental principle.”  While differing on the nomenclature, both candidates 
understood the conflict as one between the continuation of the Harding-Coolidge political 
economy and the development on a national scale of the progressive polity Smith had 
administered in New York and had described throughout the campaign.   
 Responding to Hoover’s consistent praise of the economic status quo, Smith 
pointed out the struggles of certain sectors—most notably textiles—during his Boston 
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  The Democrat criticized the Coolidge administration, which persisted in 
presenting a sanguine interpretation of employment and payroll statistics in spite of the 
profound suffering of industrial laborers.
1016
  He also scoffed at Herbert Hoover’s 
rationalization that northeastern textile workers, who were making forty cents an hour, 
“were much better off than the textile workers in any other part of the world.”
1017
   
 It was easy for Smith to criticize Republican economic policies in New England, 
where the slumping textile industry was causing great hardship for many working-class 
families.  But he continued on this theme a week later in Newark, New Jersey, renewing 
the call made during his August acceptance address for a study of unemployment 
conditions.  To remedy the accumulated ills of two terms of Republican dereliction, 
Smith proffered initiating a program nearly identical to that proposed by Robert Wagner 
in March of that year, calling on the Department of Labor to collect “accurate and 
comprehensive information on employment in important industries.”
1018
  (Both Smith and 
Wagner continued to assert that as many as four million workers were unemployed at the 
time.)  Similarly to the Wagner bill, Smith’s proposal would adopt “a scientific plan 
whereby during periods of unemployment appropriations shall be made available for the 
construction of necessary public work,” at the conclusion of the study.
1019
  Turning his 
attention to those who were employed, Smith challenged the Coolidge administration’s 
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interpretation of its own wage statistics, asserting that while the Republicans claimed that 
“everybody owns an automobile and everybody lives on chicken dinners,” the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics had declared $2,000 a year to be a minimum livable wage for a family of 
five, while the administration had calculated the average wage for a manufacturing 
worker to be $1,280 a year.
1020
   
 Smith partisans made similar arguments.  At a Labor Day rally in Fort Hamilton, 
New York, John J. Manning of the American Federation of Labor “spoke of the necessity 
of caring for the 4,000,000 men who he said are now unable to secure employment.”
1021
  
In Elizabeth, New Jersey, Eleanor Roosevelt, who headed the campaign’s women’s 
division, stated that “the Republican party is making much of the issue of prosperity.  
There may be prosperity in spots, but it is not uniform.  We cannot truly say that the 
whole country is prosperous. . . .  Great groups of people are very badly off, including the 
farmers and the textile workers of New England.”
1022
  In Newark, a voter named L. 
Mastriani wrote the Evening News what could easily have been an excerpt from a 
Democratic campaign speech: 
The spellbinders of the Republican party are making a desperate effort to garner 
the vote of the working-men in this year’s campaign, and their chief stock in trade 
is stressing the prosperity issue.  They do not have a single constructive measure 
to offer the workers.  They talk about great prosperity, regardless of the fact that, 
according to the Labor Department’s Minimum Health and Decency Budget, a 
family of five should have an annual income of between $2,059.63 and $2,511.02, 
depending upon the locality, while the annual average earnings of all workers 
amounts to only $1,222. . . .  Governor Smith has shown by his record in New 
York that he is in sympathy with the workers’ struggle for improved conditions, 
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and no attempt to frighten them about bad times if the Democrats are elected is 
going to swerve them from their purpose to help make him the next President of 
the United States.”
1023
   
 
 Smith and his supporters challenged the very notion of Republican prosperity, 
demanding that a truly universal public welfare required a serious evaluation of the 
shortcomings of American economic life.  They did not call for a massive overhaul of 
American capitalism—such a demand from a mainstream candidate would have been 
anachronistic in the 1920s.  But neither did they turn a blind eye to the failures of the 
“American system.”  Those failures included the depression of certain sectors of the 
economy and rising unemployment.  Smith proposed progressive remedies, calling for 
scientific studies of the problems in order to develop a state-run and state-funded 
solution; an approach reminiscent of the transitional progressive executive style he had 
administered over four terms as governor. 
Allan Lichtman has written that Smith “neither articulated an alternative vision of 
America nor challenged the values represented by the candidacy of Herbert Hoover.”
1024
  
Robert Slayton has concluded that in 1928 there was “no substantial issue to differentiate 
the parties.”
1025
  A number of other important works have shared in this assessment.
1026
  
Smith’s pronouncements were certainly tempered by the reality that he was running in a 
generally strong economy, and there is no evidence that he sought a profound remaking 
of the American economic system.  But this does not mean he did not question the 
efficacy of Republican policies and propose an alternative vision of a just society.   
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Indeed, the Democratic campaign, while in accord with the basic tenets of 
American capitalism, was strongly critical of Republican satisfaction with the 
economy.
1027
  President Coolidge and treasury secretary Andrew Mellon were said to 
have “made some amazing tax reductions, amazing for the discrimination practiced for 
the benefit of the millionaire and profiteering classes as opposed to the interests of the 
great majority of taxpayers.”
1028
  The apparent prosperity of the 1920s was portrayed as 
“flawed”—not only because of the much commented upon struggles of agriculture and 
textiles, but also because of the “speculative” nature of the “unsound inflationary 
condition” which was being presented as prosperity.
1029
  “As is usual under such 
circumstances, the ‘insiders’ have profited at the expense of the ‘outsiders’ and many 
small investors,” lamented the Democratic campaign handbook.
1030
  Much like Smith’s 
speeches in Boston, Newark, and elsewhere, official campaign materials did not whole-
heartedly accept the economic assumptions of the 1920s in the way the historical 
literature suggests.  “This is not prosperity at all, in a national sense, but a regrettable 
episode in our financial history.  It has had its evil effects, not only upon the small trader 
and investor, but upon labor seeking employment, and upon legitimate business and the 
farmers, who need credit at reasonably low rates.”
1031
  Smith knew well from his tussles 
with Coolidge over hydroelectricity that the administration saw virtue in such conditions, 
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but he and his campaign believed differently, assigning federal policymakers “some of 
the responsibility” for the “speculative inflation” that was deemed so harmful.
1032
   
Moreover, speculation was not the only flaw that the Democrats saw within the 
apparently robust growth of the American economy.  Smith and Wagner had both spoken 
of an undetected—or rather unacknowledged—rise in unemployment in recent years.  
The Democrats pointed to a “shameful condition” whereby “in spite of the fact that the 
United States is now the richest country in the world . . . there are still large sections of 
the population whose incomes are so small or uncertain that they fall below the 
requirements for what would be recognized as a decent standard of life.”
1033
  The “most 
important cause of poverty and destitution” was unemployment, but campaign literature 
also pointed out that in spite of continued growth, wages had failed to keep up with 
productivity, just as employment had failed to parallel expansion.
1034
  Far from singing 
hosannas for the economic conditions of the 1920s, Al Smith and his campaign were in 
fact beginning to point out what William Leuchtenburg has so poignantly described as 
“the rotten beams in the economic structure.”
1035
 
There were many in the contemporary press who shared the view of later 
historians that the candidates were one in the same.  No less a Smith partisan than Walter 
Lippmann suggested just that in a piece for Vanity Fair in September.  “My own personal 
opinion,” he suggested, “is . . . if Mr. Hoover and Mr. Smith met in a room to discuss any 
concrete national question purely on its merits, they would be so close together at the end 
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you could not tell the difference between them.”
1036
  Many progressive intellectuals felt 
this way: The Nation famously editorialized that during the campaign “the two older 
political parties” had become “as like as two peas.”
1037
  Yet the fact remains that in spite 
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of popular accolades for Republican economic policies, Smith partisans rejected the 
notion—however expedient—that their candidate was in accord with Hoover’s proposals.  
Former Wyoming governor Nellie Tayloe Ross, addressing five hundred fellow 
Democratic women at Rochester, New York, suggested that Republican leaders who 
sought “the aggrandizement of the carefully chosen few” trembled at the prospect of a 
Smith election, for they feared “the governor’s progressive theories” and his talent for 
harnessing state power “in the interests of the rank and file of the people.”
1038
  “The real 




Bronx congressman Anthony Griffin summarized this view for a crowd in 
Hamden, Connecticut:  “It has become a custom today to make the frivolous 
generalization that there is no difference between the policies of the two great 
parties.”
1040
  But this was “vicious propaganda to lull the American people to sleep . . . .” 
because in fact, the Republicans sought “to perpetuate the economic slavery of the 
American people. . . .” on behalf of “the aluminum trust, the coal trust and the electric 
lightning [sic] and power trust.”
1041
  Against this backdrop, “the greatest imposition and 
the most outrageous insult to the intelligence of the American people is the effort of these 
minions of special privilege to circulate propaganda that prosperity now prevails and that 
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it would be dangerous to trust the country’s welfare to a Democratic administration.”
1042
  
Citing commerce department figures with acknowledged irony, Griffin pointed to 
weakness in farming, textiles, and coal, and called Republican optimism “tantamount to 
the cheering diagnosis of a Doctor, who tells his patient he is alright except that his heart 
is not working rightly, his lungs are effected and his skin is effected with dermatitis.”
1043
  
Pointing to wage cuts in various industries, rampant strikes in textiles and in coal mining, 
and the desperate pleas for farm relief, Griffin concluded:  “No, all is not right in the 
land.”
1044
  A change of direction was needed, extricating the ruling Republicans who 
“truckle to the vested interests” and installing “Alfred E. Smith in the White House,” so 






 As Smith and his allies were touring the nation articulating the candidate’s 
reformist vision and challenging aspects of the economic status quo, the Democratic 
nominee for the vice presidency was also busy campaigning on such questions.  Joseph 
Robinson’s campaign tour concentrated largely on the South and especially the West, 
where the candidate focused on topics including agriculture and Republican 
corruption.
1046
  Another recurring theme within Robinson’s remarks was the rights of 
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labor.  The Arkansan echoed the progressive sentiments of Smith’s acceptance address 
during a speech at Dallas, enunciating his opposition to the issuance of injunctions in 
“pretended emergencies,” asserting Democratic support for “the principle of collective 
bargaining which implies that organized labor shall choose its own representatives 
without coercion or interference,” and calling for “a scientific program for public works 
construction in times of unemployment.”
1047
  Most significantly, Robinson declared that 
“labor is not ‘a commodity,’” but should be “exalted above the plane of mere things and 
given its proper recognition as a function of the human brain and hand.”
1048
  In San 
Francisco, Robinson turned these arguments against Republican economic stewardship, 
demanding that while “the Democratic party recognizes the right of every individual to 
enjoy prosperity . . . it must be distributed among all who contribute to our national 
wealth.”
1049
  Thus he joined Smith in “condemn[ing] the system set up by the Republican 
Party whereby only a few enjoy real prosperity and the remainder are required, like 
Lazarus, to accept the crumbs which fall from the overladen tables of Dives.”
1050
     
 Historian Vaughan Davis Bornet has shown that in 1928 both major party 
candidates were seen as friendly toward unions.
1051
  Indeed, the Republican enjoyed a 
great deal of support from organized labor—such as it was in the 1920s.  United Mine 
Workers of America president John L. Lewis supported Hoover, declaring over the radio 
that “unprecedented conditions render it imperative ‘from the standpoint of Organized 
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Labor, as well as business and industry, that Herbert Hoover should be elected.’”
1052
  
Lewis credited the secretary of commerce’s refusal to accept prewar economic conditions 
as natural with instigating “a new industrial revolution which has become the marvel of 
the civilized world.”
1053
  American Federation of Labor president William Green lauded 
Hoover for his “announced opposition to any change in the quota and restriction 
provisions of existing immigration legislation,” calling the policy “most welcome.”
1054
  
Meanwhile, George L. Berry, president of the International Printing Pressmen and 
Assistants Union of North America (and chairman of the labor division of the Democratic 
National Committee) scourged Hoover as an enemy of labor, pointing out the 
Republican’s consistent advocacy of “the open shop,” a charge echoed by other 
Democratic unionists, including Chicago Federation of Labor president John 
Fitzpatrick.
1055
   
 Democrats hailed their own candidate as a champion of labor.  Voters were 
reminded that in 1925 Smith had asserted that “the labor of a human being is not a 
commodity or an article of commerce,” and that the following year he had recommended 
hearings to circumscribe the judiciary’s power to enjoin striking unions.
1056
  Teamsters 
                                                 
1052
 “John L. Lewis Delivers Radio Talk for Hoover,” The Philadelphia Trades Union News, October 25, 
1928, p. 6, Pattee Library, Pennsylvania State University, State College, Pennsylvania. 
1053
 “Miners’ Leader Lauds Hoover,” The Los Angeles Times, October 18, 1928, p. 7. 
1054
 “Green Praises Hoover’s Attitude on Immigration,” The Philadelphia Trades Union News, November 
1, 1928, p. 2. 
1055
 George L. Berry, “To the Officers and Members of the American Labor Movement,” Alfred E. Smith 
Papers, Box 22, Folder 224.  Fitzpatrick also served as spokesman for the Alfred E. Smith Union Labor 
League.  “Hoover is Accused of Being Advocate of the Open Shop,” The Atlanta Constitution, October 23, 
1928, p. 20.  In his history of labor in the 1920s, Irving Bernstein suggests that “the inclination of most 
AFL leaders was toward Al Smith, and with good reason.”  Bernstein describes the attraction of Smith’s 
gubernatorial record and his messages on the rights of labor, but contends that since “a Republican victory 
was generally anticipated and no one believed labor could prevent it by endorsing Smith,” a “reversion to 
neutrality was the safest course, and in 1928 the Federation could hardly be accused of being anything but 
safe.”  Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years: A History of the American Worker, 1920-1933 (Baltimore: 
Penguin, 1960), p. 104.   
1056




president Daniel J. Tobin declared Smith “the best friend labor ever had”; an 
endorsement made all the more powerful by the fact that only four years earlier Tobin 
had denounced the national Democrats under John W. Davis as “‘just as reactionary’ as 
the Republicans” in explaining labor support for Robert La Follette.
1057
   
 The Republicans’ favorite argument against Smith among workers was to criticize 
his opposition to immigration restriction.  The “Democratic presidential candidate’s plan 
to break down restriction would admit many more immigrants who immediately would 
become competitors with American labor,” workers were warned.
1058
  Since Smith was a 
Tammany man he was “bound to advocate the Tammany Hall idea on immigration—
which is, MORE IMMIGRANTS”; nor should this surprise anyone, since “New York has 
the largest foreign-born population of any city in America,” and the 1924 vote on 
restriction had come down to “Tammany Versus the Nation” with “New York City 
utterly opposed to the rest of America in the matter of restrictive immigration.”
1059
      
 Smith had indeed criticized the National Origins Act of 1924 for establishing 
immigration quotas based on the 1890 census.
1060
  However, at St. Paul the Democrat 
attempted to assuage fears that he intended to “open up the flood gates and let Europe 
pour all over this country,” which Republicans warned would cause a glut in the labor 
market and depress American wages; while he had demanded a halt to the use of thirty-
eight year old census data in the formulation of national origins quotas in his acceptance 
address, the candidate avoided calls for further changes, instead suggesting that there 
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would be no difference in the number of immigrants admitted under a Democratic or a 
Republican administration.
1061
  Smith’s timorous challenge to restriction policy has been 
rightly criticized by historians including Mae Ngai, who notes that he “opposed the 
quotas in the North while favoring them before southern audiences.”
1062
  In fact, Ngai’s 
analysis is simultaneously too harsh and too lenient:  Smith did openly oppose the use of 
the 1890 quota during his acceptance speech as “designed to discriminate against certain 
nationalities and . . . an unwise policy,” and thenceforth consistently referred audiences to 
that statement; yet a reading of his campaign addresses suggests that he never again 
enunciated this posture explicitly, and so it was not only the South, but everywhere 
beyond the friendly confines of the Empire State which was denied a serious critique of 
the National Origins Act.
1063
   
 While immigration restriction presented the GOP with an appeal to labor of 
specific usefulness against Al Smith, Republican advocacy of protective tariffs had long 
served to win votes among industrial workers.  In Louisville, Smith departed from party 
orthodoxy, gingerly suggesting that as president he would not necessarily do away with 
Republican protections for industry, instead calling for tariff formulation by a non-
                                                 
1061
 “Stenographic Report of Address by Gov. Smith at St. Paul,” The New York Times, September 28, 
1928, p. 2. 
1062
 Mae Ngai, “The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the 
Immigration Act of 1924,” Journal of American History, 86:1 (June, 1999), pp. 67-92, p. 68. 
1063
 “Full Text of Smith’s Speech Accepting Party’s Nomination for the Presidency,” p. 2.  It is to Smith’s 
credit that he maintained his opposition to the 1890 census as the basis for the quota, for even this went 
beyond what many in his circle would have preferred.  Walter Lippmann and Felix Frankfurter repeatedly 
forwarded Smith messages from Harvard Professor Calvert Magruder, who had convinced them (and hoped 
to convince Smith) of the wisdom of Hoover’s call for the retention of the 1890 quota.  Frankfurter found 
his Harvard Law colleague Magruder’s anti-immigration stance “the most lucid statement of it that I have 
thus far seen,” and Lippmann even had Magruder draft a statement for Smith to use to “clarify” his 
position.  Walter Lippmann to Belle Moskowitz, October 4, 1928, Walter Lippmann Papers, Reel 20, Box 
21, Folder 844; Walter Lippmann to Belle Moskowitz, October 9, 1928, Walter Lippmann Papers, Reel 20, 
Box 21, Folder 844; Felix Frankfurter to Walter Lippmann, Walter Lippmann Papers, Reel 10, Box 10, 
Folder 429; (Illegible Harvard Law Professor [likely Felix Frankfurter]) to Henry Moskowitz, October 17, 
1928, Alfred E. Smith Papers, Box 9, Folder 104; Calvert Magruder, “MEMORANDUM FOR 




partisan panel of experts and demanding that the benefits of the tariff be extended to 
agriculture.
1064
  Such a panel already existed, but Democrats, led by former tariff 
commissioner Edward P. Costigan, claimed that the current commission had “ceased to 
represent disinterested and non-partisan independence,” that its findings were made to 
promote favored industries rather than to reflect detached scientific conclusions, and that 
in any case its judgment was often overruled by the president.
1065
  In fact, many 
progressives were frustrated with the current state of the Wilson-era tariff commission; 
“Young Bob” La Follette lamented that under Coolidge it had been “packed with men 
who were appointed not because they were personally equipped to perform the duties of 
the office but solely because they were subservient and ready to carry out the 
administration’s will.”
1066
  Furthermore, reforms to the commission similar to those 
Smith was proposing had been suggested by a senate select committee chaired by Joseph 
Robinson (and including La Follette) in the spring of 1928.
1067
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 While Smith’s proposal showed hints of Wilsonianism in its reliance on experts 
and of Bryanism in its demand for the equality of farmers, there can be no question that it 
abandoned the traditional free trade posture of the Democrats.  It has been argued that 
this signaled a surrender to the contemporary popularity of Republican economic 
policies—Allan Lichtman has disparaged Smith’s posture as “pusillanimous.”
1068
  Yet if 
protectionist proposals by the Democrats broke faith with the populist left, it must be 
remembered that free trade policies had long cost the populist left the full support of 
organized labor.  Diagnosing the ailments of the Democratic Party in late 1927, Walter 
Lippmann wrote in Harper’s that “reduction of the tariff in the interest of the farmer 
might cost many workingmen their jobs.  So while both farmers and workingmen may 
denounce Big Business, they do not have a common interest and they do not mean the 
same thing.”
1069
  As high tariffs were an essential piece of labor’s agenda, the change in 
direction should be understood as a strategic shift rather than a defeatist retreat; the 
Democrats were reaching out to urban workers who were convinced of the benefits of 
protectionism, seeking to neutralize the issue (as well as the question of immigration) and 
differentiate themselves from the Republicans on other matters.  Even still, on both 
questions Smith did suggest significant reforms in the execution of Republican policies, 
if not the policies themselves.   
 In any case, Smith did find points of grievance with Republican economic 
policies and in his Boston and Newark speeches he was particularly aggressive in 
distinguishing his posture from Hoover’s.  Some of this was explicit, such as his rejection 
of the notion of universal prosperity and his charges of rising unemployment.  Other 
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criticisms were less obvious; for example, the question of hydroelectricity was framed 
not merely as a moral clash over the disposal of public property, but also as a struggle to 
determine which class should benefit from these resources.  Public water power projects 
were presented as a means for decreasing household expenses and therefore improving 
the quality of life for laborers.  Additionally, Smith’s recapitulations of his record of 
industrial reforms and welfare initiatives in New York State were always used to suggest 
that his administration would seek similarly to improve living and working conditions 
nationally—a case made even more explicitly by Smith’s progressive surrogates. 
While Smith separated himself from Hoover on these issues of interest to both 
organized and unorganized laborers, he also sought to gain an advantage on the central 
concern of many unions: injunctions.  Even this was complicated by the fact that the 
Republican platform had noted an occasional abuse of the injunction.  Yet on this issue 
Smith exploited his position as challenger, suggesting that Republican inaction was to 
blame for the perpetually high number of injunctions issued: legislation had been 
introduced, a commission had been called to study the problem (with Hoover as a 
member), and yet “what happened to it?  Nothing.”
1070
  The Democrats talked specifics:  
picketing, a usual target of injunctions, was called “an essential activity for organized 
labor during a strike, and to forbid it is to place unions at a disadvantage as instruments 
for collective bargaining.”
1071
  While decrying violence or outright bullying of 
strikebreakers, the party claimed that “some forms of what courts have called 
intimidation . . . if one approves of unions and collective bargaining, may be legitimate 
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and desirable expressions of group loyalty and social ethics.”
1072
  In order to promote this 
vision of liberated labor, the Democrats called for laws to regulate “the process by which 
courts may issue injunctions in industrial disputes,” to regulate “the process by which 
guilt of constructive contempt may be determined and punishment meted out,” and to 
exempt “organized labor from the anti-trust laws.”
1073
  Furthermore, the party called for:  
 A declaration of public policy in favor of collective bargaining, and the 
 enumeration and definition, under that declaration, of the substantive rights of 
 labor to perform legitimate acts necessary to further its interest.  Such a guarantee 
 of the rights of labor would have to be weighed by the courts against rights 
 asserted for the employer, and against the ‘right of contract.’  It would permit 
 emphasis upon the fact that, in most if not all cases, strikes are carried on, not as 
 conspiracies to injure the employer, but as a part of the process of collective 
 bargaining, to protect the interest of labor.
1074
    
 
 In 1928, most American workers enjoyed relative comfort.  This presented an 
obvious problem for a presidential candidate who sought to critique the economic 
ideology of the incumbent party.  Yet while accepting many of the underlying principles 
of Republican policies—a move that can only be seen as pragmatic given the robust 
economy—Smith still challenged aspects of those policies on progressive terms crafted to 





 If Smith partisans proposed to challenge aspects of the Harding-Coolidge-Hoover 
polity, their alternatives could be found in the Smith governorship.  Not only did Smith 
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seek the presidency on the merits of his gubernatorial résumé, he also submitted that 
résumé to the American voters as a means for divining his executive temperament and 
policy intentions.
1075
  The candidate said as much on the campaign trail repeatedly.
1076
  
While Smith made these assertions, some of the most important iterations of this 
argument came from the very group that had been central to crafting and implementing 
his transitional progressivism over the course of two decades in New York State: female 
social work progressives. 
Eleanor Roosevelt, whose husband had nominated Smith at the Democratic 
National Convention in Houston, spearheaded the women’s division of the Smith 
campaign, which essentially used existing contacts to propagate campaign 
information.
1077
  In meetings with women’s groups, Roosevelt highlighted Smith’s 
“interest in providing adequate educational facilities [and] advocacy of better salaries for 
teachers,” as well as “the Governor’s outstanding record regarding humanitarian 
legislation on behalf of women and children.”
1078
   
Molly Dewson, president of the New York Consumers’ League and former 
secretary of the Massachusetts State Minimum Wage Commission, was another social 
worker who would become a leading Democratic partisan, rising to national prominence 
during the Franklin Roosevelt years.  But she was already an active Democrat by 1928, 
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serving as a campaign vice chair and director of women’s activities for the central United 
States.
1079
  During a radio speech from St. Louis, Dewson explained why she had chosen 
to campaign for Smith:  
My own interests are in the field of education and social economics.  It is natural, 
therefore that my attention should have been early called to the man who has been 
unceasingly active as the chief executive of New York in making real for the 
people through the channels of government those opportunities and services about 




Dewson proceeded to outline Smith’s progressive record on public education, health care, 
and factory legislation.
1081
    
It is not surprising that one of the most active Smith partisans was New York 
State Industrial Board chairperson Frances Perkins, one of the architects of the 
governor’s transitional progressivism.  Perkins made a number of speeches for her fellow 
Democrat, and in all of them she emphasized his progressive record, particularly as an 
advocate for the social welfare agenda.  In a September speech at Boston, Perkins 
emphasized Smith’s “social service record,” and admonished her audience that it was 
“the duty of social worker[s] to press for their social conception as controlling political 
policies,” by voting for the Democrat.
1082
  Perkins reiterated this point in a radio address 
from New York on September 24, proclaiming:  
Governor Alfred Smith has stood by us, has put the women’s social welfare 
problems into effect, has listened with sympathy, with knowledge and 
understanding, to the aspirations of working women for leisure, for fair wages, for 
a good life. . . .  Will they recognize their duty to be loyal, not only to the man and 
his service, but to the program of industrial progress and of social welfare, of 
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 Frances Perkins, “Notes for Campaign Speech to Social Workers in Boston, Sept 1928,” Frances 




equality of women, and the protection of the weak, which he represents and on 




Perkins was not the only social welfare progressive to demand that loyalty compelled a 
vote for the Democrat:  Mary Van Kleeck, who chaired a national committee of social 
workers supporting the New Yorker, reportedly said “emphatically that any working 
woman who failed to support Smith is almost guilty of treason.”
1084
  
Returning to Boston in October, Perkins predicted that Smith would garner 
tremendous support within the social work community “because he is the one outstanding 
personality in American political life who has translated into reality and made effective 
the social welfare programs which social workers have formulated and have dreamed of 
throughout this country for the last generation.”
1085
  Furthermore, this was not simply one 
aspect of Smith’s political sensibilities; rather, he was “the first politician who has built 
his political career on the practical expression in legislation and in government of this 
passion for social justice.”
1086
  Before these audiences, Perkins outlined Smith’s park and 
playground initiatives, his “strengthening the work of the State Health Department,” his 
“espousing the cause of increase of nurses for maternity care,” his development of 
“traveling child health clinics throughout the state,” his work “to secure suitable widows’ 
pensions,” and his “leadership in the movement for better factory and labor laws.”
1087
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Indeed, suggested Perkins, Smith’s was “a program of social welfare legislation which 
might have been written by the National Social Workers’ Association.”
1088
  
Many social workers longed for a Smith presidency because of his record—a 
record which, as summarized by Perkins, captures the very essence of transitional 
progressivism.  In her Boston speech she did this succinctly by simply describing Al 
Smith:  “He understands these problems and talks about them as a social worker.  The 
greatest contribution perhaps to the whole program of making a better life for the plain 
people in New York State, has been his political leadership.”
1089
  Smith’s governorship 
had expressed transitional progressivism in both policy and politics, and this was reason 
enough to promote him to the nation’s highest office. 
After giving the Boston speech, during which she had “got a great hand,” Frances 
Perkins recalled feeling that the 1928 “campaign, whether it elected Al Smith or not, 
would plant the seed of a set of ideas all over the country.”
1090
  Perkins gave similar 
speeches in Pittsburgh, Chicago, Buffalo, and Detroit—each time arguing that Smith was 
the social welfare candidate.
1091
  To Perkins and many other social welfare progressives, 
the 1928 campaign was not only about electing Al Smith; it was, at its core, a drive to 
broaden an entire agenda—the articulation for the first time on the national stage of a set 
of progressive values that they had promoted at the state level and hoped to implement in 
Washington under the presidency of their strongest political patron.
1092
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Another Smith supporter, Lillian Wald, took a much different approach to the 
campaign.  Fellow settlement house leader Jane Addams, a Hoover supporter, had written 
Smith advisor Henry Moskowitz that she would not speak on the Republican’s behalf; 
and so in a sort of gentlewomen’s agreement, Wald acted in kind.
1093
  Yet Wald was 
“working all the time” for the Democrat.
1094
  One technique she employed was “to talk to 
little groups,” telling “stories of [Governor] Smith . . . in very much detail,” at dinner 
parties and other gatherings.
1095
   
Of broader significance, Wald penned dozens of letters to fellow social workers 
on behalf of the Democratic candidate.  She wrote many of her colleagues that Smith 
possessed a “tender sympathy for humanity” rivaled in American political history only by 
Abraham Lincoln.
1096
  To justify this appraisal she directed her correspondents to “the 
record of his unique and able administration of the affairs of New York State.”
1097
  Wald 
implored one Chicago settlement activist to “ask . . . the doctors who know his programs 
for hospitalization, and the New York child labor committee who know his 
comprehension of children’s needs.  Ask the housing people and the people who 
understand his great program for conserving the water power for the benefit of the 
people.”
1098
  In these letters Wald praised not only Smith’s progressive policies, but also 
the efficacy of his political methodology:  “Time and time again when the opposition has 
[blocked] measures that the Governor thought important for the welfare and happiness of 
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the people, he has gone before the voters directly, explaining as only Theodore Roosevelt 
ever did.”
1099
       
 Beyond these personal correspondences, Wald reached an even wider audience 
with an open letter to her charitable colleagues.  The document, which was co-authored 
by fellow settlement house leader John L. Elliott and mailed to social workers across the 
nation, proclaimed that Smith had “done more to promote human welfare and social 
justice in New York than any other man in public life throughout the history of the 
State.”
1100
  Citing accomplishments including the $50 million hospital bond, “financial 
assistance to mothers of dependent children,” the creation of a commission on child 
welfare, “efforts to promote the building of low priced houses and to improve housing 
conditions generally,” the forty-eight hour work week for women, and administrative 
reorganization, Wald and Elliott determined that “social workers and the socially minded 
generally may find great satisfaction in Governor Smith’s record of transforming hopes 
for social reform into the realities of legislation and efficient administration.”
1101
  Readers 
were reminded of Smith’s methodology—of his ability to make “an appeal to the 
people,” and achieve “victories of popular government.”
1102
  Again, in making the case 
for Smith’s candidacy, social welfare advocates were describing his unique qualifications 
for the presidency as precisely what has been termed “transitional progressivism”:  “His 
record of legislative achievement in social work and his rare qualities as a public leader, 
                                                 
1099
 Ibid., p. 3. 
1100
 “An Open letter to Social Workers,” Lillian Wald Papers, Reel 33.  John L. Elliott was head worker at 
the Hudson Guild Settlement House in New York City.  Proceedings of the National Conference of Social 
Work, at the Forty-Fifth Annual Session Held in Kansas City, Missouri, May 15-22, 1918 (Chicago: Rogers 
& Hall Co., 1919), pp. 458-459. 
1101






displayed in dealing with the social problems of the State, have fitted him in an unusual 
way for national leadership.”
1103
   
 As Perkins spoke and Wald wrote on Al Smith’s behalf, Belle Moskowitz crafted 
political strategy for the campaign.  In fact, Moskowitz had for years been the central 
figure maneuvering on Smith’s behalf behind the scenes, and her position was 
strengthened as the election season dawned.  According to Elisabeth Perry, Moskowitz 
had not only “penetrated” the ostensibly all-male leadership of the Smith campaign; she 
“could almost be said to dominate it,” meeting regularly with “a smaller, more intimate 
group within the War Board.”
1104
  Bolstered by her assiduous recordkeeping over the past 
decade, as well as by a vast national network of correspondents and political allies, 
Moskowitz was probably the only indispensable person within the Smith circle.
1105
  She 
did not always get her way:  Moskowitz had opposed Smith’s selection of Raskob as 
party chair, and like many women within the party she was disgruntled when female 
members of the DNC (who constituted precisely half of the membership) were excluded 
from the process of selecting vice-chairs for the campaign by an informal meeting of 
male committee members.
1106
  Nevertheless, Moskowitz, along with Smith’s other long-
time advisors Joseph Proskauer and Robert Moses, sat atop what Robert Slayton has 
deemed “the real flowchart” of power within the campaign.
1107
   As a member of the 
party’s executive committee and head of the publicity bureau, Moskowitz was charged 
with “the selling of Al Smith”; coordinating materials for the press, directing research, 
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and preparing campaign literature.
1108
  It was Moskowitz who put together the party’s 
campaign handbook, shaping an image of the candidate and his credentials that fit with 
her conception of his “best points.”
1109
  Thus campaign publicity stressed Smith’s 
progressive achievements as governor of New York, his attachment to the progressive 
tradition, and his personal virtues.
1110
  While Moskowitz molded the official public image 
of Al Smith, she also distributed talking points to speakers and approved advertisements 
for publication.
1111
  With direct authority over the “Social Work, Public Health, and 
Education” committee and the “Women’s Activities” committee, she was further 
empowered to promote Smith’s social welfare progressive credentials.
1112
  While many 
progressive women played important parts in the Smith campaign, Belle Moskowitz had 
enjoyed, in Rexford Tugwell’s words, an “elevation to the role of President-maker.”
1113
      
 One branch of the campaign which fell under Moskowitz’s jurisdiction was the 
“Public Health Workers for Smith,” a group formed to promote the Democrat’s 
candidacy among social welfare progressives on the key issue of health care.
1114
  In an 
effusive letter to their colleagues, the committee declared:  “No man in public life in New 
York State has contributed as much in terms of constructive legislation, and in the 
support of adequate appropriations for the development of the state’s modern public 
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  The development of county health units and generous state funding 
for local health work was praised, as was the governor’s supposed non-partisanship and 
his understanding “that the health of the people is one of the State’s most precious 
assets.”
1116
  Significantly, the letter suggested that such an administration could be 
expected nationally should Smith ascend to the White House:  “Those of us who 
subscribe to this letter believe that he would bring to the complex public health problems 
of the nation, the same intelligent and sympathetic understanding that has marked his 
leadership in New York State.”
1117
   
These activists saw in Smith’s gubernatorial career and in his agenda for the 
nation the manifestation of a great deal of their social welfare agenda.  Moreover, in 
Smith they saw not merely a politician playing the part of reformer, but rather a coworker 
who shared genuinely in their progressive vision.  Smith made much of this clear in his 
campaign speeches, and women like Molly Dewson and Frances Perkins made the case 
more explicitly and in greater detail in addresses of their own.  These progressive 
sentiments matched those articulated in Smith’s defense of his program during his Boston 
rejoinder to Hoover’s “socialism” charge.  After all, as Lillian Wald wrote to her fellow 
social worker Graham Taylor, “most of us are for what Hoover designates as ‘Smith’s 
state socialism.’”
1118
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Not all progressive women rallied to the Smith cause.  One group which roundly 
rejected his platform was female progressives who might be dubbed “equal rights 
feminists.”  During the 1910s, as historian Nancy Cott has written, “the suffrage coalition 
temporarily concealed” the internal divisions among progressive women; by the 1920s 
there was a clear gulf between women interested in social welfare and labor legislation 
and those who prioritized women’s total equality, individuality, economic independence, 
and political rights.
1119
  The latter coalesced around groups like Alice Paul’s National 
Woman’s Party and pressed for an Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution.  These 
feminists, in contrast with the social welfare progressive women, frowned upon welfare 
and labor legislation that presupposed sex differences.  Simultaneously, those who 
supported the social welfare agenda tended to be staunch opponents of the Equal Rights 
Amendment because its adoption would render the lion’s share of their progressive labor 
statutes unconstitutional.   
 Given this background, it is not surprising that the National Woman’s Party—
which Smith derided as an “interesting sidelight” in his notes—supported Herbert 
Hoover, citing vice presidential nominee Charles Curtis’ support for the Equal Rights 
Amendment and chastising the Democrat for “refusing to put their ideas into effect in 
New York State.”
1120
  Walter Lippmann cabled Smith that this presented an “admirable 
opportunity” to enunciate his social welfare vision, since “what is meant by equal 
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opportunity is the destruction not only of laws unfavorable to women but laws specially 
designed to protect them.”
1121
  The Fall River Globe, which supported the Democratic 
nominee, shared this assessment on its editorial page:  “An organization exerting itself for 
the interests of the sweatshop is something that could not properly find a place for itself 
under the Smith banner.”
1122
  The candidate himself addressed the question directly the 
following month at Newark:  
When it comes to women’s legal status, when it comes to the custody of children, 
when it comes to property rights, I will go as far as anybody in the world to 
maintain the equality between women and men.  But what I will never do is 
consent to an amendment to the Federal Constitution that will prohibit the States 
from enacting legislation to promote the health, the comfort and the happiness of 
women who are compelled to work in factories.
1123
   
 
Even among those progressive women whose focus was on social welfare there 
was nothing approaching unanimity.  Jane Addams, like many social work progressives, 
supported Hoover largely based on the Republican’s own progressive credentials, 
particularly his humanitarian efforts at the close of the World War.  Hoover, she said, was 
“the one American connected with the Great War that should have been distinguished not 
for his military services but for ‘conservation of tender lives menaced by war’s 
starvation.’”
1124
  A social worker from Minneapolis wrote that despite her own preference 
for Al Smith, she saw “little to choose between the social service record of the two men,” 
for Hoover, like Smith, had proved a great humanitarian.
1125
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Many others opposed Smith because of his stance on prohibition.  As had been 
the case among agrarian reformers, Smith’s openness in questioning the efficacy of 
federal prohibition and his advocacy of a state-level system of enforcement had earned 
him mistrust from many social welfare progressives—both male and female.  Responding 
to Lillian Wald’s entreaties, Irving Fisher, a noted Yale economist and social reformer, 
wrote that in spite of Smith’s “great vision in Public Health measures, educational and 
labor measures,” he was compelled to support Hoover because “Prohibition in the hands 
of its enemies could never succeed.”
1126
  A social worker from Kalamazoo, Michigan, 
expressed similar ambivalence:  “I am sorry, for Governor Smith fills my imagination 
and I would have liked to vote for him but I believe a victory for Mr. Hoover at the 
present time would settle the question of the Eighteenth Amendment.”
1127
  Another wrote 
Wald that “I recognize with you, the great service which Governor Smith has rendered to 
the improvement of public social service in the state of New York—especially in the 
reconstruction of hospitals for the insane, institutions for feeble-minded, and public 
prisons, as well as the development of the park system,” however, “I am for prohibition, 
and I am therefore compelled to vote against Governor Smith.”
1128
  Another social 
worker suggested that Smith’s position on prohibition was “reactionary, not progressive,” 
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overshadowing “the progressive work which he has done in the field of social work.”
1129
  
Worse still, the writer had read of “the number of highballs and cocktails which the 
Governor is in the habit of imbibing daily.”
1130
  One writer called those social workers 
who favored Smith in spite of his opposition to prohibition “the worst kind of 
hypocrites.”
1131
  An anonymous “progressive” woman wrote Eleanor Roosevelt to 
criticize her for supporting Smith, suggesting, “You must have seen him at some time or 
another at some of his public appearances in a condition which you as a supporter of the 
Volstead Act would disdain . . . .  Can you imagine Mr. and Mrs. Smith in the White 
House as the leading family of the nation?”
1132
  Thus did social workers from Demorest, 
Georgia, to Wellston, Missouri, to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, express their opposition to 
Smith on the question of prohibition.
1133
 
Another reason for disapproval of the Democrat among some in the social work 
community was his lack of a formal education.  The fact that the New York governor had 
educated himself to a par with any of his colleagues through rigorous self-discipline (to 
the point that he was correcting fellow assemblymen’s grammar during debate) was less 
well known than the fact that he had often bragged that his only degree was “F. F. M.”—
from the Fulton Fish Market.
1134
  This was an obvious liability when courting 
professionals in a field founded by college graduates on principles of social scientific 
expertise.  A correspondent of Lillian Wald’s from Pittsburgh pointed this out, 
demanding: “Do you social workers, belonging to a group that is stressing so much these 
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days the importance of training for the job—do you not think the presidency is the 
biggest job there is and cannot have a man too well educated and trained?”
1135
  This 
suggested an education gap between the two candidates in the opinion of the executive 
secretary of the Massachusetts Child Labor Committee, who pointed out that Hoover 
“has had the best training for president of any man we have had.”
1136
  A social worker 
from St. Louis was less charitable, admonishing Wald for “trying to ‘go down the line’ 
for a man whom you would otherwise call illiterate, just because he favored a few good 
things for suffering humanity.”
1137
 
Hoover’s progressive credentials, prohibition, and the education gap all served to 
divert much of the social work vote, a particularly large bloc among female social 
welfare progressives, away from the Democrat.  So too did religious bigotry, which will 
be explored later.  In spite of these failures, the New Yorker attracted the support of many 
female progressives, and it was these women who gave voice (and in the case of Belle 
Moskowitz, direction) to the most fundamental aspirations of Smith’s transitional 
progressivism.  Prohibitionists or not, there were many important progressive women 
who were ready to work tirelessly on behalf of the Democrat; for they could not easily set 
aside their hope that with Governor Smith in the White House they might be able to 
accomplish a few more “good things for suffering humanity.”          
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From Albany to Washington 
 
 Other issues received expansive treatment during Smith’s speaking tour.  
Prohibition, which cost the Democrat dearly among progressive farmers and social 
workers, was the focus of Smith’s speech in the beer capital Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 
where “no more popular subject could have been chosen for an audience,” according to 
the Brooklyn Eagle, since “a large proportion of [the residents] are Germans or of 
German extraction.”
1138
  The topic also received prominent comment in Newark and 
Philadelphia, and in Chicago, which had been dubbed six years earlier “the town Billy 
Sunday couldn’t shut down” by songwriter Fred Fisher.
1139
  In these speeches, Smith 
defended his plan to allow states to decide how to handle the question as “nothing more 
nor less than the simple application of the good old Jeffersonian democratic theory of 
States’ rights.”
1140
  While he often discussed the topic, Smith shared the opinion of a 
group of forty Harvard professors who had suggested in endorsing the Democrat that 
prohibition “should not be allowed to overshadow other matters.”
1141
  Indeed, when asked 
directly in Omaha “Do you believe that liquor is the great issue in this campaign,” he 
responded tersely:  “I certainly do not.”
1142
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 Controversial as it was, Smith’s position was little more than a nationalization of 
the stance he had taken throughout his tenure as governor, during which he signed an act 
repealing the Mullin-Gage Law (which had provided for the enforcement of prohibition 
in the state).
1143
  Based on this record, no one should have been surprised by the New 
Yorker’s antipathy toward the Eighteenth Amendment.  Yet his handling of the issue left 
much to be desired.  Walter Lippmann, who approved of Smith’s position as “wise, 
courageous and fine,” nevertheless disapproved of the Democrat’s reticence on the 
question prior to the primaries and party convention, demanding that “good faith requires 
you to serve notice on the convention as to the line you intend to take on a matter of such 
importance.”
1144
  Publicly, Lippmann suggested in Harper’s Magazine that prohibition 
was becoming the most important issue of the upcoming campaign, and that Smith was 
being kept quiet by his advisors for fear of upsetting dry Democrats.
1145
  Smith chose a 
different course.  As former secretary of the navy Josephus Daniels, a North Carolina 
delegate and committed prohibitionist would later recall:   
At Houston . . . . the only fight was in the Committee on Platform where the drys 
had a small number of determined men who were opposed to a plank demanding 
the repeal of national prohibition.  Such men . . . told the Smith forces that if they 
insisted on an outright repeal declaration we would offer a minority report and 
carry the debate to the floor of the Convention.  The Smith forces wished to avoid 
that if possible for fear of its effect on the election.
1146
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Thus, hoping to avoid an intraparty rift, Smith steered clear of the sort of outright 
declaration urged by Lippmann—until after the nomination and platform were finalized.  
Then, he abruptly broke his silence on the question and sent a telegram to the delegates at 
Houston declaring his intent to stand by the platform but simultaneously reiterating his 
belief in the need for “fundamental changes” in the prohibition law.
1147
  Apparently, 
Smith acquiesced to Lippmann’s urgings—Franklin Roosevelt would later blame this 
“fool telegram” on Lippmann and the New York World.
1148
  The dilatory tactics of 
Smith’s representatives may have kept the major actions of the convention amicable, but 
the telegram did indeed alienate many dry delegates and cause serious problems 
throughout the campaign.  Yet despite such faulty strategy, the Smith forces remained 
relatively disciplined on the alcohol question, avoiding outright calls for repeal while 
focusing on the “Jeffersonian” nature of Smith’s position as New York governor; and so 
while many prohibitionist Democrats were antagonized, figures like Josephus Daniels 
were given ample cover to remain within the partisan fold.   
 Another issue on which Smith proposed New York policy writ large was 
government efficiency—a question of greater consequence in New York but lesser 
comment in 1928.  In a major speech at the Missouri State Fairgrounds in Sedalia, Smith 
mocked Republican claims of “economy in government” as petty compared to what he 
considered the enormous waste overseen by the Coolidge administration.  He ridiculed 
Republican boasts about “the young man in charge of the navy store room in Washington 
who had affected a great saving in the Administration of the Government by going 
through the wastepaper baskets every night and picking out the pins and the paperclips 
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and the short stubs of pencils and saving them all,” and “the Consul General at Curacao . 
. . .  [who]  saved $14 in one year by turning off the electric lights early at night.”
1149
  At 
the same time, the Democrat skewered federal officials for failing to allocate funds to 
develop government properties across the country, a condition which led to the 
unnecessary expenditure of millions of dollars in rent; he cited cases in Brooklyn, 
Binghamton, Chicago, and Pittsburgh, and claimed that there were “more than one 
hundred parcels of land spread out through the length and breadth of this country, 
purchased by the Government for Federal buildings, upon which there has never been a 
brick laid or a dollar appropriation made to progress them.”
1150
  Smith also decried the 
lack of government appropriations for necessary projects, blaming federal haggling with 
the states for delays in Mississippi River flood controls and demanding that “instead of 
wasting time debating and arguing what this State and that State ought to pay, the whole 
improvement ought to be financed by the Federal Government itself in the interest of the 
whole country.”
1151
  Similarly, Republican economy was held responsible for miserly 
funding within the Department of the Interior that had led to horrible neglect of American 
Indians living on reservations.
1152
   
 As he had in New York, Smith proposed that such austerity did not constitute real 
economy; instead, the adoption of business-like management and common sense reforms 
(such as developing federal holdings to eliminate the long-term cost of rent) could enable 
the federal government to provide for the people’s welfare while promoting more 
efficient administration.  The Democratic campaign suggested that “there are endless 
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anomalies, often serious as well as humorous, in the grouping of activities within 
departments. . . .  The lack of coherence in the departments, due to failure to organize 
them on the principle of the association of related functions, is accompanied by a 
scattering of the same kinds of work among numerous, unconnected branches of the 
administration.”
1153
  The party’s official Campaign Book neatly juxtaposed what it saw as 
Smith’s position on government economy and that of the Republicans: 
 The real friends of departmental reorganization are not these cheese-paring 
 sticklers for an economy that is merely negative.  Rather they are those who view 
 government in positive terms, seeing what effective governmental service can 
 mean in the lives of ordinary people.  It is not accidental, therefore, that the last 
 two Administrations should have seemed so lacking in real seriousness and 
 should have been so demonstrably unable or unwilling to put driving force behind 
 its lip-service to the ideal of reorganized administration.
1154
    
 
It is unsurprising that the argument presented in 1928 paralleled so closely the arguments 
Smith had made against miserly government and in favor of positive reorganization as 




 After the nominee articulated all of this in Missouri, the Wall Street Journal 
expressed indignation at Smith’s “cheap” attempt to “ridicule . . . economy in 
government.”
1156
  Not content with this rebuff of the Democrat, the Journal then 
objurgated Smith in one of the most patronizing paragraphs of the campaign:   
 All of us think the more of him that he rose from humble surroundings and made 
 himself a genuine success in politics. . . .  But if Mr. Smith rose in the world in so 
 creditable a way, he took a less worthy part of his original surroundings with him.  
 Just as your maid-servant or your office boy sees no sense in economy and 
 nothing reprehensible in waste, each believing that your income is far greater than 
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 any needs they can imagine, so the politician of the Smith type views the public 
 purse.
1157
       
 
 Equally critical of Smith’s speech was Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon, 
who believed that the Democrat “undertook to challenge my good faith and to accuse me 
of presenting a false picture of the nation.”
1158
  Referencing the “scorn and ridicule” 
Smith had offered to “examples of minor savings,” Mellon queried:  “Doesn’t he realize 
that these . . . are simply proof that the example set by the President at the top has reached 
down until it has permeated the whole civil service and revolutionized their attitude 
toward the expenditure of public funds?”
1159
  Mellon also disputed Smith’s 
characterization of the government’s building program, and concluded that “Governor 
Smith has been led to draw rash conclusions from insufficient data and inadequate 
study.”
1160
  Despite the arrogant flippancy of the Wall Street Journal, the debate over 
economy demonstrated that unlike in New York, Smith’s battle for national 
reorganization would not be characterized by a Democratic monopoly on reasoned 
arguments.  Rather than inspiring a progressive revolt, Smith’s criticism of the 
administration allowed Republicans to hail Mellon’s policies and to celebrate his reply as 
a brilliant discourse on the imperative of continuing the policies of Calvin Coolidge.  
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The Religious Question as Entering Wedge  
 
In the midst of all of these policy speeches, the question of Smith’s religion 
retained a clear significance.  The governor recognized this, and so he decided to devote 
much of his September 20 address at Oklahoma City to the Ku Klux Klan and others’ 
opposition to his candidacy on the basis of his Catholicism.  A somewhat naïve 
confidence that the American voter would instinctively look to a candidate’s 
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qualifications and not their ethnicity or religion had always been part of Smith’s 
worldview.  He had brushed aside the Klan’s taunts in New York, and this posture had 
been justified by electoral success.
1162
  Even in 1928, the nominee tried literally to laugh 
off the issue.  As his campaign locomotive crept into Oklahoma, Smith and Joseph 
Proskauer gazed out their window at the fiery crosses that had been erected on a hillside 
near the tracks in anticipation of the Catholic candidate’s arrival.  Rather than take the 
display to heart, he brushed it aside with humor, turning to the Jewish Proskauer and 
inquiring, “Joe, how did they know you were on this train?”
1163
   
Nevertheless, the Democrat took an uncompromising stand against such bigots 
during the second speech of his campaign tour.  He declared that it was not immigrants or 
racial or religious minorities who were un-American, but rather that it was the Klansman 
and his ilk that were “totally ignorant of the history and tradition of this country and its 
institutions.”
1164
   Addressing a series of documents that had been circulated in Kentucky 
to defame him as immoral, the governor became angry, declaring that the “set of men 
responsible for the publication of that wicked libel, in my opinion, do not believe in 
Christ.”
1165
   
 Smith saw addressing the religious question as part of his duty to the nation, 
believing that he could put it to rest and move on to discuss his reform agenda, 
proclaiming:  “The wicked motive of religious intolerance has driven bigots to attempt to 
inject these slanders into a political campaign.  I here and now drag them into the open 
and denounce them as a treasonable attack upon the very foundations of American 
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liberty. . . .  Let the people of this country decide this election upon the great and real 
issues and upon nothing else.
1166
  Thus, Smith wanted to put the religious issue, which he 
believed had no place in political debate anyway, permanently behind him, stating that if 
this happened he could be “confident of the outcome in November.”
1167
   
In fact, the candidate’s cheerfulness reflected a gross misjudgment of the political 
and cultural climate.
1168
  As early as 1926, one Georgia Grand Wizard had promised: 
“We will march in 1928, chanting a funeral dirge, carrying a coffin on which will be 
inscribed: ‘Here lie the political remains of Al Smith.’”
1169
  The wizard’s kinsmen and 
like-minded Americans did not disappoint.  Reminiscing on the events of 1928, Eleanor 
Roosevelt recalled that “if I needed anything to show me what prejudice can do to the 






In 1928, Alabama Democrat Thomas Heflin, who had already denounced Smith 
and the Pope on the floor of the United States Senate, embarked on a nationwide 
speaking tour, partially funded by the KKK.
1171
  In North Carolina, Governor Angus 
McLean lamented that opposition to Smith in his state was “based on the fact that he is a 
                                                 
1166
 Ibid., pp. 55, 58. 
1167
 Ibid., p. 59. 
1168
 For a classic consideration of the religious question in the 1928 campaign, see Moore, A Catholic Runs 
for President: The Campaign of 1928.     
1169
 “Vengeful,” Time, December 6, 1926.  
1170
 Eleanor Roosevelt, This I Remember (New York: Harper, 1949), p. 39. 
1171
 “Heflin Assails Smith, Edge Defends Governor,” The Washington Post, March 3, 1927, p. 4; “Heflin 
Issues Defi To Party In Senate On Catholic Issue,” The Washington Post, January 24, 1928, pp. 1, 10;  
“Papal Red In President Room, Heflin Charges,” The Washington Post, May 18, 1928, p. 5; “Heflin, Clad 
in Papal Hues, Stirs Smith Row in Senate,” The Washington Post, May 24, 1928, pp. 1, 10; Burner, The 
Politics of Provincialism, p. 204; “Heflin Predicts Hoover Will Win By 10,000,000,” The Boston Globe, 






  In Arkansas, the president of Central College had his school’s 
funding discontinued by “the bigoted leaders of my church in Arkansas—the Baptist 
Church,” as retribution for his active support of the Catholic Smith.
1173
  The Anti-Saloon 
League distributed literature that not only alleged Smith drank “from four to eight 
‘cocktails’ a day,” but also made thinly veiled allusions to the religious question—
describing the looming threat of “THE DOWNFALL OF CHRISTIAN 
CIVILIZATION,” the support of Smith among “aliens,” and the opposition to the 
Democrat by “Evangelical Churches,” while explicitly denouncing DNC chairman John 
Raskob’s Catholicism and his membership in the Knights of Columbus.
1174
  
The “fraternal” (i.e. Klan-published) periodical Fellowship Forum “regularly . . . 
devoted eight of its ten pages to violent, blatant and inaccurate attacks on Al Smith, the 
Pope and rum,” featuring headlines like “‘Drunk Negro Boosting Smith,’ ‘Kissing Pope’s 
Ring Insult to Flag,’ [and] ‘Tirades on Religion and Liquor by Smith in West Turn Voters 
in Disgust.’”
1175
  During the campaign, Fellowship Forum “won more circulation and 
showed a greater increase in gross revenue than any other U.S. publication.”
1176
  Indeed, 
Kenneth T. Jackson has argued that Smith’s candidacy was a “temporary godsend for the 
Invisible Empire,” helping to revivify the Klan and enabling it to boast “that it had nailed 
‘Smith’s political hide to the Klan’s barn door.’”
1177
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 Kenneth T. Jackson, The Ku Klux Klan in the City, 1915-1930 (New York: Oxford, 1967), p. 252.  
Historian John Higham agreed with this assessment, noting that “the anti-Catholic spirit that the order 
embodied flared up violently again in the election of 1928, when the Democratic candidate, Al Smith, 











A flyer entitled “Appointments made by Gov. Al. Smith” was circulated across 
the country, falsely asserting that of twenty-one judicial appointments made by Smith, 
“ONLY 21 Were Roman Catholics.”
1179
  As a result, Smith’s campaign was inundated 
with letters requesting “a certified list of appointees” and verification of the religious 
affiliations of each Smith hire.
1180
  Acquiescing, the Democratic National Committee 
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published a pamphlet in September providing the requested statistics, and distributed 
several printings-worth of the document in September and October.  There was no similar 
flood of letters inquiring about the governor’s stance on administrative reform or water 
power.   
These concerns were not quarantined among anonymous bigots or public clowns 
like Thomas Heflin.  In March, 1927, after a discussion with Idaho Republican senator 
William Borah, Walter Lippmann wrote Al Smith that “in spite of the decline of the 
organized power of the Klan . . . there has been a very strong development in the last few 
months, of fear, on the part of progressive and on the whole tolerant-minded people about 
the political power of the Catholic Church.”
1181
  Hostility over the candidate’s faith and 
related cultural questions was evident even among social welfare progressives.  One 
letter, sent from a self-professed progressive woman to Eleanor Roosevelt, explained why 
the writer could not support Smith:  “You discreetly refrain from mentioning [Smith’s] 
stand on Immigration.  Naturally he would like to let down the bars and permit more of 
the same kind of people to come in as are in large part supporting him now, regardless of 
the fact that we have not half-way assimilated those already here.”
1182
  She went on to 
criticize “those men whose names appear on your stationary . . . .  for the most part they 
are Catholics and Jews, who would at any time, it is evident, support one of Smith’s type 
. . . for the sake of opposing what to them is anathema, the ‘Old Americans’ of the United 
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  A welfare advocate from New Orleans lamented to Lillian Wald that “even 
among social workers, who ought to know better, Smith’s remarkable record in social 
legislation, and his unquestioned ability, courage and honesty, seem to go for naught as 
against his church affiliation.”
1184
  Wald herself aired similar frustrations in her own 
correspondences with fellow settlement activists.
1185
  She did so with good reason:  one 
social worker had attacked Wald for supporting the Democrat since “wherever the 
Catholic Church rules, there is darkness, superstition, and deterioration,” while another, 
who called Smith “a cheap politician,” accused her of “prostitut[ing]” herself on his 
behalf.
1186
   
These shameful episodes and others like them have led scholars to conclude that 
Smith’s religion caused a backlash that bifurcated the electorate Catholic against 
Protestant and produced a result neatly understood through the question of religion.  Such 
a framework may be convenient, but it is also far too simplistic to account for the realities 
of the contest.  The first hint of this is contained in the speech renowned for Smith’s 
denunciation of the Klan.  At Oklahoma City, the candidate spent nearly as many pages 
dealing with his progressive record as governor of New York as he did decrying bigotry.  
Of equal significance, the issues which he chose to use as evidence of his executive 
prowess—water power, administrative reorganization, labor reforms, and social 
welfare—were the issues on which he was seeking to differentiate himself from Herbert 
Hoover.  Thus the Oklahoma City address demonstrates the multifaceted nature of 
Smith’s campaign in a way that challenges the literature’s singular focus on religion.  It is 
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clear that Smith’s denomination cost him votes—and that it helped attract other votes.  
But looking at the positive side of this equation—examining those voters who were 
drawn to Smith because of his Catholicism—demonstrates just how complicated the 
issues of the election really were, and invites a more profound consideration of the 




 As the conventional narrative goes, Smith, a working-class urbanite and grandson 
of immigrants who was the first Roman Catholic to secure a major-party nomination for 
the presidency, became himself the central issue of the campaign.  Formerly loyal 
Democrats, especially in the South, turned away from this representative of the “new 
Americans,” while many of those new Americans became enthusiastic supporters of the 
New York governor.
1187
  While this traditional history contains many elements of truth, it 
masks the authentic, discernible ideological differences between Smith and Hoover.  It 
also masks the fact that the new Democrats of 1928, the urban ethnic workers who were 
voting as a bloc for Alfred E. Smith, were fully aware of his progressive approach to 
economic and social welfare issues, and that these voters supported Smith based not only 
on their biographical similarities, but also based on a developing political ideology.  The 
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implications of this point are profound:  if urban ethnic workers were voting for Smith 
based not exclusively on ethnocultural issues but also on economic and social concerns, 
then the 1928 election should be viewed as one in which a new coalition began to 
develop around principles that would inform the New Deal and provide the basis of 
Democratic policy for decades.  It would certainly be going too far to say that New Deal 
ideology per se was forged in the battles of 1928.  More appropriately, it must be 
acknowledged that in the midst of the cultural struggles of that year, the Smith campaign 
would, as Frances Perkins prophesied, “plant the seed of a set of ideas all over the 
country.”
1188
   
 Importantly, those who were antagonized by the 1920s march toward “one-
hundred percent Americanism” were themselves diverse; southern and eastern European 
Jews and Catholics, Irish Catholics, and African-Americans had very little in common 
besides their enemies.  While these groups were often bitter toward one another, they did 
harbor similar resentments toward a society that seemed quite willing to exclude them 
from the mainstream.  Historian J. Joseph Huthmacher described the phenomenon 
succinctly:  “True, there were many religious and ethnic differences among the 
component elements of the lower class, which often resulted in prejudice and violence.  
But each of these elements resented the Old Stock’s contention that all of them were 
equally inferior to the ‘real Americans’ of Yankee-Protestant heritage.”
1189
 
 Nevertheless, there is nothing to suggest that by the late 1920s there was any sort 
of alliance on the horizon.  There were no obvious signs that these diverse groups would 
coalesce behind Alfred E. Smith.  And yet that is precisely what occurred.  The 
                                                 
1188
 Frances Perkins Oral History, Book II, pp. 628.    
1189




Democracy’s opening wedge with these voters was the cultural assault being leveled 





 One favored theme of pro-Smith newspapers was the opposition to their candidate 
by the Ku Klux Klan.
1190
  This was reiterated time and again to urban ethnic audiences—
as when readers of the rabidly Democratic New York World, a leading paper among that 
city’s working classes, were told of a thwarted Klan plot to march on the Democratic 
convention in Houston in a desperate attempt to deny Smith the nomination.
1191
  
Meanwhile, Smith’s speeches denouncing the Klan, particularly those delivered at 
Oklahoma City and Baltimore, were lauded in front page tributes and reprinted in full.
1192
   
Some articles went further—asserting that Hoover’s reticence regarding the Klan, 
and the antics of Hoover lieutenants like Mabel Walker Willebrandt and Horace Mann—
both reputed to be tied to scurrilous anti-Smith propaganda—demonstrated that the 
Republicans and perhaps even their nominee were party to the “whispering 
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  Numerous political cartoons made the same point.
1194
  One that appeared 
on the front page of the Baltimore Afro-American entitled “Where They Roost” 
represented Al Smith as a bird nesting with “Religious Freedom” and “Personal Liberty,” 
while Hoover nested with “Bigotry,” “Race Prejudice,” and the “Ku Klux Klan.”
1195
  
 Official Democratic rhetoric encouraged such connections.  At Ridgefield Park, 
New Jersey, Brooklyn congressman Loring Black accused the Republicans of 
participating in the campaign of bigotry.
1196
  A full-page Democratic advertisement that 
ran in several cities pictured the tomb of the Unknown Soldier and queried:  “Who Asked 
His Religion?”  As if this icon were not enough, the ad included an excerpt from a speech 
by New York mayor Jimmy Walker that had been delivered at Newark in which the 
mayor referenced the anonymous martyr, suggesting with righteous indignation that “no 
one knew what color he was, and no one knew where he went to church.”
1197
  “Beau 
James” also took aim at Hoover, slyly remarking that he did not “feel like charging the 
Republican candidate with the responsibility of the whispering, bigoted campaign that is 
carried in contradiction of the Declaration of Independence, but there are men in this 
country who would refuse to be President if they got it with that kind of vote.”
1198
  The 
Unknown Soldier was also invoked by Democrats in Boston, where once and future 
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mayor James Michael Curley displayed a poster at his headquarters with an image of the 
monument and the sardonic caption:  “What a tragedy if we should learn he was a Jew, 
Catholic or a Negro.”
1199
  A Democratic ad appearing in Marcus Garvey’s New York 
Negro World admonished readers:  “Smash Republican Deal With The Ku Klux Klan 






Fig. 4.6: Anti-Hoover cartoon from the New York World by Pulitzer Prize-winning cartoonist Rollin Kirby, 
encouraging readers to associate the GOP with anti-Smith bigotry.
1201
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 It is significant that this last advertisement appeared in an African American 
newspaper, and that many similar articles and cartoons did as well.  The nebulous 
community that began to materialize in 1928 in response to the Smith candidacy and the 
constricted view of Americanism espoused by allies of the Republican campaign was not 
restricted to those who were of the specific ethnic or religious group of the Democratic 
nominee.  Rather, in a crucial development, recent immigrants, Catholics, Jews, and 
many African Americans, began to see each other as similarly under assault and thus 
discovered an impetus for alliance.  The important development of 1928 was not that 
minority groups realized they were threatened by a movement to homogenize American 
society under Anglo-Saxon hegemony—this had been going on for generations; what 
mattered was that these groups all saw in the struggles against bigotry of the Democratic 
candidate an analogy to their own cultural battles, and with encouragement from the 
Democrats and their allies in the press they developed a sense of coalition, in part as a 
unified response to such attacks.  
When the Baltimore Afro-American announced in a banner headline that 
“Religious Intolerance Is Biggest Campaign Issue,” it followed with the hopeful 
declaration “RACE QUESTION IS NEXT,” and reprinted a statement from the Kansas 
City Call that editorialized, “to our way of thinking, the denunciation [of the KKK by 
Smith at Oklahoma City] was as momentous as Lincoln’s question to Stephen A. 
Douglass [sic].”
1202
  The Chicago Defender supported Smith, in part, because the 
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Catholic candidate, like blacks, was an enemy of the Klan.
1203
  In fact, at least eighteen 
typically Republican black newspapers across the country, including leading publications 
like the Defender and the Afro-American, strongly endorsed Al Smith.
1204
   
 Not only black publications, but their readers, responding on the editorial pages, 
pronounced notions of a community of interest among ethnic, religious, and racial 
minorities.  One reader from St. Louis wrote the Afro-American that “the Ku Klux Klan 
has put us with the Catholics and they will have to defend us if things go on as they have. 
. . .  Please do all you can to help elect Smith.”
1205
  A Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, man 
reminded his fellow Afro readers that the “Preamble to the Constitution does not say ‘We 
The Protestants,’ . . . Catholics are people.”
1206
  The ambivalent St. Louis Argus 
editorialized that “The Klan is opposed to the Catholics, Jews or Negroes holding public 
office.  Let the real Americans rise up and down such a doctrine.”
1207
  A New York City 
man meditated cheerfully in the Afro-American: 
 The farmers will be satisfied 
 The Gentile and the Jew. 
 Prosperity will be nation-wide. 
 For every Negro too. 
 And everyone that’s in this land,  
 Will feel his vote well-spent, 
 For we are all going hand in hand— 
 Smith is our next President.
1208
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 Like mayors Curley and Walker, who alluded to African-Americans and Jews as 
well as their Catholic co-communicants in attacking the Republicans, the Polish-language 
Dziennik Chicagoski warned its mostly Catholic readers that Republicans were “warring 
against ‘all Catholics, foreigners and Negroes.’”
1209
  Similarly to these Irish and Slavic 
Catholics, Jewish leaders and publications began to adopt a coalitionist posture in the 
midst of the 1928 struggle.  At a New York luncheon featuring Democratic gubernatorial 
nominee Franklin D. Roosevelt, Rabbi Stephen S. Wise called for “a great uprising of the 
American people to smite the bigots and fanatics who dare to say to 20,000,000 loyal 
American citizens, ‘Not one of you is fit and qualified, not one of you shall be trusted by 
us to be President of the United States of America!’”
1210
  Rabbi Wise played a prominent 
role in boosting Smith on such terms within American Jewry—for example, a sermon he 
gave against the Republican campaign at Carnegie Hall was reprinted in the Cincinnati 
American Israelite and accounted for the most prominent election coverage of the entire 
season in that publication.  In it Wise opined that “if America is to mean to me nothing 
more than the perpetuation in the Western World of the century old phobias and 
fanaticisms of the past, then is America not worth while.”
1211
  Adopting a similar line, the 
Chicago Jewish Courier scolded Herbert Hoover for not condemning those who used 
religion against the Catholic candidate.
1212
   
 Jews and African-Americans began to see the assault on Smith’s Catholicism as 
an analogue to their own disadvantaged social position.  Outsiders who aspired to 
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mainstream acceptance could relate naturally to the Democrat’s travails.  Historian Oscar 
Handlin, thirteen at the time, later recalled of Smith:  “I heard a lot of talk about the 
religious issue, and I knew his middle name was Emanuel—I thought he was Jewish.”
1213
   
Meanwhile, Catholic ethnic groups began to reach out to these non-Catholic 
minorities in order to develop a sense of shared purpose.  In New York, where the 
Democrats had already mastered such politics, Smith campaign events reflected such 
diversity.  Brooklyn’s largest Columbus Day celebration, hosted by Deputy Street 
Cleaning Commissioner Michael Laura, erupted into a Smith-for-President rally, 
prompted by speeches from a diverse set of dignitaries, including Monsignor Alfonso 
Arcese, a prominent Italian Catholic priest; John H. McCooey, the Irish head of the Kings 
County Democratic machine; Frank M. Ferrari, president of Manhattan’s Italian Hospital; 
and Herbert Lehman, the Jewish Democratic nominee for lieutenant governor of New 
York.
1214
  A Democratic rally for “up-town Italians” held at New York’s Central Opera 
House featured Irish, Italian, and Jewish speakers, and even threw in a white Anglo-
Saxon Protestant for good measure—gubernatorial nominee Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt.
1215
   
Nationally, coalitionist sentiment was encouraged by the Democratic Party and 
facilitated by the Democratic press.  But if ethnic and religious questions were an 
effective opening wedge, they were not enough to establish a durable coalition among 
this polyglot confederacy of the culturally disfranchised.  Tirades against Yankee 
snobbery, southern racism, and Protestant fanaticism only told these groups what they 
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were against; recognition of their similar position in American economic life facilitated 
the development of an affirmative sense of community among these diverse members of 




 In September, the Brooklyn Eagle reminded its readers that Herbert Hoover, 
whose fortune was “shrouded in mystery,” would be the first millionaire president should 
he achieve election in November.
1216
  Contrastingly, the Democratic Philadelphia Record 
described how Smith was beloved by even the domestic workers at the New York 
governor’s mansion, where his rise to prominence had apparently not diminished his 
working-class humanity.
1217
  Similarly, the Record published the findings of a 
psychologist who had determined Smith to be the American politician with the closest 
affinity to the common man since Abraham Lincoln, while Hoover was found to be “out 
of touch.”
1218
  The Negro World repeatedly reminded the public that Smith was “a man 
from the people,” and beckoned its readers “To the polls for ‘The Happy Warrior,’ the 
truckman’s son!”
1219
    
 Such strategically placed biographical morsels held a narrow currency in a decade 
when the cult of wealth had taken deep root in American society—they were of use only 
within a specific community: among the working class.  The constant repetition of such 
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background information uncloaks the Democratic alliance-building strategy.  More 
significantly, the relentless cataloguing of Smith’s social welfare and labor achievements 
in New York, as well as his similar agenda for the nation, both by the Democratic 
campaign and their allies in the media, demonstrates that economics, along with cultural 
tolerance, would form the basis for this nascent coalition.   
 Democratic rhetoric—especially the speeches of Al Smith himself—often focused 
on the concerns of the working class.
1220
  These speeches were disseminated to workers 
by the Democratic press, who vigorously extolled Smith’s positions on labor issues.  
Hoover meanwhile was painted as an enemy of the labor movement and workers more 
broadly—a disgusted Philadelphia Record, for example, angrily alerted its readers that 
“brushing aside a custom of Presidential candidates declaring their views of labor [on 
Labor Day], Herbert Hoover rested again today in the quiet of his home.”
1221
  Claims of 
Republican prosperity were challenged in political cartoons that highlighted the plight of 
textile workers, miners, and farmers in a manner paralleling the speeches of Smith and 
other Democratic orators.
1222
   
 Democratic newspapers emphasized Smith’s support for government owned and 
operated hydroelectric plants as an issue that would profoundly benefit workers—and one 
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which clearly distinguished the Democrat from his Republican rival.
1223
  The Brooklyn 
Eagle declared this to be “the first time since 1912 that a great economic issue has been 
seriously debated in a national campaign,” and publications left no ambiguity as to what 
was at stake for workers.
1224
  “Billions” would be saved by rank-and-file consumers 
under the Smith plan, Philadelphians were told.
1225
  “Hoover is for the power trust,” the 
Negro World summarized; “Smith has renounced this giant economic threat to the poor 
man in terms which none may misunderstand.”
1226
  Democratic newspapers went wild 
when George Norris endorsed Smith and his power plan; and were aroused further by 
Smith’s caustic rejoinder to Hoover’s “state socialism” charge, reprinting the Boston 
address verbatim and dismissing the Republican critique as a ridiculous “straw man.”
1227
  
The Democratic press used the sharp partisan differences over water power to 
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Fig. 4.7: A cartoon from the Philadelphia Record celebrating George Norris’ endorsement of Smith as an 




Smith’s support for social welfare programs and his record as a national leader on 
such questions was routinely lauded.  While the Democrats reached out to non-Catholic 
minority groups such as Jews and African-Americans by emphasizing Smith’s appeals 
for tolerance, his social welfare record as governor was also highlighted—adding an 
important class dynamic to these cultural entreaties.  Why should Philadelphia’s Jews 
support the Democratic nominee? asked one advertisement.  “Because he stands for (1) 
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Constructive, broad, social service legislation as evidenced by his splendid record of 
achievement as Governor of New York State,” and “(2) Absolute elimination of the spirit 
of bigotry, intolerance and snobbishness.”
1229
  Similarly, an ad by the “Smith for 
President Democratic Colored League of Maryland” appearing in the Afro-American 
gave a list of seven reasons “Why New York Negroes Favor Al Smith,” including his 
housing program, his dramatic increase in appropriations for public education, his 
widow’s pension program, and his advocacy of minimum wages and employment 
standards for women and children.
1230
  The Negro World saw these policies as proof that 
Smith was a man of “broad humanitarian sympathies,” and dubbed him “the symbol of 
liberalism and Christian charity.”
1231
  The cartoon in the Afro-American that had placed 
Al Smith alongside freedom and liberty included another bird in his roost: “industrial 
democracy.”
1232
        
These genuine policy differences on economic questions like labor rights, public 
power, and social welfare, helped feed the broader argument of the Democrats and their 
allies that, as Marcus Garvey wrote, “Smith is a man from the people; Smith is a man 
who has sprung from the common people, he knows their wants and their heart-beats and 
their pulse.  Hoover has been pampered by the monopolist class; he is himself a 
millionaire; he can only see American politics and American power from the capitalist 
point of view.”
1233
  On election eve, a page one editorial in the Negro World proclaimed: 
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“Hoover believes in millions for the few and crumbs for the millions; Smith believes that 











This sharp class dichotomy was not merely implied by speeches given by 
Democrats and articles published by their allies in the press; it became a part of the 
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Democratic line, and was often absorbed by workers.  A report about the behavior of a 
rowdy group of Smith supporters published in the Philadelphia Record demonstrates 
both the success of this class-based community-building strategy and the manifestation of 
that strategy in the presentation of news.  In a scene “reminiscent of Hallowe’en or New 
Year’s Nights,” a mob of several thousand milled about the Bellevue-Stratford Hotel in 
Philadelphia, hoping to catch a glimpse of their political hero.  These “ebullient Smith 
rooters tooted raucously on horns, cried out and cheered every passing automobile that 
bore a Smith tag.”  But as the evening progressed, “a hundred lusty-lunged Smith 
followers let out an uproarious ‘Hooey!’ as an expensive limousine with a Hoover 
placard behind rolled by. . . .  The occupants, two men and a woman in evening clothes, 
stared frigidly.”
1236
  This delightfully partisan journalism demonstrates the success of the 
Democratic strategy—these grassroots, probably working-class Smith supporters were 
aroused but apparently not surprised by a passing group of upper-class Hoover voters.  
Simultaneously, the story is an obvious attempt to perpetuate this class politics with its 
close attention to the fancy clothing and expensive automobile that are implied to be 




 The Democratic press successfully imbued portions of the working class with a 
sense of shared values under the auspices of the Smith presidential campaign.  In 
response, urban ethnic working-class citizens exhibited unprecedented enthusiasm for 
Smith’s candidacy.  Tales of individual initiative on behalf of the New Yorker abounded.  
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Thomas De Mayo of the Bronx, an Italian immigrant and musician, was “not content 
merely to cast his vote for Gov. Alfred E. Smith,” and “dedicated his latest composition, 
a campaign march, to the Democratic nominee.”
1237
  Francis J. McGuire, a truck driver 
from Manhattan, drove to Democratic headquarters and donated $25.00 of his $42.00 
wages to the Smith cause, exclaiming, “I can’t afford to give this much money, but the 
Governor has been a hero of mine for years.  I want to see him President.”
1238
  John F. 
Donohue, a former hobo from Idaho now working as a carpenter in Philadelphia and 
supporting a family of seven, sketched a charcoal portrait of Smith for publication in the 
Record.
1239
  Even children got involved:  three-year-old William James McKay of 
Camden, New Jersey, “had been saving his pennies for months only to decide that he 
would spend them for flowers when he heard Governor Smith was coming.”
1240
  So too 
did celebrities:  New York Yankee hero Babe Ruth (a son of German-American 
saloonkeepers who was raised in an orphanage in Baltimore) took to the airwaves on 
Smith’s behalf, while the prolific Irving Berlin (a Russian-Jewish immigrant) composed a 
campaign theme in order to put “his devotion to Al Smith into song.”
1241
    
 While these episodes demonstrated grassroots initiative, they also provided 
instructional tales for other potential Democrats, and so Smith-friendly newspapers 
covered such human interest stories in depth.  At times they strained credulity, like the 
saga of James Joseph Buriage, a seven-year-old Baltimore boy who was struck by a car 
and according to “several surgeons and physicians” was saved by a packet of Al Smith 
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placards he was carrying under his shirt which “had broken the blow and protected the 
boy’s heart and lung jacket.”
1242
  (As an inspiring footnote, readers were informed that 
the brave lad’s nurses had “assented to his appeal and displayed the twenty-five pictures 
about the room.”)
1243
   
Meanwhile, readers were reminded of the sinister tactics that nefarious 
Republican operatives were willing to employ to thwart these enthusiastic Democrats.  
Stories were told of a Republican scheme to disfranchise tens of thousands of rank-and-
file voters in Hudson and Essex Counties, New Jersey, as part of “an effort to defeat 
Governor Smith.”
1244
  New Yorkers learned of a Republican plot in Columbus, Ohio, to 
deny the franchise to nuns.
1245
  Philadelphians were informed with outrage by the Record 
that the city’s Republican machine had terminated a tax collector for supporting Smith 
with the brazen proclamation: “This is a Republican office.”
1246
  African Americans in 
Baltimore were alerted that a black Smith supporter had received a threatening letter that 
included a news clipping outlining the flogging of a black Democrat in Florida.
1247
        
This passion translated into enthusiastic receptions for Smith at campaign stops 
nationwide.  Welcomes for the Democrat in cities like Omaha were compared favorably 
to the only similarly triumphal outpouring of unbridled fervor in recent memory: 
welcome parades for aviator Charles Lindbergh.
1248
  Eastern journalists noted the 
“uproarious and spontaneous outpouring of enthusiasm” for Smith by an audience of 
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twelve thousand in St. Paul, where it was reported that the Democrat had been greeted by 
“25 miles of humanity-lined streets.”
1249
  New Yorkers read of an unprecedented 
reception for their governor at the state fairgrounds in Sedalia, Missouri, by “between 
35,000 and 45,000 farm folk.”
1250
  Writers described a “stampede” to the “Smith cause” 
in Iowa and the “riot” over Smith in Chicago, where a “huge crowd gathered” at the train 
station to “thunder” their approval of the New Yorker.
1251
  A “gay tumult” greeted the 
Democrat in Baltimore; and in Richmond enthusiastic bands blasted “The Sidewalks of 
New York” along with “Dixie.”
1252
    
 The Brooklyn Eagle described Smith’s reception in Boston as “without 
exaggeration, the most overwhelming that a candidate for President—or for that matter a 
President of the United States—has ever had. . . .  it was a combination of the most 
turbulent, riotous and wild elements of Armistice night and the return of Lindbergh.”
1253
  
As the Happy Warrior departed the city that had granted him this fantastic popular 
endorsement, the “vociferous reception [was] repeated as a goodbye,” as crowds stormed 
the railroad tracks to bid farewell to the Democrat, delaying his departing train.
1254
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Indeed, enthusiasm for Smith in industrial New England was such that it spurred “hope of 
winning the east.”
1255
   
 After this triumph Smith journeyed to Republican Philadelphia.  There, 
Democrats used the “eager, welcoming crowds of Boston” to instruct residents on how to 
greet the nominee in the City of Brotherly Love.
1256
  Publishing a photograph of the 
“Greatest Crowd Boston Ever Saw . . . Hail[ing] Democracy’s Leader,” the Record 
implored, “Will Philadelphia Duplicate This Welcome To Al Smith Today?”
1257
  The 
Democrats were not disappointed:  “hundreds of thousands jam[med] sidewalks . . . 
cheering like a tidal wave” as Smith made his way to deliver “his striking speech before a 
wildly enthusiastic crowd.”
1258
  Smith was the first Democratic candidate even to 
campaign in Philadelphia in twenty years, and the response was advertised as the 
“greatest political triumph in city annals.”
1259
  The Negro World described “a roaring, 
cheering, maddened throng of 12,000 souls within, and 20,000 more outside upon the 
ramparts . . . . What a mob!” they exclaimed, “What an ovation!  Folks, you really ought 
to be here to join in the revelry.”
1260
   
New Yorkers responded to these developments with a clamorous reception of 
their own.  A crowd of forty-five thousand was reported to approach delirium during 
Smith’s speech in Brooklyn, while an ardent crowd of “23,000 yelling voices” granted 
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Smith the “biggest ovation of his campaign,” at Madison Square Garden.
1261
  Outside the 
halls, two million citizens feverishly greeted their governor as he paraded down the 
streets of his home town on the last leg of his campaign tour.
1262
  After almost three 
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Chapter V: Critical Election 
 
 
“The campaign now beginning will prove memorable for many reasons. . . .  It is destined 
to be marked by a breaking up of old political lines and the formation of new ones.” 
 





“Before the Roosevelt Revolution there was an Al Smith Revolution.  In many ways, 
Smith’s defeat in 1928, rather than Roosevelt’s 1932 victory, marked off the arena in 
which today’s politics are being fought.” 
 
-Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (1951) 
 
 
 Alfred E. Smith lost the 1928 presidential election in a landslide.  The Democrat 
carried only eight states, while Hoover won the Electoral College 444 to 87.  The 




 The result was a rout; yet simultaneously Smith had received more votes than any 
previous Democratic candidate—the 15,016,169 ballots marked for the Happy Warrior 
were more than 5.8 million greater than the second-largest total for a nominee from his 
party.
1265
  In fact, only Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover bested Al 
Smith among the hegemonic Republicans.
1266
  Because Smith was able to attract so many 
voters to the Democratic cause despite being defeated so soundly, many scholars have 
recognized within this ostensible fiasco the beginnings of a significant shift in the 
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  The boldest of these, the eminent political scientist V. O. Key, has asserted 
that “the Roosevelt revolution of 1932 was in large measure an Al Smith revolution of 
1928.”
1268
   
 This “revolution” was found in the impressive gains Smith made in areas 
dominated by working-class ethnic citizens, which produced substantial inroads for the 
Democratic Party among recent-immigrant, Catholic, and Jewish industrial laborers 
across the Northeast and the Midwest.  New England witnessed “the activation by the 
Democratic candidate of low-income, Catholic, urban voters of recent immigrant stock,” 
prompting a realignment that led to Smith victories in Massachusetts and Rhode Island 
and was destined to “persist for several succeeding elections.”
1269
  Historians have 
detected similar developments in places like Chicago and Philadelphia, although such 
cities usually lacked an actual Smith plurality.
1270
  Nationwide, of the nineteen cities with 
a population over 250,000 that had ethnic (either immigrant or child-of-immigrant) 
majorities at the time of the 1930 census, all nineteen had given strong majorities to 
Harding in 1920.
1271
  In 1928, Smith won seven of these cities, and in each of the 
nineteen, his tally represented a Democratic increase of over 100 percent—even in those 
jurisdictions where he failed to achieve a majority.
1272
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Smith attracted the attention of these diverse voters in large part because his 
background embodied their own struggles for respect—for ethnic equality, religious 
tolerance, and social acceptance.  Smith’s career was a metaphor for all these things, as 
well as for the rise of the city and its newest inhabitants to prominence in American life.  
But the governor offered more than hopeful metaphors.  His campaign, like his career, 
spoke effectively to these voters’ desire for household security and reliable, dignified 
employment.  Americans who flocked to the Democratic banner in 1928 were often those 
hungriest for such assurances—those to whom accolades for Republican prosperity 
seemed increasingly preposterous.
1273
  As tens of thousands of these anxious citizens 
cheered Al Smith at speeches and rallies, he and his allies promised them dignity—
something that entailed both social acceptance and economic security.      
In fact, Smith’s appeal to those voters least enamored with the 1920s political 
economy transcended urban environs and traditional minorities.  James L. Sundquist has 
shown that of the forty-five counties Smith carried in Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, and 
North Dakota, fewer than half had Catholic majorities.
1274
   Moreover, in all of the 
twenty-five he labeled “predominantly Protestant,” except four in Illinois, Smith’s 
percentage showed marked improvement over both the average Democratic vote since 
1908 and the average Democratic vote in 1916 and 1920.
1275
   
                                                 
1273
 It is noteworthy that Smith enjoyed success in areas where Robert M. La Follette’s progressive 
insurgency had been particularly successful in 1924.  This phenomenon will be discussed below as it relates 
to the upper Great Plains; but it also occurred in Midwestern manufacturing cities.  In Allegheny County, 
Pennsylvania, there was a much stronger correlation between Smith’s vote in a given municipality and that 
of the Progressive La Follette than existed between the Smith vote and that of the Democrat John W. Davis.  
In St. Louis City, Missouri, a similar pattern occurred—there too Smith wards correlated better with La 
Follette’s strength than with the Davis vote, although in St. Louis, unlike in Allegheny County, Davis out-
ran the Progressive insurgent.  Republican Calvin Coolidge carried both municipalities by wide margins.  
See appendix one.  
1274
 Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System, p. 175. 
1275





Fig. 5.1: 1928 Electoral Vote by State.  




In North Dakota, Logan County (37 percent Catholic), McIntosh County (11 
percent Catholic), and Mercer County (9 percent Catholic) voted Democratic for the first 
time in their histories.
1276
  In Mercer, Smith’s 62 percent of the vote literally doubled the 
31 percent Wilson had garnered in the party’s former high-water mark for that county in 
1916.
1277
  Significantly, all three counties had defected to La Follette in 1924, and the 
latter two had voted for Theodore Roosevelt in 1912.
1278
  These farmers had a history of 
political protest and now found a new outlet for it in Al Smith’s Democratic Party.  The 
same could be said for voters in Traverse County, Minnesota (40 percent Catholic; 61 
percent for Smith, a gain of 20 percent over the Democratic average since 1908), where 
both Roosevelt and La Follette had been victorious; Big Stone County, Minnesota (33 
percent Catholic, 56 percent for Smith, a gain of 22 percent over the Democratic average 
since 1908), where Roosevelt had won and La Follette had come within five votes out of 
over 3,300; Lincoln County, Minnesota (29 percent Catholic; 51 percent for Smith, a gain 
of 10 percent over the Democratic average since 1908), which TR had carried and La 
Follette had lost 48 percent to 44 percent; Crawford County, Iowa (22 percent Catholic, 
57 percent for Smith, a gain of 6 percent over the Democratic average since 1908 and of 
23 percent over the average in 1916 and 1920) which La Follette had carried by a robust 
9.7 percent; and Plymouth County, Iowa (42 percent Catholic, 51 percent for Smith, a 
gain of 7 percent over the Democratic average since 1908) where Roosevelt had won and 
La Follette had come within less than 2 percent.
1279
  The Midwestern granary, like the 
urban ethnic enclaves of the Northeast, harbored many of those citizens most disaffected 
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by 1920s economic realities; and while farmers exhibited more hesitancy toward Smith’s 
message than many city-dwelling workers (for example, he carried only one county in 
Kansas), the Democrat appealed to both groups’ desire for stability, with each responding 
in tangible ways.   
This was not an aberration—a temporary flaring of political passions that had 
artificially divided the electorate based on emotional debates over religion and culture.  
Rather, it represented the beginning of something more:  the emergence of a new national 
politics divided by both economic and ethnocultural factors.  Exploring more deeply the 
events of the 1928 campaign and the reactions of individual citizens to the issues of that 
contest at the local and regional levels helps affirm this thesis, while also elucidating the 
wonderful complexities of the voters and the election.  It demonstrates the prescience of 
Joe Robinson’s prognostication, made early in the contest, that “the campaign now 
beginning will prove memorable for many reasons. . . .  It is destined to be marked by a 






 Al Smith’s 1928 presidential campaign featured the nationalization of his 
transitional progressivism.  There were places in both the Cotton South and the Corn Belt 
Midwest where Smith’s articulation of progressive solutions to the problems of 
agriculture earned him strong support among pockets of struggling farmers.
1281
  Yet 
whether due to substance, style, or lack of exposure, this politics did not captivate rural 
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voters in a widespread or electorally significant way.  Even noting the Democrat’s 
successes among farmers, it is clear that the population for whom transitional 
progressivism had been formulated was to be found elsewhere.  It is no surprise, then, 
that Smith’s greatest triumphs came among those who toiled not in the fields, but in the 
factories. 
 By the 1950s, scholars were looking to the 1928 contest as a turning point in 
American political development.  Political analyst Samuel Lubell would proclaim:  
“Before the Roosevelt Revolution there was an Al Smith Revolution,” concluding that 
“Smith’s defeat in 1928, rather than Roosevelt’s 1932 victory, marked off the arena in 
which today’s politics are being fought.”
1282
  The most significant facet of this revolution 
was the shift in the urban vote, which had been solidly Republican until 1928, when the 
nation’s twelve largest cities yielded a Democratic plurality that was not relinquished for 
decades.  Four years after Lubell’s pronouncement, V. O. Key confirmed his conclusions 
in the case of New England, where the 1928 contest was found to have precipitated “a 
sharp and durable realignment between the parties,” in which the post-Smith Democratic 
Party would dominate “urban, industrial, foreign-born, Catholic areas,” while the 
Republicans would draw strength from those areas that “tended to be rural, Protestant, 
native-born.”
1283
  Other scholars have since recognized in 1928 the beginnings of a 
significant shift in the electorate.  Important works by political scientists Samuel 
Eldersveld (1949), Duncan MacRae and James Meldrum (1960), and Gerald Pomper 
(1967), as well as historians Carl Degler (1964) and John Allswang (1971), have 
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variously suggested that the 1928 contest was a critical election, the fulcrum of a critical 
period, or the initiation of significant voter realignment.
1284
  In 1973, political scientist 
James L. Sundquist would conclude that “some of the great Democratic strongholds of 
the present day . . . trace their Democratic preponderance not to the New Deal but to the 
pre-New Deal election of 1928.”
1285
    
 Since the 1970s, however, a majority of those commenting on 1928 have found 
this argument less convincing.  In 1969, historians Jerome M. Clubb and Howard W. 
Allen complicated the scholarly view of 1928 with an examination of down-ballot 
political behavior, suggesting that while “in terms of the presidential vote alone in these 
areas . . . it is plausible to speak of an ‘Al Smith Revolution,’” consideration “of the vote 
in elections to lesser offices . . . does not provide consistent support for the view that 
significant and lasting changes in partisan loyalties and habits of political participation 
occurred in 1928.”
1286
  In his Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics 
(1970), political scientist Walter Dean Burnham noted significant changes occurring 
within the electorate in 1928, but turned away from the idea that the election represented 
a specific point of partisan realignment.
1287
  Historian John L. Shover determined that 
while the 1928 election in Philadelphia fulfilled “two of the criteria necessary to classify 
                                                 
1284
 Eldersveld, “The Influence of Metropolitan Party Pluralities In Presidential Elections Since 1920: A 
Study of Twelve Key Cities,” pp. 1189-1206; MacRae and Meldrum, “Critical Elections in Illinois: 1888-
1958,” pp. 669-683; Pomper, “Classification of Presidential Elections,” pp. 535-566; Degler, “American 
Political Parties and the Rise of the City: An Interpretation,” pp. 41-59; Allswang, A House for All Peoples.  
In a more recent study considering United States presidential elections from 1868 to 1996, Larry M. Bartels 
identified 1928 as the first of three elections constituting “the New Deal realignment” which “erased much 
of the existing party system,” which he saw evidenced in very low “partisan persistence levels” in 1928, 
1932, and 1936—with 1928 representing the lowest of the three.  Larry M. Bartels, “Electoral Continuity 
and Change, 1868-1996,” Electoral Studies, 17:3 (September, 1998), pp. 275-300, p. 281.       
1285
 Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System, p. 178.  
1286
 Jerome M. Clubb and Howard W. Allen, “The Cities and the Election of 1928: Partisan Realignment?” 
The American Historical Review, 74:4 (April, 1969), pp. 1205-1220, pp. 1210, 1218. 
1287
 E.g.: “First, 1928 was not a realigning election as such in Pennsylvania.  It was part of a realigning 
sequence which could be identified as such only after it had been completed.”  Walter Dean Burnham, 




an election as critical: intensity and abnormality,” it failed at the “third and most 
important test”: producing durable cleavages within the electorate.
1288
  Moreover, Shover 
found in a separate study that 1928 was of little consequence in the state of California.
1289
  
Political scientists David J. Alvarez and Edmond J. True suggested much the same for 
Hartford, Connecticut, tempering suggestions of an urban-ethnic shift toward the 
Democrats in 1928 with evidence that those voters had been inclined toward the party 
much earlier in the century.
1290
  By 1975, historian Bernard Sternsher could point to the 
growing consensus against the quantitative significance of the 1928 election to level a 
larger critique of the prevailing interpretative framework of the period’s politics:  “A 
deterministic axiom which imposes on the elections of 1928, 1932, and 1936 a 
grandfather-father-son relationship is not warranted by the analyses of Lubell and 
Key.”
1291
  The death blow for 1928 as a critical election was seemingly delivered by 
historian Allan Lichtman with an extensive statistical analysis of the voting returns, 
presented in both a 1976 article and a 1979 book on the subject.  Lichtman concluded that 
ethnicity and class were not driving factors, that 1928 was by no means a critical election, 
and that religion was far and away the most significant determinant of voter preferences 
in 1928.
1292
  In fact, Lichtman argued that 1928 was quite simply an anomaly in which 
turnout was bloated on both sides due to the heated ethnocultural controversies 
surrounding Smith’s Catholicism.  He concluded that “however fascinating and exciting, 
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the presidential election of 1928 was not the harbinger of the next generation of politics.  
The contest was neither a critical election nor a key component of a critical era of voter 
realignment.  The presidential election of 1928 is best viewed as an aberrant election that 
had little impact on later patterns of politics.”
1293
   
Yet even while challenging the 1928 realignment narrative, many of these critics 
discerned significant qualitative transformations within large portions of the electorate.  
Sternsher acknowledged this, reiterating in 1984 his view that “the election of 1928 
involved significant qualitative change (many Al Smith supporters in the cities, including 
many who had never voted before, became Democratic loyalists for some time to come) 
but did not meet the quantitative requirement of a critical election (Smith received 40.8 
percent of the two-party vote).”
1294
  Shover recognized such developments in considering 
Philadelphia, deeming 1928 “a clear case of ethnic group political mobilization”—the 
dawning of a pluralistic politics which maintained prominence well after the New Deal 
coalition had been forged.
1295
  While challenging the 1928 election’s quantitative 
significance and rejecting suggestions of a causal relationship with the New Deal 
coalition, most scholars have affirmed the existence of many of the dynamics that Lubell 
found revolutionary.  
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 From a qualitative perspective, Al Smith made substantial inroads for the 
Democratic Party among members of the recent-immigrant working classes in the 
nation’s great manufacturing centers.  In Boston and elsewhere in urban Massachusetts, 
groups such as Italians, Poles, Greeks, Lithuanians, Portuguese, and French-Canadians—
once isolated from the Democracy by Irish hegemony—now formed ethnic “Smith for 
President” clubs and flocked to the polls on behalf of the Democrat.
1296
  In Chicago, 
throughout the 1920s ethnic voters “could be confidently labeled neither Democratic nor 
Republican in presidential voting,” but “from 1928 on, they were clearly Democratic,” 
with tremendous gains for Smith not only among Catholic Poles, Italians, Germans, 
Czechs, and Slavs, but also among Protestant Germans and African-Americans.
1297
  In 
Philadelphia, sections of the city with heavy concentrations of Catholic Germans, Poles, 
Irish, and Italians gave Smith 64 percent of their vote—a significant improvement from 
the combined 21 percent given by these same neighborhoods to the Democrat Davis and 
the Progressive La Follette in 1924.
1298
   
 As much as with Catholics, the shifts in Jewish voting patterns were dramatic.  In 
Philadelphia, the Jewish vote for Smith was twenty-one points higher than the combined 
Davis/La Follette.
1299
  Jews in Chicago voted 60 percent for Al Smith, a forty-one point 
Democratic increase over the previous election.
1300
  In Malden, Massachusetts, the Jewish 
population defected from the GOP in 1928, the culmination—inspired by the Smith 
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candidacy—of a trend of gradual exodus from the Republican ranks.
1301
  In fact, across 
the country, typically Republican or independent Jews voted heavily for Smith.
1302
  
 What are scholars to conclude from all of this?  By these reports, 1928 was a year 
of extraordinary change within the American electorate—most particularly in the 
industrial cities of the Northeast and Midwest, and there, most especially among ethnic 
working-class voters.  Yet so much of the quantitative evidence suggests that this was, as 
Lichtman suggested, an “aberrant election”:  irrespective of the fact that no one can 
dismiss the real shifts that occurred within the electorate in 1928, and regardless of the 
scholarly consensus that these same urban ethnic workers constituted the very heart of 
Roosevelt’s electoral coalition, scholars have concluded that the numbers simply cannot 
affirm Lubell’s hypothesis of an Al Smith Revolution.
1303
  In fact, they can.  Considering 
the electoral results within their appropriate context yields a more revealing perspective 
on the profound quantitative significance of the 1928 election.  More than that, traditional 
qualitative historical work elucidates the very complex motivations of these voters and 
presents a case for taking their ideas—and those of their chosen candidate—seriously.  
 Numerous scholars have used very sophisticated quantitative analyses to 
challenge the notion of a 1928 partisan realignment.  One method, as suggested earlier, 
has been to consider down-ballot activity, which by and large has shown that Democratic 
voting by urban ethnics in 1928 either was nothing new or did not precipitate lasting 
changes, depending on the locality in question.  The other important method of 
debunking the importance of 1928 has been to consider county-level voting trends:  
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scouring these results to determine the predictive capacity of certain demographic factors 
to voting behavior as well as to determine how well one election predicts the outcome of 
another.  This was the approach taken by Lichtman, and the results are difficult to dispute 
within the parameters of his study.  However, in order better to understand county-level 
voting trends, scholars must recognize how those trends fit into state and even national 
electoral contexts.   
While it is true that many Roosevelt strongholds did not support Smith in 1928, 
this actually demonstrates very little about the nature of the electoral coalition.  In fact, 
the metamorphosis in the profile of a party’s loyalists is the real touchstone of a critical 
election that precipitates significant partisan realignment.  As political scientist John R. 
Petrocik has suggested, “realignment occurs when the measureable party bias of 
identifiable segments of the population changes in such a way that the social group 
profile of the parties—the party coalitions—is altered.”
1304
  Abandoning “the 
conventional assumption that electoral realignments are synonymous with a change to a 
new majority party,” Petrocik’s nuanced definition allows historians to investigate 
alterations in the character of partisan coalitions and track the significance of specific 
contests to those changes.
1305
    
This understanding of partisan realignment reopens the debate over the viability 
of the Lubell thesis, for it was his argument that the nature of American politics changed 
in 1928 as the Democrats became the party of the urban, ethnic, working classes—a 
transformation which fueled Democratic hegemony in the decades proceeding from the 
initiation of Roosevelt’s New Deal.  The centerpiece of this argument, particularly as 
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presented by Lubell, Key, Eldersveld, and Degler, is the rise of the city—specifically the 
great industrial cities of the Northeast and Midwest, which witnessed a spectacular surge 
in Democratic strength beginning with Al Smith.  
 
The Democratic Quotient 
  
To affirm this point, it must be demonstrated that the party’s vote became more 
urban in 1928, and that it remained so during the Roosevelt years.  Anecdotal evidence of 
the increasingly working-class, ethnic, and urban nature of the Democratic Party in this 
period, however voluminous, will never be inoculated against charges of impressionism 
except by some sort of quantitative measure.  Happily, there is a rather basic means of 
accomplishing this task: the “Democratic Quotient” (DQ).  The Democratic Quotient 
does not measure success in a given jurisdiction; rather, it reveals each jurisdiction’s 
relative importance to the party’s state electoral coalition.  It is calculated by dividing a 
county’s percentage of the state Democratic vote by its percentage of the state 
turnout     
                          
                        
).  Tracking changes in the DQs of urban counties 
across the presidential elections from 1896 through 1944 demonstrates that in many 
important cases, the 1928 election dramatically altered the urban/rural balance of state 
Democratic voting coalitions, and did so in a way that would be reinforced during the 
Roosevelt years.   
 Taking as a sample the 167 counties of the Northeast and Midwest identified as 
part of metropolitan regions in the 1930 United States Census, it becomes possible to 




confirmed in the Roosevelt period.
1306
  When the DQs of all 167 metropolitan counties 
are plotted for each of the nine elections preceding the Great Depression against each of 
the four Franklin Roosevelt elections, 1928 stands out as the contest that best predicts the 
relative importance of specific municipalities to the New Deal coalition.  The significant 
differential in r
2 
values (strength of correlation) between 1928 and the other elections 
demonstrates the singularity of the Smith-Hoover contest as a predictor of Roosevelt-era 
outcomes.  Of equal significance, the correlation between the earlier elections and 1928 is 
quite weak.  Thus, in terms of the relative importance of specific counties to their states’ 
Democratic vote, the 1928 election represented both a break with traditional patterns and 
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Fig. 5.3: Chart tracking the strength of correlation (r2) of the Democratic Quotients of the 167 Northeastern 
and Midwestern counties defined as “metropolitan” in the 1930 census in each election (1896-1928) for 
predicting the DQ of those counties in each of FDR’s presidential elections.  
 
 
Fig. 5.4:  Chart demonstrating the average predictive strength for the entire Roosevelt period for each 
election’s metropolitan DQs.   
 
Below: Figs. 5.5 through 5.12, showing the correlations of the metropolitan DQs in the four elections 
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 The predictive capacity of the 1928 election is increased further when the sample 
of counties is reduced to those with a population greater than 250,000.  These figures 
begin to suggest that the Smith vote presents a strong indicator of the Roosevelt 
coalition’s urban nature.  Like the earlier scholars argued, the 1928 election appears to 
have been part of a shift toward a much more urban Democratic Party; this analysis also 
suggests that this was in fact an enduring change.  
 
 
Fig. 5.13: Chart showing the value of the Democratic Quotients of the twenty-seven metropolitan counties 
with a population over 250,000 in the elections from 1896-1928 to predicting the DQ of those counties in 
each Roosevelt election.
1307
   
 
 
  Narrowing the focus, the Democratic Quotient allows for an understanding of 
statewide electoral patterns that reveals the importance of specific jurisdictions to a 
state’s Democratic coalition.  If the Democratic Quotients are under 1.0 for most of a 
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state’s metropolitan counties, this means that the Democratic coalition in that state was 
more rural in nature.  Unsurprisingly, the DQ figures for the 1928 and New Deal 
elections demonstrate a more urban coalition in the Northeast and Midwest than during 
the preceding period.   
 In many places, the most urban counties consistently had DQ values of less than 
1.0 from 1896 through 1924, indicating that the cities were not a source of Democratic 
strength in those states.  In 1928, many of those scores underwent a precipitous rise, to a 
level well above 1.0, indicating that the cities had become a relatively significant source 
of Democratic votes.  These new higher urban DQs often declined a bit in 1932 and 1936 
(because of the landslide nature of those elections, in which most jurisdictions in many 
states were strongly Democratic and thus the relative significance of specific jurisdictions 
was tempered).  But these rates would not decline to their pre-1928 levels, and usually 
rebounded to nearer the 1928 figures in the later Roosevelt elections (when FDR’s 
political appeal had become less universal).  This was particularly true for many of the 
great cities of the Mid-Atlantic and the Midwest.  Indeed, even many cities in this region 
that had occasionally scored DQs of greater than 1.0 in the early twentieth century 
experienced an increase in relative Democratic strength in 1928.  Therefore, an important 
trend becomes evident in these cities (many of which were not previously Democratic 
strongholds): the DQ, or that jurisdiction’s relative importance to the state Democratic 
coalition, rose—in most cases quite remarkably—in 1928, and then straddled this plateau 
for the entirety of the Roosevelt presidency.  
 
Below: Figs. 5.14 through 5.21, tracking the Democratic Quotients for selected major metropolitan counties 
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 The pattern is more impressive in some counties and states than in others.  But it 
is important to keep a sense of perspective: even in places like Cook County, Illinois, or 
Essex County, New Jersey—places where the rise in the urban DQ was not nearly so 
precipitous in 1928 as it was in other jurisdictions—the figure exceeded, and would 
largely continue to exceed, the previous high marks for those counties in the period under 
consideration.  A new, higher norm had been established for the relative importance of the 
largest cities to the Democratic coalition. 
 
 
Fig. 5.22: DQ in Cook County, Illinois, 1896-1944, indicating pre-1928 high mark. 
 
























 These patterns were far from universal.  In many states, especially in New 
England, the largest cities had already been centers of Democratic strength.  In fact, DQ 
figures for the counties containing Boston, Providence, Jersey City, and St. Paul were all 
lower in 1928 than 1924; and in Milwaukee it was essentially the same—in spite of the 
fact that Al Smith carried all of these counties in 1928 while of the entire group John W. 
Davis carried only Hudson County, New Jersey in 1924.  This is because the DQ does not 
measure electoral achievement in a given jurisdiction, only the relative importance of that 
jurisdiction to the statewide coalition.  In these cases, Davis’ overall performance was so 
poor that otherwise unimpressive urban numbers (10 percent in Ramsey County, 
Minnesota and in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin; 22 percent in Suffolk County, 
Massachusetts; 39 percent in Providence County, Rhode Island) were enough to skew the 
weight of the state coalition toward these cities.   
 There were other counties where 1928 did not establish an enduring precedent for 
the state Democratic coalition.  For some jurisdictions, like Lackawanna and Luzerne 
Counties in Pennsylvania (Scranton and Wilkes-Barre, respectively), 1928 was a year of 
peculiar weightiness in the statewide Democratic vote.  In other places, the 1928 election 
appears to have represented more a restoration of an urban district’s Democratic strength 
than an unprecedented level of support—two examples of this are Lucas County, Ohio 
(Toledo) and St. Joseph County, Indiana (South Bend), which had generally scored DQs 
of under 1.0 until 1916, when each came nearer 1.2, only to sink again during the 1920s 
and be restored to a plateau around 1.0 beginning in 1928 (slightly higher in South Bend, 
slightly lower in Toledo).  In other jurisdictions, like Lake County, Indiana (Gary), or 




upward trend in Democratic voting strength that would be tempered in 1932 but then 
continue to increase for the rest of the Roosevelt years.  Therefore, while the trend in the 
largest cities appears to have been toward an increase in relative Democratic importance 
in 1928, which then remained somewhat stable during the New Deal era, for the medium-
sized metropolitan counties of the same region, the implications of the 1928 shift were 
less uniform.  While there were medium-sized metropolitan counties like Passaic and 
Middlesex in New Jersey, where the DQ followed a pattern similar to those of the more 
populous jurisdictions, the conclusions drawn from the experiences of Cleveland, Detroit, 
Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and other large cities cannot be applied universally.  
 In fact, some cities actually held unusually little importance to their state’s 
Democratic coalition in 1928.  This was the case in Summit County, Ohio (Akron), where 
the DQ in 1928 was the lowest since 1912, and far lower than those of the Roosevelt 
elections.  This trend was even more evident in Genesee County, Michigan (Flint), where 
1928 represented the lowest DQ of the entire period, a nadir from which a swift 
restoration would take place in 1932.  Elsewhere, 1928 set a new, lower precedent for 
relative significance to the statewide Democratic coalition: in Kent County, Michigan 
(Grand Rapids), the DQ dropped below 1.0 in 1928 for the first time since 1904, and 
would remain there throughout the Roosevelt years.  In Dauphin County, Pennsylvania 
(Harrisburg), 1928 was an even ruder break for local Democrats:  the election interrupted 
a steady trend for the county of increasing prominence to the statewide coalition which 
had reached 1.15 in 1924; in 1928, the DQ had plummeted to 0.45, and would remain 
well under 1.0 through 1944.   
Below: Figs. 5.24 through 5.27, showing various patterns that emerged in metropolitan counties defying the 



















































 There are several obvious explanations for these variations.  One is the classic 
argument about religion and ethnicity.  Akron and Flint had fewer Catholics, Jews, and 
people of recent-immigrant stock than Cleveland or Detroit.  Another is the question of 
prosperity.  Rubber manufacturing remained robust in 1928, and the automotive sector 
was booming; cities like Akron and Flint continued to benefit from Republican prosperity 
and returned the favor electorally.  This economic point may help explain the growing 
Democratic vote in places like Lowell, Massachusetts, or Scranton, Pennsylvania, where 
key local industries were experiencing stark decline—and this will be considered below.  
But economics cannot fully explain the growing prominence in statewide Democratic 
voting of Detroit or Pittsburgh, where industry continued to enjoy success.  An important 
reason for these discrepancies is that in general it was the largest cities that were the 
source of the shifts in the electorate outside of New England.  Totaling the voting results 
for the counties containing the twenty largest cities from the 1930 census and tracking 
their combined DQ as a part of the national popular vote reveals a pattern similar to that 
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Fig. 5.28: DQ of the twenty largest cities (according to the 1930 census), 1896-1944. 
 
There are other explanations for the variances.  Because the DQ tracks a 
jurisdiction’s relative importance to the statewide party coalition, it can mask Democratic 
success in two situations: medium-sized urban areas in states where the largest cities have 
undergone spectacular improvements; and cities in states with a history of poor 
Democratic performance, like the New England jurisdictions noted above.  Because of 
these complications it is important also to track changes in a more traditional measure of 
success: the Democratic percentage of the vote.  This approach abandons the focus on the 
changing nature of state coalitions, and instead demonstrates how Smith and Roosevelt 
were each able to transform areas of relative Democratic strength into sources of 
statewide Democratic majorities. 
 Smith did not carry most of the counties that fit the DQ trend of the great urban 
centers in 1928.  However, the DQ does not misrepresent the changes that occurred in 
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a stark increase over previous levels—sometimes a new high, other times a return to 
Wilson-era successes.  The DQ illuminates the fact that while Democrats were enjoying 
relative improvement in the great cities in 1928, they were losing strength in rural 
counties; the Democratic percentages show that despite these vast urban improvements, 
in most cases the party still had work to do to achieve majority status. 
 In these urban locales, the Smith campaign improved Democratic percentages 
drastically over those of the preceding two elections, and often set new high marks for the 
party; in places like Milwaukee and St. Louis the Democrats even achieved a majority.  
These relative successes, coupled with the decrease in rural Democratic percentages, 
shifted the Democratic Quotients in the Northeastern and Midwestern states toward much 
more urban coalitions—a quantifiable change with profound qualitative significance.  
Moreover, Democrats would build upon these successes during the Roosevelt years, 
crystallizing the realignment that occurred in 1928.  Even in states where Smith lost 
badly—like Michigan, where he received 28.9 percent of the vote and did not carry a 
single county; or Pennsylvania, where he won only three counties and 33.9 percent—his 
campaign had shaken old patterns of political behavior and replaced them with at least 
the foundations of a new system.   
 
Below: Figs. 5.29 through 5.32, tracking the Democratic percentage of the presidential vote in four major 
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 Significantly, portents of that new system could already be observed in 1928 in 
places where Al Smith actually won.  Unlike the Mid-Atlantic and Midwestern states, 
Smith was able to achieve victories in Massachusetts and Rhode Island.  In these states, 
he improved on the relative Democratic strength that had already been established in the 
largest cities—Irish Democrats were firmly ensconced power brokers in Boston, and held 
significant influence in Providence.  This had been reflected in the high DQs of these 
cities prior to 1928, but had never translated into a working majority.  As Roosevelt 
would do in states like Michigan and Illinois in 1932, Smith would build upon the 
existing urban foundations of Democratic strength in Massachusetts and Rhode Island in 
1928 with a campaign that spoke directly to the social and economic grievances of 





Below: Figs. 5.33 through 5.36, tracking Democratic Quotients and Democratic percentages of the 
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 In New England, as in the rest of the nation, a key facet of Smith’s success was 
his ability to appeal to urban ethnic working-class voters.  Just as his campaign had 
brought ethnic voters firmly into the party in cities like Chicago and Philadelphia, Smith 
was able to transcend the Democracy’s traditional Irish Catholic base in New England 
and attract the votes of typically Republican “new immigrant” groups.  Historian J. 
Joseph Huthmacher has noted that in Massachusetts, “New Immigrants left the 
Republican Party in droves” in 1928.
1309
  Similarly, a study of ethnic voting in Rhode 
Island found that 1928 “was the year of a lasting Democratic alignment for the French 
and Italians in the state.”
1310
   
 Furthermore, unlike most of the country, this region was experiencing widespread 
economic discontent.  Indeed, depression did not wait until 1929 to set in for the textile 
sector—a key New England industry which suffered through a painful decline for most of 
the 1920s.  Tellingly, in areas where textiles had been particularly hard hit, Smith 
achieved unprecedented Democratic victories. 
 All of these quantifiable developments suggest to two hypotheses.  First, as 
argued above, the 1928 election was in fact a “critical election,” insofar as it heralded the 
elevation of the great urban centers to prominence within the Democratic Party on the 
national level, establishing a new pattern that would persist throughout the Roosevelt 
years.  Second—and more controversially—this process, completed nationally by the 
Great Depression and by Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, came to maturation four years 
earlier in southern New England.  In the face of economic calamity, social upheaval, and 
widespread suffering, the national Democratic Party, fueled by the activation of urban, 
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ethnic, working-class voters, achieved majority status in Massachusetts and Rhode 
Island.  It was the confluence of cultural grievances with economic despair that set this 
region apart and enabled Al Smith to capture the loyalties of millions for his political 
vision of progressive government action on behalf of his conception of social and 
economic justice.  From its origins in 1910s New York, transitional progressivism had 
always spoken to both of these categories of human experience, for it was born out of the 
pragmatic recognition that people are complex and have both cultural and economic 
needs.  By articulating the transitional progressive agenda throughout his national 
campaign, Smith had presented his formula for fulfilling those needs.  In the great cities, 
where urban, ethnic, working-class voters heard a major party presidential nominee 
speaking to these questions in a relatable fashion for the first time, portents of the 
looming Roosevelt Revolution became manifest.  In New England, where the longing for 
dignity and respect and industrial democracy was coupled more often than in other 
regions with desperate uncertainty as to the stability of one’s job or how to provide meals 
or pay rent, transitional progressivism attracted majorities.  In that region, there was 












Chapter VI: The Revolution before the New Deal 
 
 
“We get a lot of prosperity hash, with here and there something about the full dinner pail, 
but working men are reading up a little these days and the old dinner pail argument is 
getting to be more of an insult than an incentive.” 
 
-“Luke Warm,” Letter to the Editor of the Hartford Courant, September 30, 1928 
 
* * * 
 
“The deplorable existing conditions and partiality and favoritism that the Republican 
party has been showing to the manufacturer and powerful combines with their poor 
records during the eight years and with the uniform and despicable tactics that they are 
using against Gov. Smith is the reason why he is going to be our next president.”   
 
-V. Gentile, Letter to the Editor of the Westerly Sun, October 7, 1928 
 
* * * 
 
“Perhaps it would be best after all to elect Mr. Hoover, with his wide experience in 
feeding the hungry in other lands and let him direct the ‘Prosperity Breadlines’ in 
America.” 
 
-“Breadwinner,” Letter to the Editor of the Springfield Daily News, October 30, 1928 
 
 
Herbert Hoover’s landslide victory over Al Smith represented both an affirmation 
of the Republican economic policies of the 1920s and a rejection of the new, urban, 
pluralistic America represented by the Democrat.  Yet Smith ran strong in Republican 
New England, scoring unprecedented victories in Massachusetts and Rhode Island.  In 
that region, anti-Catholic sentiment and prohibitionist harangues failed to resonate as they 
had nationally; indeed, urban, ethnic, “wet” voters were rallied to the Democratic cause 
by these ethnocultural controversies.  Moreover, Smith’s criticisms of Republican 





Huthmacher noted, “in the Bay State prosperity of any brand was hard to find.”
1311
  Smith 
was successful in New England because his transitional progressivism appealed to the 
region’s ethnic working class on both cultural and economic levels.  Based on this, the 
Democrat was able to construct a new and durable Democratic coalition in this depressed 
region—a realignment that foreshadowed the New Deal coalition and has rightly been 
dubbed an “Al Smith revolution.”
1312
   
Historians have tended to minimize the economic dimensions of the profound 
political realignment that occurred in New England in 1928.
1313
  This cultural focus is not 
entirely illogical given that the majority of New England workers were wets, Catholics, 
urbanites, of recent stock, and qualified for membership in every other cultural cohort 
that historians have inducted into the Smith coalition.  Yet assigning prohibition or 
religion dominant—even exclusive—responsibility for the political upheavals of 1928 
requires ignoring much of what was written and uttered by rank and file workers as well 
as the Democrats for whom they voted.  More importantly, the reality of these voters’ 
lives is misunderstood through denial of their economic motivations.  In 1928, New 
England’s ethnic working class was striving both for economic security and social 
acceptance, they had been battered by regional decline as well as by religious and ethnic 
prejudice, they longed for good pay in decent working conditions and for a glass of beer.  
In order to bring these long-quiescent, politically disorganized voters into a working 
majority, a candidate was needed who addressed these varying motivations.  Smith 
criticized Republican economics while standing, both symbolically and rhetorically, 
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against cultural condescension.  By necessity, Al Smith’s New England victory was a 
holistic revolution. 
 
The Happy Warrior in New England 
 
 Portents of the coming upheaval could be recognized in late October when Al 
Smith arrived in New England.  As he departed the familiar environs of the Empire State 
and crossed eastward into the Republican citadel of Massachusetts, ten thousand hailed 
the nominee’s train in Pittsfield.
1314
  Thirty thousand provided a “tremendous 
demonstration” of enthusiasm for the Democrat as he stopped in Springfield.
1315
  On 
Boston Common, Smith was greeted by 150,000.
1316
  At Boston Arena, only fifteen 
thousand were able to enter out of the fifty thousand who attempted to gain entrance for 
his speech, and so crowds extended for “blocks around the arena . . . listening to the radio 
to what was going on inside, this, though two other halls, the largest in the city, were 
crowded to the doors with listeners. . . .  Moreover, the passion of the people was 
appalling in its intensity, more like what might be seen at a monster religious revival than 
at a political gathering.”
1317
  All told, police estimated that 750,000 people flooded the 
streets of Boston to greet the governor of New York.
1318
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 As Smith travelled from Boston to Providence, he abandoned his train in favor of 
an automobile tour “through the mill towns of the Blackstone Valley which are 
traditionally Republican, French-Canadian, wet and Roman Catholic.”
1319
  As he did, 
“mill hands left their piece work, ran to big windows and yelled,” forcing “numerous 
mills to shut down from five minutes to an hour.”
1320
  Smith toured Woonsocket, 
Manville, Albion, Berkeley, Valley Falls, Central Falls, and Pawtucket, greeted all along 
the way by the shouts and cheers of mill families who formed “one unbroken line of 
howling humanity . . . all the way down the historic valley.”
1321
  Arriving in Providence, 
Smith encountered a “frenzy of mobs” that “cheered him lustily.”
1322
  In Hartford, “five 
miles of packed humans jammed the streets, through which police fought a slow way for 
the Candidate’s car,” and in this “pandemonium,” Smith’s famous brown derby seemed 
more like “a magician’s wand” able “literally to conjure cheers” from the two hundred 
thousand who thronged to catch a glimpse of the Democratic nominee.
1323
  In Bridgeport, 
Smith’s train was greeted by twenty thousand, who “roared a welcome” as “red torches 
flared.”
1324
  The New Yorker reflected on the Boston reception as the greatest of his life, 
while Mrs. Smith was moved to tears.
1325
    
Republicans insisted that New Englanders remained in their camp—particularly 
on economic matters—and that the enthusiasm for the “Happy Warrior” was less a 
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political statement than excitement over the arrival of a celebrity.
1326
  The Woonsocket 
Call declared the Smith visit “a non-partisan event,” for “a cheering crowd will always 
turn out to welcome any prominent figure in the life of the nation,” concluding that 
“crowds and cheers are seldom an indication as to just how the political wind is 
blowing.”
1327
  Similarly, the Providence Journal explained that “Governor Smith may be 
pardoned if he concluded, after his enthusiastic reception, that he is destined to carry 
Rhode Island, but he will receive more definite information on that score the night of 
November 6”; and the Hartford Courant clarified that “as the one and only ‘Al’ Smith, he 
was enthusiastically received by fellow Democrats, while those of a different political 




 It was likely the case that the majority had come to see the champion of religious 
liberty and of liberation from Volsteadism, while many others were there to witness a 
national star waving his iconic hat.  A group in Providence probably articulated the 
motivations of many as they traipsed about the confetti-laden streets carrying a large 
banner that read: “Remember November sixth—beer!”
1329
  But as these New Englanders 
listened to Smith’s Boston address at the auditorium or on their radios, as they read his 
words in their local newspapers or heard regional politicians outline the Democratic 
vision for the future, a more complete picture emerged.  With purpose, Smith had chosen 
New England as the setting for his most vigorous response to Hoover’s consistent praise 
of the economic status quo—which was said by Republican speakers to have “filled the 
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workingman’s dinner pail and his gasoline tank besides, and placed the whole nation in 
the silk-stocking class,” allowing the GOP to invoke the promise of “a chicken in every 
pot.”  Smith called attention to those neglected by this “Republican Prosperity.”
1330
  The 
Democrat elicited laughter from his Boston audience by asking them to “see if you can in 
your mind’s eye picture a man at $17.30 a week going out to a chicken dinner in his own 
automobile, with silk socks on.”
1331
  This was an amusing one-liner, but the issue was no 
joke to Smith—and certainly it was not a throw-away to thousands of struggling New 
England workers, most notably those employed in the slumping textile sector.  “In one 
manufacturing city in this State the number of wage earners in industry dropped from 
33,300 in 1921 to 24,800 in 1927, a loss of work for 8,500 men and women, particularly 
in the woolen and cotton mills,” he reported solemnly.  “In that same period the amount 
of wages earned in a year had fallen from $36,904,884 to $28,961,874, or a loss of 
$8,000,000 a year.”
1332
   
Dissenting from the popular accolades for “Republican prosperity,” Smith 
presented a serious consideration of the thousands of jobs lost in New England textiles 
and suggested that the interests of workers were being neglected in favor of rich, 
powerful forces.
1333
  Furthermore, he suggested an alternative policy approach, based on 
his record of progressive social welfare and labor reforms in New York.  Smith 
campaigners and spokespeople constantly discussed his gubernatorial record, and argued 
that the Democrat would bring a similarly dynamic and compassionate posture to the 
White House.  Indeed, for the hundreds of thousands that had flocked to hear the Boston 
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address Smith presented a vigorous defense of his social welfare record and of his 
ambitions to mobilize the federal government to assuage the condition of American 
workers.
1334
   
Progressive Smith allies like Frances Perkins were particularly active in espousing 
the governor’s program in New England.
1335
  Social welfare and labor activists, 
especially women from these traditions, promoted Smith’s ambitions in the industrial 
Northeast by extolling his progressive record on these questions and by insisting that 
such a humanitarian agenda was the key to remedying the injustices of 1920s America.  
Across the region, New Jersey congresswoman Mary Theresa Norton took to the 
airwaves to celebrate the New Yorker’s “humane record,” including struggles to limit 
women’s working hours, end child labor, provide aid for infant and maternal welfare, 
extend generous funding for public health services, and mandate equal pay for female 
teachers.
1336
  Throughout the national campaign, Perkins, Norton, Eleanor Roosevelt, 
Molly Dewson, Lillian Wald, and many other social welfare activists made similar 
arguments on the Democrat’s behalf.
1337
  In New England these efforts were buttressed 
by local initiative.  In the closing weeks of the campaign, a group of Massachusetts trade 
union women barnstormed the Bay State for Smith, setting out for “every factory city and 
town in Massachusetts” in “three motorcars . . . decorated with seven banners, in colors 
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representing the rainbow, while on each are . . . printed the Democratic issues of the 
campaign.”
1338
  Smith and his allies did their utmost to notify New Englanders of their 
reform agenda.  
 Political historians have long sought to categorize voters and their motivations, 
and in the case of 1928 the most assertive studies have concluded that cultural issues 
were absolutely dominant.
1339
  Yet political motivations often defy neat classification.  
This is so because the vast majority of human beings defy such classification.  Most of 
the actors in working-class New England, aside from the most conservative priests or the 
most myopic Marxists, lived their lives with multiple layers of interests covering varying 
categories of analysis.  People are complex—their lives and their problems and their 
hopes are complex, and it has been as superficial for historians to avoid this basic reality 
as it has been for them to dismiss Al Smith’s strenuous challenge to the political-
economic status quo.  Granting serious consideration to both Smith and his constituents 
demonstrates that prior to the national onset of the Great Depression and the national 
ascension of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, a Democratic revolution was underway in New 
England, fueled both by changing demographics and industrial turmoil, and led by a 
working-class Irish Catholic social welfare progressive from “the Sidewalks of New 
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Ethnic New England 
 
Angelo Peter Bizzozero was a notable figure among the Italians of Quincy, 
Massachusetts.  A veteran of the Great War, Bizzozero was on the honor roll of the Ave 
Maria Council No. 1535 of the Knights of Columbus in West Quincy, and had been 
elected as a Republican to the city council several times in the 1920s.
1340
  By September 
29, 1928, the councilman was an important enough figure in the Fourteenth 
Congressional District that the Massachusetts Republican Party nominated him as one of 
eighteen presidential electors to stand for Herbert Hoover at the Electoral College, should 
their candidate carry the Bay State as predicted.
1341
  This was done without the 
knowledge of the nominee, however, and three days later Bizzozero formally 
declined.
1342
  “I have intended, and will vote for Alfred E. Smith for President of the 
United States,” he revealed:  “I cannot on election day go and vote for Alfred E. Smith 
and permit my name to be used as Presidential elector for Herbert C. Hoover. . . .  I 
would be unworthy of the trust which has been placed in me by the voters if I was false to 
myself in voting and appearing on the ballot in another way.”
1343
  This vignette was but a 
minor episode—noteworthy more for the “amusement” it brought to Democrats than for 
any profound electoral influence.
1344
  Yet it is indicative of a tremendously important 
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phenomenon that occurred across New England during the 1928 election:  the shift in the 
ethnic vote away from neutrality and even Republicanism, and into the Democratic fold. 
In most considerations of the 1928 election, questions of ethnicity have held great 
prominence.  In fact, the “ethnic vote”—nebulously understood as the political 
preferences of communities dominated by second-wave immigrants and their progeny—
underwent transitions that alone make 1928 important, for these voters were to become 
an essential element of the Democratic majority in the Roosevelt era.  According to 
political scientist Kristi Andersen, it was this mobilization “of new populations, rather 
than conversion of Republicans, which . . . constituted the substance of realignment,” in 
the 1930s.
1345
  During the preceding decade, “the pool of . . . electorally inexperienced” 
potential voters was “unusually large,” because children of second-wave immigrants (and 
many of those immigrants themselves) were only then becoming adult citizens.
1346
  In 
general, ethnic voters lacked strong party prejudices because they “had not been around 
at the last major party reshuffling at the end of the nineteenth century.”
1347
  Therefore, 
these “inexperienced and ‘available’ citizens” of the 1920s were especially malleable 
when it came to partisan preferences, and the major events that would follow their entrée 
into civic participation—the Smith candidacy in 1928, the Depression, and the New 
Deal—“gave the Democrats an appeal among these groups which was translated into 
votes and into a persisting Democratic majority.”
1348
  Tracking voting trends from 1920 
until 1940 in major American cities with substantial immigrant populations, John 
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Petrocik affirmed the Andersen thesis:  “the Republican party simply did not get its share 
of the increase in the size of the voting population, and this failure to attract the new 
voters resulted in a 30 percentage point decline in the Republican share of the vote.”
1349
  
The conclusion was “inescapable”: Democratic success after 1928 was “less a 
consequence of changed behavior on the part of old voters than . . . the result of the 
choices of new voters.”
1350
 
However, while the bulk of the second-wave immigrant populations had remained 
electorally aloof until the late 1920s, the leadership of these communities had been quite 
active politically, purporting to speak for their ethnic brethren.  These élites supported 
Republicans at least as often as Democrats.  The behavior of such ethnic political 
pioneers mattered, for their influence at the local level would help direct the partisan 
preferences of their cohorts as they entered into the franchise.  Some Republican ethnic 
notables dug in during the 1928 campaign, but there were enough Angelo Bizzozeros in 
New England and elsewhere to alter significantly the political dynamics of many 
communities.       
It did not have to be this way.  The Democrats were not predestined to become the 
party of tolerance toward recent immigrants, let alone the party of progressive labor and 
social welfare reforms.  The dual processes of converting Republican ethnic communities 
and mobilizing naturalized citizens and their children were a vital phase—perhaps the 
vital phase—in developing the foundation for Roosevelt’s Democratic majority.  It was 
not until the 1928 Smith campaign that these new voters were firmly established as 
Democrats. 
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On October 14, 1920, Democratic presidential nominee James Cox delivered an 
address at Memorial Hall in Columbus, Ohio, in which he denounced a confederation of 
special interests—what he described as “the most motley array of questionable groups 
and influences”—that he believed were behind the candidacy of Republican Warren G. 
Harding.
1351
  Many of these groups were identified as “reactionaries” who sought low 
wages, suppression of “progressive thought,” and “martial law” as “a solvent for all 
industrial disputes.”
1352
  This populist rhetoric, particularly as it appealed to the 
apprehensions of the working class in a period of uneasy economic adjustment to 
peacetime conditions, could have bolstered the Democrat’s cause among urban ethnic 
citizens laboring in the nation’s factories.  Yet this was hardly the overriding theme of the 
speech.  Cox identified such “selfish” blocs as “the pro-German party,” “the Italian 
party,” “the Greek party and the Bulgarian party,” and the “Afro-American party” as only 
some of the “racial groups” bolstering the Republicans.
1353
  
 However noble Cox’s intention to carry on Wilson’s quixotic pursuit of the 
League of Nations (or his apparent fear of “counter-attacks” and “bloody race riots” 
against “unsuspecting colored people”), his speech became noteworthy for its 
denunciation of “hyphenated” Americans.
1354
  While the African-American vote was 
already overwhelmingly Republican, this rejection of ethnic-group cohesion hastened the 
Democratic Party’s isolation of recent immigrant voters—a process well underway in the 
closing years of Wilson’s second term.  Many Irish and German citizens had opposed 
American participation in the Great War from the beginning; and other groups were 
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dismayed as the shape of the post-war world became clear—most notably the Italians, 
whose motherland’s claims to the Adriatic port of Fiume had been scuttled at Versailles 
by the American president.
1355
  Nationwide, including in the ethnic enclaves of America’s 
great cities, Cox and the Democrats were soundly defeated.  
 In fact, this was only the latest setback in the turbulent Democratic courtship of 
immigrant voters in the Northeast.  The lure of the “full dinner pail” and promises of 
higher wages through Republican protectionism had entranced urban workers of 
immigrant and native stock alike since the Gilded Age.  Meanwhile, the Democrats 
embodied much that repelled immigrants.  There was the undiluted agrarianism of the 
party’s populist western wing; the domination of the national party by the South and of 
the regional party by the Irish; the homiletic declarations of Bryan and, to a lesser extent, 
Wilson; all of these Democratic hallmarks had served to alienate ethnic voters.
1356
   
This was particularly true in New England.  There, high-tariff shibboleths 
beckoned mill workers into the Grand Old Party, while resentment against 
monopolization of the Democratic Party and the Roman Catholic hierarchy by the Irish 
tempered any chances of cross-ethnic cooperation in an anti-Yankee alliance.
1357
  The 
Irish themselves were dismayed by the alleged Anglophile bias of Wilson’s 
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internationalism—despite Governor Cox’s intentional exclusion of this group from his 
catalog of malignant hyphenators.
1358
  While things were more complex at the local level, 
in the 1920s, French Canadians, Italians, Jews, Poles, Portuguese, and other New 
England ethnic groups whose electoral strength had been steadily increasing since the 
turn of the century were deeply skeptical of the Democratic Party.  In national and 
especially presidential voting this reality was particularly consequential to the electoral 
calculus in places like Massachusetts and Rhode Island, where such groups held the 
balance of power between Yankee Republicans and Irish Democrats.   
For decades the Irish had dominated the Democratic organizations in many 
American cities; among them New York, Boston, and Providence.  But in contrast to the 
evolving ethnic pragmatism of New York’s Tammany Hall, the Irish Democrats of New 
England clung to power through exclusionary tactics—monopolizing political offices and 
patronage and in turn isolating other ethnic groups.  In response, recent immigrants often 
aligned themselves with the Republican Party in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and 
Connecticut, producing a counterintuitive coalition that set Italian, Polish, Portuguese, 
Jewish, and especially French-Canadian voters alongside old-stock Yankee Protestants.  
In 1928 Al Smith captured new-immigrant loyalties for the Democratic Party—
permanently—and thus shifted the balance of power in southern New England away from 
its traditional Republicanism.  Yet within the Democracy, Irish hegemony remained 
strong in 1928.  When a preliminary set of Smith organizations for Boston was 
announced, their leaders included former mayor James Michael Curley (the “Smith 
Volunteers”), former fire commissioner Theodore A. Glynn (the “Smith Flying Wedge”), 
Boston Schoolhouse Commission chair Francis E. Slattery (the “Boston Smith Campaign 
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Executive Committee”), and former mayor Andrew J. Peters (the “Smith Campaign 
Advisory Committee”).
1359
  Moreover, the list of speakers for Commissioner Glynn’s 
“Flying Wedge” was comprised of 80 percent Irish surnames; with a dusting of English 
and Scottish orators, as well as a single Italian.
1360
  There were no French, Polish, or other 
recent-immigrant names included.
1361
  These groups faired only slightly better in 
Hartford, Connecticut.
1362
  In that city, the executive committee that was named to make 
preparations for Smith’s October 25 visit was dominated by Irish Democrats, with a 
strong English presence on the sixty-member board.
1363
  Meanwhile, Italians made up just 
under 7 percent of the executive committee; 5 percent of the members had traditionally 
Jewish surnames; and Poles represented slightly over 3 percent of the body.
1364
  While 
clearly more diverse than the Boston group, the Hartford partisans did not provide an 
ethnically representative sample of their city’s population, which was more than 12.8 
percent Italian and 7.6 percent Polish at the time of the 1930 census.
1365
 
As Irish dominance of New England’s Democratic organizations persisted into the 
1928 campaign, élites from other ethnic groups—especially fellow Roman Catholics—
continued to stoke resentment at their exclusion from power.  During a Republican rally 
at a Sons of Italy hall in Newport, Rhode Island, Luigi Cipolla, “a venerable of the 
lodge,” reminded his brethren that “the Democratic party in the nation and the state has 
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always discriminated against the Italians.”
1366
  In the same state, one Franco-American 
leader claimed that his community “had been persecuted by the Irish for over fifty 
years.”
1367
  Indeed, while prevalent across New England, these internecine antagonisms 
were especially bitter among Rhode Island’s Catholics.  This was largely due to lingering 
animosity between the Irish and the region’s sizable French-Canadian community, which 
held its greatest strength in the Ocean State.   
The political significance of these rivalries was well-established by 1928.  
Throughout New England, the French-Canadian vote had been a source of Republican 
strength since the late nineteenth century.  While in some areas, including western 
Massachusetts, these voters had occasionally flirted with the Democratic Party, French 
Canadians were largely Republican, by virtue of their rivalries with the Irish as well as 
their general support for the economic ideology of the GOP.
1368
  In Rhode Island, the 
Republicans had amplified their advantage with this crucial bloc through recognition at 
nomination time.  By 1908 the party had elected a French-Canadian governor, Aram 
Pothier, who served several terms and was followed after a six year Yankee interlude by 
another French Canadian, Emery San Souci, who was elected in 1920.
1369
     
During the 1920s these partisan loyalties suffered numerous trials.  In 1922, 
Republican legislators in Rhode Island passed the Peck Act, a law extending the authority 
of the state board of education to parochial schools and mandating English-language 
instruction.
1370
  This law was especially egregious to French-Canadian proponents of “la 
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survivance”—a zealous defense of the community’s traditional cultural institutions—and 
these citizens were particularly disturbed by the passive ascent given the law by 
Governor San Souci.
1371
  With community élites antagonized by this cultural harassment 
and working-class voters dismayed by the state’s repressive response to the 1922 textile 
strikes in the Pawtucket and Blackstone valleys, the French joined with other Catholic 
ethnic groups and voted Democratic that fall.
1372
  While portentous, these developments 
proved fleeting, for they had represented a rejection of Republican policies rather than an 




Entering the 1928 campaign there was little reason for Republicans to doubt the 
security of the French vote—particularly in Rhode Island, where it was strongest.  There, 
an ongoing feud between Bishop William Hickey, the Irish-American prelate of 
Providence, and an outspoken group of French Canadians who had been excommunicated 
the previous year as a result of a quarrel over school funding, seemed likely to reinforce 
Franco-Irish rivalries.
1374
  One of the rebels, Elphege Daigneault of Woonsocket, did his 
part to exaggerate this wedge, penning a screed for the French-language La Verité in 
which he both extolled Herbert Hoover and denounced Bishop Hickey.
1375
   
Further boosting their prospects, the Republicans nominated Felix Hebert, a 
prominent French-Canadian jurist from West Warwick, to challenge Democrat Peter 
Gerry for the United States Senate.   Republicans would trumpet this nomination as “the 
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greatest honor ever conferred on the Franco-American element” in ads featuring Hoover 
and Hebert.
1376
  Gerry himself faltered in his attempts to court the French vote, 
condescendingly centering his pitch on the Volstead Act and allowing Hebert to claim 
that the senator “meant the only interest the French had in the election was 
prohibition.”
1377
  Rhode Island’s French Canadians were persuaded to their countryman’s 
cause, joining the majority of the state’s voters in ousting Gerry in favor of the 
Republican challenger. 
Yet 1928 was far from business as usual for New England’s French Canadians.  
While these voters had occasionally entered the Democratic ranks, such alliances had 
always proven ephemeral.  In 1928, however, the French-Canadian vote went strongly for 
Al Smith, breaking with precedent; and the patterns established in that year would persist 
for decades.
1378
  On the strength of this vote, Smith carried communities with large 
concentrations of French Canadians—such as Central Falls and the ethnic wards of 
Pawtucket.
1379
  The great French enclave of Woonsocket went to Al Smith by a margin of 
nearly two to one—this despite the ongoing battle between members of the French 
community and the Catholic hierarchy and despite decades of mistrust between the 
French and both the Irish and the Democratic Party.
1380
  In several of the city’s most 
heavily French districts, Smith won by margins of eight and even ten to one—and his 
appeal in these communities was so strong that Peter Gerry actually defeated Felix 
Hebert in French Woonsocket by a thin margin.
1381
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The Democrats enjoyed similar success among French Canadians across New 
England, the result of momentum that had been established in the closing weeks of the 
campaign.  In Lowell, Massachusetts, Democrats were compelled by requests “from 
numerous French-American voters of the city” to begin organizing a local French-
American Smith club.
1382
  A few days later, former Fall River mayor Edmund P. Talbott, 
the head of the Massachusetts French-American Smith League, began sending agents 
from his state staff into the region to help coordinate a registration drive.
1383
  In short 
order bilingual meetings were held to organize local French-American women interested 
in the cause.
1384
  All of this occurred as a Democratic response to the initiative of French 
Americans in Lowell who found the party’s nominee attractive and sought aid in 
mobilizing their community politically.    
The case of Hartford provides a sense of the vitality the Democrats enjoyed in 
French New England in the closing weeks of the campaign.  In October, the city saw the 
formation of its French-American Al Smith Club at St. Ann’s Hall, with bilingual mass 
meetings held through Election Day.
1385
  From national headquarters the Democrats 
dispatched Orphie Langevin, who headed the French division of the party’s “Naturalized 
Citizen’s Bureau,” to deliver an oration in his native tongue, joined by Barney Fallon, a 
former football star from Fordham.
1386
  By election eve, the French-American Smith-for-
President Club drew a “demonstrative” crowd of six hundred to a rally featuring 
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congressional nominee Herman P. Kopplemann.
1387
  Less than a month earlier the 
organization had been founded by a mere thirty-five people.
1388
 
Indeed, shifts in the French vote, although most impressive in Rhode Island, were 
not isolated to the Ocean State.  Across New England working-class French Canadians 
abandoned their traditional Republicanism in favor of Smith.  In Massachusetts, John 
Merrill of the Boston Globe noted that many French voters “who had hitherto supported 
Republican candidates voted for Gov Smith” in 1928.
1389
  In Fitchburg, Smith improved 
the Democratic vote by 4.6 percentage points in the old-stock ward; in the French ward, 
he was up an astounding 20.1 points.
1390
  In Lowell, Smith topped 65 percent in the two 
majority-French wards; in Chicopee, the French ward gave Smith 71.5 percent; in 





Fig. 6.1: Smith ad from the Lowell Sun calling for support from the local French-American community.
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Smith’s success with New England’s Italian-American voters, while grounded in 
a slightly more favorable partisan tradition, was equally dramatic.  In September, the 
Smith Italian-American League of Massachusetts was formed, with former Suffolk 
County assistant district attorney Vincent Brogna in command.
1393
  The Boston Globe 
described the league as “the first movement of its kind to band the Italo-American voters 
of this State for a presidential candidate.”
1394
  By October 1, local clubs had been started 
in twenty-five municipalities, with ambitions to organize “in every city and town where 
there are Italian-American residents.”
1395
  These organizations were always headed by 
Italians themselves, whether it was Mr. Tony Garofino in Lynn, Mr. Silvio Bernardini in 
Lowell, or Mr. George Costanza in Boston.
1396
  In short order, a state women’s division 
was organized, chaired by Mrs. Luigi P. Verde, whose leadership enabled her to utilize 
existing social and political networks in ways that paralleled Brogna’s use of his status as 
a former state representative.
1397
  Nor was this an exclusively top-down initiative, for 
some local Smith organizations had their own women’s division.
1398
  Statewide, Smith 
forces had clearly captured the enthusiasm of the Italian community:  an Italian-American 
Smith League rally in Springfield attracted more than four thousand citizens; a few nights 
earlier, an Italian meeting for Hoover in the same city had attracted forty-two.
1399
  
 In Hartford, local Italians organized on Smith’s behalf in early September, 
founding a non-partisan “Italian-American Smith-for-President Club” for the purpose of 
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“educating the voters,” and entering “whole-heartedly” into the presidential campaign.
1400
  
Unlike the Massachusetts Smith League, the Hartford club was part of a national 
movement among Italians that had emerged outside the purview of the Democratic Party.  
In fact, the non-partisan organization elected several Republicans to its executive 
committee and declined an offer of quarters at the Democratic regional offices.
1401
  Also 
unlike the Massachusetts movement, in Hartford there was no auxiliary women’s 
organization; instead, women served alongside men on prominent committees, and the 
club elected a female vice president, Miss Rose D’Esposo.
1402
  While these efforts 
remained ostensibly independent, partisan Connecticut Democrats also pursued the 
Italian vote with vigor:  New Britain mayor Angelo Paonessa, state chairman of the 
Italian division of the Democratic National Committee, refused his party’s offer of the 
nomination for lieutenant governor, “so that he might have complete freedom in leading 
an Italian campaign for the Democratic nominee.”
1403
   
 Local circumstances encouraged this new enthusiasm for the Democrats, just as 
local conflicts had previously foreclosed such possibilities.  In Connecticut, Francis A. 
Pallotti had been elected secretary of state as a Republican in 1922, and had come to be 
regarded by Italians “as one of the outstanding citizens of their race in the State.”
1404
  
However, Pallotti’s ambitions for higher office were thwarted in 1928, when his bid for 
the Republican nomination for lieutenant governor was rejected at the party’s 
convention.
1405
  In response, thirty-eight Pallotti clubs “changed their names to Al Smith-
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for-President clubs and . . . indicated that they would give their whole-hearted support to 
the candidacy of Governor Smith.”
1406
  Mayor Paonessa sought to capitalize on the 
“dissatisfaction” that he saw growing from the incident, and in fact the Pallotti 
controversy helped many Italian Democrats transform the presidential election into a 
campaign against the political denigration of their community—paralleling what many 
ethnic groups saw as Smith’s national battle against racial, ethnic, and religious 
bigotry.
1407
   “We shall respect those who have shown respect for us,” declared George 
DiCenzo, toastmaster at a rally of eight hundred Italian Americans in New Haven.
1408
  At 
a Hartford rally for 1,200 Italians on the Sunday before the election, editor Giovanni 
Lizzi warned the crowd in Italian that “they would set back the cause of the Italian-




 These efforts were rewarded on Election Day.  In late October, M. E. Hennessy of 
the Boston Globe declared that in Rhode Island, “the Italians are almost solid for 
Smith.”
1410
  A few weeks later, Smith carried 79 percent of the vote in the Italian sections 
of Providence.
1411
  In Boston, Smith topped 80 percent in Wards One and Three, both 
with sizable Italian populations; and in the precincts encompassing the Italian-dominated 
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North End, Smith received 2,325 votes to Hoover’s 134.
1412
  In Waterbury, 
Connecticut—a city which was about a quarter Italian—the turnout was a robust 91 
percent; Smith carried the Brass City with 58 percent, and the entire Democratic ticket 
was swept to victory as a result.
1413
 
 The Poles were another source of traditional Republican strength in New England, 
and the party did what it could to maintain the community’s favor in 1928.  On October 
20, when 250 members of the Polish Political Organization gathered for a banquet in 
Hartford, they were met by John Trumbull, Connecticut’s Republican governor, who 
noted that his party had “always had loyal support from the Polish citizens of this state,” 
expressing confidence that 1928 would witness the continuance of this happy 
tradition.
1414
  Indeed, the banqueters were treated to a procession of Republican 
luminaries, each of whom shared the governor’s confidence.  All of this was capped by 
the surprise appearance of Herbert Hoover’s running mate, Kansas senator Charles 
Curtis, who pithily beckoned his hearers to the support of the national ticket with his 
“warm and contagious smile” and a bonhomous “God bless you all!”
1415
   
Other members of the GOP ticket were more explicit in rallying Poles to the 
Hoover banner.  “You, of all people, should vote for the man who made the new Poland 
possible,” insisted State Senator Frederic Walcott, the party’s choice for United States 
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  “We are on the verge of an industrial era of prosperity, and we want men in 
office like Senator Curtis,” proclaimed Governor Trumbull.
1417
  These three themes—
traditional ethnic Republicanism, Polish nationalism, and Republican prosperity—
constituted the bulk of the Hoover pitch to Polish New England.   
 The Republican nominee’s work in feeding post-war Europe, including millions 
of desperate Poles, was deemed a particularly powerful argument for his elevation to the 
presidency.  A Hartford attorney told a Polish gathering at Meriden, Connecticut, that 
“Herbert Hoover did much for Poland during the dark days of the World War.  He fed 
and clothed the Polish people and he did not ask their faith.”
1418
  Suzanne Farnam, a 
veteran of Hoover’s Belgian relief efforts, reminded a group of Hartford Poles gathered at 
White Eagle Hall of the Republican’s post-war humanitarianism.
1419
  Farther north along 
the Connecticut River, a “Polish Citizen” wrote the Springfield Daily News that Poles 




 Smith Poles also drew on cultural motifs to promote their candidate.  
Unsurprisingly, the Democrats relied heavily on the twin issues of prohibition and 
Catholicism.  In Connecticut, Democratic senatorial nominee Augustine Lonergan told a 
group of Bridgeport Poles that prohibition was a “sham,” and ventured that “if Smith is 
elected, it will insure new hope in every mother’s breast and will again prove to the world 
that in America a lowly birth or any membership in the Catholic church is no bar to the 
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  On November 4, Herman Kopplemann warned separate Hartford rallies 
for French, Polish, and Lithuanian voters that the Anti-Saloon League was “playing a 
major part in the campaign for Mr. Hoover,” and that anti-tobacco legislation loomed in 
the event of a Republican triumph.
1422
 
 While projecting superficial confidence in the security of the Polish vote, 
Republican speeches betrayed a fear that these cultural issues threatened their viability 
with this usually reliable bloc.  Hoover campaigners often felt compelled to dismiss 
prohibition.
1423
  Moreover, when addressing Smith’s Catholicism before ethnic 
audiences, New England Hoover Republicans often sounded like national Smith 
Democrats.  “I believe that politics and religion are two distinct subjects that should 
never be mentioned at the same time, much less mixed,” was the sermon from Joseph B. 
Kulaf, a Hartford lawyer.
1424
   “There is no religious issue in this campaign,” Suzanne 
Farnam assured; “There are going to be as many Catholics voting for Hoover as there are 
going to be Protestants for Smith.”
1425
        
 Affirming these arguments, especially those regarding Hoover’s good deeds for 
the old country, New England’s Polish élite remained true to their traditional 
Republicanism—as was the case in other American Polish enclaves.
1426
  When the 
Republican nominee visited Boston, the president of the Massachusetts Polish State Club, 
A. S. Bachorowski, thanked him personally for “the humanitarian work rendered by you 
in Poland,” and promised the support of “Bay State Poles” during a reception for “the 
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spokesmen of the foreign groups” hosted by Governor Alvan Tufts Fuller.
1427
  Nationalist 
gratitude toward Hoover was even articulated by Poland’s legendary pianist-patriot 
Ignacy Jan Paderewski, who spoke warmly of the Great Humanitarian during the 
campaign.
1428
  As expected, the Polish Federated Political Clubs of New England 
endorsed Hoover in October.
1429
  Yet the Democratic Springfield Daily News noted 
indications of “a sizable reaction among the Poles in this vicinity” against the 
endorsement.
1430
  In Chicopee, an officer of the federation responded to the endorsement 
by resigning, “with the frank statement that he is unreservedly for Smith.”
1431
   Others 
went further, immediately forming a Polish Democratic Club for Chicopee.
1432
  In 
Holyoke, an existing club “expressed strong dissatisfaction with the course of the New 
England federation.”
1433
  This dissent was not limited to western Massachusetts:  in New 
Bedford, the endorsement had been preempted when Stanley J. Sieczkowski had declared 
in late September that the Polish-American Bristol County Club was for Smith.
1434
  




 By November, it was predicted from Springfield that “a heavy vote for Smith is 
certain among the Polish people of this city, Chicopee and Holyoke as a result of an 
intensive campaign that has been carried out in each neighborhood,” and on Election Day 
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this prophecy came to fruition.
1436
  Indeed, the Polish vote across New England helped 
fuel a Democratic explosion in the region.  Hamden County, Massachusetts—12.7 
percent Polish—returned a Democratic presidential majority for the first time in the 
century, and only the second Democratic plurality of that period.
1437
  The county’s three 
major cities all showed marked Democratic improvements.  In Chicopee, a city which 
was 32 percent Polish, Smith carried over 70 percent of the vote.
1438
  In the previous two 
elections, Democrats had averaged just under 28 percent, and since 1896, only one 
Democrat had cracked 50 percent.
1439
  Nearby Holyoke was 13 percent Polish at the time 
of the 1930 census.
1440
  In the Paper City, Democrats like Bryan and Wilson had 
sometimes gained small majorities (the best performance was Wilson’s 56.3 percent in 
1916), but the party’s presidential nominees in 1920 and 1924 had achieved 35.5 and 
32.3 percent, respectively.  Al Smith scored 66.5 percent of the vote in 1928.
1441
  In 
Springfield, by far the largest city in western Massachusetts, Poles accounted for only 5.3 
percent of the population—still a considerable enclave, although nothing near the one in 
three of Chicopee.
1442
  There, Smith carried 48.7 percent—a significant improvement 
over the 26.1 percent earned by Cox in 1920 and the 21.7 percent that went to Davis in 
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1924; in fact, only one other Democrat, Woodrow Wilson in 1916, had even surpassed 40 
percent in Springfield since the century began.  
 Neighboring Hampshire County was even more Polish—20.8 percent—and there 
the results were similar to those in Springfield: although the county did not deliver a 
Smith majority (he carried 46.9 percent of the county-wide vote), his percentage was 
nearly twenty points above the 1920s average, and in fact this represented only the third 
time in the century a Democrat had surpassed 30 percent of the county’s presidential 
vote.
1443
  More revealing, however, were the results from Northampton, a city that was 
11.6 percent Polish and was home to 20.1 percent of Hampshire County Poles.
1444
  There, 
Smith achieved a majority of 54.3 percent—making him the first Democrat to win the 
Meadow City in the twentieth century.  
 Southward in the Connecticut River Valley, other large Polish enclaves 
underwent similar transitions.  Hartford County was 11.3 percent Polish, and more than 
60 percent of the county’s Poles were concentrated in the cities of Hartford and New 
Britain—the latter of which was nearly a quarter Polish.
1445
  Both cities had sizable 
populations of other ethnic groups—especially Italians, who comprised 12.8 percent of 
Hartford’s population.
1446
  In any case, in both Hartford and New Britain, there was a 
clear correlation between the percentage of each ward’s population that was first or 
second generation immigrant and the strength of the ward’s Democratic vote.
1447
  Smith 
carried both cities, and his 46 percent of the county-wide presidential tally was a 
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substantial improvement over the 31.2 percent that had been averaged by Cox and 
Davis.
1448
   
All of this occurred despite the traditional Republicanism of Polish New England 
and in the face of the Polish-American élite’s avowed preference for Hoover.  Much of 
this popular dissent was based on hostility toward prohibition and on membership in the 
Catholic Church—both of which the vocal majority of Polish New Englanders shared 
with the Democratic nominee.  A Polish-American baker from Hartford noted how his 
community had mobilized on their co-communicant’s behalf—and that as a result pro-
Hoover Poles had been shunned.  “With the opening of the present Presidential campaign 
I naturally continued my Republican activities. . . .  Yet because of my course some of 
my friends have ostracized me and some of my customers have withdrawn their trade,” 
reported John Winialski.
1449
  The baker’s erstwhile friends and customers admonished 
him that he had a duty “to support Governor Smith because his religious faith is the same 
as mine.”
1450
    
In fact, chronicling Democratic attempts to mobilize rank-and-file Polish, Italian, 
and French-Canadian New Englanders does much to commend the literature’s traditional 
focus on cultural conflict.  In East Hartford, Angelo Paonessa labeled federal prohibition 
agents “a bunch of grafters” and denounced the Eighteenth Amendment as “a curse to 
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  In New Haven, Democratic gubernatorial nominee Charles Morris 
deplored “the injection of the religious question into the campaign,” before that city’s 
Italian Smith club.
1452
  A Yale divinity student rallied his French audience in Hartford by 
promising that a Smith victory would settle “one and for all the question of a man’s 
religious faith as a test for public office.”
1453
  Along with prohibition and religious 
bigotry, speakers before these groups often denounced Republican-sponsored 
immigration quotas—“perfectly insane” was how they were viewed by Herman 
Koppleman at an Italian rally in Hartford.
1454
  
Religion, prohibition, and immigration restriction represent the well-known ethnic 
rallying points from 1928, and they have achieved this prominence with good reason, for 
they were all employed enthusiastically by Democrats before ethnic audiences.
1455
  The 
shifts in the Polish-American vote during the 1928 election help affirm the importance of 
these ethnocultural concerns to that campaign.
1456
  However, this was only one facet of 
the reasoning employed by Poles in their flight to the Democratic Party.  Among the 
many Polish-Americans who were stirred to rebellion by élite Polonia’s support for the 
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Republican nominee was Alexander Bielski of Chicopee, who wrote the Springfield 
Daily News that “so-called” Polish leaders, “drunk with their own powers of intimidation 
and coercion,” had attempted to deliver the Polish vote to Hoover; but rank and file Poles 
would mobilize to defeat this “clique.”
1457
  The reason, according to Bielski, was not so 
much ethnocultural as it was economic:  “For the past seven and one-half years, our 
government has been of the type which has furthered, protected, and fostered the special 
interests of a certain few against the common interests of the many.”
1458
  Another Pole 
wrote the Republican Springfield Union in even more explicit terms which reveal the 
connections between class and culture:   
Capital governs the Republican party and influences the people to vote for 
Hoover, who thus far favors prohibition.  It is said that after a workman performs 
his daily task and refreshes himself with a glass of beer or wine he becomes 
unable to maintain his efficiencies. . . .  Alfred Smith . . . holds that should the 
laborer, the farmer and the small business man prosper, money will be in more 
free circulation and the country will prosper. . . .  it is the duty and obligation of 




These attitudes were not confined to Hamden County, nor were they limited to 
Poles.  A letter from one Italian-American Rhode Islander to the Westerly Sun amply 
demonstrates the multifactorial nature of ethnic New Englanders’ political preferences.  
The Republican Sun had lamented in an editorial that Italians could be expected to vote 
for Al Smith because of their desire to restore the saloon.
1460
   One reader, V. Gentile of 
Pierce Street, became indignant at this superficial analysis, composing a corrective letter 
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to the editor:  “The deplorable existing conditions and partiality and favoritism that the 
Republican party has been showing to the manufacturer and powerful combines with 
their poor records during the eight years and with the uniform and despicable tactics that 
they are using against Gov. Smith is the reason why he is going to be our next 
president.”
1461
  The desperate, “deplorable” state of New England’s working class was 
just as significant as the cultural conflicts of the 1920s in shaping the world view of these 
voters.   
Indeed, such denunciations of Republican economics rang painfully true for many 
living in New England’s ethnic enclaves, adding a strong class dynamic to these voters’ 
interest in Al Smith’s Democratic Party.  For the region’s working class, Herbert 
Hoover’s confidence in the policies of the previous eight years demonstrated a favoritism 
of capitalist over laborer, especially when compared to the Smith campaign’s regular 
probing of the weaknesses of the Coolidge economy.  Hoover’s contentment with the 
status quo suggested to the Springfield Daily News that the Republican approved of what 
many New Englanders perceived as sharpening economic inequality:  “He has been 
content to hide behind a mass of evasions and irrelevancies, which is ever the way of 




Industrial New England 
 
 A chorus of Republicans responded to these critiques by reiterating their party’s 
support for high tariffs as a tonic for low wages and unemployment.  Visiting 
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Swampscott, Massachusetts, Speaker of the House Nicholas Longworth of Ohio 
presented a stark choice:  “No Republican protective tariff ever closed a factory, 
mortgaged a farm, or caused an American man or woman to lose their jobs.  No 
Democratic tariff law ever failed to do all three.”
1463
  “It would be suicide for 
Massachusetts to turn the country over to the Democrats,” agreed A. Platt Andrew, a 
member of Longworth’s caucus from Massachusetts who spoke at the same meeting.  
“The depression in the industries of New England” was the result of cheap foreign goods 
undermining domestic manufacturing and imperiling “the future of those industries and 
of the hundreds of thousands of persons employed therein.”  The congressman concluded 
that “a continuance of the policy of protection,” under prudent Republican 
administration, was the only way to assure an industrial renaissance.
1464
   
In acknowledging the serious challenges facing New England textiles, Andrew’s 
remarks reveal an important facet of the economic stance of regional Republicans.  
National figures like Longworth could point to widespread prosperity and only allude in 
passing to localized blemishes; New England Republicans had no such luxury.  At 
Whitinsville, Massachusetts, on October 5, Loring Young, the Republican challenger to 
Senator David Ignatius Walsh, encapsulated his party’s response to the poor condition of 
regional industries:  “Bad as conditions now are in the textile industry, they would be 
even worse today if Senator Walsh and his southern associates had written the tariff 
law.”
1465
    
For their part, Democratic speakers in New England sought to distance 
themselves and their presidential nominee from the party’s traditional free trade posture.  
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Democratic National Committeeman Thomas Spellacy told New Haven’s Italian-
American Smith club that the governor’s “attitude on the tariff is one of absolute 
protection,” a position that was reinforced by Augustine Lonergan at the same rally.
1466
  
The nominee himself bolstered these claims on October 13 with his Louisville speech, 
criticizing Coolidge’s tariff commission but also suggesting that his election would not 
foredoom protectionism.
1467
  New England Democrats were cheered by this articulation 
of a new Democratic trade policy—the Lowell Sun called Smith’s Louisville address 
“probably the best he has yet delivered.”
1468
  Herman Kopplemann buttressed Smith’s 
point at a Hartford labor hall, declaring that “he, together with all other Democratic 
congressmen, would favor a high protective tariff.”
1469
    
While in New England, Smith affirmed these arguments with a note he handed to 
Angelo Paonessa during a visit to New Britain in late October.  When the mayor emerged 
from a private meeting with the nominee, he revealed a signed statement promising 
Connecticut laborers that Smith “will do nothing to bring about tariff legislation which 
will so injure the industries of their cities as to reduce their earning powers one 
penny.”
1470
  In the closing weeks of the campaign, the Hartford Courant, for years an 
advocate of high tariffs and of Republican leadership, would mockingly announce that 
“We Are All Protectionists Now.”
1471
  
 Republicans varied in their interpretation of Smith’s stand.  Navy Secretary Curtis 
Wilbur told a “record-breaking audience” in Nashua, New Hampshire, that while Smith 
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may well have been genuine in his Louisville address, “no candidate . . . can change his 
party’s platform nor reverse the decision of its convention,” suggesting facetiously that 
“if Gov Smith really believes in the protective tariff, he should vote the Republican 
ticket.”
1472
  New Jersey congressman Franklin T. Fort was more skeptical of Smith’s 
conversion.  In Boston, Fort contemplated, “how can we turn over the Government to a 
party which changes its views as it changes its shirts or socks?”
1473
  Pennsylvania 
governor John E. Fisher, speaking in Holyoke, concurred, expressing suspicion toward 
Smith’s protectionist remarks in light of “practically every previous statement he had 
made upon the tariff subject.”
1474
  The Hartford Courant was similarly incredulous, citing 
the New Yorker’s past denunciations of the Fordney-McCumber tariff and other 
protectionist policies and concluding that if Smith “were elected the policy of protection 
which he now espouses would not weigh heavily on his conscience.”
1475
   
While Smith attracted minimal support from notable New England businessmen, 
the region’s leading capitalists were broadly in accord with their traditional Republican 
allies in looking askance at the Democrat’s economic policies, and so as usual, New 
England industrialists rallied to the Republican banner.
1476
  The Boston Wool Trade 
Association held an important public meeting in support of “the election of all candidates 
on the Republican ticket in Massachusetts” that featured Frank G. Allen, the party’s 
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nominee for governor and a member of the association.
1477
  DeWitt Page, president of the 
New Departure Manufacturing Company and a vice president with General Motors, 
lauded “the policies that have made for the prosperity of the country over a considerable 
number of years,” remarking from Bristol, Connecticut, after his nomination as a 
Republican presidential elector that “I must support the party that has served the best 
interests of our own and other industries during the past two decades.”
1478
  As Hoover 
departed Boston after an October 15 speech, his tour through textile country was greeted 
with the enthusiasm of mill owners, who “turned their steam on for Candidate Hoover . . . 
kept every whistle at full toot as long as he was in hearing.”
1479
      
More significantly, manufacturers inundated their payrolls with dire predictions 
about the consequences of a Smith victory.  On October 16, responding to Smith’s 
Louisville address on tariff policy, Brigadier General Charles Cole, Democratic nominee 
for governor of Massachusetts, told a Boston audience that “no longer will the mill 
overseer stand by the gate and assure the men that their job and pay envelope depends 
upon so-called republican protection.”
1480
  In fact, Smith’s candidacy only served to 
exacerbate such activities.  Republican-aligned industrialists doggedly promoted Hoover 
among those who toiled in the textile mills and machine works of New England.  One 
large Connecticut manufacturer posted signage:  “Hoover and Curtis—If these men are 
elected your jobs are safe.”
1481
  Large pictures of the Republican nominee were 
“conspicuously” placed at the doors of The New Bedford Spinning Company.
1482
  The 
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Bigelow-Hartford Carpet Company warned millworkers:  “Hoover and Prosperity—Save 
Your Job.”
1483
  From Lowell, it was reported that workers in parts of Massachusetts were 
“receiving in their pay envelopes little folders showing the home of a working man 
protected by a tariff wall which the democrats are pictured as tearing down.”
1484
    
 Republican campaigners reiterated these threats.  In newspaper advertisements for 
the Republican ticket, workers were implored to preserve prosperity:  “Let’s Keep What 
We’ve Got!”
1485
  Horace Greeley Knowles, a lawyer and retired diplomat, wrote the 
Hartford Courant that “within a very few weeks after the election, should Smith be 
successful, lack of confidence, doubt and uncertainty as to the effect of the change of 
administration . . . would develop into a panic, would result in many thousands and 
probably millions of men and women being thrown out of work.”
1486
  
 Smith alluded to these tactics during his labor speech at Newark, New Jersey, 
claiming that “circulars were paid for and sent out by the Republican National Committee 
to be put in the pay envelopes of American workingmen”; responding to the Democrat, 
the Lowell Sun reported that “instances of such coercion are reported in this state; and it 
is nothing new,” for “in past years” Massachusetts Republicans had employed “the old 
tariff bogey” to “intimidate labor” into voting the GOP ticket.
1487
  Indeed, the scale and 
tactics may have been novel, but by 1928 Republican propaganda extolling high tariffs 
was an autumn tradition in New England.  What was quite new, however, was how the 
region’s workers responded to these entreaties. 
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 Some New England laborers were stirred by the Republican economic argument, 
as they had been since the nineteenth century.  “A Worker” reminded the Hartford 
Courant that the Republican tariff must be preserved in order to bolster Connecticut 
manufacturing.
1488
  Yet many were unmoved by such boilerplate.  “We get a lot of 
prosperity hash, with here and there something about the full dinner pail,” went a 
different letter to the Courant, “but working men are reading up a little these days and the 
old dinner pail argument is getting to be more of an insult than an incentive.”
1489
  A voter 
from Northampton dismissed Republican claims of prosperity as “a myth”:  “Prosperity 
in New England just is not.  The McCallum Hosiery Company, the Cutlery, the Corticelli 
mills in Northampton have slashed salaries and let help go.  The Northampton Hosiery 
Company has failed.  A community in this condition cannot feel there is prosperity 
simply because Mr. [Charles Evans] Hughes says so.”
1490
  A writer from Glastonbury, 
Connecticut, agreed, arguing that “our prosperity is not anything to brag about and has 




 In fact, the lived experiences of tens of thousands of working-class New 
Englanders belied Republican satisfaction with Coolidge prosperity.  A pseudonymous 
“Breadwinner” from Springfield noted an increase in the number of beggars in the 
community, sardonically suggesting that “perhaps it would be best after all to elect Mr. 
Hoover, with his wide experience in feeding the hungry in other lands and let him direct 
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the ‘Prosperity Breadlines’ in America.”
1492
  A former Republican from Holyoke agreed 
that there was a perceptible decline in the region’s economic fortunes:  “Our closed 
industrial plants, comprising textile, shoe, paper and those producing from iron and steel 
does not uphold the Republican slogan, Prosperity!  New England’s thousands of 
industries that operate from four days to 12 days per month; the hundreds of thousands of 
idle and part-time idle workers is a refutation of the statements made by the ballyhoo 
speakers of the Republican Party.”
1493
  A writer from Westfield, Massachusetts, 
emphasized that in the unbalanced economy of the 1920s, these questions were ultimately 
a matter of perspective:  “Yes, there is prosperity, but not with the poor, the struggling 
tradesman or the farmer.  But the rich are prospered, the bloated bondholder, the 
manipulator in stocks and the politically high up.”
1494
 
 Democratic politicians perceived this discontent, joining both New England 
workers and their party’s presidential nominee in challenging the very notion of 
Republican prosperity.  Speaking before 3,500 people in Lowell, once and future mayor 
of Boston James Michael Curley employed his characteristic ethnocultural appeals—
denouncing the Klan, lauding the Americanism of those who had fought in the Great War 
“regardless of race or creed,” and amusing Irish listeners by adopting a cockney accent to 
mock “’Erbie ’Oover” and his ties to England.  But the “Purple Shamrock” also engaged 
in a long dissertation on the worsening lot of New England workers.  “Where is the 
prosperity?” he queried.  “Where is the protection the Republicans talk about? . . .  It is 
too bad Hoover couldn’t have stayed in this state a few days and seen the bread lines in 
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New Bedford.  They are timid of talking about prosperity here—with 2300 homes 
unoccupied in Lawrence, 3000 here, 2000 in New Bedford and the same number in other 
textile cities.  What have the republicans done for the people of this state?”
1495
   
At Ansonia, Connecticut, Augustine Lonergan speculated whether the state’s 
closed mills were indications of Republican prosperity.
1496
  In Manchester, Connecticut, 
Hermann Kopplemann wondered which workers were receiving the supposed “luxury 
wages” Speaker Longworth had claimed resulted from GOP policies.
1497
  Prosperity was 
unbalanced, claimed Senator Walsh at a Massachusetts mill town—“centered on a 
preferred class of men, namely big business.”
1498
  New York congressman Anthony 
Griffin agreed during an address in Hamden, Connecticut:  “Every one concedes that the 
big fellows are doing well, with plenty of money in the bank—the thing now to do is to 




New England Textiles 
 
During the Hamden speech, Congressman Griffin centered much of his critique of 
Republican economics on “the strike in the textile industries of a neighboring State—a 
strike which lasted for 25 weeks and was only settled by the starving workmen at last 
consenting to accept a reduction of 5% in their meager wages.”
1500
  Here Griffin referred 
to the New Bedford textile strike of 1928, a conflict that began on April 16 as a response 
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by both union craftsmen and hastily organized unskilled workers to a 10 percent wage cut 
which had been announced by mill owners on April 9—Easter Monday.  The strike had 
involved more than twenty thousand mill hands and, as noted by Griffin, did not end until 
ragged, exhausted workers voted on October 6 to concede a 5 percent pay cut.
1501
  For 
Smith and his allies, the New Bedford episode exemplified the perils of the Republican 
economic posture:  the administration, in this view, had been too swollen with its own 
sense of accomplishment to address the struggles of certain sectors—in this case, 
textiles—and as a result the working class was forced to absorb the consequences of 
regional misfortune.  Thus, to Griffin and other Smith Democrats in New England, 
bromides on the nation’s flourishing economy were absurd.   
Across New England, the New Bedford crisis and that of textiles generally 
provided Smith’s forces with an ideal rebuttal for Republican warnings about Democratic 
recklessness.  At Lowell, Curley pointed to the bitter irony revealed by the strike: “when 
the country was supposed to be prosperous, there were soup kitchens in New 
Bedford.”
1502
  In the same city, the Smith-boosting Lowell Sun scoffed at the suggestion 
that workers should retain Republican administration in the interest of prosperity.  “We 
are told that the ‘continued prosperity’ of the textile industry in New England demands 
that the republican party be retained in power.  The continuance of present conditions 
would threaten the extinction of what remains of this industry.  The republican party has 
been in control of the government since 1920, and it is safe to say that the textile industry 
never experienced any period of such intense depression as during that time.”
1503
  The 
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next day, the editors continued on this theme:  “The people of Massachusetts, and 
particularly in the textile cities, realize how absurd is the claim that general prosperity 
abounds.  The textile industry during the past five or six years has suffered probably the 
most severe depression in its entire history.”
1504
   
 About twenty miles to the southwest, in the shoemaking hub of Marlborough, 
Massachusetts, Senator Walsh “doubted the glowing stories of the country’s prosperity 
when strike conditions exist” in cities like New Bedford—a theme he reiterated in towns 
across the state.
1505
  General Cole joined Walsh in Ludlow, Massachusetts, just east of 
Chicopee, to review the influence of Republican policies on local workers.  “You people 
here have nothing to thank the Republican party for.  You know how many families have 
had to leave Ludlow in the past few years because there is no work here.  You have a 
tariff already and what good has it done you?  The Republican talk of raising the tariff 
wall to restore the textile industry will not fool the people in Ludlow any more than it 
will fool the people in Lowell, in New Bedford, in Fall River, where the mills have under 
the Republican party written their own tariff schedules.”
1506
  In struggling manufacturing 
communities this rhetoric had resonance:  Two weeks later, Al Smith carried Ludlow 
with 54.9 percent of the vote—the first Democrat to win the town in the twentieth 
century.
1507
   
This responsiveness to Democratic derision of Republican prosperity was not 
limited to small mill towns like Ludlow.  The great Massachusetts textile manufacturing 
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cities of Fall River, Lawrence, Lowell, and New Bedford all voted strongly for Al Smith 
in 1928.  Of these cities, the one with the strongest Democratic tradition since the 
realignment of 1896 was Lawrence, which had twice produced Democratic presidential 
majorities—in 1900 and 1916.  In the latter election Lawrence had the best Democratic 
showing of any of the four cities in this entire period, with just over 57 percent of the 
two-party vote going to Woodrow Wilson; and Lawrence had been joined in the 
Democratic column by Lowell and Fall River, each of which produced their lone pre-
Smith Democratic majority in 1916.  New Bedford never delivered a Democratic 
majority or even plurality in this period, and during the 1920s none of these cities had a 
Democratic presidential percentage above the mid-30s.  Simply:  Most New England 
textile workers were Republican in presidential voting.  In 1928, Smith gained 71.6 
percent in Lawrence, 64.8 percent in Fall River, 64.1 percent in Lowell, and 55.8 percent 
in New Bedford.
1508
  Victories in the traditionally Republican textile centers propelled 
Smith to a statewide victory in Massachusetts, as they did in neighboring Rhode Island, 
where the New Yorker became the first Democrat to win since Woodrow Wilson in 
1912—and the first to gain a majority in the Ocean State since Franklin Pierce.  In both 
Massachusetts and Rhode Island, this new Democratic strength in the textile regions 
would be fortified during the New Deal era.
1509
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Fig. 6.2: Chart demonstrating the precipitous increase in the Democratic vote in major textile cities in 1928. 
 
Of course, the mill workers who voted for Al Smith in droves in 1928 were also 
largely Catholic and heavily immigrant.  In 1926, 72.4 percent of Lawrence, 
Massachusetts, citizens claiming membership in a religious denomination were Roman 
Catholics.
1510
  In other textile centers this figure was even higher: in New Bedford, as 
well as in Cranston, Rhode Island and Pawtucket, Rhode Island, Catholics comprised 
more than 73 percent of the religious population.
1511
  In Lowell, the figure was 79.8 
percent.
1512
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 It is also clear that ethnic voters in these cities were aroused by the cultural 
conflicts of the day, and this likely influenced many people’s presidential vote.  In Fall 
River, there was a strong correlation between a ward’s concentration of first and second 
generation Americans and its support for the Massachusetts referendum calling on the 
state’s United States Senators to vote to repeal the Eighteenth Amendment.
1514
  Fall River 
was 78.4 percent immigrant or child of immigrant and 78.8 percent Roman Catholic; its 
voters favored repeal of prohibition by a healthy 70.7 percent, and also gave 74.7 percent 
of their vote to a separate referendum to lift the state ban on Sunday sports.
1515
  This was 
the archetypical Smith stronghold, and the Democrat carried the city with nearly 65 
percent of the vote.
1516
 
 Yet this is an incomplete profile of the city—and of Smith’s supporters.  Fall 
River was also a textile center, and by 1928 it was in the doldrums of industrial 
depression.  On January 30, 1928, thirty thousand of the city’s mill workers, in thirty of 
the city’s thirty-two mills, acquiesced through their frail union to a 10 percent wage 
reduction.
1517
  This was in the wake of an identical cut in Lawrence, and shortly in 
advance of the 10 percent cut that would precipitate mass strikes less than fifteen miles to 
the east in New Bedford.
1518
   
 The political mobilization of New England’s working class behind Al Smith and 
the Democrats in 1928 can only be understood within the broader context of this decade-
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long decline in textiles.  In Bristol County, Massachusetts, home of both Fall River and 
New Bedford, the 1920s were a disastrous time.  Following sharp declines in cloth prices 
after the close of the Great War, New Bedford’s mills were shuttered for several months 
beginning in late 1920, and in February, 1921, a shrunken work force returned to the 
mills for 20 percent less than they had previously been paid.
1519
  In early 1922, some 
workers in Fall River, which had followed a similar trajectory, were complaining that 
since resuming operations their salaries had been halved.
1520
  By 1927, New Bedford mill 
hands were paid 15 percent less than even their reduced 1921 salaries.
1521
 
 Moreover, things were even worse elsewhere in the region.  As 1922 began, a 
wave of industrial austerity swept irresistibly northward from Connecticut and Rhode 
Island across southeastern New England.  On January 17, 20 percent wage cuts were 
announced for mills in Putnam, Wauregan, and Danielson, Connecticut.
1522
  Two days 
later, seven thousand mill hands in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, as well as in Lonsdale and 
Ashton in the same state, were informed of a 20 percent cut.
1523
  By January 23, about 
eighteen thousand workers were “affected by the new wage conditions” in northeastern 
Connecticut alone.
1524
  On February 2, 1922, textile manufacturers announced a 20 
percent cut for fifty thousand workers in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Maine.
1525
  
That day, the employees of the Lancaster Mills in Clinton, Massachusetts, were informed 
of a cut to take effect in less than two weeks—the two thousand mill operatives affected 
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represented fully 15 percent of the town’s entire population.
1526
  Two days later, 1,500 
mill workers in Easthampton, Massachusetts, were informed of a “general wage 
reduction,” to take effect later in the month on top of the 22.5 percent cut instituted in the 
aftermath of the World War.
1527




 Workers in Lawrence, Fitchburg, Pawtucket, and elsewhere erupted in protest.
1529
  
By Valentine’s Day, there were more than fifty thousand New Englanders out on strike 
against the ubiquitous 20 percent cut—as well as against a parallel campaign by many 
employers to “restore” the fifty-four hour work week.
1530
  The situation in Rhode Island’s 
Blackstone and Pawtuxet valleys was especially volatile.  By February 9, police in 
Cranston had received a “shoot to kill” order in response to rioting by workers and their 
sympathizers.
1531
  On one winter evening, “more than 500 strikers besieged the Pontiac 
mill office of B. B. & R. Knight, Inc., shattered all the windows with brickbats and clubs, 
driving the office help and two police constables out,” while the high sheriff of Kent 
County was compelled to “flee to the attic and take refuge behind bales of cotton while 
the mob ransacked the lower floor.”
1532
   
 In response to this and other riots, Governor San Souci dispatched Troops C and 
D of the Rhode Island National Guard to the area, and mobilized a battery of the guard’s 
103
rd
 Field Artillery—a unit including “artillerymen . . . equipped with machine guns” 
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and possessing four “French 75s.”
1533
  The next morning, as soldiers patrolled the streets 
of mill towns including Pontiac and Natick, a riot in Pawtucket led to police fire that left 
five critically wounded and one dead.
1534
  Throughout the spring the governor continued 
to escalate the military presence in the strike centers.
1535
  Judges contributed their usual 
slew of injunctions against the strikers.
1536
  On April 29, mill owners began evicting 
workers from company housing.
1537
  At one point, two thousand strikers stormed the state 
house in Providence in an effort to compel the legislature to adopt a forty-eight hour 
work week; but the state senate, like the governor and judiciary, rebuffed Rhode Island’s 
floundering labor movement.
1538
  In September, it was agreed that the strike would be 
ended and January pay rates would be restored, along with the fifty-four hour week, 
although “discrimination in re-employing strikers” delayed the reopening of some 
mills.
1539




 The eighteen thousand strikers in Lawrence won a similar victory, returning to the 
mills in early September at their original wages.
1541
  In his Labor Day review for 1922, 
Baltimore Sun columnist John T. Leary, Jr., declared that while “textile unions have had a 
                                                 
1533
 Ibid., p. 1. 
1534
 “Police Fire on Pawtucket Mob,” The Boston Globe, February 22, 1922, pp. 1, 5.   
1535
 “More Troops Go To Strike Zone,” The Boston Globe, June 15, 1922, p. 6. 
1536
 “Serve Subpoenas on Strike Chiefs,” The Boston Globe, May 13, 1922, p. 5; “Court Bars All Strike 
Pickets,” The Boston Globe, June 23, 1922, p. 8; “Injunction Checks Textile Strikers,” The Boston Globe, 
July 9, 1922, p. 2. 
1537
 “Textile Mills Begin Eviction of Strikers,” The New York Times, April 30, 1922, p. 16. 
1538
 “Strikers Storm R I State House,” The Boston Globe, April 14, 1922, p. 13. 
1539
 “Knight Mill Strike Ends,” The New York Times, October 6, 1928, p. 23; DeMoranville, “Ethnic Voting 
in Rhode Island,” p. 58. 
1540
 “Pawtuxet Valley Mill Strikes End,” The Boston Globe, October 6, 1922, p. 5. 
1541
 “Textile Strike Ends in Lawrence,” The Hartford Courant, August 31, 1922, p. 1; “Lawrence Spindles 
Hum,” The New York Times, August 31, 1922, p. 28.  The more radical “One Big Union,” which held out 
against Lawrence’s Pacific mills, eventually capitulated to that mill’s decision to restore the “old wages” 
beginning October 1, rather than retroactive to September 1, as had the other Lawrence manufacturers.  





hard year of it,” ultimately, “offers of old wages at a future period by important mills in 
Lawrence and elsewhere may be taken to show which way the wind is blowing.”
1542
  
Swiftly, these fickle winds shifted. 
 In the May 1924 edition of its monthly bulletin The Index, the New York Trust 
Company described the “difficult and discouraging” condition of the cotton textile 
industry.
1543
  Rising prices for raw cotton, increasing foreign competition, and dropping 
consumer demand had conspired to produce a “disturbing situation,” and as a result, 
“few, if any of the cotton mills are operating at normal capacity . . . and many mills are 
closing down temporarily.”
1544
  While “labor costs” were forecast as “likely to continue 
permanently higher than pre-war costs,” the report proposed “lower operating costs” as 
one potential remedy to these unfortunate circumstances.
1545
  Textile manufacturers 
responded to these conditions with initiatives to help stem those costs—especially the 
cost of labor.  
 By September of 1924, Rhode Island manufacturers were heralding a new round 
of wage cuts.
1546
  In November, the Amoskeag mills in Manchester, New Hampshire, cut 
the wages of fourteen thousand operatives—18.2 percent of the city’s population—by 10 
percent.
1547
  That winter, one after another, the dominoes fell.  A week before Christmas, 
the Massachusetts mills and the Appleton mills in Lowell announced 10 percent wage 
reductions to go into effect by the end of the year.
1548
  On January 3, 1925—after a year 
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of operating at half capacity—Fall River manufacturers announced their own 10 percent 
cut affecting twenty-five thousand.
1549
  Fall River was joined that week by more Rhode 
Island mills.
1550
  United Textile Workers president Thomas F. McMahon did a great deal 
of foot-stomping—lambasting the Fall River and Rhode Island reductions as an “outrage” 
and a “steal”—but the unions acquiesced within four days.
1551
  Neighboring New 
Bedford made the call on January 9.
1552
  Mills in Lawrence and in Willimantic, 
Connecticut soon followed.
1553
  Conditions did not improve that summer:  in Lawrence, 
“part time, or complete shutdowns” became the rule in the woolen mills, and in that 
city—as well as in Andover, Haverhill, and Pittsfield, Massachusetts, Franklin and Goff’s 
Falls, New Hampshire, and Peace Dale, Rhode Island—10 percent wage reductions were 
instituted.
1554
  The 1925 “adjustment” in labor costs was not the last word—in the years 
following this burst of parsimony, wage cuts continued across the region.
1555
    
 Nor did such cuts prove the salvation of New England textiles.  Throughout the 
1920s, mills halted operations for extended periods due to poor business.  Often factories 
were closed altogether.  Some mills were simply liquidated, while many others were 
moved to the South in search of cheaper labor and lax regulations.  A 1925 survey by 
social worker Mary Van Kleeck found a tremendous disparity in the prevailing work 
weeks of Massachusetts and North Carolina:  in the Bay State, 93.2 percent of cotton 
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factories operated with a work week of forty-eight hours or less; in North Carolina, that 
figure was 0.2 percent—and 51.1 percent of the Tar Heel State’s cotton mills were 
operating under a sixty hour week.
1556
  Such conditions were nothing new, and this 
exodus had been ongoing since the late nineteenth century.
1557
  Yet in some cases 
regional wage and regulatory differentials had actually sharpened in the 1920s.  In 1924, 
female weavers in South Carolina cotton mills earned 38.6 percent less per hour than 
their Massachusetts peers, and among frame spinners the gap was 49.8 percent—at the 
close of the World War, the gaps had been a more modest 14.6 percent for weavers and 
22.7 percent for spinners.
1558
  In the face of such disadvantages, the region was 
hemorrhaging manufacturing jobs by mid-decade.
1559
   
 
Next page: Fig. 6.3: Chart showing the decline in cotton textile employment in three leading Massachusetts 
cities during the 1920s.
1560
  Fig 6.4: Average hourly wage rates for female frame spinners and weavers in 
Massachusetts and South Carolina (in dollars), 1890-1928.
1561
  Fig. 6.5: Chart showing growth and decline 
of cotton textile industries in the South, New England, and Massachusetts.
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 In 1928, the Lowell Sun, gazing downstream along the Merrimack to Lawrence, 
lamented that by 1927 the city’s workers had lost “$8,000,000 as compared with the 
amount earned in 1921.”
1563
  Moreover, thousands had been laid off, “these having been 
mainly employed in the woolen, worsted and cotton mills.”
1564
  The next week, the Sun 
turned its gaze inward:  “the total value of cotton goods manufactured here in 1926 fell 
off by 20.6 per cent from the year 1925, while the average number of wage earners 
declined 8.3 per cent. . . .  The value of production of woolen and worsted goods fell . . . 
15.1 per cent from 1925 and although the number of wage earners seemed to remain the 
same, a large proportion of them were on short time schedules or on periodic layoffs.”
1565
  
These numbers had broader social implications for the Spindle City: “The slump in 
Lowell is seen in the total property valuation which fell from $145,910,187 in 1926 to 
$136,678,260 this year, a loss of $9,234,927.”
1566
     
 The story could be found in scores of communities scattered along dozens of 
rivers across New England.  On the eve of Thanksgiving, 1926, the Otis Company 
announced that its stockholders would be voting to move operations from Ware, 
Massachusetts (where they had been located since 1835 and employed almost 20 percent 
of the population) to Lee, Alabama.
1567
  The Otis mills employed around 1,500 in this 
“immaculate town of 8,000, nestling in the Ware valley and surrounded by a fertile 
farming community”; and it was predicted that “should the mills close nearly every 
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family in town will be affected.”
1568
  Along Main Street, shopkeepers “sadly discussed 
the future,” as wistful mill hands talked openly of “going to the almshouse.”
1569
  
Merchants were left with bloated stock as Thanksgiving inventories sat untouched on 
shelves and buyers reneged on orders made prior to the announcement.
1570
  Town leaders 
feared that Ware would share the fate of nearby Thorndike—a community similarly 
dependent on a single mill which had closed earlier in the year, leading the town to 
“suffer disastrously.”
1571
   
 Ware, however, was more fortunate.  In December, the board of the Otis 
Company voted to postpone action, causing the townspeople to “rejoice.”
1572
  An 
anonymous Associated Press reporter captured the prevailing mood:  “Just as to the man 
in the death cell any stay of execution is an augury of good holding out infinite 
possibilities, so to the mill worker,” the delay was “an omen of good that holds out 
hope—none too strong, to be sure—that the town may not be called upon to face a 
readjustment so basic as to gender a feeling almost of despondency.”
1573
  Otis 
stockholders granted Ware clemency the next day, voting to remain “indefinitely” and 
“brighten[ing] the Christmas outlook,” according to Governor Fuller.
1574
  Fuller, a 
Republican, informed Otis that “you may consider us entirely at your service” as the 
company began to articulate the terms of its continued residence in Massachusetts.
1575
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These included “relief from excessive State and town taxation and an amendment to the 
law limiting the hours of daily operations.”
1576
  Stockholders’ Chairman Henry K. Hyde 
denounced “social legislation, particularly the law forbidding women to work after 6 pm, 
even when they so desire.”
1577
  As Massachusetts considered these demands, Ware 
moved to become more hospitable to business.  The following February, the town 
meeting voted to cut over $20,000 from the municipal budget “in an effort to keep the 
Otis Mills here by materially reducing the taxation on property.”
1578
    
 In the mean time, Otis did what it could to maintain profitability:  on Christmas 
Eve, those living in company housing “received notice that an increase in rentals will be 
effective for the future, probably averaging about 25 percent.”
1579
  Two weeks later, a 
“wage readjustment” was declared.
1580
  The price of keeping the mills had been a 
reduction in household incomes and thus of quality of life—but then, netting less was 
better than netting nothing at all.  Through all of this “cooperation,” the mills were 
saved—for now—“with the understanding that should their future operation prove 
unprofitable they would eventually be closed.”
1581
  Spared the fate of Thorndike, the 
people of Ware toiled on at the mills—now for less pay, and always with the sword of 
Damocles dangling overhead.   
 That sword plunged mercilessly into the heart of many a New England 
community.  In 1919, before the textile slump began in earnest, there were 122,499 
people employed in cotton textiles in Massachusetts and 53,869 employed in woolens; by 
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1930, these numbers had plummeted to 73,404 for cotton and 48,401 for wool—
reductions of 40.1 percent and 10.2 percent, respectively.
1582
  This collapse was hardly 
confined to the Bay State.  In Rhode Island the employment rolls went from 31,404 to 
18,427 in cotton and from 24,393 to 20,861 in woolens; in Connecticut, employment 
declined from 15,647 to 10,711 in cotton and from 7,798 to 6,747 in woolens; in New 
Hampshire, from 21,183 to 12,691 in cotton and from 9,772 to 5,265 in woolens.
1583
  
From 1919 to 1930, these four states lost 27.6 percent of their woolen textile jobs, and 
48.2 percent of their cotton textile jobs.  In Massachusetts, these losses during the 1920s 
would have accounted for 3 percent of all employment in the state in 1930.  
 From this macro perspective the considerable economic motivation behind the 
political mobilization of New England workers becomes compelling.  Of course, to the 
workers themselves these were not numbers, but rather a threat to their very survival.  
Even in good times life had been a bitter struggle for the unskilled immigrant laborers 
who ran New England’s mills.  They faithfully continued their tasks out of desperation, 
but also out of a nebulous sense of promise:  there was a vague spirit of progression—
grindingly slow, yes, but improvement nonetheless—that seemed to fuel the aspirations 
of the mill workers despite reality’s daily assaults on hope itself.  That vision of eventual 
progress, along with traditional elements including culture, family life, and religion, 
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sustained these New Englanders against abominable circumstances.
1584
  In the 1920s, 
their culture and their religion were under attack, and this affected the politics of the 
ethnic working class.  Statistically it is obvious that hopes of progression as a reward for 
years and even generations of faithful toil were also under siege.  This too had a profound 
influence on the political outlook of these workers.  The upheaval of the 1920s delivered 
a death blow to the faith many workers had held that, however bad things might be, they 
could get better with hard work—or at the very least, one might expect to maintain the 
status quo.  Now there was regression, and an already tenuous existence began to appear 
unsustainable.
1585
    
 In his study of working-class Woonsocket, historian Gary Gerstle noted that in the 
1920s, “the French-Canadian masses . . . lived their cultural life much as they had always 
done but were consumed with worry about their precarious economic predicament.  The 
source of their economic anxiety was the city’s failing cotton textile industry.”
1586
  To an 
organizer from the 1928 New Bedford textile strike this was obvious:  the trepidation of 
mill employees was “because their living was so closely connected with working. . . .  so 
that there was no something else, you work in the mill and that mill was your life, that’s 
the place you went to, that’s the place you came back from, and there is very little in 
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between because there wasn’t enough income to take care of in between.”
1587
  
Transcending the regional perspective and tracing personal experiences establishes the 
unavoidable primacy of such concerns to many workers’ lives.  Considering those 
experiences within the broader political and economic context of the 1920s clarifies those 




 “At half-past five each morning in the City of the Dinner-Pail the factory bells 
ring out in merry chorus; only the older factories keep up the custom, but they are so 
numerous that the bells are heard from one end of the city to the other.  On many a dark 
winter morning the sound of the bells has awakened me to reflect for a moment on the lot 
of those who ‘get up by night and dress by yellow candle-light’; and I have returned to 
my dreams while already the streets were beginning to be thronged with the army of the 
dinner-pail.”
1588
  So meditated a Fall River businessman in 1909 as he explored the lives 
of the city’s “nearly thirty thousand men and women who earn their daily bread making 
cotton cloth.”
1589
  Joining in these reflections provides context for the political activities 
of mill workers in the twenty years following this rather romantic account.  This specific 
reflection is particularly instructive because it opens before sunrise. 
In many smaller mill towns, the schedules of workers were directed by their 
employers even outside of working hours.  In Pontiac, Rhode Island, bells rang nightly at 
                                                 
1587
 “Interview with Jack Rubenstein, 9/2/80,” New Bedford Textile Workers’ Strike of 1928 Oral History, 
University of Massachusetts—Dartmouth, Dartmouth, Massachusetts (hereafter, “New Bedford Oral 
History”), Box 1, Folder 8, p. 12.  Emphasis in original.   
1588
 Jonathan Thayer Lincoln, The City of the Dinner-Pail (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1909), pp. 10-11. 
1589





nine o’clock to clear the streets, and then rang again at five in the morning to awaken 
workers in preparation for the six o’clock factory opening.
1590
  Thus began the twelve-
hour six-to-six shift at the Pontiac mill Monday through Saturday.
1591
  In Cranston, 
Rhode Island, bleachers at the Cranston Print Works put in an eighty-four hour week in 
1926, working from 7:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. for $38.00 to $40.00 weekly.
1592
  Since these 
bleachers worked long past dinner, wives or mothers prepared their “full dinner pails” 
and sent them to the factory with their children acting as couriers.
1593
  At this particular 
plant, recalled Francis Dailey, one of the bleachers, there was “no lunch hour.  You ate on 
the fly.”
1594
  Meanwhile, Dailey’s sister worked fifty-five hours a week, netting $6.00.
1595
  
However weary mill laborers might grow after long shifts and six-day weeks, they dared 
not take off:  “I remember seeing people take a day off and they were fired . . . because 
they wanted to be off too often,” recalled one Lowell worker.
1596
  These marathon shifts 
affected not only adults but children as well, whose family life was severely restricted.  In 
the face of Lowell’s twelve-hour shifts in the 1910s, a son of one worker would remark 
that the mills “kidnapped your parents.  You never saw them.”
1597
 
 Nor was this the only way in which the factories touched these children’s lives.  
Teens in textile families usually went to work in the mills as soon as it was legal to do 
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so—and in many cases even younger.
1598
  In fact they felt an influence earlier still, for 
their parents’ scant wages meant that even young children needed to help support the 
household.  Before they were legally allowed to work (for most of this period the 
minimum age was fourteen), the children found ways to contribute.  Schoolchildren 
routinely scavenged for wood, boxes, and any other potential sources of fuel for winter 
heating.
1599
  One mill hand’s daughter recalled the simple reason she had taken up selling 
newspapers in the streets of Brockton, Massachusetts, at an early age: “after all I was a 
worker’s kid.”
1600
  To aid his widowed mother, whose meager $9.00 a week “wasn’t 
quite enough to meet all the things she felt we needed,” a New Bedford adolescent took a 
position spraying lacquer on light fixtures in an electrical plant, a job so “terrible” that he 
longed for his fourteenth birthday to arrive so that he could begin at the mills.
1601
   
Indeed, “if you had a large family, everyone went to work.  There was no 
question”—and this meant that there was “no chance” that a child attending school “was 
allowed to continue after 14.”
1602
  Such was the case for Brigida Bristol, who went to 
work at a mill in Peace Dale after finishing the eighth grade in 1922.  The mill “looked 
like a prison to me every time I went by,” she recalled.  “It was the last place I ever 
wanted to go into.  My dream was to be a school teacher.”
1603
  This was not to be, for 
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once Bristol was fourteen, her mother explained that “I need your help,” and so she began 
a career in the sewing department, dutifully contributing “every penny” of her $12.90 
weekly income to the household.
1604
   
When asked later in life why she had gone into the mills at fourteen, Rose 
Fontaine, who worked on doublers in a twisting room in Central Falls earning $6.20 for a 
fifty-four hour week, answered matter-of-factly:  “Because I had to”—her father had 
become too sick to continue working in the mill himself.
1605
  Lillian Melia, also of 
Central Falls, also went to work at fourteen, and was “very happy to get $3.00 a week,” 
because her family’s income was insufficient.
1606
  When Aldea LeDuc went to work at 
the Lafayette mill in Woonsocket in 1921 she was a mere thirteen years old, securing the 
job after her mother had “talked to the boss.”
1607
  Martha Doherty had simply lied to 
secure a position for sixteen-year-olds at Lowell’s Merrimack mills.  When she was 
eventually found out and confronted, she coolly explained that “if I told you I was 
fourteen you wouldn’t hire me and I need the job.”
1608
 
 Valentine Chartrand, the daughter of French-Canadian immigrants, attended 
classes at Immaculate Conception School in Lowell until December of her seventh grade 
year.
1609
  On the occasion of her fourteenth birthday, Chartrand’s father approached her 
to ask if she would mind quitting school.  Tearfully, he confessed that “he needed help”; 
tearfully, the teenage girl agreed.
1610
  Inside of two weeks, she had a job at the woolen 
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mills in North Chelmsford.
1611
  Chartrand had ambitions to finish high school, and the 
nuns at Immaculate Conception were disappointed that she had to go, noting her strong 
academic performance.
1612
  Yet with a pithy resignation that reflected a precocious 
awareness of her new place in the world, Valentine Chartrand explained to her teachers: 
“Well my father needs the extra money and I have to leave.”
1613
  She would continue to 
work in the mills for the next fifty-four years.
1614
 
 Because of Progressive Era restrictions on children’s work hours, New England’s 
most youthful mill hands were often limited to forty hour weeks until sixteen, and then to 
nine hour shifts on weekdays plus some morning work on Saturday, adding up to a robust 
forty-eight hour week.  In Lowell, teens worked from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. with an hour 
for dinner and some work on Saturday mornings—reaching the forty-eight hour 
ceiling.
1615
  Similar schedules could be found in New Bedford and in Peace Dale, where 
fourteen-year-olds worked from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. plus a half day on Saturday.
1616
   
 The specifics varied, but the recurring theme in textiles during the 1910s and 
1920s was labor less appropriately described as work than as a daily test of human 
endurance.  During these long hours, mill workers were expected to toil without 
interruption or distraction.  In many plants, sitting was forbidden, and most had no chairs 
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or stools—thus forcing employees to stand for the entire shift.
1617
  One Lowell worker 
even recalled being admonished for whistling on the job.
1618
 
It was an unpleasant atmosphere, lacking even the most rudimentary comforts.  
Drinking water was often “ladled out of a pale.”
1619
  In many mills, water was provided in 
an unsanitary barrel which was shared by all of the hands.
1620
  In the summer, workers 
were given ice to cool the water they drew from the barrel—at a 25¢ charge.
1621
  The 
plants often lacked sanitary facilities.  In 1926, the Cranston Print Works still had no 
toilets—although, as one employee recalled, “the stream wasn’t too far away.”
1622
  At the 
same operation, there was “a dirty old sink in the washroom and they provided the 
industrial soap they used on washing the cloth.”
1623
 
 The carding room—where laps of mixed cotton fibers still containing debris were 
cleaned, combed, and straightened in preparation for spinning—featured particularly 
disagreeable conditions.
1624
  As a nine-year-old boy, Joseph Figuerido would walk from 
school to visit his mother, an immigrant from the Azores, at her New Bedford mill during 
lunch.  “I used to get very upset . . . .  she would be sitting on a box of bobbins, cotton all 
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over her eyebrows and around her ears,” adhered to her face with sweat.
1625
  Even “when 
the machinery was shut down there was still cotton in the air.”
1626
  Throughout the mills 
but particularly in the card room, “workers used to breathe a lot of cotton dust,” and “a 
lot of workers in those days . . . got tubercular effects.”
1627
  Especially in the winter, 
workers breathed a great deal of the lint that was constantly “flying around” the work 
area since the windows of the plant were all closed with the cold.
1628
  “I always had a 
feeling that wasn’t good for your lungs,” recalled a doffer from Lowell.
1629
  The swirling 
cotton dust managed to contribute to insults as well as injury—a derogatory moniker was 
assigned to the lower-tier employees in the weaving rooms, who were constantly covered 
in cotton from sweeping up after the machinery: “mill rats.”
1630
 
 The machinery itself could be quite dangerous.  Lena O’Brien, who began 
working at the Little Scholl mill in Tiverton, Rhode Island, after turning fourteen in 1918, 
had once caught her dress in the spinning machinery, and was spared catastrophe only by 
a quick-thinking coworker cutting her free.
1631
  O’Brien was less fortunate on another 
occasion, when her hair was caught in the machinery “and it yanked my hair right 
off!”
1632
  More than five decades later she still had a bald spot from the incident, 
concealed only by a helpful hair dresser.
1633
  Such accidents were an occasional 
spectacle.  At a Lowell mill, horrified employees witnessed a “girl . . . with long, long 
hair” become “caught in the pulley and she went up with the strap”; coworkers “heard the 
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screech” of the woman as the machinery “pulled a lot of hair out”—a sound which would 
haunt witnesses for life.  The victim soon died.
1634
  Blanche Graham, whose mother was 
also scalped in a Lowell mill when her long hair became caught in a belt, suffered 




In general, the work was arduous and dangerous.
1636
  Historian Mary Blewett 
notes that bleachers and dyers in the mills “performed some of the worst kinds of work 
near scalding steam, dangerous chemicals, and indelible dyes.”
1637
  Many other positions 
included a great deal of heavy lifting.  In her mid-teens, Martha Doherty “got a ruptured 
appendix from lifting” large bobbins in a Lowell spinning room.  “I was out about two 
months and almost died.”
1638
  Joseph Figuerido recalled that his father had also suffered 
internal injuries from working conditions.  A boiler attendant in New Bedford’s 
Hathaway mill, Thomas Figuerido, a native of Portugal, died of a bladder condition that 
“was actually job related” when his son was only four years old.
1639
  The reality was that 
“in those days there was little concern on the part of mill owners of any safety conditions. 
. . . in terms of safety everything was geared to satisfy production.”
1640
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When Doherty’s appendix burst, the mill beneficently paid for her surgery.  This 
was an act of charity, for there was no compensation coverage for such occurrences.
1641
  
Certainly there was nothing resembling a “safety net” for these workers, despite the 
dangerous nature of their jobs.  One mill hand from Rhode Island recalled that “if a fella 
lost a finger in a mill or was taken ill, he’d never get anything.  There was no workmen’s 
compensation.”
1642
  Most cities had some sort of municipal charity by the 1920s, but 
there was “no such animal” as social welfare in the mill villages; instead, “each town had 
a poor farm.”
1643
  These institutions were each run by “a political appointee who had the 
opportunity to run the poor farm as a money-making proposition and it was just 
pitiful.”
1644
  Likewise, there was “no retirement.  There was nothing.  If he worked 50 
years, they’d give him a gold watch and they cost $7-8 in those days.  But there was 
nothing.  If a fella quit work, that was it.  It was a pitiful situation.”
1645
  And while 
progressive initiatives such as child labor laws and income tax reforms “helped a bit . . . . 
so far as helping a disabled workman who worked in the plant, no matter how many 
years, they never did a thing for him.”
1646
  “If you were sick, there was no pay unless you 




 All of this took an exceptional toll on the women.  A male worker from New 
Bedford observed:  “These women workers many of them had families and they needed 
to work, they needed the income . . . to help their husbands support the family.  And it 
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was a real, very difficult life to run.”
1648
  “Remember that these same women were 
raising families . . . when they used to leave their mills to go home, you would look at 
their faces and they were the faces of people that were worn out.  You could see it, and 
many of them had large families and they had to take care of their children, take care of 
their family life and they did most of the domestics you know . . . and they thought of 
themselves last.”
1649
  Valentine Chartrand continued working at the mills during each of 
her five pregnancies.  Only two of her babies survived birth.
1650
  “I worked until I was 
ready to go,” she recalled, noting that many women did the same.
1651
  “I was in the Boott 
Mill and they had to take me to First Aid and they called the ambulance.  I thought I was 
going to have her in the ambulance.”
1652
 
 There was rarely respite for these workers, and when rest did come, it did not take 
place in anything resembling comfortable—even healthful—conditions.  Even with the 
entire household contributing, life for the mill families was “very meager.”
1653
  Houses, 




 This was often company housing, and so the mills permeated the lives of workers 
further still.  By the 1920s, mill hands in larger centers like New Bedford and Fall River 
typically attained housing from independent landlords, but in many of the smaller towns 
and villages workers still rented from their employers.
1655
  In Pontiac, company housing 
cost 50¢ weekly rent for small homes that housed up to four families.  They featured “a 
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kitchen and the pantry and the bedrooms,” with “four families and one entrance.”
1656
  
Cranston village consisted of about 75 duplexes for around 150 families, each of which 
paid $5.00 monthly rent for a home with “no indoor plumbing,” and “no central heating 
system.”
1657
  Workers were compelled to go outside to pump their water in Cranston, and 
things were the same in Pontiac, where “if you wanted water, you had to go to the village 
pump in the center of the town, and bring a galvanized bucket along.”
1658
   
 These homes, heated only by the kitchen stove, were especially susceptible to 
harsh New England winters.  Put bluntly, residents “froze sometimes in the cold, going to 
bed.”
1659
  “You wake up in the morning and you could draw pictures on the frost on the 
windows.”
1660
  Preparing for the long day at the mill was more complicated under such 
conditions, for “in the winter, without having central heat, the first thing you would have 
to do before you could wash your face was to break the ice in the bucket.”
1661
   
 Water and warmth were not the only basics that were usually lacking.  In a bitter 
irony, these textile workers often went without the most elementary of their own 
products.  For some unskilled New Bedford workers, towels proved a luxury, and these 
scarce items were treated with the utmost care in order to maximize their lifespan.
1662
  
Similarly, “sheeting was a commodity,” and thus families made their own—usually not 
large enough to provide full coverage or comfort.
1663
  
 Strenuous, often noxious working conditions and an impoverished home life left 
workers prone to disease.  “You’d have epidemics of scarlet fever, stuff like that.  You’d 
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take up the red card on your door and your father wouldn’t come home.  He’d sleep 
somewhere else so he could continue to go back and forth to his job.  Because if he come 
into the house, he couldn’t go to work.”
1664
  During the Great War, Lowell was struck by 
a wave of typhoid fever.
1665
  In New Bedford, rates of “children’s deaths from gastric, 
respiratory and intestinal diseases” ranked “among the highest in the country.”
1666
  In the 
1910s in Lawrence, a third of mill hands died within their first decade on the job, and the 
average worker lived to thirty-nine—nineteen years less than the typical mill boss.
1667
 
 Considering the oppressive circumstances in which they lived, these New 
Englanders were remarkably resilient.  Often workers considered themselves fortunate to 
have what so many described as “good jobs.”
1668
  “Good” is of course a relative term; but 
it is clear that most of these mill hands were doing what was necessary to survive, 
embracing whatever small felicities they encountered along the way.  One Lowell woman 
concluded that textile employment “was very difficult work, but . . . one didn’t have a lot 
of choices available to them.  And you made the best of what you could.”
1669
  
Burdensome and hazardous though it was, mill work at least provided the means of self-
preservation, and this source of security was something worthy of thanksgiving.  This 
was a perfectly natural and reasonable posture to assume in such a precarious world, and 
this attitude helped maintain a level of dignity and a vague glimmer of hope.  In the 
1920s, struggling mills began increasing the burden on labor, cutting pay, raising rents, 
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and issuing layoffs.  In the process they sapped their workers’ ability to provide 
themselves with a sense of dignity and robbed their employees of the lingering hope that 
life would someday brighten through faithful service in the mills.    
 Anton Huettel, an immigrant from Russian Poland who went to work at the Ever-
Lastic factory in Pawtucket in 1918 at fourteen years old, recalled that being a weaver “to 
begin with . . . wasn’t so bad.”  But “as the years went on, they wanted more 
production—they’d speed up the machinery to the limit without giving you an increase in 
pay.”
1670
  Speed-ups and reductions in the number of workers, instituted in earnest during 
the 1920s, chafed the mill workers.  Many believed that “the mill owners were making a 
lot of money but they were obviously never satisfied . . . .  They always wanted to make 
more, and the way they could do that is by taking it off the hides of workers by increasing 
their production with less workers.”
1671
  In real terms, this meant “giving the workers 
more machines to operate, more looms for the weavers or more spinning frames for the 
spinners and so on down the line.”
1672
  Victor Signorelli, who worked at a mill in Peace 
Dale, concluded that management “wanted new machinery so they could . . . cut down 
the help.  It was 200 laborers in there, just the weave shop.  All they run is one loom.”  
But with increased automation came efficiency, and what this meant from Signorelli’s 
perspective was more work for less workers.  “There would be three weavers, instead 
they only had one.  They put two people out of work.  They was always figuring how to 
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throw people out of a job.”
1673
  By 1928 in Peace Dale, each worker operated six 
looms.
1674
    
 In the mid-1920s Theophile Brien observed similar changes at the Weybosset 
mills in Rhode Island where he worked as a twister, like his father before him.  His plant 
had once run 1,200 looms, with 50 workers per shift.  Then management introduced “a 
bobbin-combing knotting machine from Framingham.  It would take 8 hrs., the machine 
would tie them in 15 min.  So what they did with us was take the youngest ones and 
learned them that and [threw] the other ones out of work. . . .  They bought 2 knotting 
machines and they were using 2 men on each shift to replace 40 men.”  Management was 
not satisfied with even this massive reduction in labor costs because foremen began to 
notice that many of the remaining workers, eager to preserve their tenuous employment, 
were running more looms than they had been assigned.  “When the foremen seen that 
they said these guys can run 4 looms, so we’ll give them 4 looms. . . .  for the same price 
as 3 looms.”
1675
    
 Mill workers had endured a great deal, often maintaining a surprisingly cheerful 
disposition in the face of grueling hours, paupers’ wages, and deplorable conditions at the 
plants and in their homes.  In the 1920s, mill owners began seeking to economize by 
slashing wages and cutting payrolls, effectively robbing workers of their only motivation 
for industrial cooperation—the vague hope that hard work would pay off.  As confidence 
waned, resentment built:  “the workers were angry about this.”
1676
  Yet the actions of 
owners only occasionally provoked rebellion, for while the workers were frustrated, “at 
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the same time they were kind of influenced in terms of job security.”
1677
  Indeed, even 
when conflicts did flare, they were often about security.  Looking back on the 1920s, one 
Rhode Island worker agreed with the premise that “the people went out on strike not 
because they were trying to make one man work three looms, but because people were 
losing their jobs”; in this view, the purpose of the labor activism of the 1920s was the 
modest goal of preventing the company from arbitrarily throwing people out of work.
1678
  
Wage cuts exercised a similarly devastating influence on workers whose original wages 
had scarcely been adequate—these too threatened the security of the workers, and caused 
further labor turmoil.
1679
  “They were treading water,” recalled one New Bedford worker, 
“and no one could see how they could make ‘ends meet’ with a 10% cut.”
1680
  All of 
these actions, especially the wage cuts, precipitated a series of strikes; but they also led to 
a dramatic shift in the political sensibilities of many workers.   
The final ingredient that was necessary for such a political shift to occur was a 
candidate who understood both the social and economic needs of the ethnic working 
class.  This of course had been the precise formula of Alfred E. Smith’s political success 
in New York State.  Smith was the first major national candidate to embody the cultural 
aspirations of ethnic workers.  His denunciations of religious and ethnic prejudice, his 
opposition to prohibition—his very biography—all seemed to affirm ethnic workers’ 
vision of their place in America.  Simultaneously, the economic dimensions of that 
vision—increased security, livable conditions, and dignified, rewarding labor—were 
addressed in Smith’s acknowledgment of the weaknesses of the 1920s economy and the 
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progressive agenda he proposed in response.  The fervent, frenzied reception which New 
England granted the Happy Warrior in 1928 resulted largely from the arrival of a 
candidate who espoused ethnic workers’ vision of a just society.   
 The alternating despondency and outrage provoked by wage cuts, speed-ups, and 
layoffs, the desire for a holistic solution to the economic and social grievances of ethnic 
workers, and the attraction to Smith’s unique progressivism could all be seen in New 
Bedford—a major textile center that voted for a Democratic presidential nominee for the 
first time in 1928.  There, the strikes against the 10 percent wage cut that raged through 
most of 1928 and ended in October were followed within a month by a victory for Al 
Smith.  The complicated demarcations within the city—by ethnicity, class, and craft—
and the ultimate political conclusions to which these conditions led demonstrate the 
importance of the accumulated social and labor grievances of New England’s ethnic 
workers to political outcomes in 1928 and beyond.    
As in many New England mill cities, the mounting woes of New Bedford textiles 
led in 1928 to wage cuts that in turn precipitated mass strikes.  A central feature of this 
ordeal was the existence of dual organizations among the workers: the Textile Council, a 
well-established craft union, and the Textile Mill Committees (TMC), the first real effort 
to organize New Bedford’s unskilled immigrant workers.
1681
  The former group was 
affiliated with the United Textile Workers and through that organization the American 
Federation of Labor, while the latter was directed by Communist veterans of such 
episodes as the Passaic textile strike of 1926.
1682
   
 
                                                 
1681
 See McMullen, Strike!, pp. 120-131. 
1682












The Textile Council was focused narrowly on averting the wage cut—indeed, 
earlier in the decade they had acceded to speed-ups in order to maintain their salaries.
1684
  
The TMC had a more ambitious agenda, owing both to its Bolshevik heritage and its 
constituency among New Bedford’s unskilled Polish-, French-, and especially 
Portuguese-American workers:  they called for a forty hour week, an end to child labor, a 
reversal of speed-ups, equal pay for women, and a 20 percent pay raise.
1685
  Their 
radicalism and aggressive tactics—such as using children on the picket lines—drew the 
ire of institutional forces in the city who were also opposed to the wage cut, including the 
Textile Council, Democratic mayor Charles Ashley, and the city’s three daily 
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  But when the Textile Council began denouncing the TMC as “reds,” few 
were swayed—partly because the unskilled strikers were mainly immigrants, who often 
spoke little English and were impervious to appeals to “Americanism”; but more 
significantly because the craft union lacked credibility among the disciples of the 
TMC.
1687
  A Portuguese worker captured this antagonism as he catalogued his cohorts’ 
accrued grievances in the opening weeks of the strike:  
One south end mill with 144 twisters had from 16 to 20 tying-in men.  The same 
mill now with 168 twisters has but six to eight tying-in men with no wage 
increase. . . .  Same mill same department—two doffers and piecer for eighteen 
frames.  Now the same three men doff from 50 to 60 frames.  Check boy in this 
department at one time earned $19.30 is down to $16.05 and they say they are the 
last to cut down wages.  Ten per cent of $16.05 is how much?  Same department, 
same mill had 10 to 12 rail washers; now they have five to six.  Is this higher 
production cost?  This department is 100 per cent union.  Is the secretary of this 




 Part of the matter with the union was that for years it had been conspiring with 
management to buttress the pay of organized craftsmen by cutting the salaries of 
unskilled workers.
1689
  Moreover, divides between skilled and unskilled employees were 
notoriously collinear with divides between national groups; and so the recent immigrant 
laborers were also the workers operating under the worst conditions with the least 
security and the lowest wages.  In New Bedford, “it was clear that there was a 
discriminatory policy in effect in terms of hiring and in terms of promotions and so that 
you would find that among the skilled workers the predominant group would be among 
                                                 
1686
 “Mayor Terms Child Picketing Contemptible Refuses His Aid,” The New Bedford Evening Standard, 
May 5, 1928; “Mayor Raps at Radicals for Child Pickets,” The New Bedford Times, May 5, 1928, in 
“Charles F. Ashley Mayor of New Bedford from 1891-1936 Scrapbook of Newspaper Clippings,” 
University of Massachusetts—Dartmouth, Dartmouth, Massachusetts (hereafter, Ashley Scrapbook), Reel 
1; Georgianna, The Strike of ’28, p. 85.  
1687
 Georgianna, The Strike of ’28, p. 89. 
1688
 Alfred L. Botelho, “Letter to the Editor,” The New Bedford Evening Standard, April 21, 1928, Ashley 
Scrapbook, Reel 1. 
1689







  French Canadians, Poles, and Portuguese were left to the lesser 
positions, while Cape Verdeans, the only major “black” immigrant group in New 
England textiles, were “relegated finally to the card room which was the dirtiest, 
unhealthiest department.”
1691
   
As a result of this cliquishness, Portuguese workers constituted “the backbone” of 
the TMC.
1692
  For Jack Rubenstein, one of the radical organizers, this was unsurprising.  
“You didn’t have to go very far to tell these people that they were down-trodden, when 
kids made thirteen cents an hour and they got a ten percent cut and had three cents an 
hour taken out of their pay.”
1693
   
The prospect of checking declines in labor conditions and pay at all skill levels 
and asserting their own social worth fueled the unskilled workers’ enthusiasm for the 
TMC.  These workers, who sang Portuguese folk songs and anthems with “no strike 
ideology whatsoever” on the picket lines, were not as interested in the TMC’s world view 
as they were in its willingness to mobilize the unorganized and treat them with a level of 
respect that their skilled coworkers had always withheld.
1694
  Thus did the Textile 
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Council’s anti-Communist screeds fall on indifferent ears; as economist Daniel 
Georgianna has noted, many workers “knew the difference between a labor strike for 
higher wages and a political revolution to overthrow the government. . . .  For them, the 
TMC was fighting for higher wages and equality with other workers, principles easily 
identified with American democracy.”
1695
 
The TMC treated Polish and Portuguese workers, who “knew that they [were] 
really getting the raw deal in terms of equal opportunity,” with dignity, and pursued a 
platform that essentially sought to provide workers with the security that events in the 
1920s had removed.
1696
  Yet this did not lead to a surge in ethnic support for radical 
politics.  Socialist Party presidential nominee Norman Thomas donated $500 to aid the 
strikers and addressed a rally of three thousand unionists in New Bedford during the 
conflict.
1697
  In November, this support earned Thomas 510 New Bedford votes—just 
under 1.6 percent of the city’s presidential ballots.
1698
  Notably, Thomas had been closely 
associated with craft leaders like William Batty, and delivered his pro-worker oration 
under the auspices of the Textile Council.
1699
  By the later months of the strike, fights 
were breaking out on the picket lines between Textile Council and TMC members, and so 
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Communist candidates, whose partisan and ideological leanings were more 
closely aligned with those of the TMC, fared even worse.  Workers Party presidential 
nominee William Z. Foster carried 0.4 percent of the New Bedford vote, while Socialist 
Labor Party nominee Verne L. Reynolds achieved 0.07 percent.
1701
  None of these figures 
represented a substantial increase from the previous presidential election.
1702
  These 
results partially confirmed the observations of Communist organizers like Jack 
Rubenstein, who saw TMC success as a testament to the group’s frank embrace of 
workers’ basic economic needs rather than a portent of revolution.  They also confirm the 
reflections of one Portuguese mill hand, who lamented the Communists’ hostility toward 
workers’ cultural and especially religious traditions.  “This was one of their main 
issues—the religious question.  That isolated them.  It made them ineffective because 
most of them saw religion as the opiate of the people and we did not share that concept at 
all.”
1703
   
Successful political mobilization of New England’s ethnic workers could ignore 
neither their cultural nor their economic desires.  There was indeed an appetite for 
change, and there existed among these laborers the sheer numbers to fuel a dramatic 
political realignment.  But such an upheaval would require sensitivity to the complex 
realities of those workers and would have to approach problems in terms acceptable to 
the workers themselves.  The only revolution that was possible was a holistic revolution. 
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Republicans were at a disadvantage on both economics and culture.  In New 
England, they attempted to neutralize the latter challenge by openly rejecting Klan 
attacks on Smith, by denouncing the notion of a “religious test” for political office, and 
by downplaying prohibition.  On economics, Republicans were cursed with incumbency 
in a region suffering industrial decline.  They sought to check this by appealing to their 
traditional strength with New England workers—proposing to amplify customary 
prescriptions like protective tariffs and limits on business regulation.  For many workers 
these were familiar, even comfortable remedies, but their plunging economic fortunes 
now complicated once-reliable solutions. 
For their part, the Democrats ardently embraced the cultural aspirations of the 
majority of ethnic workers—fiercely condemning prohibition and demanding that 
Smith’s election would strike a blow for religious tolerance.  Smith himself provided both 
rhetorical and symbolic material for this narrative.  The Democrats attempted to leverage 
regional economic discontent by insistently linking industrial woes to Republican 
stewardship.  Ironically, these challengers also sought to negate traditional Republican 
strength with industrial workers by adopting a friendlier posture toward protectionism.   
 All of this shuffling did not minimize important differences between the remedies 
proffered by the two major parties.  For New England businessmen and many Republican 
politicians, the solution was reductions in taxation and regulation.  “The return of New 
England’s manufacturing resources to a position of parity with those of the South,” 







  Officials were admonished that “New England has within 
itself the power to reestablish conditions of parity with the newer sections of the cotton 
manufacturing industry,” through the “reestablishment of equal competitive opportunities 
with the South with respect to labor legislation.”
1705
  Massachusetts officials had 
themselves noted this as early as 1923, when Republican governor Channing Cox’s 
commissioner of labor and industries, General E. Leroy Sweetser, had pointed to a 
number of industrial disadvantages suffered by the Bay State—among them high wages, 
the forty-eight hour week, and, “worst” of all according to the commissioner, the 
prohibition against women’s night work.
1706
   
 While regulatory repeal had yet to gain traction, the business-government 
cooperation proposed by Governor Fuller and other Republicans would certainly mean 
cuts in state and local taxes.  This approach was of course shared by the national party, 
which consistently decried governmental burdens on business and extolled tax cuts.  At 
the state and municipal level, tax cuts meant budget cuts, and these were already well 
under way by 1928—with tangible results.  In Ware, the $20,000 budget reduction in 
February 1926 came mostly from the town’s Highways Department, which was forced to 
reduce the snow removal allotment by more than half.
1707
  In early 1928 in New Bedford, 
as wage reductions struck nearby Fall River, aldermen debated a 10 percent tax cut—and 
accompanying layoffs of municipal employees—in order to avert similar adjustments to 
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pay scales in the city’s mills.
1708
  The layoffs were rejected, but the budget was slashed 
by $162,000, with the “bulk of reductions” coming at the “expense of children” as “no 
new teachers” would be hired that fall.
1709
   After the mills decided to reduce wages 
anyway, the city health board, also struggling at “living within the amount given us by 
the City council,” decided to “concentrate our resources on the work that is required by 
law,” and thus terminated its program of dental clinics for school children.
1710
    
 Moreover, in order to keep factories in New England, some Republicans were 
now considering rolling back labor protections.  Cooperation with business would mean 
acceding to corporate demands for reversals in Progressive Era industrial laws.  
Announcing their 10 percent wage cut for New Bedford mill workers, textile 
manufacturers made a representative statement, complaining that “New Bedford 
manufacturers, paying the old wage scale, limited to a 48-hour week and restricted as to 
night work, must be doing business under a serious handicap.”
1711
  The message was 
clear:  state and local politicians must seriously reconsider labor regulations if they 
desired to hold on to the mills. 
Frank P. Walsh, the leader of the Smith Progressive League who had served under 
Woodrow Wilson as chairman of the United States Commission on Industrial Relations, 
connected these demands to Hoover himself during a fiery address at Weavers’ Hall in 
Fall River on October 18, censuring the Republican nominee as “the open-shopper of 
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  Textile workers ought to support Smith, Walsh demanded, because 
of the New Yorker’s endorsement of public power projects and his record of reforms in 
New York State; but also because Hoover opposed eight-hour laws and had called instead 
for “cooperation” between management, labor, and the state.
1713
  For New England 
workers, “cooperation” meant surrendering to wage readjustments or rolling back 
industrial reforms in order to assuage business interests. 
Smith Democrats never entertained that option, instead suggesting that industrial 
conditions were worsening precisely because business interests dominated the 
Republican Party and were manipulating the regional response to the downturn.  In 
Medway, General Cole charged that “prominent Republicans who are raising funds and 
urging the election of Hoover . . . had signed reports of a national cotton manufacturers’ 
association asking that Massachusetts mills be removed to Texas or other Southern States 
because of lower wages and longer working hours for men, women, and children.”
1714
  A 
week later he asserted that “‘the big business’ interests prefer to obtain the larger 
dividends paid by mills in States where the protection afforded employes is less 
rigorous.”
1715
  These politicians—and most of the mill workers whose votes they 
sought—insisted that the mills were profitable, but their owners were either insatiable or 
incompetent:  Gilded Age labor conditions in the South were an attractive alternative for 
avaricious Massachusetts industrialists who had grown weary of cumbersome details like 
wages and hours regulations or unionized employees; while failing mills were victims of 
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inept businessmen who mulishly retained outdated marketing practices or foolishly 
expanded beyond their means.
1716
  
 Like most of his New England allies, Al Smith was in many ways vague on 
solutions, focusing instead on criticizing the shortcomings of Republican administration.  
While there is within such a critique an implicit agenda of policy reversal, this was not in 
fact the Democrat’s most important contribution to the debate.  Rather, what mattered 
most about Smith was his record as governor of New York, and his promise to bring to 
Washington the agenda and approach he had so long employed at Albany.  At times the 
connections were obvious, as between the Muscle Shoals controversy and the ongoing 
debates over resource conservation and power development in New York.  What was 
most pertinent in New England (aside from Smith’s pledge to protect industry and to 
rework tax and tariff policies to end what Democrats saw as inequitable distribution of 
national prosperity) was the governor’s record regarding social welfare and labor 
legislation.   
 Al Smith’s progressive supporters insisted that his election would “make social 
justice a national issue.”
1717
  A group of prominent social workers, including Lillian 
Wald, Mary Van Kleeck, Mary Simkhovitch, and Harry Hopkins, judged Smith “unique 
among our statesmen for his contribution to social progress.”
1718
  Since they believed that 
“all the problems of the nation have their roots in the needs of the people and . . . can best 
be solved by one who has not only faith in social progress but skill in bringing the 
resources of government to bear upon it,” these progressives enthusiastically promoted 
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the ambitions of Al Smith, who would nationalize the transitional progressive policies 
and administrative tactics he had established in New York State.
1719
     
 This language was employed nationally, and New England was no exception.  
Indeed, while business interests were demanding that states roll back their social welfare 
programs and labor regulations, Smith Democrats were boasting of the New Yorker’s 
activist record in the Empire State and suggesting that this would be a central facet of his 
national agenda.
1720
  At Quincy, during a speech skewering Republican leaders for their 
handling of the textile crisis, Senator Walsh explained that “more than all else [Smith] 
has a heartfelt realization of the problem of the common man . . . .  He has shown this in 
the great program of social welfare legislation which he put into effect in the State of 
New York.”
1721
  Other New Englanders more explicitly used Smith’s achievements to 
challenge the wisdom of retrenchment.  A Connecticut Democrat suggested in 
Southington that her state should not celebrate its record of fiscal prudence since Smith’s 
more aggressive spending had yielded manifold benefits to the people of New York.
1722
  
Massachusetts state senator John W. McCormack, running for Congress in the twelfth 
district, summarized this understanding of Smith’s credentials on the eve of the election:  
“The people realize that he typifies the progressive leadership America needs and 
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demands, and they appreciate the straightforward manner in which he has stated to the 
American people his position on the great issues of the day.”
1723
   
 Republicans also recognized that Smith sought to pursue his progressive 
gubernatorial policies at the federal level, criticizing both the record and its national 
implications.  Of course there were the famous denunciations of Smith’s proposals as 
“state socialism”—articulated by everyone from Herbert Hoover, who made the attack at 
Madison Square Garden, to Congressman Fort, who told a Boston audience that Smith 
was committed to “the broadest policy of Government in business ever proposed to the 
people of any Nation except Russia.”
1724
  Supplementing such castigation were critiques 
of Smith’s liberal spending as governor.  Massachusetts state representative Henry 
Shattuck warned a Boston rally of Smith’s “extravagant” spending in the Empire 
State.
1725
  The Hartford Courant ridiculed Democratic rebukes of President Coolidge’s 
spending policies, given their nominee’s prodigality at Albany.
1726
  In a radio address 
comparing Smith’s New York record to his own sober stewardship of Connecticut, 
Governor Trumbull claimed that the interest payments on New York’s bonded debt 
“would run every department and institution of Connecticut for three quarters of a 
year.”
1727
  From Torrington, a Connecticut writer questioned whether voters were 
“willing to have [their] taxes increased over 100 percent” as a result of  “Governor 
Smith’s free and easy spending,” admonishing readers to “remember that they are the 
ones who must pay for extravagance.”
1728
  Given the Democrat’s propensity for lavish 
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state programs, Connecticut senator Hiram Bingham suggested that the “Happy Warrior” 
might more accurately be called “the Happy Spender.”
1729
 
 Smith’s social welfare policies and his support for expansive labor protections 
bolstered his cause in struggling industrial cities like New Bedford, where economic 
insecurity and reductions in welfare services were rampant.  They also held a clear 
resonance in depressed New England mill towns, where families living in pre-modern 
shacks raised children to begin working forty-eight hour weeks at age fourteen while 
overburdened parents toiled without interruption until they were laid off, maimed, or 
became too old or sick to work and were sent off to the dreaded “poor farm.”  Much like 
New Bedford, Fall River, Lawrence, and Lowell, Massachusetts mill towns like Clinton, 
Easthampton, Ludlow, Palmer, and Ware delivered unprecedented Democratic 
presidential majorities.  Palmer, Massachusetts, which contained the struggling textile 
village of Thorndike, voted Democratic for the first time in the twentieth century, while 
in Easthampton, Smith’s 53.6 percent made him the first Democrat to avoid losing the 
city by at least 25 points since Grover Cleveland. 
 There were sections of New England that were not enduring especially poor 
economic conditions in 1928 and still voted for Al Smith.  The most important example 
of this is Chicopee, the city that showed the largest Democratic increase of any in 
Massachusetts.  J. Joseph Huthmacher noted this as an exception to his proposition that 
depressed areas voted for Smith: “contrary to the trend . . . employment and payroll 
figures indicated an actual improvement in the economic situation compared with 1926 
and 1927.”
1730
  Huthmacher found that defections from the GOP among the city’s sizable 
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French-Canadian and Polish populations and increased registration among those groups 
were the driving factors in this shift, concluding that “the matter of ‘recognition’ involved 
in Smith’s candidacy, with all the resentments and aspirations implied in that term, 
sufficed in itself to cause a political revolution among those elements, even though 
unabetted by acute economic distress.”
1731
    
 All of this is true.  But immediate losses or gains in employment and payroll are 
only part of what defined the economic outlook of New Englanders.  It is clear that mill 
workers did not suddenly perceive economic distress in 1928 and therefore precipitously 
mobilize as Democrats; rather years, decades, and sometimes even generations of 
accumulated degradation left these populations poised for activation by the right political 
leader.  Poverty and prosperity are not short-term conditions.  Nor are they purely 
quantitative.  Small, recent improvements in household incomes were insufficient to 
provide a sense of security to workers who had long suffered physically and socially from 
their economic position and lived within a regional context of industrial instability. 
 Chicopee in fact provides an outstanding example of all of this.  Huthmacher 
accurately noted the slight increases in employment and in wages in Chicopee in 1928 
over 1927 and 1926.  But the capital invested in the city, the value of materials consumed 
by the factories, and the value of the city’s products all declined from 1926 to 1928, with 
the latter year showing only minor improvements over 1927.
1732
  The number of 
manufacturing establishments had slipped from a high of fifty-seven in 1923 to forty-
eight in 1926, settling at fifty in 1928—a figure nearer pre-war numbers than those of the 
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  The zenith of Chicopee industry had come in 1926, and by 1928 the city 
had already embarked on a slow decline.
1734
  Indeed, Chicopee lost a number of 
important manufacturers during this period: the Stevens-Duryea Company, which had 
produced cars there for two decades, was liquidated in 1922; the Belcher and Taylor 
Agricultural Tool Company, employer of three hundred, was sold to outsiders in 1923 
and soon saw its Chicopee operations halt; the Page Needle Company was similarly sold 
to outsiders and discontinued production in this period.
1735
  The Chicopee Manufacturing 
Company, a textile concern purchased in 1916 by Johnson and Johnson, saw many of its 
operations shipped in 1927 to a new mill town which had been built in Georgia by the 
New Jersey firm.
1736
  Annunciating a now-familiar trope, Johnson and Johnson treasurer 
Charles A. McCormick made clear that the Peach State’s “sane policy of taxation” had 
played a decisive role in the move.
1737
  As a final insult, the new town was named for the 
textile company around which it was constructed—it was called Chicopee, Georgia. 
 By far the worst blow to Chicopee, Massachusetts, was delivered by another 
textile firm, the Dwight Manufacturing Company.  Dwight had established a mill in 
Alabama at the end of the nineteenth century, but operations had continued in Chicopee 
into the 1920s.
1738
  In 1927, Dwight ceased all manufacturing in Chicopee, concentrating 
production in Alabama and throwing around two thousand people out of work.
1739
  A 
1934 study noted:  “For Chicopee the loss of the Dwight Company was disastrous. . . .  in 
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many cases whole families had been entirely dependent on cotton earnings.  A large 
proportion of the workers affected by this shutdown lived in a compact area, and the 
traders who served it also suffered.  The city lost one of its largest taxpayers.”
1740
  Many 
workers were able to secure employment in Springfield or Holyoke, but Chicopee took a 
serious hit from the shutdown.
1741
  
 In fact, the opulence of the “Roaring ’Twenties” never arrived in this factory city, 
for Chicopee lacked any real middle class from the 1890s forward, and enjoyed very little 
upward mobility among its working class—even among community leaders and skilled 
workers.
1742
  The city’s population was scattered in a series of villages with no unifying 
commercial district.
1743
  This decentralization conspired with the city’s proximity to more 
attractive commercial hubs in Springfield and Holyoke to ensure that Chicopee remained 
distinctly working class.  Thus in the late 1920s, Chicopee’s per capita retail sales were 
far lower than other Massachusetts factory cities, while the number of residents per store 
was 84.1—far higher than the 74.3 of Fall River, which had the second highest rate in 
one study.
1744
  In 1929, a mere 979 of Chicopee’s 43,930 residents met the income 
threshold to pay federal taxes.
1745
  At the end of the decade, the city had fewer citizens 
engaged in professional services, fewer business proprietors, fewer retail dealers and 
managers than other mid-sized manufacturing cities in Massachusetts.
1746
   
 Chicopee was compelled to abstain from the consumption boom of the Coolidge 
years, and this influenced the working class profoundly.  Per capita annual food sales in 
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Chicopee were $112 in 1929—far lower than comparable Bay State industrial cities.
1747
  
The 1934 study concluded that “what we have . . . is the result of a large factory 
population living on a lower food standard than is usual in communities which have a 
larger middle class element.”
1748
   
 This had some effect on the health and welfare of Chicopee’s workers.  Mortality 
rates and disease rates in the city remained comparable with the rest of the state 
throughout the 1920s.
1749
  But this was not the case among infants.  In Chicopee, the 
infant mortality rate (IMR) in 1921 was a horrific 105 per 1000 live births.
1750
  In 1928, 
the rate was reduced, but it remained an appallingly high 88 per 1000 live births.
1751
  
These reductions over the decade paralleled those made across the commonwealth and 
across the nation in the 1920s; but parallel declines, while clearly indicating progress, do 
not suggest a satisfactory improvement in local infant and maternal health care, since 
Chicopee’s IMR in 1921 was 38.2 percent higher than that for the entire state of 
Massachusetts.
1752
  In fact, this was the case throughout the decade:  in only one year 
between 1921 and 1928 was Chicopee’s IMR less than 20 percent higher than the 
Massachusetts rate, and in most years that figure compared even less favorably to the 
national rate, which was usually slightly lower than that of the Bay State.
1753
  In 1928, 
Chicopee’s IMR remained 35.4 percent higher than the figure for all of 
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  The gap clearly had not closed:  among all municipalities in the state 
with a population greater than fifteen thousand, Chicopee had the second highest IMR in 
1928—behind only nearby West Springfield, a small industrial town with large Italian 
and French-Canadian populations.
1755
  A child born in Chicopee in 1928 was 2.5 percent 
less likely to survive its first year of life than a child born elsewhere in Massachusetts.
1756
  
This damnable condition could be observed to a lesser degree in many of the ethnic 
industrial cities of Massachusetts: Fall River, New Bedford, Lowell, and Holyoke all had 
above-average IMRs throughout the 1920s.
1757
  Chicopee was not unique—it simply had 
things even worse.   
 So while Chicopee’s wages and employment rolls remained relatively stable until 
the onset of the Great Depression, other measures of quality of life—consumption, social 
mobility, nutrition, and infant mortality—remained unacceptably stable.  Voters in 
Chicopee did not necessarily experience a sudden economic shock in 1928 that primed 
them for political activation (although the loss of the Dwight Company the previous year 
certainly mattered a great deal).  Rather, encroaching economic insecurities and years 
devoid of progress, along with a profound yearning for ethnocultural affirmation, had 
prepared these citizens for mobilization by a candidate who acknowledged both their 
cultural and their economic concerns. 
 When Smith and his lieutenants spoke of his record of social legislation, they 
often referred specifically to his successful push to bring the Sheppard-Towner maternal 
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education and health program to the Empire State.  Smith had made Sheppard-Towner an 
election issue in 1922, and it helped him oust Republican Nathan Miller, who had 
blockaded New York’s entry into the program.  Miller’s party brethren to the east 
enjoyed greater success.  Boasting that Connecticut was “a state that begs no favors,” 
Senator Hiram Bingham and other Republicans had prevented the Nutmeg State from 
participating in the federal program; and their Massachusetts neighbors followed suit—
placing the two Yankee stalwarts among only three states never to accept Sheppard-
Towner funds.
1758
  Once again, New England Republicans and Smith Democrats 
provided starkly contrasting views of the role of government—including the federal 
government—in providing for the health and welfare of the population.  Within the 
context of the dangerous, unhealthful conditions experienced in New England’s 
manufacturing cities—conditions that sometimes manifested themselves in inflated rates 
of disease and nearly always were shown in abnormally high infant mortality rates—it is 
understandable that Smith’s progressive posture on questions of social welfare held great 
appeal for working-class voters. 
 Many New England laborers were beginning to understand their struggles within 
a broader national political context, and the 1928 Smith campaign hastened this 
development.  Workers sometimes found clever ways of expressing their political views:  
In the wake of President Coolidge’s terse August 2, 1927 memorandum informing the 
press “I do not choose to run for president in nineteen twenty-eight,” New Bedford textile 
workers carried signs early in their 1928 strike bearing a similarly direct message: “WE 
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DO NOT CHOOSE TO WORK.”
1759
  Of course, their participation in national politics 
was not merely editorial.  As Smith and his local allies promoted social welfare reforms, 
labor protections, economic progressivism, and cultural tolerance, rank and file ethnic 
workers registered as Democrats, organized into Smith Clubs, delivered speeches, and 
opined in local newspapers.  Their words and actions indicate that the inspiration for this 
initiative came from their own life experiences, stimulated at last by the arrival of a 
candidate who both symbolized their view of social progress and articulated their concept 
of economic justice.       
 It is clear that while workers’ enthusiasm for Smith may have originated with 
admiration for his humble roots or their shared religious affiliation, his record of 
achievement in New York—and the promise of a similarly progressive administration in 
Washington—was also especially attractive to these voters.  An address delivered on the 
Democrat’s behalf in Springfield, Massachusetts, in October of 1928 captured these 
sentiments: 
 Why is Alfred E. Smith, a graduate of the city streets, the political idol and the 
 political hope of so many of his county-men?  Because he possesses leadership, 
 honesty, human interests and the executive ability necessary for presidency. . . .  
 His strongest opponent has recognized his achievement in the total reorganization 
 of the government, in the business-like management of state finance.  Through his 
 leadership he was able to show the quality of interest in humanity.  On the 
 enactment of a legislative program, he has been able to protect the man, woman, 
 and child engaged in industry, he has improved the  public health and he has 
 attained the finest standard of public service.  This interest in humanity could only 
 be attained with his leadership. . . .  he has learned the business of government 
 from the bottom up.  He knows well every phrase in government 
 administration.  Mr. Smith also possesses the quality of selecting appointees who 
 are able to give the highest success in the management of their tasks.  The ability 
 and integrity of these people have appealed strongly to citizens regardless of 
 party. . . .  The last quality which will make an efficient President and which 
 Governor Smith possesses is the ability to interest people in . . . the government.  
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 The Governor has proved during his eight years as Governor of New York his 
 desire and his power to make the people as interested in the government as he is 
 himself. . . .  Governor Smith senses [the needs] of the people because he has 
 [been]  through hardships himself.  Between him and the people is that bond 




 This could easily have come from the notes of Frances Perkins or Molly Dewson, 
but these particular lines were not delivered by one of the legions of social workers 
trekking the nation espousing Smith’s credentials.  Nor were they delivered by a visiting 
Democratic luminary, a state-ticket candidate, or even a local Springfield politician, 
community leader, or labor activist.  The speech was given by Katherine Cofski, a Polish-
American high school senior from Springfield, during a school-wide debate on the 
presidential campaign.
1761
  Smith’s ideas and achievements, and the entire reform 
narrative associated with his campaign, were successfully diffused among receptive New 
Englanders.  
 
*  *  * 
 
The battles of 1928 established durable electoral coalitions in New England, 
determining party allegiances and setting the tone for regional politics in the ensuing 
decades.  In many ways, those nascent coalitions were personified by the combatants in a 
high school debate in Hartford on the theme, “Resolved:  That Governor Alfred E. Smith 
is better qualified for the Presidency than Herbert C. Hoover.”  On the affirmative side 
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were James Clancy and Stanley Straska, on the negative, Allen Hyde and Robert 
Crandall; Irish and Polish for Smith, English and Scottish for Hoover.
1762
   
Yet this ethnocultural view provides only a partial understanding of the 
developments of 1928.  Democrats had often tried to use such issues to their electoral 
advantage, and these efforts had repeatedly failed.  In his 1924 campaign for governor of 
Massachusetts, James Michael Curley ran a flamboyantly urban and Irish operation, 
denouncing religious bigotry and making attacks on the Ku Klux Klan a centerpiece of 
his movement—to the extent that multiple historians have joined Curley’s Republican 
opponent in accusing the Democrats of staging cross burnings in order to stir their ethnic 
base.
1763
  In some areas it is apparent that this strategy paid dividends:  in heavily 
Catholic Fall River, Curley would be the first Democrat in recent times to crack 50 
percent; he expanded on existing Democratic strength in Chicopee, where he came nearer 
60 percent; and he made impressive gains in other Catholic, working-class cities as 
well.
1764
  Yet while Curley showed strength in some of the working-class ethnic areas 
that would fuel Smith’s 1928 victory, he did not gain enough support in such locations to 
achieve a statewide majority; as one biographer noted, “the Klan as an issue was not 
enough, and Massachusetts was not yet ready for Curley.”
1765
  Indeed, his numbers were 
worse than his Democratic predecessor John F. Fitzgerald in Lowell and Lawrence—each 
with a strong tradition of state-level Democratic voting—and in Republican New 
Bedford, where he garnered a paltry 38.6 percent of the vote despite the city’s 
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  The same year, Connecticut’s Democratic Party 
“decided to wage its campaign on the Klan issue”; but this proved ineffective, and the 
election was a “one-sided” Republican romp.
1767
  It was only with the rounded campaign 
of 1928 that Connecticut Republicans would be forced to admit that “Smith had pulled 
the Italian and Polish vote from the GOP.”
1768
   
A similar phenomenon occurred in Rhode Island.  When that state’s Democrats, 
who had championed industrial reforms in the wake of the 1922 labor revolts, chose to 
stress cultural issues in the 1924 election, their 1922 gains among Italian voters receded, 
and they once again surrendered the statewide French vote.
1769
  The Democratic inroads 
of 1922 were crystallized only when Al Smith carried the state with a holistic platform 
embracing both the cultural and economic aspirations of these voters.  Espousing such an 
agenda produced political upheaval, propelled by Smith’s strength in working-class 
ethnic jurisdictions.
1770
  This would be consummated at the local level in the elections to 
follow.
1771
   
New England’s ethnic working-class voters were clearly offended by anti-
Catholic bigotry, cultural condescension, and self-righteous prohibitionism.  But in many 
cases, economic desperation was also a defining characteristic of these workers’ outlook.  
Tellingly, when Victor Signorelli, an Italian immigrant who began working in a Peace 
Dale textile mill at fifteen, recalled “one time during the depression” in an oral history 
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interview years later, he was referring not to the 1930s, but to events that occurred in 
1927 and 1928.
1772
  Religion and prohibition were important, but so were economic 
conditions, and it was the confluence of these factors that made the upheavals of 1928 
possible.   
In New England, the Smith campaign ran blatantly contrary to national policy 
assumptions—the Democrats were almost iconoclastic in their open rejection of the 
widely held faith in Republican economics.  “SMITH RAPS G.O.P. PROSPERITY,” 
went a representative headline.
1773
  Meanwhile, New England Republicans held firm to 
the contention that only the preservation of their party’s administration with an even 
deeper commitment to party orthodoxy could ameliorate the woes of the region’s 
manufacturers.  Thus, Republicans presented the election as a clearly defined contest 
pitting the steady continuance of Coolidge’s pro-business policies against the 
experimentation of myopic critics too focused on lingering regional complications to 
appreciate the architecture of the robust national economy.  The Hartford Courant 
summarized this position:  
The voters are offered a choice of roads, one marked Republican, the other, 
Democratic; one recommended by Hoover, the other by Smith.  Hoover says: 
‘You have been travelling along this road.  You know where it leads to.  There are 
no uncertainties about it.  Your progress has been pleasant thus far.  The next four 
years of the journey will be like the last four, not tedious and painful, but marked 
all along the way by agreeable experiences.’  Mr. Smith says: ‘The road you have 
just passed over was full of all sorts of pitfalls which perhaps you didn’t notice.  
You thought you had a comfortable journey, but that was because you simply do 
not know what real comfort means.  Go along with me on the next lap, pursue the 
course that I and my associates have charted, and you may be sure that no evil 
will befall you.’
1774
     
 
                                                 
1772
 “Interview: Victor Signorelli (1974),” p. 4.  
1773
 “Smith Raps G. O. P. Prosperity,” The Fall River Globe, October 5, 1928, pp. 1, 10. 
1774





 Speaking at the Mechanics’ Building in Boston on October 12, New York 
Democratic gubernatorial nominee Franklin Delano Roosevelt agreed that the election 
was a question of continuity versus change:  “The Republican candidate for President 
will appeal to those in New England who are satisfied with things as they are, who are 
content to have no change even though it be a change for the better.  The Democratic 
candidate and his party are appealing to New England because they believe New England 
wants and needs a change, that conditions today are bad, and that they will be doing 
everything that lies in their power to bring a more fundamental and general prosperity not 
only to New England, but to all of the United States.”
1775
 
 Thus the lines were drawn in bold relief for New England voters.  Republicans 
hoped to leverage their economic credentials to retain the loyalties of workers despite 
Smith’s appealingly familiar demographic profile; Democrats hoped to use that profile to 
secure a forum for leveling their broad critique of the status quo.  This made many 
people’s decisions very complicated.  On October 26, Hartford’s Republican mayor, 
Walter E. Batterson, praised Judge John L. Bonee’s steadfast loyalty to the party cause.  
Bonee, the Republican nominee for state senate from the third district, was a Roman 
Catholic, but had unequivocally endorsed the presidential candidacy of Herbert Hoover in 
what Batterson deemed “one of the finest demonstrations of tolerance any man could 
give.”
1776
  The judge’s reckoning was honorable for its frankness—he “asserted that 
prosperity was the principal matter in which individuals should be interested.”
1777
  A 
Catholic, an Italian, and a Republican, Bonee understood the stakes for New England in 
the 1928 presidential contest, and he exhorted his fellow ethnic citizens to consider their 
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economic welfare when casting their ballots.
1778
  They did—and they voted 




Fig. 6.7: Rollin Kirby, “A Great Army” (1928)
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Chapter VII: A Warning Shot from Dixie 
 
 
 “Let me see, the Governor spoke about the blending of ‘Dixie’ and the ‘Sidewalks of 
New York.’  I do not think that can be done.” 
 
-Senator William Borah (R-ID),  
Charlotte, North Carolina, October 17, 1928 
 
* * * 
 
“[Governor Smith] is already defeated unless there are 500,000 liars in the South.” 
 
-Bishop H. M. DuBose, Anti-Smith Democratic Conference,  
Asheville, North Carolina, July 18, 1928 
 
 
Historically, the South’s political culture has been distinct from that of the rest of 
the nation, and this was certainly the case in the early twentieth century.  While for most 
of the United States the default political position in the decades between Reconstruction 
and the Great Depression was Republicanism, in the “Solid South,” the Democracy 
reigned almost unchallenged.  Southern politics were sufficiently unique in this period for 
political historian Allan Lichtman simply to exclude the region from his otherwise 
sweeping quantitative analysis of the 1928 election.  Yet there is much that occurred in 
the South in 1928 that is instructive—elucidating the major themes of the campaign as 
well as significant long-term trends.   
From a national perspective, the story of the 1928 campaign in the South derives 
particular significance from the region’s uniquely hyperbolic politics, as well as its 
complex relationship with the rest of the union.  Viewed in this way, the 1920s South can 
be understood as an anomalous region that within its exceptionalism enriches the 





ethnicity, and race—significant nationwide—were intensified to an almost travestied 
degree.  Simultaneously, controversies over economic policy and progressive ideology 
were engaged in Dixie as they had been in the North; but the idiomatic manner in which 
these questions were broached by the combatants in the South, as well as the distinctive 
socioeconomic realities of the region, rendered the electoral results of these activities 
peculiar.  The home of a polarized political economy that pitted the populist proclivities 
of struggling farmers against the unbridled boosterism of zealous urban promoters and 
entrepreneurs, the South provided a unique setting for the weighing of Smith’s 
transitional progressivism against the Coolidge-Hoover status quo.   
The region’s relationship with Al Smith himself presented yet another peculiarity.  
The nominee’s background did not have the same allure to most Southerners that it did 
for many urban Northerners.  Rather than attracting attention to his progressive agenda 
and rallying popular support for the Democratic cause, Smith’s personality repelled many 
potential Southern supporters.  Furthermore, the candidate largely failed to engage those 
prospective followers:  Smith spent very little time or effort in the region—a dereliction 
that begat a flamboyant politics which drowned out the candidate’s program with the 
calumnies of partisan demagogues.  Exploring the factors that led to these idiosyncrasies 
not only adds to the understanding of Southern politics; it also contributes richly to the 
study of the rest of the nation by providing a sort of real-life counterfactual.     
Within the South, North Carolina was exceptional as well.  Dubbed a “progressive 
plutocracy” by V. O. Key in 1949, the state exhibited the virulent race-baiting and 
Piedmont/Black Belt rivalries that marked the politics of much of the region.
1780
  At the 
same time, the Tar Heel State was set apart, enjoying “a reputation for progressive 
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outlook and action in many phases of life,” including industrial development and 
education.
1781
  In the 1920s, North Carolina exhibited manufacturing might and a 
business acumen that tied the state to larger national trends, while hosting a disciplined 
and well-funded political machine as powerful as any in the urban North.
1782
  Therefore, 
the state presents a useful case study because it concurrently exhibited traits of the “Old 
South” and the “New South,” clinging to provincial attitudes while embracing 
unabashedly the business ethos of 1920s America.  Exploration of the events of the 1928 
campaign in the South, with particular focus on North Carolina, reveals a great deal about 
the important themes of that election, while simultaneously allowing the election to be 
used to understand the development of Southern politics. 
In fact, the complexity of the 1928 presidential election was felt as acutely in the 
states of the former Confederacy as it was anywhere in the nation.  Southerners in 
particular were presented with a knotty decision:  abandon the Democracy—the party of 
their forefathers and the only political refuge for the noble vanquished in the wake of the 
Civil War; or vote for a nominee who embodied the most unpalatable features of the 
modern American polity—the rise of the city, the aspirations of the immigrant masses, 
and disdain for prohibition and more broadly for the traditional social order, including the 
ascendency of Protestantism in American life.  This was not a minor issue.  The intensity 
of the South’s loyalty to the Democratic Party in the years since most African-Americans 
had been purged from the voting rolls in the region was remarkable:  from 1904 to 1924, 
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the Democratic presidential candidate scored, on average, 18.7 percentage points higher 
in North Carolina than their national share of the popular vote—and this was relatively 
modest.  In Florida that figure was just over 25 percentage points; in Georgia and 
Alabama it topped 30; in Louisiana it was 41; and in Mississippi and South Carolina the 
Democrat polled more than 50 points higher than nationally.  Indeed, over the first four 
decades of the twentieth century, South Carolina never granted the Democratic 
presidential nominee less than 91 percent of the popular vote!    
The reasons for this steadfast partisanship have been well chronicled.  The 
Republicans were the party of Lincoln, the party of carpetbaggers and scalawags and the 
oppressive radicals who had imposed a decade of Reconstruction on prostrate Dixie; it 
had been the Republicans who elected African Americans to the state legislatures and the 
Congress.  It was the Democrats who had redeemed the South from this insulting and 
corrupt despotism and restored good government under the explicit banner of white 
supremacy.   
Yet the people who now sought to command that venerable party were not worthy 
of its heritage.  They were of alien stock; papists advised by Jews; machine men and wets 
masquerading as law-abiding public servants; the rabble from the slums of New York 
(and Jersey City and Boston and Chicago) that had made a Roman holiday of the 1924 
convention—conducting themselves in a disgraceful manner as they mocked the values 
of Bryan, scuttled the aspirations of McAdoo, and incited rivalries that sent the party 
down to humiliation.  Four years later the leaders of Southern Democracy insisted that 
their party remained the haven of white rule in government, while from national 





Democrats in the South continued to remind law-abiding citizens of the dangers to white 
womanhood and community peace posed by the disintegration of the social hierarchy 
certain to result from infiltration of the Solid South by the GOP, while others alerted 
voters to the black Smith ally in Harlem who employed a white woman secretary, and the 
legal acceptance of miscegenation in New York State.  The heirs of Jefferson and 
Jackson doggedly exhorted their constituents with cautionary tales of Republican plots to 
enfranchise Negroes and undermine the established order, while the Republican Party 
purged itself of Southern black leadership and made entreaties to the rest of the South as 
an organization that was now reliably “lily-white.”  It was a complicated time indeed.         
 These were concerns of the Old South; but such questions only begin to reveal the 
complexities of the election in that region, for the South itself had been changing in the 
years since Reconstruction.  Some areas were industrializing, and in these and other 
sections business interests were gaining a foothold in life and politics.  Simultaneously, 
the legacies of the plantation system and attempts to retain its spoils for the regional 
aristocracy in the wake of the Civil War yielded a perennial harvest of economic 
desperation and social deferment, against which a strong populist undercurrent often 
flared in rebellion.  Certain areas developed sophisticated infrastructures, attracted 
modern manufacturing, and provided for their citizens a world-class education; while 
others remained bound by environmental disadvantage and intransigent feudalism.   
 Like those of any other region, Southern voters were not monolithic.  They had 
multiple layers of political, social, and economic interests and beliefs that all affected 
their electoral behavior.  For many decades after Reconstruction, this complexity was 





instigate any of these complexities; instead, it provided a forum for lingering grievances 
to be aired and for fractures that had been thirty years or more in the making to be 
temporarily revealed.  There had always been a number of distinctive forces pulling 
Southern voters toward the political conclusions they were making.  The difference in the 
1928 contest was that these forces were no longer all moving voters in the same 
direction—toward the Democrats.  Instead, voters were drawn along divergent paths by a 
range of public questions.   
 This splintering of the Southern vote along various fault lines in 1928 can be 
understood by employing the sociological concept of reference groups.  Voters in the 
South may have identified themselves as whites, as farmers, as Democrats, as 
progressives, as entrepreneurs, as prohibitionists, as Protestants, or as members of any 
number of other social categories; and in fact each citizen was a member of multiple 
reference groups.  In 1928, the combination of a serious campaign for white Southern 
votes by the Republicans and the unfamiliar background and style of the Democratic 
nominee created the jarring circumstance of conflict between these groups, forcing 
Southern voters to make difficult and uncomfortable choices.  Ultimately, voters cast 
their ballot based on their interpretation of the best interests of the group with which they 
most strongly identified.  The decision each Southern voter made in 1928 reflected which 
of these forces had the most powerful influence on that individual or on their community.   
The election results demonstrate that many of those voters were willing to 
abandon their Democratic loyalties based on other influences.  Florida, North Carolina, 
and Virginia voted Republican for the first time since Reconstruction; Texas did so for 





time in the century.  Smith barely retained Alabama for the Democracy, and the party’s 
victory in Arkansas has been credited almost entirely to Joe Robinson’s presence on the 
ticket.
1783
  Indeed, even in states where Smith prevailed, his percentages represented a 
stark decline both from Democratic averages and recent party achievements.   
Within North Carolina these changes were particularly evident.  Of the state’s one 
hundred counties, forty-three gave majorities to at least one Republican and one 
Democratic presidential candidate during the 1920s; of those swing counties, eight voted 
for Warren G. Harding in 1920, and one voted for Calvin Coolidge in 1924.  All forty-
three voted for Herbert Hoover in 1928.  Exploring the key controversies of the 1928 
election by examining the motivations of the most significant Southern reference groups 
provides explanations for these important electoral shifts.   
 
Fig. 7.1: Showing the decline in Democratic dominance in Southern states, 1924-1928. 
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In 1949, nearly sixteen years after the repeal of national prohibition, Forsyth 
County, North Carolina, asked its citizens to decide by referendum whether to legalize 
the sale of liquor.  The two leading local publications, the Winston-Salem Journal and the 
Twin City Sentinel were owned by Secretary of the Army and tobacco heir Gordon Gray, 
a “moderate drinker” who favored repeal.
1784
  The publisher was compelled to have 
associate editors write in behalf of his position, for his chief editor was “a lifelong 
teetotaler and editorial crusader for prohibition.”
1785
  Santford Martin, a “tall, pink-
cheeked man” two decades Gray’s elder, was permitted to compose his own essays 
decrying repeal, and these were printed alongside the official editorials on the subject.
1786
  
Martin’s conviction was strong enough to drive him into direct conflict with his powerful 
superior, with whom he fought an editorial battle over the course of the summer; and this 
conviction was shared by the voters of Forsyth County, who sided with the editor over 
the publisher 56.7 percent to 43.3 percent in a September contest that witnessed “record 
numbers” at the polls.
1787
  All of this occurred in a world far removed from that of 1928; 
after the Twenty-First Amendment had been swiftly ratified with overwhelming popular 
sentiment, and after the Great Depression and World War II had dulled the significance 
of many divisive cultural issues.  Two decades earlier such issues mattered even more 
(and Gray, barely twenty at the time, was not yet in the picture).  Thus it would be during 
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the 1928 presidential campaign that Santford Martin would firmly establish his 




Fig. 7.3: Santford Martin, at work in the offices of the Winston-Salem Journal, 1954.
1788
   
 
Certainly the most candidly discussed of the issues that drove Southern 
Democrats away from Al Smith’s candidacy was the nominee’s posture toward alcohol.  
By 1928, there was a general consensus in favor of the Eighteenth Amendment and the 
Volstead Act within the public sphere of Southern life.  While it was likely the case that 
many citizens agreed privately with the writer from Vandemere, North Carolina, who 
queried, “Why fight Al Smith about whiskey?  If one third of the reports I hear is so, 
there is not five square miles in Pamlico County in which whiskey is not sold,” the 
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overwhelming majority of public sentiment and political capital lay on the side of the 
dries in the American South.
1789
 
Many who had opposed Smith’s nomination over the question remained within 
the Democratic fold, justifying their steadfastness by pointing to sundry other issues.  
Even these figures continued to assert their prohibitionist credentials throughout the 
campaign.  Josephus Daniels, Woodrow Wilson’s navy secretary and the publisher of the 
Raleigh News and Observer, made clear his differences with Smith on prohibition, even 
while campaigning vigorously for the New Yorker’s election.
1790
  Daniels and others 
suggested repeatedly that Smith’s position was irrelevant, since the president was 
powerless to modify the constitution and any alterations to enforcement legislation would 
have to come from Congress.
1791
  
Furthermore, these loyalists insisted, like Smith, that the Republican Party had 
failed to enforce prohibition effectively.  While Smith suggested that this was because 
Volsteadism had discouraged respect for law and order, his Southern allies concluded 
that these failures demanded Democratic solutions.  This argument was made doggedly 
on the pages of Daniels’ News and Observer, where cartoonist Reyn Olds portrayed the 
Republican elephant, Herbert Hoover, and Andrew Mellon singing “How Dry I Am” 
while the treasury secretary clutched a liquor bottle.
1792
  An editorial noted that the 
Prohibition Party’s presidential nominee, William F. Varney, had scored the Republican 
enforcement record, “and yet, good men and women, folks of conscience, are planning to 
shut their eyes to all this because of the personal opinions of the Democratic party’s 
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  Indeed, while political operatives crisscrossed the Tar Heel State 
demanding that dries must vote for Hoover, the News and Observer alleged that these 
“Republican candidates and whipper-snappers . . . a year ago were as wet as the Atlantic 
Ocean.”
1794
   
 Democrats aligned with Smith also demanded that the Happy Warrior receive 
credit for at least taking a firm stance on the question.  This, they opined, was superior to 
the “wriggle and wabble campaign” of Herbert Hoover, whose vague statement of 
prohibition’s “nobility” was dismissed by O. Max Gardner, Democratic gubernatorial 
nominee in North Carolina, for being “as classic and as romantic as his promise to 
abolish poverty.”
1795
  Gardner contrasted this “vacillating policy of Mr. Hoover with the 
candid and courageous statement of Governor Smith.”
1796
  Some even claimed that 




 Such sentiments were expressed by party loyalists in North Carolina and 
elsewhere, allowing Southern politicians to support a wet candidate while maintaining 
their own reputations for temperance.  It only partially worked.  Even before he came out 
for Smith, Josephus Daniels was lectured by Methodist bishop James Cannon, Jr., who 
argued that “as an intelligent, well-informed, Democratic leader” the secretary was 
“obliged to agree” that because of the question of prohibition, Smith’s nomination would 
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render other issues irrelevant.
1798
  As Daniels’ support for the national ticket became 
clear, readers of his newspaper began to protest.  “I have liked the News and Observer 
and have loved Josephus Daniels but I do not appreciate the positions of Mr. Daniels and 
his paper in regard to Al Smith.  I am not able to see how such a position can be taken 
without betraying the cause of prohibition,” suggested a reader from Monroe, North 
Carolina.
1799
    
Many Democrats suggested that by nominating Smith the party had broken faith 
with its rank and file and would cost itself votes.  Due to his position on liquor, “there are 
hundreds, perhaps thousands, of lifelong Democrats . . . who will not vote for Al Smith,” 
wrote George Conrad of Harrisonburg, Virginia, a correspondent of Bishop Cannon.
1800
  
W. T. Danforth of Houston warned that the Democratic Party, whose ticket he had been 
supporting for five decades, had now “fallen into the clutches of an evil gang and the 
good people of the party are not going to follow their lead into the camp of the old liquor 
gang.”
1801
  Moreover, like Bishop Cannon, Danforth suggested that these developments 
rendered all other debates moot:  “The candidacy of Al Smith means nothing but the last 
supreme effort of the old distillery, brewery and saloon gang to get their grip on this 
country once more.”
1802
  Another Texan agreed:  “There is but one issue worthy of 
Christian citizens’ honest consideration—the Tammany-Smith-Raskob program for the 
restoration of liquor to America.  All the rest is pure ‘hokum.’”
1803
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 Across the South, “Anti-Smith Democratic Clubs” were formed.  Many, like the 
one in Durham, North Carolina, chaired by a Duke professor, were explicitly responding 
to the nominee’s position on prohibition.
1804
  In some places this broadened from a local 
to a state-wide phenomenon, with the most powerful politician in North Carolina, Senator 
Furnifold Simmons, proudly taking the reins of the anti-Smith Democratic forces in his 
state.  
 Simmons had a number of reasons for opposing Smith, and the complexity of his 
motivations, explored in greater depth below, presents a useful tool for understanding the 
political impulses of his state.  It is clear however that one of Smith’s attributes that 
particularly chafed North Carolina’s senior senator was his opposition to prohibition.  In 
May of 1928, Simmons took to the floor of the United States Senate and delivered a 
broadside against the governor of New York, declaring that no one knew anything about 
his record or his agenda other than his “conspicuous role” in Tammany Hall and his 
desire to bring back “bar rooms and liquor.”
1805
  Earlier that spring, Simmons began 
consorting with Santford Martin, using the Winston-Salem Journal to demonstrate that 
“90%, at least, of the voters of Winston-Salem and this section are against Al Smith, and 
that thousands of life long Democrats will either vote against him or not vote at all if he is 
nominated.”
1806
  Responding to entreaties from Simmons’ personal secretary, Martin 
“begged, cajoled, persuaded, and threatened” one of his news men “to write but one story 
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. . . to show that sentiment [in] northwest North Carolina is against Al Smith,” proposing 
to run “at least one story a week along the line” suggested by the Simmons camp.
1807
 
 Upon Smith’s nomination, Simmons’ ally in Winston-Salem continued his war on 
the New Yorker.  Both the editor’s life-long stance and the emphasis of the Journal’s 
news and editorial coverage demonstrate that Santford Martin’s reason for opposing the 
Democratic candidate was undiluted prohibitionism.  Martin’s writers insisted that 
prohibition was working, that it was “neither farce nor failure.”
1808
  “North Carolina 
Democrats should not be misled,” they warned on one occasion:  “A vote for Smith is a 
vote against the forces that are fighting to maintain the laws outlawing the liquor traffic.  
A vote for Smith is a vote for the forces that are trying to restore the liquor traffic.”
1809
  
The paper beckoned its readers to the “enthusiastic support” of those who sought to derail 
“Smith’s program of destruction of national prohibition.”
1810
  As citizens continued to 
join anti-Smith organizations and a flood of letters arrived supporting the editor’s 
position, the Journal announced with satisfaction in mid-October that “southern 
Democracy is rising in its might to repudiate the Tammany-Smith-Raskob liquor 
program.”
1811
  Meanwhile, it was suggested that party stalwarts had lost credibility.  
Daniels was called on to “apologize and retract” several of his campaign speeches 
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because he was said to have mischaracterized Smith’s repeal agenda as innocuously 
theoretical.
1812
    
 Since all of this represented an internal Democratic feud, Republicans were 
generally content to let anti-Smith Democrats do all of the campaigning.
1813
  However, 
when Republicans did speak up, they usually drew attention to their opponent’s desire to 
modify the Volstead Act.  When vice presidential nominee Charles Curtis spoke at 




 It was alleged by Smith supporters at the time and has been suggested by 
historians since that much of the opposition to the Democrat that was ostensibly focused 
on prohibition was in fact rooted in the candidate’s Catholicism.
1815
  A Charlotte attorney 
who supported the New Yorker claimed that “Roman Catholicism and ‘wetness’ 
constitute a two-fold objection to Smith, and are as closely connected to each other as 
were the Siamese Twins, although the ligament that binds may not always be visible.”
1816
  
Nevertheless, there were many Santford Martins in the South—many people for whom 
prohibition was the dominant motivator.
1817
  Such voters may or may not have been anti-
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Catholic; but it is clear that the reason they abandoned the Democrats in 1928 was their 
aversion to drink.  The pro-Smith Raleigh News and Observer suggested as much 
repeatedly.  “The bulk of the dry Democrats who hesitate to vote for Governor Smith are 
concerned over his opposition to the New York State enforcement law and his advocacy 
of change in the law.  The attempt to charge religious bigotry as the chief cause has no 
basis in truth,” they editorialized on one occasion.
1818
  “There are those who will not vote 
for a Catholic,” they recognized on another, responding to allegations by former 
congressman Clyde Hoey; “But the bulk of the objection to Smith is not his religion.”
1819
  
Indeed, they suggested—as would historian David Burner four decades later—that the 







 On the other hand, there were many voters who were motivated by religious 
prejudice.  When Harrisonburg’s Conrad wrote Bishop Cannon of his prohibitionist 
objections to Smith’s nomination, he also hinted darkly that the New Yorker sought “to 
make of himself the party’s pope.”
1821
  R. L. Ryburn of Houston wrote that city’s Post-
Dispatch that “Alcohol Catholic Smith Tammany and Catholic Alcohol Republican 
Raskob are just too much for good people of the South to swallow. . . .  We prefer to let 
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the pope run the Catholic church and the people the United States.”
1822
  A Charlotte 
attorney delivered a speech to decry “the record of Al Smith on the liquor question, and 
also state my objections to him for President on account of being Catholic.”
1823
  At a July 
conference in Rockingham, North Carolina, Methodist bishop Edward D. Mouzon 
unleashed a “pulpit assault on wets and Catholics,” and two months later clergymen in 
Gaston, North Carolina, were reported to “declare war” on Smith on the twin issues of 
religion and alcohol.
1824
   
 Prohibitionist forces, led by Bishop Cannon, organized a major conference for 
anti-Smith Democrats at Asheville, North Carolina, on July 18.  Walter Adams of the 
Asheville Times noted that “if Smith’s being a Catholic has anything to do with the 
movement here against him, it has not been allowed to creep out in the open. . . .  These 
crusaders . . . have all the issue they want in liquor and Tammany.”
1825
  The rebel 
Democrats’ detractors were forced to concede that “the fact that Governor Smith was a 
member of the Roman Catholic Church does not seem to have been emphasized at the 
Asheville meeting.”
1826
  Nevertheless, during the conference Cannon explained to a 
reporter that it was clear some voters would oppose the Democrat on religious grounds; 
while Bishop Mouzon “made a sly wager with a reporter that the latter did not know that 
                                                 
1822
 R. L. Ryburn, “Letter to the Editor,” The Houston Post-Dispatch, October 8, 1928, p. 6. 
1823
 D. E. Henderson to Frank A. Hampton, March 6, 1928, Furnifold Simmons Papers, Box 64, Folder 
March 6-10, 1928. 
1824
 “Conference Hears Pulpit Assault On Wets and Catholics,” The Charlotte Observer, July 7, 1928, p. 3; 
“Gaston Clergymen Declare War on Smith,” The Charlotte Observer, September 11, 1928, p. 2. 
1825
 Quoted in Rembert Gilman Smith, Politics in a Protestant Church: An account of some happenings in 
the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, during the Hoover-Smith race of 1928 and of some events in 1929; 
containing a defense of the equal political rights of Roman Catholic citizens and discussions of other 
burning issues of the day in Church and State (Atlanta: The Ruralist Press, 1930), p. 53.  It was at this 
conference that Bishop DuBose suggested that Smith was “already defeated unless there are 500,000 liars 
in the South.”  Ibid., p. 83. 
1826





the pope had a secretary of state.”
1827
  Reviewing these events two years later, a 
Methodist pastor from Wilkes County, Georgia, demanded that “by suggestion to the 
public through the press, these two bishops thus early in the campaign injected the issue 
of religion; later on they were quite outspoken.”
1828
 
Indeed, Bishop Cannon, who began organizing against Smith on the prohibition 
issue immediately upon the New Yorker’s nomination, was accused by contemporaries of 
shrouding in his dry crusade a virulent anti-Catholicism—an accusation which has been 
echoed by historians including Robert Slayton.
1829
  Virginia senator Carter Glass, for 
whom the 1928 campaign morphed into a personal battle with the bishop, “fairly 
shouted” at a Norfolk audience that while the clergyman “didn’t say it in terms. . . .  
prohibition is a mask and cloak to conceal religious bigotry.’”
1830
 
 In fact, while superficially Cannon used prohibition to disguise his religious 
motives, his private papers demonstrate a deep-seated intolerance extreme enough to 
offend many of his contemporaries.  In August of 1928, Cannon’s attempt to convince a 
Norfolk grocer of Catholic abuses against Protestant missionaries in Durango, Mexico, 
was met with a storm of opprobrium.  “It strikes me that your letter excludes Catholics 
from the fold of Christianity so in view of that I see no reason to continue a newspaper 
discussion with you,” responded J. L. Buck, adding with an allusion to the contemporary 
political situation that “if the Catholic church authorities in the Country were in politics 
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as deeply as the Methodist Church there would indeed be reason to fear for the future.  I 
have never seen the equal in my lifetime and rarely read of it in history.”
1831




Fig. 7.4: Bishop James Cannon, Jr. (right), anti-Smith Democrat from Virginia, sparring with Senator John 
J. Blaine (left), pro-Smith Republican from Wisconsin, during a hearing of the Senate Lobby Committee, 
June 5, 1930.  Cannon was called as part of an investigation of campaign funding led by Blaine and acting 
committee chairman Thomas Walsh (D-MT).  Later that day, the bishop walked out of the hearing, 
because, among other reasons, “I believe the proposed investigation to be a part of the effort for many 
months of wet and Roman Catholic elements, and of those who worship party regularity, preventing a 
recurrence of the Asheville conference in 1932.”
1832
    
 
This pattern was repeated in October when Cannon drew the scorn of the 
publisher of the Richmond Times-Dispatch over an advertisement the bishop submitted to 
that publication entitled “Is Southern Protestantism More Intolerant Than Romanism?”  
Explaining his rejection of the ad, C. P. Hasbrook lectured Cannon that “it must be 
apparent to you, upon reflection, that much of the enclosed is not a political 
advertisement.  It is, rather, a discussion of the merits and de-merits of two religious 
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beliefs.  The Times-Dispatch cannot open its columns to an attack upon the tenets or 
creed or ritual of any church, be it Protestant, Catholic or Hebrew. . . .  We consider it an 
act against the common good to foment ill-will and hatred between the several religious 
groups of which our nation is made.”
1833
  A week later, an engineer from Martinsville, 
Virginia, wrote Cannon that the “scurrilous and untrue matter used by you in an attempt 
to defeat a man . . . whom I consider superior to you in all respects, was received today. . 
. .  I have been a Methodist for the past fifty years, and you are the only one who has 
made me ashamed of that fact.”
1834
  These personal correspondences reveal that Cannon’s 
base motivation in opposing Smith was not prohibition, but religion; and while these 
letters capture the disgust of many Southern voters with such tactics, Cannon was not 
alone in lacking an ecumenical spirit.       
 
Protestant, Anglo-Saxon Southerners 
 
In September, Mrs. Willie W. Caldwell, a Republican National Committeewoman 
for Virginia, warned that “we must save the United States from being Romanized and 
rum-ridden.”
1835
  The following month, “Dr. Bob Jones, wealthy evangelist,” who was 
identified by the Washington Star as “the first to openly inject the religious issue into the 
campaign,” traveled home to Alabama promising “to make 100 speeches in the interest of 
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 Also in Alabama, “Oliver D. Street, republican national 
committeeman . . . and state republican campaign chairman . . . declared that he has 
distributed through the mails 200,000 copies of a circular attacking the ‘political, civic 
and social doctrines’ of the Roman Catholic church, of which Governor Smith is a 
communicant.”
1837
  Writing in the Wesleyan Christian Advocate, Dr. A. M. Pierce 
“declared that the Republican party was the party of the ‘upper world’ and the 
Democratic party of the ‘under world’ and that a vote for the Republican party was a vote 
for ‘the kingdom of God’”; while another Methodist periodical, The Quarterly Review, 
suggested that it was lawful but “not expedient” to elect a Roman Catholic president.
1838
  
Touring the South to battle Smith, a Baptist minister from New York alerted a Dallas 
audience that the Democrat was “the nominee of the worst forces of hell.”
1839
    
Things got just as ugly in the Tar Heel State.  Responding to the Raleigh News 
and Observer’s insistence that prohibitionists’ opposition to the Democrat was not 
grounded in religious objections, Thomas Gill of Laurinburg, North Carolina, suggested 
that “judging by this community, I think you are wrong as to the main opposition to 
Governor Smith in this State, especially among the women voters . . . .  the bulk of 
women voters do not hesitate to say that they will not vote for a Roman Catholic for 
president of the United States.”
1840
  Meanwhile, it was revealed by the Charlotte 
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Observer that “the wife of a prohibition agent is spreading a story to the effect that if 
Governor Smith is elected the hands of all Protestant children will be cut off.”
1841
   
It is significant that these two examples involved women, for just as some women 
were particularly active in promoting Smith’s candidacy, others were especially 
galvanized against the Happy Warrior.  To such voters, the social workers and other 
progressive women who campaigned for the Democrat were the worst sort of traitors.  
Lillian Wald endured a number of attacks based on her endorsement, and these detractors 
often explicitly cited Smith’s Catholicism.
1842
  Nellie Tayloe Ross also drew fire, 
condemned by one Houston woman to “political death” for choosing to “‘sell out’ in this 
campaign”—a death which was certain because “the imps of satan cannot ‘whip, beat or 
buy’ the womanhood of the South, or the North, either, in this moral fight.”
1843
 
While alcohol and Catholicism were often merged into a single criticism of Al 
Smith, prohibition was not the only question with which religion was conflated during the 
1928 campaign.  A Baptist minister from Raleigh attacked the Catholic Church in an 
address to a group of Wake County anti-Smith Democrats, asserting that “every man who 
votes the straight Democratic ticket this fall will be voting to crucify his country on a 
black, bloody cross builded by the foreign element.”
1844
  Indeed, whether linking it 
directly with religion or not, the question of immigration and the anxiety over the rise of 
“foreigners” in American life was also a significant objection to Smith among Southern 
Democrats. 
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 These fears had been given voice by Furnifold Simmons in 1912, when he took to 
the floor of the Senate (in an election year) and declared: 
Speaking broadly, it is untrue that an American if he is unlettered is ignorant. . . .  
But this is not true of the illiterates coming to us from southern and eastern 
Europe. . . . they learn nothing of the genius of our institutions and life by contact 
and absorption.  Their ignorance is dense. . . .  They are unfit for citizens when 
they come, and they remain so. . . .  It is this element who come here unfitted for 
citizenship who, after they get here, segregate themselves in the slums of the great 
cities or in colonies of our manufacturing and mining centers, who learn nothing 
by contact and make assimilation practically impossible, who are willing to live 





 Sixteen years later these sentiments retained political salience.  “American Ideals” 
cautioned the Winston-Salem Journal that Al Smith intended to “open the immigration 
doors so that the poor of Southern Europe shall flow over our Nation and State and 
destroy the foundations of our civilization.”
1846
  An oil dealer from Greensboro wrote 
Senator Simmons, encouraging him to battle “the wops and aliens of Tammany Hall—Al 
Smith’s hoards.”
1847
  Republican congressional candidate A. I. Ferree made the picture 
clear at Wilkesboro, North Carolina, alerting his audience that under Smith’s proposals, 
“32,000 Italians will be let in instead of 3,000 . . . 2,000 Turks can enter instead of 100 . . 
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. 25,000 Russians will be granted entrance instead of the present quota of 2,000.”
1848
  
Former Charlotte mayor Frank McNinch, who led North Carolina’s anti-Smith 
Democrats and would later serve as chairman of the Federal Communications 
Commission under Franklin Roosevelt, told a Fayetteville crowd that Smith’s 
immigration policies presented “one of the most menacing threats to our American 
civilization.”
1849
   
 These fears were not isolated to the South, but they were of special significance in 
a region where, as historian Dewey Grantham notes, “it was the outside . . . that most 
alarmed and frightened . . . traditionalists,” who observed with trepidation the ascent of 
“huge polyglot cities, Roman Catholic and Jewish religions, and foreign cultures,” in the 
Northeast and Midwest.
1850
  Such citizens feared for the nation’s future in the event that a 
politician like Smith gained control of immigration policy, and Republicans could sense 
these anxieties.  Thus, when speaking in Charlotte, Idahoan William Borah would go out 
of his way to mention that Smith would “let down the bars of immigration for southern 
Europe,” just as he would transplant Tammany Hall to Washington and personally see to 
the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment.
1851
  Playing to all of these fears, the senator 
summarized his case:  “Let me see, the Governor spoke about the blending of ‘Dixie’ and 
the ‘Sidewalks of New York.’  I do not think that can be done.”
1852
  
  Like those who wrote to rebuke Bishop Cannon, there were many in the South 
who found the cultural attacks on Smith unsavory.  A Middlesex, North Carolina, man 
concluded that “the objections to [Smith] are trivial, founded for the most part on 
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ignorance and narrow, silly prejudices.”
1853
  Many lifelong Protestants were particularly 
dismayed at the politicization of their cherished faith.
1854
  A Methodist bible class in 
Norfolk reproved their pastor when he attempted to inject campaign rhetoric into their 
study, which had “remained free of politics for twenty years.”
1855
  Also in the Old 
Dominion, 133 Methodists signed a statement denouncing four bishops who had 
attempted to “exert influence” to “promote the election of Herbert Hoover”; while in 
Atlanta, 83 Methodist-Episcopal laypeople issued a statement of “protest against 
dragging our beloved church into politics.”
1856
   
 The most forceful reprobation of anti-Catholic opposition to Smith came on the 
eve of the campaign from attorney Charles Tillett, a Methodist of fifty-five years who 
liked to refer to himself in newspaper columns as “The Near Iconoclast.”
1857
  Responding 
to the campaign against a Smith nomination that had been underway as long as 
speculation about the Democrat’s ambitions had been the subject of public comment, 
Tillett penned a lengthy essay defending Catholic participation in public life and 
promoting Al Smith’s aspirations for the presidency.  In it he declared that many opposed 
Smith due to religious “hatred,” that anyone fighting Smith on such grounds “besmirches 
his American citizenship,” and that “He who avers that the American Catholics are 
less loyal to their government than are the Protestants, is either a willful maligner, 
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an ignoramus or a blind bigot.”
1858
  The piece, entitled “Al Smith and Fair Play,” was 
published by three of the state’s four leading dailies: the Raleigh News and Observer, the 
Greensboro News, and the Asheville Citizen.
1859
  The fourth, the Charlotte Observer, 
declined the piece due to its length (although Tillett speculated that it was truly rejected 
because the paper’s “editor is a ‘rantankerous’ Presbyterian”), so the author paid to have 
the entire essay printed as an advertisement.
1860
  While Tillett was certainly an 
exceptional character, his sentiments were shared by many, and his vigorous arguments 
and personal enthusiasm for Smith were making some, including his “intimate friend” 
Josephus Daniels, “almost enthusiastic” themselves.
1861
 
 While cultural objections to Smith—especially religious opposition but also 
questions like ethnicity and immigration—were indeed a significant factor in the 
Democrat’s unusually weak performance in the South, the election cannot be understood 
only in such terms, for this bigotry was far from universal.  There was enough sentiment 
against the vituperations of anti-Catholics that ardent Democrats could comfortably 
denounce religious prejudice.  While it still took some courage to do so, it was not 
uncommon for partisan politicians to call on their constituents to accept diversity of 
creed.  Thus the actions of Mississippi senator Pat Harrison during the 1928 campaign 
would produce incredible headlines like “Harrison Pleads for Tolerance in Southern 
States.”
1862
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 Such appeals for tolerance would have been nobler had they not been so ironic; 
for what made the headlines incredible was the open racism of Harrison and his 
colleagues.
1863
  While Smith Democrats in the South asked for a cooling of passions on 
religious differences, they simultaneously stoked the politics of race.  This paradox can 
be seen in a letter to the editor of the Houston Post-Dispatch that asked:  
Do you through narrow-mindedness ‘Southerners’ want it unsafe for your 
children, your wives, sisters and mothers, and self?  Then vote for Hoover and 
afterwards cry aloud up to heaven for real fighting constructively Smith 
Democrats to lock up kidnappers, rapists, murderers and robbers and protect you 
while you turn your back to a reel set with spiked boots for voting for Hoover, 
and tearful at heart for life to think you placed prohibition and religious hate 
before blood of Southern heroes, safety for your women, your children and self.  




 This clear reference to the supposed perils of black empowerment traditionally 
associated with Republican ascendency in the South was often invoked even more 
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explicitly.  The editors of the Post-Dispatch later reminded Houstonians that “the last 
time the Republican party carried Texas was during the infamous carpetbag regime, when 
the white Democracy of the South was disfranchised and Yankee soldiers, white and 
negro, stood guard with fixed bayonets at the polls.”
1865
  Days later in the same city, 
Judge H. M. Garwood presented “a graphic picture of ‘carpet bag’ days following the 
civil war, days of terror and negro rule under the victorious Union war leaders,” before a 
crowd of twenty-five thousand Democrats.
1866
 
 Of course such sentiments were hardly unique to the Magnolia City.  In North 
Carolina, the Raleigh News and Observer was scandalized by Hoover’s Ohio primary 
campaign, in which it alleged that “white men and women were put side by side with 
Negro women.”
1867
  In Virginia, Governor Harry Flood Byrd alerted a constituent that “if 
Virginia goes Republican, I believe that the Progress of the State will be set back many 
years.  The Democratic Party preserved white supremacy in Virginia.  It has given 
Virginia throughout the years, honest and efficient government.”
1868
  In Piedmont, 
Alabama, Major Lamar Jeffers, a Democratic congressman from that state, appealed to 
his constituents to vote the straight Democratic ticket in order to retain “White 
Supremacy.”
1869
  Numerous Democratic firebrands reminded listeners of the threat to 
local sovereignty posed by the Republican-backed federal anti-lynching bill, with one 
suggesting that the bill’s sponsor, Missouri representative Leonidas Dyer, “is promising 
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the south a second reconstruction, and is promising the negro absolute equality with the 
white man.”
1870
  In Mississippi, Governor Theodore Bilbo, a venomous race-baiter, began 
circulating gossip that Herbert Hoover “had danced with a negro woman” during flood 
relief work in Mound Bayou, Mississippi, in 1927.
1871
 
 All of this was standard fare for Democratic spellbinders in the early twentieth 
century South—and in that regard 1928 was unspectacular.  What makes the election 
fascinating is that the Democratic monopoly on racist politics had been broken.  Bilbo’s 
feigned distress over Hoover’s alleged interracial cotillion was surpassed by the 
unrestrained fury expressed by Republican operatives, who took umbrage with the 
governor’s apparently scurrilous story.  George Akerson, Hoover’s personal assistant and 
future press secretary, called the contention “unqualifiedly false,” adding that this was 
“the most indecent and unworthy statement in a bitter campaign.”
1872
  Chairman Walker 
K. Welford of the Memphis Non-Partisan Hoover Club wired Democratic Party chair 
John Raskob demanding that he repudiate the “disgraceful charges,” which he classified 
as “libel.”
1873
  Contacting the governor himself, the Hoover camp summarized their 
outrage over Bilbo’s tale:  “No more untruthful and ignoble assertion was ever uttered by 
a public man in the United States than that attributed to you.”
1874
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 It is one thing to deny a false report; but the bombardment of superlatives 
discharged by Hoover’s supporters to express their righteous indignation over Bilbo’s 
allegation provides insight into the Republican racial strategy.  Indeed, 1928 may have 
been the only time that Theodore Bilbo found himself being attacked for taking sides 
with “a friend of the negro,” as he was during a debate with Colonel Louis P. Bryant at 
the South Louisiana State Fair in Donaldsonville.
1875
  Across the South, Hoover 
supporters portrayed Smith as dubious at best on white supremacy.  In Montgomery, 
Alabama, Senator Thomas Heflin suggested that Smith favored “‘social equality’ as 
against ‘white supremacy,’” noting the governor’s support for a New York statute 
“providing punishment for a hotel or restaurant keeper who refused to serve a negro.”
1876
  
In Georgia, Judge Hugh Locke echoed these charges; and while the pro-Hoover but also 
genteel Christian Science Monitor suggested that this was not necessarily meant as a 
criticism of Smith’s position on the matter, they further reported that Locke’s anti-Smith 
organization was also advising voters that New York senator Royal Copeland was 
boasting of black support for the Democratic nominee in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, and 
that “Al Smith-Joe Robinson Negro Clubs” were being organized across the North.
1877
  A 
Wilmington, North Carolina, man expressed similar concerns about black support for the 
Democratic ticket; after spying a Smith placard on the car of a “Negro undertaker,” he 
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concluded that “the national Democratic party during this campaign is endeavoring to 
corral the Negro vote, a ‘sin and crime’ that the Republican party has been accused of as 
long as I can remember.”
1878
  A Mumford, Alabama, man challenged the Democratic 
Anniston Star:  “Why do negroes as a whole support Al Smith? . . .  Why is Jack Johnson 
(negro with white wife) out for Smith?  Why has Smith appointed more negroes to office 
in New York State in one year than Coolidge has during his entire term of office?”
1879
   
 Often these criticisms went beyond questioning Smith’s credibility as a friend of 
the white South and became full-fledged indictments of the Democratic presidential 
nominee as the “Negro-loving Al Smith,” as one detractor referred to him during a 
speech in Hickory, North Carolina.
1880
  “He stands for race equality,” wrote a voter from 
Galveston, Texas.  “Under Tammany rule in New York City there is no distinction in the 
public schools on account of color.  White and black children mingle together, and of 
course, in Harlem the majority of children are negroes . . . .  Intermarriage of blacks and 
whites frequently occurs in New York, usually a negro man to a white woman with 
hybrid offspring resulting. . . .  this mixing of races permitted by Tammany rule in New 
York continues to menace the future of the American nation.”
1881
  An anti-Smith 
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Democrat from Georgia told a crowd of one thousand in Atlanta that “the republican 




Leading the charge, the Ku Klux Klan began actively “using the Negro in their 
propaganda to discredit Alfred E. Smith.”
1883
  Numerous Klan publications, as well as 
advertisements appearing in the mainstream press, pointed to the intermeddling of the 
races in New York State, Tammany’s reliance on “the Negro vote,” and Smith’s apparent 
reputation as a “Negro Lover.”
1884
  At a Klan fish fry in Foley, Alabama, a preacher—
aptly named Showt—indignantly accused Smith of employing “a Negro wench” as his 
stenographer, a story which survived the duration of the campaign.
1885
    
A favorite target of these attacks was Ferdinand Q. Morton, the leader of the 
Tammany-aligned United Colored Democracy.  A Smith ally, Morton had been a key 
figure in shifting a substantial portion of the black vote in Harlem from the Republican 
column into the Democratic, and was rewarded by Tammany Hall with considerable 
patronage for his followers.
1886
  Morton himself became a civil service commissioner, 
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appointed by the Tammany mayor.
1887
  When anti-Smith Democrats stumbled upon this 
situation, they broadcast their findings with alarm.  Morton was not only a civil servant 
drawing a $7,500 annual salary and a “recognized leader” in New York politics; he also 
dictated to “a white, American-born woman,” assigned as his personal secretary by 
Smith’s Tammany allies.
1888
  At Bristol, Virginia, Bishop Cannon “strayed from his main 
theme, Prohibition, to declare that Negroes employed by Tammany have white 
stenographers.”
1889
  As Smith Democrats equivocated in response to these charges, their 
opponents demanded, “Let’s Have the Truth About This Negro Morton!”
1890
  
 Morton was alleged to typify the equality offered to African-Americans in New 
York; and in fact pointing to the divide between Northern and Southern racial systems 
and the supposedly glamorous lifestyle of the “Tammanyized Negro” of the Empire State 
that resulted was an especially popular tactic.
1891
  “Give us the Southern colored brother 
every time, with his petty graft thrown in.  We are accustomed to him, but deliver us from 
the Tammanyized black politicians.”
1892
  Smith and his ilk were deemed antagonistic 
toward Southern racial mores, and Southern Democrats were said to be hamstrung by 
these malevolent Yankees.  “Senator Pat Harrison, of Mississippi, is prominent in 
Democratic headquarters in New York,” wrote author William Rufus Scott in his “Letter 
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to an Alabama Voter”; “But try to imagine Tammany inviting him to make the same kind 











 Although this was the popular perception of the New Yorker among white 
Southerners, in actuality Smith’s record on race was mixed.  Biographer Robert Slayton 
assesses the Happy Warrior as “a typical, reasonably liberal politician of the time.”
1895
  
The diversity of his boyhood haunts on Manhattan’s Lower East Side had made him 
basically tolerant, and his father, a Union veteran and volunteer fireman who according to 
family legend had saved the lives of several African Americans during the 1863 New 
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York draft riots, had inculcated young Smith with the belief that, like anyone else, their 
black neighbors were “children of God.”
1896
  As a Tammany man Smith had been 
enthusiastic to court the black vote, and was rewarded by these citizens with electoral 
support; yet he had never made any prominent appointments of African Americans as 
governor, and, like Franklin Delano Roosevelt after him, Smith was noticeably silent on 
Jim Crow—a reticence which drew a strong rebuke from W. E. B. Du Bois.
1897
  
 Meanwhile, behind the scenes the Democrat showed hints of a more progressive 
attitude.  According to civil rights leader Walter White’s 1948 autobiography, the Smith 
campaign had approached the NAACP officer through Belle Moskowitz (whose husband 
had helped found the organization in 1909) and sought his help in attracting the African 
American vote; in a private meeting, Smith assured White that “I know Negroes distrust 
the Democratic Party, and I can’t blame them.  But I want to show them that the old 
Democratic Party, ruled entirely by the South, is on its way out, and that we Northern 
Democrats have a totally different approach to the Negro.”
1898
  Smith then asked White to 
help him “demonstrate this conversion” to skeptical African Americans, and White 
drafted a statement declaring Smith’s independence from “the anti-Negro South.”
1899
  All 
of this ultimately came to naught, as Smith was eventually persuaded by advisor Joseph 
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 While reality was ambiguous, it was the image of Smith as the spokesperson for a 
vaguely defined new social order that mattered more to voters.  Questioning Smith on 
race was particularly useful for the insurgent Democrats, who could then justify their 
abandoning the party that had restored white supremacy.  Frank McNinch warned a 
crowd in Goldsboro, North Carolina, that “Governor Smith does not know us, does not 
understand us and is governor of a state where in public office white people work not 
only with, but under negroes and where white people and negroes intermarry under 
protection of the law.”
1901
  The anti-Smith Democrats in North Carolina made special use 
of their best-known supporter; at New Bern, McNinch was introduced by “our Old 
Chieftain of White Supremacy, the Leader of the campaign of ’98 and 1900, whose wise 
leadership has survived all the vicissitudes of the past 30 years, and who is now the Sage 
of Democracy and the best beloved of North Carolinians—SENATOR F. M. 
SIMMONS.”
1902
    
 Simmons, who “always regarded the removal of black voters as his greatest 
accomplishment,” was particularly valuable to the insurgent Democrats because he 
brought them unquestioned credentials in both partisan and racial loyalty.
1903
  He had 
been the leader of the 1898 crusade to overthrow the interracial Populist/Republican 
fusion government of North Carolina and to reestablish white rule under the 
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  The senator’s power as well as his popular appeal remained strong 
through 1928, and if he had any hesitation about bucking the party he had led for three 
decades, the deluge of correspondences entreating him to abandon the national ticket 
satiated his fears.
1905
  So too did promises of help from friends in the Ku Klux Klan, one 




 Not only anti-Smith Democrats like Simmons and McNinch, but also Republican 
partisans were participating in racial politics in 1928.
1907
  Making a “definite step toward 
taking Mississippi and other Southern states out of the hands of the negro politicians, and 
turning it over to the white men and women,” the Republican National Committee 
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“shoved aside” black party leaders in 1928.
1908
  Across the nation, it was alleged by 
African Americans that Hoover sought a “lily-white” Republican Party in order to 
compete for the South.
1909
  As William Leuchtenburg points out, “to cater to southern 
whites, [Hoover] denied that he opposed Jim Crow; allowed his subordinates to make 
racist remarks; and ignored an appeal to denounce the Ku Klux Klan.”
1910
 
 None of this is meant to suggest that the Smith Democrats in the South were any 
better on race—Leuchtenburg has deemed them “far worse.”
1911
  Much like the 
Republican hand-wringing over Bilbo’s attacks on Hoover, the Democrats responded to 
Republican accusations that Smith was a friend of African Americans with excessively 
forceful denials.  When a Klan lecturer said in Lumberton, North Carolina, that “Al 
Smith told Senator Glass and John C. Cohn, publisher of the Atlanta Journal, that he 
would appoint a negro member of his cabinet if elected,” an overwrought Carter Glass 
was quick to point out that this was an “unmitigated lie.”
1912
  The Raleigh News and 
Observer denigrated McNinch’s attacks on Smith as an appeal “to the moron vote,” 
countering that it was Hoover who stood for desegregation.
1913
  As the North Carolina 
anti-Smith Democrats continued to criticize the New Yorker on race, Daniels’ paper 
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again leapt to his defense, reminding readers that it was the Republicans who sought to 
extend the franchise “to every ignorant Negro in the South,” and concluding that given 
each side’s record, “There is no occasion for anyone to talk Negro in this campaign.”
1914
   
 Nevertheless, Smith’s credibility among white Southerners was poor enough, and 
his appeal to black Northerners was strong enough, that the issue of race was severely 
muddled for the first time in the postbellum era.  Washington Star columnist William 
Hard noted as much when he suggested that “these two facts—the presence of the 
Republican foxes in the vineyard of the South and the presence of Democratic wolves in 
the sheepfold of the colored vote—attest to a revolution in American politics.”
1915
  Most 
telling was the transformation of the Republican Party in the South, for Democrats were 
loath to abandon their traditional position on white supremacy.  The metamorphosis of 
one North Carolina Republican aptly demonstrates how 1928 had redrawn the battle 
lines.  In 1915, Charles Andrew Jonas told Lincoln County voters that:  
The politician who yells ‘Reconstruction,’ ‘Negro Rule,’ and ‘Butler’ does so for 
the purpose of blinding the people to the real issues and for the purpose of 
appealing to the baser natures in men rather than reason and judgment.  He wants 
to win on hate, deception, prejudice, and malice, rather than on merit.  He is 
playing the voters of the state for fools and suckers, and laughs in his sleeve at the 




 Yet in 1928, as a congressional candidate on a ticket opposing Al Smith, Jonas 
felt quite differently about such matters, telling voters in front of Lincoln courthouse: 
Let me tell you democrats about one of your candidates.  A negro man named 
McLemore, of St. Louis, educated and considered the best looking negro in the 
United States, has been nominated by the democratic party for congress.  There 
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are no negro candidates on the republican ticket.  In New York state the negroes 
vote the democratic ticket and they get their share of the profits.  There are fifty 
negro school teachers in New York now and they all teach white children.  A 
negro named Burkley is principal of the first and second ward in New York while 
the teachers and pupils under him are all white.  There are 200 negro policemen in 
the city.  Tammany Hall caters to the negro.  Jimmy Walker is the Tammany Hall 
mayor of New York.  Two months ago he addressed a negro meeting in which he 
said, ‘after the first Monday [sic] in November I can assure you that you will be 




Jonas was elected to Congress that November. 
 While these were major developments that complicated the racial politics of the 
South, the election results strongly suggest that the Republicans made only minimal gains 
in areas of the Black Belt where these questions were traditionally the primary motivator.  
V. O. Key found that “generally the whites of the black belts remained most steadfast in 
their loyalty to the Democratic Party, while in the areas of few Negroes the shift to 
Hoover was most marked.”
1918
  The two states with proportionately the most African 
Americans were also the strongest Smith states:  Hoover carried less than 10 percent of 
the vote in South Carolina and less than 18 percent in Mississippi.
1919
   Meanwhile, states 
captured by Hoover “had relatively low percentages of Negro population.”
1920
  Key 
concluded that the “whites of the black-belt counties were bound in loyalty to the 
Democracy by a common tradition and anxiety about the Negro.  Whites elsewhere could 
afford the luxury of voting their convictions on the religious and prohibition issues.”
1921
  
Within North Carolina, Hoover carried eighteen of the twenty counties with the lowest 
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percentages of African American population, while Smith carried eighteen of the twenty 
counties with the largest proportions of black citizens.
1922
   
While this was all true, the evidence complicates the question of race a bit.  First, 
it is wrong to presume that voters outside the Black Belt were not motivated by racist 
ideology; for example, multiple scholars of Southern textile workers have noted the 
“virulent racism of the villagers” in Piedmont towns where white workers “successfully 
fought to keep blacks out of the mills,” and forced management, even in times of labor 
shortages, “to restrict black labor in the mills to janitorial tasks.”
1923
  Furthermore, the 
traditional Republican vote outside the Black Belt was never enough to produce 
Republican victory in Florida, North Carolina, Texas, or Virginia, all of which Hoover 
carried.  The Democrats ceded some of their usual base; and while controversies over 
prohibition and religion certainly carried a great deal of import, the fact that Republicans 
had to some extent inoculated themselves on the race question and even neutralized the 
Democrats’ appeals to white supremacy relaxed some of the impetus toward fidelity to 
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 Key also recognized that “not only high Negro population ratios were associated 
with Democratic steadfastness.  A complex of factors—ruralism, cotton-growing, 
plantation organization, intense Reconstruction memories—as well as anxieties about the 
racial equilibrium characterized the Democratic areas.”
1924
  The counties of the Black 
Belt were also the counties most dominated by agrarian interests, especially tenant cotton 
farmers and other “dirt farmers”; and as was the case in the Corn Belt, Black Belt farmers 
and indeed farmers throughout the South were struggling mightily by 1928.   
 Since 1921, the indexed cost of commodities purchased by farmers had 
outstripped the amount received for farm products, with only a fleeting break in 1925.
1925
  
Partially as a result, farm debt ballooned.  Across the South, the total value of farm debt 
increased in proportion to the total value of farm land and buildings between 1920 and 
1925: in the South Atlantic region, this figure rose from 29.5 percent to 37.2 percent; in 
the East South Central region, it grew from 30.9 percent to 42 percent; and in the West 
South Central region, the value of farm debt was 26.8 percent the value of farm land in 
1920, a figure which would grow to 37.4 percent by 1925.
1926
   
Furthermore, the average price of the ten leading U.S. crops had plummeted in the 
wake of the Great War, and after a mild rebound from 1922 to 1924, remained 
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  Southern farmers engaged in a variety of enterprises, so the general 
downward trends in agricultural fortunes were bad enough; and with the traditional 
attachment to cotton still strong in the region, that crop’s fate was of particular influence.  
The relative condition of cotton farmers was on par with that of American farmers as a 
whole, and in fact appears to have become slightly worse by the mid-1920s.
1928
  By that 
time, the value of the nation’s cotton yield had dropped 35 percent since the close of the 
Great War.
1929
   
The collapse in cotton had broad effects, especially in the South.  In North 
Carolina and elsewhere in the region, “poor cotton prices tempted growers to turn to 
tobacco,” swamping an already glutted supply of that product and contributing to a 41 
percent decline in tobacco prices in the five years after the war.
1930
  In 1928, the price of 
flue-cured tobacco fell below 20¢ per pound for the first time in the decade.
1931
 
Indeed, many important southern crops saw their values collapse in the five years 
after the armistice, only to remain somewhat stable thereafter: from 1919 to 1924, the 
value of the peanut yield decreased 43 percent due to lower prices; rice dropped 48 
percent; peaches dropped 36 percent.
1932
  All of this occurred in addition to the well-
chronicled depression in cereals.  Cotton or otherwise, Southern farmers were far 
removed from the vaunted prosperity of the Coolidge years. 
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Fig. 7.6: Showing cotton and other agricultural prices in the 1920s. 
  
 Because of the enduring significance of agriculture to the social and economic life 
of the South, Al Smith’s proposals for farm relief and his attacks on the complacency of 
the Republican administration were compelling to many Southern voters.  Much like the 
candidate’s rhetoric, the agricultural arguments of Southern Smith backers initially 
focused on criticizing Coolidge and Hoover rather than presenting a positive case for the 
Democrat.  “‘Fair promises butter no parsnips.’  Hoover’s campaign pledges will fool no 
farmers unless they are suckers,” commented the Raleigh News and Observer, which 
demanded that “every farm editor and every farmer knows that Hoover holds the same 
views that Coolidge held and was with Coolidge in turning the cold shoulder to every 
plan of farm relief proposed.”
1933
  A week later, the paper renewed this line of argument, 
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suggesting that the administration’s “broken pledges” had sapped farmers’ confidence in 
Hoover’s willingness to deliver on promises of relief.
1934
 
Such arguments were made throughout the campaign, but by the fall they were 
usually supplemented with modest praise for Smith.  In Monetta, South Carolina, former 
governor Thomas McLeod spoke before a group of asparagus growers, blasting the 
Coolidge administration and noting that “in eight years they have offered no solution” to 
the farm crisis.
1935
  Suggesting that agriculture presented the “greatest social and 
economic problem of the day,” the governor commended Smith for making the “frank 
admission” that he was not an authority on farming and pledging that he would therefore 
rely on farm experts for council.
1936
  In this context, the governor encouraged farmers to 
“get into politics up to your necks and stay there until relief has been obtained as has 
been the case with labor and industry.”
1937
  Expressing similar discontent with 
Republican farm policy in an open letter to the Athens Banner-Herald, Georgia 
congressman C. H. Brand alleged that as commerce secretary, Hoover had schemed to 
cap the price of cotton at an unprofitable 15¢ per pound.
1938
  Moreover, “these eight years 
of the Republican administration” had witnessed the value of the cotton crop regularly 
falling “below the cost of production”—a condition made worse by official bulletins from 
the Department of Agriculture which had prompted further price declines, and 
exacerbated by President Coolidge’s pocket veto of the Muscle Shoals bill, which had 
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promised “a saving to the farmers of $12.73 per ton” on the price of fertilizer.
1939
  All of 
this led Congressman Brand to a similar conclusion to that drawn by Governor McLeod: 
“I prefer Smith because from what I have learned about him, if elected, he will be a real 
friend to the cotton farmers of the south, which neither Hoover nor Coolidge has 
been.”
1940
    
While these endorsements remained grounded largely in antipathy toward the 
Republican administration, others interested in southern agriculture were more 
enthusiastic in extolling the Democratic nominee.  Early in the campaign, Dr. B. W. 
Kilgore, president of the American Cotton Growers’ Association, heaped praise upon 
Smith’s proposals for farm relief.
1941
  Similarly, Dr. H. E. Stockbridge, founder of The 
Southern Ruralist and manager of Warren G. Harding’s 1920 campaign in Georgia, 
abandoned the Republican Party in favor of Smith out of “sincere appreciation and 
felicitation for what you said upon the farm situation in your able address accepting your 
nomination for the presidency.”
1942
   
Indeed, many Southern leaders viewed the question of farm relief as a prime 
reason to support Al Smith.  “Amid a bedlam of enthusiasm not seen in Atlanta since the 
stormy days of free silver and gold standard fights,” part-time Georgian Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt “scoffed at Republican claims of prosperity,” noting “that 444 farms are being 
abandoned every day of the year, that there is an average of three and one-half bank 
failures a day, and that farmers are either drifting to the cities or are enduring living 
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conditions which are a disgrace to America.”
1943
  Cataloguing the lack of affluence in 
various sections of the nation, Roosevelt concluded, “we are not even prosperous in 
Meriwether county, Georgia, or any other part of the south where we grow cotton and 
peaches.”
1944
  Later, in Columbus, Georgia, Roosevelt suggested that although “we are 
confronted with the bankruptcy of half of our population” due to the “broken pledges” of 
the GOP, “Today there is still hope for the re-birth of the farm life of the nation.  
Governor Alfred E. Smith is the key to accomplishment of that hope.”
1945
  Georgia 
senator Walter F. George repeatedly made a similar case, declaring farm relief to be “the 
big issue between the democrats and republicans in the present national campaign,” and 
insisting that “if Hoover and Curtis, in eleventh hour statements, promise the farmers that 
they will give them immediate relief if elected they should not be sent to the white house, 
but should be put in the common jails of the land for having denied the farmer this relief 
during the last eight years they have been dominant factors in the republican party.”
1946
 
In a general letter to his fellow Virginians, former congressman J. Murray Hooker 
promised that “Smith has proven himself, as Governor of New York, to be a warm friend 
of farmers. . . .  He stands for a tariff policy that will do the same for the farmer as for the 
manufacturer—that will give the farmer economic equality with industry,” concluding:  
“The farmer who votes for Smith votes for one whose policy for immediate and adequate 
farm relief is sound.  He offers the only hope farmers have of being rescued from the 
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complete ruin which threatens them today.”
1947
  North Carolina attorney general Dennis 
G. Brummitt concurred:  agricultural relief was the “real issue,” and only Smith could 
rescue American farmers from “the condition of the European or Asian peasantry.”
1948
  
From the Red River Valley, Houston Post-Dispatch correspondent Ed Kilman found that 
while some locals opposed Smith on religious grounds, “the farmers generally seem 




Certainly questions of religion, prohibition, and race outranked the issue of farm 
relief for many Southern voters.  However, in a period that experienced a sharp decline in 
the fortunes of American farmers and in a region that witnessed a discernible Democratic 
advantage in depressed rural areas, it would be careless to ignore or dismiss the farm 
question’s importance and the many figures who deemed it the most pressing political 
issue of the day.  In 1930, forty-one of North Carolina’s one hundred counties had half or 
more of their farms operated by tenants.
1950
  Twenty-nine of those forty-one voted for Al 
Smith—who carried only thirty-seven counties in the entire state.  Smith won only 37 
percent of the counties in North Carolina, but he won 70.7 percent of the counties in 
which more than half the farms were operated by tenants; and these accounted for 78.3 
percent of all the counties carried by the Democrat.  Moreover, Smith’s performance was 
even stronger at the 70 percent tenancy threshold:  the Democrat carried all of the thirteen 
North Carolina counties where at least seven in ten farms were tenant-operated.      
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Fig. 7.7: Cartoon from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch (republished in the Houston Post-Dispatch), promoting 




Significantly, struggling farmers were not the only Southerners with strong 
economic motivations in 1928.  The business community, Southern manufacturing and 
financial concerns, and those generally who espoused the virtues of the “New South,” 
also had an interest in the outcome.  They voted accordingly. 
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“Certain individual democrats have announced opposition to Smith because they 
are interested in water power companies and have been informed that his election would 
injure such companies.  Why do these citizens not come out in the open?  Why do they 
use the mask of Tammany and religion?”
1952
  This question was posed mid-campaign by 
former North Carolina congressman John H. Small, frustrated over the machinations of 
the anti-Smith Democrats in his home state.  And while it is unclear who specifically 
Small meant to indict with this remark, he identified with it a significant piece of the anti-
Smith coalition, one which has been neglected by historians of the 1928 campaign; for 
while the vast majority of the rank and file Southern Democrats who spurned party 
regularity in favor of Herbert Hoover were evidently motivated by concerns over 
prohibition, religion, or even race, many of the élites within that movement were very 
much motivated by economics.  The Coolidge economy, after all, still roared for many. 
 As a state with both a burgeoning manufacturing base and a social code 
dominated by Old South cultural conventions, North Carolina provides a particularly 
compelling case study of this phenomenon.  The bulk of the evidence is indirect, but 
taken in the context of the economic development of the post-Reconstruction South and 
the political evolution of the Tar Heel State after 1900 it is logical.  In the 1920s, the 
regional economy continued to reflect dynamics that had emerged during the period 
directly following Reconstruction, while the politics of North Carolina were still firmly 
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grounded in the developments of the 1890s.  Thus, an understanding of this background 
is necessary to appreciate in full the political economy of 1928. 
C. Vann Woodward, in his epochal Origins of the New South, stressed that the 
groups who “redeemed” Southern states after Reconstruction also set about granting 
special privileges to private railroads and retrenching state budgets; in general, suggested 
Woodward, Redeemers “definitely allied themselves with the business interests—with 
the factory owners, railroad men, and merchants” of the cities.
1953
  Meanwhile, Southern 
entrepreneurs, “uninhibited by the traditions and complacency of the Old Order,” helped 
enkindle regional manufacturing in tobacco, cotton oil, and textiles in the postbellum 
period, with considerable acceleration in the final two decades of the nineteenth 
century.
1954
  The financial motivations for these developments were matched—
particularly in the case of the cotton mills—by a remarkable “public zeal” that “converted 
economic development into a civic crusade inspired with a vision of social salvation.”
1955
  
These developments affected established Southern metropolises like Atlanta and 
Charlotte, but their influence was most profound in “isolated Piedmont towns,” where 
citizens were “suddenly aflame with the mill fever and ‘a passion for rehabilitation.’”
1956
  
Thus, “under the plume of the smokestack and the shadow of the blast furnace grew the 
New South—the industrial towns of the Piedmont.”
1957
   
 The exponents of this New South did not enjoy an uninterrupted series of 
triumphs in the post-Reconstruction years.  Throughout the 1880s, Farmers’ Alliances 
gained traction among discontented agriculturalists; and by 1890 Southern Populists were 
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enjoying spectacular electoral success, challenging “New-South romanticism head on” 
and ridiculing “the clichés of Reconciliation and White Solidarity.”
1958
  In 1894, disgust 
with Grover Cleveland’s handling of the economy and a strategy of fusion between 
Populists and Republicans produced an “outstanding victory” for these insurgents in 
North Carolina.
1959
   
 For both the proponents of white supremacy and those of unfettered economic 
expansion, these developments demanded another round of “redemption.”  Historian 
Glenda Gilmore has demonstrated the mixed motivations of the fresh Democratic 
leadership that emerged in response:  seeking to modernize and industrialize North 
Carolina, the “new generation of white men—educated, urban, and bourgeois . . . .  
plotted to replace the white Democrats of their fathers’ generation within the party 
structure and to recapture power from the Populist/Republican coalition. . . .  The New 
White Man proposed to meet backward-looking agrarian unrest with forward-looking 
urban remedies.”
1960
  In 1898 this group seized control of the state in an ugly and violent 
campaign lead by Furnifold Simmons, aided by his close ally Josephus Daniels and the 
Raleigh News and Observer.
1961
  The rhetoric employed during this defenestration was 
that of white supremacy and the “protection of white womanhood”; while the resources 
came from North Carolina businessmen.
1962
  Gilmore notes that “Simmons collected 
hefty monetary contributions from industrialists across the state to reprint Daniels’s 
newspaper articles as broadsides and send them to county Democratic leaders to 
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  Moreover, notes another study, Simmons “promised the 
railroad[s] and other large corporations that taxes would not be increased if they too 
would fall in line against the Fusionists”; a pragmatic politician, “Simmons wanted to 
keep in with industrial leaders,” since “publicity did not then have to be given about 
campaign funds . . . .  Railway President Colonel Andrews could ever count upon 
Simmons, even as Simmons could count upon the colonel’s contribution.”
1964
 
After the 1898 triumph, Furnifold Simmons became the undisputed leader of 
North Carolina’s Democratic Party, and was sent to the United States Senate in 1900; the 
“Simmons machine” would dominate the state’s politics for the next three decades.
1965
  
The economic motivations of Simmons’ racially charged ascent to power, and the 
industrial allies the Democrat made in the years culminating with his 1898 crusade, 
predetermined the nature of his powerful regime: cultural conservatism blended with 
“business progressivism.”
1966
  As a result, in the opening decades of the twentieth 
century, “North Carolina’s Democratic politics became a tug-of-war between its 
historically conservative impulses and a progressive mood of reform; between the 
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interests of farmers and those of the rising industrialist class; between the Simmons 
Machine and party insurgents.”
1967








Simmons himself was increasingly attacked by populists as a “conservative tool 
of the state’s industrial interests”; and progressive Democrats, offended by the leader’s 
support for specific tariffs favored by North Carolina businesses including the powerful 
timber industry, ran a spirited but unsuccessful campaign to oust the senator in 1912.
1969
  
In the Wilson years and after, Simmons would become a particularly strong voice for low 
tariffs, co-sponsoring the Revenue Act of 1913 (dubbed the Underwood-Simmons 
Tariff); and in national affairs—as opposed to those of his state—he exhibited 
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  Nevertheless, the senator remained a close ally of railroad 




 In 1949 V. O. Key reviewed the political economy that resulted from these 
developments:  
Industrialization has created a financial and business elite whose influence 
prevails in the state’s political and economic life.  An aggressive aristocracy of 
manufacturing and banking . . . has had a tremendous stake in state policy and has 
not been remiss in protecting and advancing what it visualizes as its interests.  
Consequently a sympathetic respect for the problems of corporate capital and of 
large employers permeates the state’s politics and government.  For half a century 




Key concluded that “the effectiveness of the oligarchy’s control has been achieved 
through the elevation to office of persons fundamentally in harmony with its viewpoint.  
Its interests, which are often the interests of the state, are served without prompting.”
1973
   
Under the care of the Simmons machine and the enlightened state leadership of 
several of Simmons’ hand-picked governors, North Carolina industry flourished.
1974
  
These regimes tended to be “Progressive, forward looking . . . but always sound, always 
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the kind of government liked by the big investor, the big employer.”
1975
  Prior to the 
Great War the leading sector in this regional boom was textiles, an industry which had 
weathered the panic of 1893 and enjoyed spectacular growth in the South during the early 
years of the twentieth century—often at the expense of the more mature New England 
mills.
1976
  In the late nineteenth century, “Southern boomers and capital seekers” had 
tallied a number of advantages to investment in their region, but the most significant 
differences between New England and the Piedmont involved labor costs.
1977
  Indeed, as 
economic historian Gavin Wright has stressed, “in the post-Civil War era . . . the South 
constituted a separate regional labor market, outside the scope of national and 
international labor markets that were active and effective during the same era. . . .  Labor 
market channels that originated in agriculture carried over into mining, manufacturing, 
and other types of employment. . . .  employers were well aware of . . . ties of family and 
race and made use of them in labor recruitment and job-design policies, which therefore 
served to reinforce and maintain the initial regionalism.”
1978
  During and after the World 
War, the labor situation in the Piedmont became more complicated, as was the case 
nationally, and it would be a gross error to imagine Southern workers as a docile group 
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who submitted cheerfully to the paternalism of industrialists.
1979
  Nevertheless, after the 
turbulence of the immediate post-war years, the mid-1920s were marked by relative calm, 
as the waves of textile strikes that were ravaging the North would hold off until 1929 in 
the Piedmont; and despite market turmoil, throughout this period “textiles dominated the 
economy, the politics of the community, and the lives of the workers.”
1980
  Furthermore, 
Wright notes that during this entire period, “as relative southern wages fell in the late 
nineteenth century—while European immigrants filled the unskilled industrial jobs of the 
North—both the economic and cultural gaps actually widened and in many respects were 
greater in the 1920s and 1930s than they had been since the Civil War itself.”
1981
 
This was the economic context of North Carolina politics in 1928.  The Piedmont 
remained dominated by industrial interests, especially textiles; the cities continued to 
harbor great enthusiasm for the sustained progress of the New South economy; the 
working class remained somewhat isolated from their cohorts in other regions, both 
culturally and economically; and the Democratic Party, under the control of the Simmons 
organization, remained an institution devoted to progressive policies as defined by the 
business community.  Finally, the geography of this political economy is noteworthy:  the 
hotbed of resistance to the Simmons machine was the Black Belt.  Key noted that this 
was an “odd aspect of North Carolina sectionalism” since, for example, “agrarian 
radicalism, reminiscent of the Populists and centered in the same areas as the strength of 
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the People’s party, is found in the Alabama counties with fewest Negroes.”
1982
  
Meanwhile, “in North Carolina opposition to the political machine, to the economic 
oligarchy of manufacturing and financial interests, comes from the counties with the most 
Negroes.  These counties as a group did not constitute the area of greatest Populist 
sentiment in the ’nineties.”
1983
  This anomaly could “be understood only in terms of [the 
Black Belt’s] minority position in North Carolina’s new prosperity.”
1984
  Therefore, in an 
odd twist, the Simmons machine found its greatest strength in the Republican counties of 
western North Carolina, where solidarity was demanded by partisan competition—but 
also where the economic ideology of the voters was more in line with the New South 
boosterism of the organization.   
Within this context, Al Smith’s denunciations of the low wages of New England 
textile workers (wages which seemed generous when compared with those offered in the 
Piedmont) and his vaguely threatening posture toward the power industry begin to hint at 
an economic motivation for opposition to the Democrat by the business-friendly 
Simmons machine.  One author pointed cryptically at this when she wrote of Simmons: 
“He said that he was not against Al Smith as a Catholic but as a wet and as a 
representative of Tammany Hall and of Wall Street.  (Incidentally, Smith was against 
Simmons and industrialists like the Dukes.)”
1985
  This is going too far, for Al Smith was 
no Robert La Follette.  But the thesis is a compelling one given the political economy of 
North Carolina in 1928 and particularly given the sectional splits revealed by the election 
returns.   
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Hoover was victorious in the counties of the west, which were established 
Republican strongholds, while Al Smith retained most of the traditionally Democratic 
Black Belt.  The major shifts occurred on the peripheries of the areas of traditional 
Republican strength.  Republican totals increased in already Republican counties as well 
as on the margins of these regions, thus pushing a larger portion of the Piedmont into the 
GOP column.
1986
  These were the areas that had the greatest attachment to the Simmons 
machine, and therefore it is apparent that the senator’s defection from the Democratic 
ranks had the greatest influence within the areas of his traditional strength.
1987
  Tellingly, 
the greatest Republican achievements in eastern North Carolina occurred in the 
southeastern portion of the state, where a handful of counties had flirted with 
Republicanism in the past but where the Simmons machine “was strong in some sure 
Democratic counties,” due to the senator’s roots near New Bern in Jones County.
1988
 
This demonstrates the power of the Simmons machine and of the senator’s 
personal appeal to many constituents, but not necessarily any economic motivation in 
voting.  Certainly voters loyal to Simmons were aware of his business progressive 
ideology, but he did not express these sentiments during his campaign against Smith—
relying instead, as he had in 1898, on divisive cultural appeals.  Yet the nature of the 
areas that defected to Hoover does provide some insight beyond suggesting fidelity to 
Simmons.  Many of the western counties that flipped to the GOP were important centers 
of industry—Gaston County, for example, which tallied a Republican majority for the 
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first time in the twentieth century.
1989
  Significantly, Key found a glaring exception to the 
general rule that counties with large black populations voted Democratic:  “Counties with 
large urban centers tended generally to be more Republican than were rural counties with 
comparable proportions of Negro population.”
1990
  Indeed, this was the case not only in 
North Carolina but across the South.
1991
  It was not simply that the Black Belt South 
remained steadfastly Democratic in 1928; rather, it was only the old, depressed, cotton 
South.  It was probably the case, as Key suggested, that urban whites were not as 
captivated by race as their rural counterparts and were therefore easier to sway on 
questions of religion and prohibition; but it is also true that it was the cities which were 
home to the most fervent exponents of the New South.
1992
  In his political history of the 
region, Dewey Grantham hinted at this when he pointed out Hoover’s success in “such 
growth-minded cities as Dallas, Houston, Birmingham, Atlanta, and Richmond.”
1993
  
Kevin P. Phillips, one of the architects of Richard Nixon’s “southern strategy,” noted 
these trends as he crafted his “political bible of the Nixon era,” The Emerging Republican 
Majority (1969).
1994
  Hoover’s success had drawn on cultural factors to be sure, but also 
on “increasing middle-class Republicanism in the Piedmont (North Carolina and 
Virginia) [and] growing economic Republicanism in the new resort and plains cities 
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  Recognizing the business conservatism at play against the 
Democratic candidate, Phillips concluded that “while anti-Catholicism was important, it 
was by no means the only factor at work for Hoover.”
1996
 
Phillips elaborated that Texas and Florida, formerly “stalwart Southern 
Democratic states,” had been transformed during “the boom times of the Nineteen-
Twenties,” which had spurred “rapid urbanization in cities like Houston, Dallas and 
Miami, bringing commerce and an element of Republicanism.”
1997
  The crux of this 
argument, which appears to some degree in the work of both Grantham and Key, is the 
centrality of urban expansion and economic dynamism to the Southern Hoover coalition.  
The story of the Simmons machine merges with these hypotheses to present a snapshot of 
the New South embracing Republican prosperity over Democratic calls for reform in 
1928; a conclusion that is strongly supported by the electoral data. 
 
 
Fig. 7.9: Presidential voting in the former Confederate states, 1928. 
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Figs. 7.10 and 7.11: Charting urbanization rates in the 1920s South.  
 
On the state level, there was a strong connection between Republican success and 
the rates of statewide population growth, urbanization, and relative urban growth.  In the 
























relative urban populations (the exception was Louisiana), while he lost all but one (North 
Carolina) of the six least urbanized.  Yet North Carolina was not actually bucking the 
trend, for the Tar Heel State trailed only Florida in its rate of urbanization relative to its 
over-all population growth during the 1920s, and by this measure again four of the top 
five states went to Hoover.  The exception, Alabama, was barely retained by the 
Democrats.  There were, moreover, discernible negative correlations between Smith’s 
performance in Southern states and both the relative urban population of the state and the 
relative growth rate of that state’s urban population in the 1920s.   
 At the county level within North Carolina, these trends were even more 
remarkable.  The state’s urban growth rate in the 1920s was a robust 65 percent.  Twenty-
one counties outpaced the state average; of these, eight had no urban population 
whatsoever in 1920 and continued to have minimal urban populations at the end of the 
decade.  However, of the remaining thirteen, most included important urban centers like 
Greensboro and High Point (Guilford County, urban growth rate of 164.4 percent); 
Durham (Durham County, 139.6 percent); Burlington (Alamance County, 113.5 percent); 
Charlotte (Mecklenburg County, 78.4 percent); Asheville (Buncombe County, 76.1 
percent); and Gastonia (Gaston County, 75.2 percent).
1998
  Of these thirteen most 
dynamic urban counties, eleven voted for Hoover.  Even more tellingly, ten of them had 
voted for Democrat John W. Davis in 1924, and seven had not voted for a Republican 
since William Howard Taft in 1908.  Mecklenburg and Durham voted Republican for the 
first time in the twentieth century.
1999
  These internal trends reveal the New South 
dynamism associated with the Hoover coalition in North Carolina—and the story of that 
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state was replayed across the urban South.  This city-based strength for Hoover was made 
all the more ominous for Democrats by the increasingly urban nature of the North 
Carolina electorate.  In the Wilson years, the twenty most urbanized counties in North 
Carolina cast around 31 percent of the state’s presidential ballots; by 1928, that figure 
was 38 percent.
2000
  It was in these New South counties—rather than the old, poor, 
stagnant counties of the Black Belt—that elections were increasingly being decided; and 
it was there that the Republicans saw their greatest triumphs. 
 
 
Fig. 7.12: Showing the increasing voting strength of urban North Carolina, 1900-1928. 
 
In fact, the political potential of the ongoing revolution in Southern economic 
attitudes was noted early in the campaign by syndicated columnist Mark Sullivan, who 
suggested that “even in the South where prohibition and Tammany are almost the 
exclusive topics of popular discussion business lies in the background, influencing a 
more important, if not more numerous class of voters than the other campaign 
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  Sullivan predicted that while the more “familiar arguments” would 
motivate “the bulk of those Southern voters who will interrupt their customary party 
allegiance . . . if any Southern states actually go Republican, the margin that makes a 
Republican majority will come from the business community.”
2002
  These developments 
were possible since “business has been . . . increasing as the vocation of Southerners,” 
and “most of those Southern business men, especially the younger ones, share the 
traditional point of view which regards the Republicans as the party of business.”
2003
  In 
fact, the seeds of change had been planted during the Harding regime, when the GOP 
began openly to court Southern business on the question of the tariff.
2004
  By 1928 the 
Baltimore-based Manufacturers’ Record, a relentless booster of Southern industry, was 
decrying the “spirit of vituperation” exhibited by Southern Smith partisans “against the 
so-called ‘robber barons’ of the Republican party,” noting that “fortunately the real 
business people of the South are not of that way of thinking.  They welcome the Northern 
and Western capital, and gladly cooperate with both.”
2005
  The next month Herbert 
Hoover made clear that he had taken these editors at their word. 
On October 6, the Republican nominee traveled to Elizabethton, Tennessee—
another urban monument to Southern industry—to laud the “amazing progress of the 
South in this past seven and one-half years.”
2006
  He cited numerous statistics to 
demonstrate the “enormous increase in wealth and production,” linking these trends to 
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the policies of the national administration.
2007
  The candidate also appealed to Southern 
businessmen with a unique variation on his stock theme that Smith’s proposals 
represented unwarranted extensions of the government into competition with private 
enterprise:  not only would this run counter to the “American system”; it also represented 
“the destruction of States’ rights.”
2008
   
None of this is to suggest that Al Smith somehow sought to do battle with either 
the ideology or the results of the New South.  The threat to business from his economic 
progressivism was mild, and indeed Smith enjoyed plenty of support from Southern 
business élites—Georgia governor L. G. Hardman, who endorsed the New Yorker on the 
basis of party loyalty, had risen to prominence as a mill owner; and the Southern Railway 
did its part to aid the Democratic campaign by offering Atlantans “a special excursion 
rate” on train fares to see the nominee appear in Chattanooga.
2009
  Yet when compared to 
Hoover’s enthusiasm for Piedmont industry, Smith’s interest in public hydroelectric 
projects, his sympathetic overtures to struggling Northern textile workers, and his 
assorted critiques of the economic status quo, proved unpalatable to many in Southern 
business.   
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Those who remained cheerful about the course of Southern industry were drawn 
to Hoover’s complimentary remarks—certainly more than to the constant quibbling of 
Smith and his backers, who, like the writer “Jeffersonian” in Burlington, North Carolina, 
exhorted Southerners to “let your conscience be your guide.  Vote for the money making 
Hoover or the humanitarian Smith.”
2010
  While Hoover claimed that the prosperity of the 
New South had enjoyed “wide distribution,” Texas senator Morris Sheppard, a Smith 
Democrat, continued to claim that “only the privileged few are prosperous.”
2011
  Given 
the choice between these two arguments it is only natural that the paladins of Southern 
progress would opt for the sanguine over the critical.    
Interestingly, the two leading men associated with the Simmons machine that 
remained loyal to Smith in 1928 often asked such critical questions.  In Orlando, 
Josephus Daniels suggested that because “republican policies, after seven and one-half 
years have not given farm relief and steady employment, the sensible voter will give the 
verdict ‘weighed in the balance and found wanting’ and will vote a change.”
2012
  
Meanwhile, O. Max Gardner, a one-time foe of Simmons who had “made his peace with 
the old man,” ran for governor in 1928 with the organization’s imprimatur—while 
campaigning actively for Al Smith.
2013
  During one speech, Gardner invoked the sort of 
partisan economic ideology that had been expressed by Northern Smith allies like 
Anthony Griffin before textile workers in New England when he said:  
The Democratic Party believes that things were made for men, the Republican 
that men were made for things.  The Democratic Party believes in the rights of 
men, the Republican Party in the ‘PRIVILEGES OF MEN.’  The Democratic 
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Party believes that politics is humanity, the rule of the people, the betterment of 
the race, service to the intimate needs of the masses, beneficial endeavor.  Have 





 In a speech earlier that year, Gardner, himself a textile manufacturer, expressed 
his discomfort with the overzealous materialism that might arise from the economic 
progress of the New South.
2015
  Before the High Point College graduating class of ’28, 
Gardner considered: “what is the dominant thing we are thinking about in North Carolina 
today?  It has been charged that we are thinking too much in the arithmetic of material 
things and too little in the mathematics of men, that we are thinking more of money than 
we are of men.  There is undoubtedly some basis for this belief, and it is running pretty 
strong through the current of American life.”
2016
  While this was a disturbing trend, the 
speaker suggested that “the serious thought of North Carolina is not concentrated wholly 
on things, but is gradually and constantly growing in the human and social philosophy of 
life that finds expression in the application of money to the multiplication of better and 
finer opportunities and social conditions for the individual man,” and proposed “for 
North Carolina a sustained thinking in human problems” as an alternative to the profit-
driven credo of the 1920s.
2017
  That September, Gardner would apply this thinking to his 
endorsement of Smith, suggesting that while he had initially opposed the New Yorker’s 
nomination on prohibitionist grounds, “I have also great admiration for the progressive 
legislation Governor Smith has secured and applied as Governor of New York.  I feel that 
he has demonstrated beyond question his absolute integrity, and has exerted his great 
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Fig. 7.13: O. Max Gardner as governor of North Carolina, on a visit to Chapel Hill in 1929.
2019 
 
It is a fine distinction to be sure, but one which parallels Smith’s own critiques of 
the political economy of the 1920s.  Gardner, like Smith, was friendly toward business; 
but both men were nevertheless troubled by the fact that public policy had focused 
increasingly on promoting economic dynamism rather than human welfare.  In North 
Carolina, the regions that voted for Smith were those that felt the ill-effects of these 
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policies most acutely; while those that voted for Hoover tended to be the ones that 
continued to reap the benefits of the status quo and subscribe to its ideological 
foundations.
2020
  Furthermore, public figures who diverged from this trend, including an 
urban New South booster and Simmons ally (Josephus Daniels) and a textile businessman 
from the Piedmont town of Shelby (Max Gardner), tended to be those who moderated 
their excitement for the material progress of the South with a recognition of the need to 
address economic ills and questions of social welfare.
2021
   
 
Southern Democrats and Progressive Southerners 
 
 Not all of the organization men who clung to the national ticket in 1928 were 
motivated by scruples with the economic status quo.  Many Simmons Democrats were 
Democrats first, and this was especially the case with politicians and publishers as 
opposed to the business community or even rank and file citizens.
2022
  In a vivid example 
of this, a Wachovia banker from Asheville lamented in a letter to Simmons that his son, 
the editor of the Hickory Record, was supporting Al Smith because “he is influenced by 
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the Hickory politicians,” elaborating that in general “the politicians are for Smith and the 
people are against him.”
2023
 
 An instructive case in point is that of Cameron Morrison, governor from 1921 
through 1925, who had gained the 1920 Democratic nomination over then-insurgent Max 
Gardner thanks to the chicanery and race-baiting of the Simmons machine.
2024
  In 1928, 
Morrison was so offended at the irregularity of his erstwhile benefactor that he broke 
with the senator in particularly powerful terms:  
Two years from now Senator Simmons says he will run again.  I hope he will live 
to make good his announced candidacy and that I may live to take the stump in 
this state in apology to the memory of Governors Vance and Aycock, and the 
Kitchins, living and dead, for having helped four times to elect F. M. Simmons 





In fact, it would have been easy for Morrison to support the New Yorker on progressive 
grounds, for while the two men were quite different in outlook, their administrations had 
numerous parallels: Morrison’s victory ushered in an era of activism and growth that 
pleasantly surprised formerly “disappointed progressives”; the Democrat pressed for $50 
million in bonds for public works—a program denounced by Virginia’s Carter Glass as 
“crazy”; and under Morrison the state’s bonded debt grew from $12 million to $107 
million, while his administration supervised the grand finale of a ten-year period that saw 
state expenditures grow by 847 percent.
2026
  Nevertheless, there is no evidence that 
Morrison was particularly motivated by any fiscal kinship with the Happy Warrior; 
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 Morrison’s old rival Max Gardner, in spite of his more cerebral arguments during 
the campaign, also made simple appeals to partisanship.  “No one realizes better than me 
that I could be elected Governor by an unprecedented majority if I would compromise my 
nomination, surrender my loyalty to the national ticket, and duck into a political storm 
cellar while the lightnings flash and the thunders reverberate; but I cannot and will not 
pay the price . . . .  I would go down to defeat before I would desert the leader of my 
party in this campaign, ” he pledged in one speech, while in another he called for “the 
United, loyal and militant support of North Carolina Democracy for the entire ticket of 
my party from constable, Tom Brown, to President, Alfred E. Smith.”
2028
   
 Beyond these political leaders, there were warnings from low-level Democrats 
and numerous editorial boards about the perils of abandoning party loyalty and the vague 
threat to “Southern culture” if the Solid South should be broken.
2029
  Reflecting such 
concerns with humorous effect, a Democratic stalwart in Jackson, Mississippi, presented 
Dr. John Roach Straton of New York with “an old-fashioned carpetbag” after the Baptist 
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minister delivered one in a series of anti-Smith tirades.
2030
  In spite of such occasional 
jocularity, calls to partisan fidelity were serious business—and were often poorly 
disguised appeals to racial solidarity.
2031
  But at other times Democrats were simply 
exhibiting a tenacious devotion to long-held partisan affiliations—as was the case with 
the indignant voter from High Point, North Carolina, who likened the bolting Furnifold 
Simmons to “Benedict Arnold or Judas [Iscariot].”
2032
 
 There were, however, many in the South who were attracted to the Democratic 
nominee not wholly on partisan terms, but also because they believed genuinely in his 
progressive agenda for the nation.
2033
  As was the case in the Corn Belt, Smith attracted 
the support of notable members of the La Follette movement (such as it was in the 
South); Robert Corley, a high-ranking member of the International Association of 
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Machinists who had abandoned the Democrats to direct Fighting Bob’s 1924 campaign in 
eleven Southern states, effused that “Governor Smith in every way comes nearer 
representing the progressive views of the late Senator La Follette than anyone who has 
ever been offered to voters of the country.”
2034
  Indeed, Southern labor in general 
demonstrated considerable enthusiasm for Smith’s candidacy, with Georgia Federation of 
Labor president O. E. Petry organizing union members around Atlanta “into a group to 
disseminate information among the workers of the community regarding the labor record 
of Governor Smith and his attitude toward the principles for which the labor movement 
stands,” in an effort “to counteract the effect of the ‘whispering campaign.’”
2035
 
Smith’s progressive appeal reached far beyond the South’s fledgling labor 
movement.  Along with his stance on agricultural relief, which had garnered support 
among struggling Black Belt dirt farmers, Smith’s progressive position on water power 
development gained notice—particularly when it came to Muscle Shoals, a project of 
keen interest to much of the region.  While Southern business was mixed in its posture 
toward Smith’s proposals, there were many in northern Alabama and elsewhere in the 
South who trumpeted the Democrat’s progressive stand as a leading virtue of his 
candidacy.  In late September, an Alabaman wrote George Norris to praise the 
Nebraskan’s position on Muscle Shoals and to encourage him to support the Democratic 
nominee on progressive grounds: “Governor Smith advocates those things which you 
advocate.  He is a progressive in every sense of the word.  He is an admirer of yours. . . .  
This is not a battle between Democrats and Republicans, but between the progressives 
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  The Anniston Star editorialized on Smith’s behalf briefly after 
Hoover attacked his program as socialism (and days after Norris came out for Smith), 
demanding that:  
The people of this city and of Alabama generally are vitally interested in seeing 
the Norris plan for the operation of Muscle Shoals put into effect.  We are now 
threatened with another raise in rates by the Alabama Power Company . . . .  The 
people of Alabama, too, have a common interest with the people of the nation in 
putting an end to the intermeddling of the power trust in the affairs of the 
American people. . . .  If it be socialism to keep out of the hands of private 





Numerous Democratic spellbinders emphasized Smith’s position on water power 
as an important reason to support his candidacy.
2038
  Among these was Josephus Daniels, 
who listed hydroelectric policy as one of twelve reasons to vote for Smith during an 
address in Atlanta and included it as a central piece of his argument for Smith in a 
published debate with Richard Edmonds of the Manufacturers’ Record.
2039
  Indeed, 
Daniels’ entire argument against Edmonds revolved around Smith’s progressivism.  “If 
there were only one issue in this campaign, and there were not fundamental differences 
upon great questions between the two leading parties, I could well appreciate your 
inability to understand why I remain in the Democratic ship,” suggested the former 
secretary in response to the Baltimorean’s concerns over prohibition.
2040
  But Smith was 
promising farm relief, and “farmers are the forgotten men of the Republican 
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administration”; government development of Muscle Shoals was a progressive priority, 
and “the record of Governor Smith in New York shows he fought the water power 
monopoly.”
2041
  Moreover, Daniels found Smith’s entire progressive record compelling, 
citing the nominee’s campaigns for minimum wage legislation, the eight hour day for 
women, maternity insurance, extensions of workmen’s compensation, state provision of 
physicians and nurses for rural areas, state ownership and operation of water power, 
state-owned and operated grain elevators “after the manner of the experiments in North 
Dakota,” state control of the milk supply, and municipal operation of public utilities; 
concluding that Smith had “championed better working conditions for men, women and 
children.  He has fairly earned the name Progressive.”
2042
        
 The South of course had its own indigenous, populist-infused progressive 
tradition, and it was that tradition which provided the basis of the Democratic argument 
in the region.  Such appeals can be seen in the constant invocations of the party’s 
Jeffersonian heritage, which only partially meant a call to arms on behalf of 
decentralization.  Less muddled by such constitutional dilemmas were comparisons 
between Smith and Andrew Jackson, which Daniels made repeatedly on his Southern 
tour—including during a stop in Nashville.
2043
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 The most important progressive parallel for Daniels was a more recent one: his 
former chief Woodrow Wilson.  There is no greater evidence of Daniels’ Wilsonian 
enthusiasm over Smith’s progressive pronouncements than the editorial cartoon run by 
the Raleigh News and Observer in response to the New Yorker’s acceptance address.  
From Albany, Smith began his speech by commenting that it was in the New York State 
capitol building that he had “confirmed my faith in the principles of the Democratic Party 
so eloquently defined by Woodrow Wilson.”
2044
  As he stood among the rain-soaked 
spectators, all that Daniels had needed to hear was the name “Woodrow Wilson” to be 
sold on the Happy Warrior.
2045
  
The News and Observer would champion Smith as a progressive throughout the 
campaign.
2046
  Responding to several of the nominee’s policy pronouncements, the 
editors made their case plainly: 
The strongest claim Governor Smith has to election this year is that upon the large 
questions he is the champion of progress, of change from the static, of opening 
doors of equality for all, and for putting an end to privilege.  His speeches at 
Denver, at Omaha and Helena reached the high water mark of Progressivism, the 
sort the old Andrew Jackson and Woodrow Wilson and LaFollette and Theodore 
Roosevelt (limited in 1912) incarnated.  But it is . . . his record for social welfare 
and social justice and the rights of labor and for better public schools and for 
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Many North Carolina progressives agreed—including C. Guillet of Elon College, who 
wrote the Burlington Daily Times that “the chief [reason to vote for Smith] is his noble 
record as Governor of the Empire State, his record of continual legislation on behalf of 






Fig. 7.14: Cartoon demonstrating the Wilsonian enthusiasm of Josephus Daniels and his Raleigh News and 
Observer for Smith’s candidacy.
2049
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The Democrats’ petition to Southern progressivism was made all the more 
explicitly by their choice of a running mate for Al Smith.  Conventional wisdom held that 
with a Catholic from New York’s Lower East Side as their presidential nominee, the 
party would need a Southerner to balance the ticket.  It had to be a Southerner; it did not 
have to be Joe Robinson, who stands out among his contemporaries as a relatively 
progressive figure.  As a young congressman, Robinson had been a supporter not only of 
regionally popular causes like railroad regulation, but also of Theodore Roosevelt’s Pure 
Food and Drug Act, on which he broke with party leadership.
2050
  Rather unique among 
Southern senators, Robinson had been a “strong and outspoken supporter” of labor.
2051
  
During his two-month tenure as governor of Arkansas (Robinson ran to succeed Senator 
Jeff Davis upon the latter’s death, shortly after ascending to the governorship), he 
managed to organize a state health board, form a state highway commission, establish a 
workmen’s compensation system, create a state department of education, and push 
successfully for a corrupt practices act.
2052
   
As a leading voice among senate Democrats and as minority leader beginning in 
1923, Robinson continued to pursue such an agenda—taking a leading role in approving 
the creation of the Federal Trade Commission; helping to strengthen the Interstate 
Commerce Commission; and supporting progressive farm remedies including the 
Capper-Volstead Act (1922) which exempted farm cooperatives from anti-trust laws, the 
Agricultural Credits Act (1923) which provided government subsidies for farms, and 
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several iterations of the McNary-Haugen plan.
2053
  Knowing that Smith needed a 
Southerner on the ticket, Nevada senator Key Pittman wrote Belle Moskowitz to 
recommend his colleague from Arkansas, assuring her that Robinson was a perfect fit for 
the New Yorker because he was “liberal at heart . . . tolerant, unselfish, and fearless.”
2054
  
Once nominated, Robinson made dozens of speeches denouncing the administration and 
the Republican nominee as tools of special interests; championing the rights of labor; and 
extolling Smith’s progressive views on resource management and farm relief—travelling 
twenty-five thousand miles by rail in the process.
2055
 
As was the case in the rest of the nation, Southern voters were not exclusively 
inundated with competing cultural appeals during the 1928 conflict.  Rather, they were 
also exposed to Smith’s progressive arguments and his progressive record, and to the 
progressive ideas of his supporters.  Much like the female social workers of the urban 
Northeast, the populist-progressives of the rural South who championed Smith’s 
candidacy set aside certain tenets of their traditional platform—especially prohibition—in 
order to promote those planks also espoused by the Democratic nominee.  Thus, when 
Thomas McLeod endorsed Smith’s proposal to call on a panel of experts to craft a federal 
solution for struggling agriculture, or when Josephus Daniels praised the New Yorker’s 
social welfare record as a compelling argument for his elevation to the White House, or 
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when Joe Robinson lambasted the “reactionaries” of the Coolidge administration for 
failing to conserve the people’s resources—all in the context of an Al Smith campaign—




Fig. 7.15: Smith’s leading Southern supporters: his running mate, Senator Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas 




Within the South there was an indigenous progressive tradition, the adherents of 
which the Democrats sought to galvanize on behalf of their reformist nominee.  Yet 
Smith’s progressive appeals, whether to desperate farmers, labor activists, or 
conservationists, did not have the same force in the South as elsewhere.  There were 
several reasons for this, all of which highlight key facets of the broader national 
campaign.   
Smith’s progressivism was born of the urban experience.  While it was absolutely 
the case that the New Yorker and his advisors made earnest attempts to apply their 
approach to rural life, there was simply less to attract farmers to the governor’s vision for 
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America than there was for urban workers.  Populist farmers and Southern reformers 
formed a starkly different audience than the one transitional progressivism had been 
crafted to serve, and the two populations’ desires on questions like tariff rates, labor 
rights, and monetary policy were not always compatible.  Moreover, ethnic urban 
workers coveted not only labor protections, but also social acceptance; indeed, many of 
the Smith supporters who would rally to his proposals for welfare reforms or economic 
justice were initially captured by the governor’s calls for a cessation of prohibition 
enforcement and the destruction of the Ku Klux Klan.
2057
  Smith’s pluralism was not 
universally the entering wedge it had been in the urban North; in the South it functioned 
as more of a door stop.   
Furthermore, the candidate himself failed to make the sort of energetic appeal to 
the people of the South that was so central to his progressive style.  If a key to Smith’s 
success had always been his talent for communicating directly with voters on serious 
matters, it is no wonder that the Democrat failed to instigate a stampede to his cause 
among Southern progressives:  put simply, the region was neglected by the candidate.  
Joseph Robinson spent much of the fall battling what he perceived as a Northeastern bias 
within the campaign that diverted resources away from Southern states, complaining 
privately of the DNC’s slow and incompetent handling of the region.
2058
  A minor 
symptom of this disregard was an uncharacteristically amateurish oversight in which 
Smith ignored a warm communication from North Carolina governor Angus McLean for 
over two months—finally replying to a congratulatory letter of July 3, 1928, on 
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  Of broader significance, the nominee spent very little time in what he 
assumed to be the Solid South.  The campaign only scheduled one major address for the 
entire region—delivered in Nashville on October 12.  This was supplemented by several 
very brief, extemporaneous speeches at stops in medium-sized cities like Chattanooga 
and Raleigh, as well as a raucous pep rally in Richmond.
2060
  Smith’s only real trek into 
the Deep South occurred en route from Chattanooga to Nashville, when his train dipped 
into northern Alabama and “passed through two stations . . . slowing down for the 
Governor to wave to a crowd of 200 at Bridgeport and stopping at Stevenson, where a 
crowd of 250 were led in three cheers ‘for the next president.’”
2061
    
The hallmark of Smith’s progressivism was his ability to communicate his 
proposals to voters; in the case of the South, the nominee not only failed to do this, he 
failed even to make a serious effort.  He did endeavor to do so during his Nashville 
address, highlighting farm relief as he had during several stops in the Corn Belt.  But 
struggling Southern farmers, heirs to a strong populist tradition who might well have 
been attracted to Smith’s pronouncements on agriculture, were largely excluded from the 
candidate’s discussion of the question—unless they happened to reside in central 
Tennessee or were fortunate enough to inhabit a community where the newspapers spent 
significant column space on the issue.  Most of Smith’s major addresses, including many 
on agriculture, were made available nationally through radio broadcasts; but this was of 
little consequence to the overwhelming majority of Southern farmers:  in 1925, only 4.5 
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percent of all American farms had radios; in the South Atlantic region, that figure was 1.1 
percent; in the West South Central region it was 1.6 percent; and in the East South 
Central region, it was 0.6 percent.
2062
  In Alabama, both Carolinas, Georgia, Louisiana, 




Smith’s failure to communicate effectively with these potential constituents 
produced a rhetorical vacuum that was swiftly filled by demagogues from both 
campaigns.  In the urban North and portions of the Midwest, the nominee was able to 
capture the interest of potential supporters with his background and win them over with 
his preternatural ability to distill complex policy problems into popular terms.  In the 
South, Smith lacked that initial appeal and failed to exercise his talents.   
While acknowledging that Smith’s “provincialism” was not totally responsible for 
his political downfall in 1928, David Burner faults the candidate for his stubborn 
attachment to his self-identity—his frank unwillingness to mask his faith, his urban 
heritage, or his personal revulsion at prohibition.
2064
  It is clear that Smith could have 
done much more to bridge the cultural gap between himself and the voters of the South 
and other rural regions; but it is equally clear that to have done so would have involved a 
great deal of dishonesty, as well as submission to the very sort of social élitism against 
which he had spent his career rebelling.  Smith’s great mistake in the South was in fact 
that he was not himself to a greater degree—he did not engage voters on progressive 
issues to the same extent he had elsewhere, and thus he failed to offer an alternative 
narrative to the one centered upon Tammany, saloonkeepers, and ultramontanism.  It 
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probably would not have changed the outcome, but it is a certainty that had the candidate 
emphasized his progressive platform in greater depth before more Southern audiences, 
and had his local supporters more enthusiastically followed the models of Robinson, 
Daniels, and others in doing the same, then the campaign would have presented a 
compelling message to contend with that being anxiously broadcast by bigots of all 
stripes. 
 
*  *  * 
 
The 1928 campaign was an ugly battle nationwide—and nowhere more so than 
the South.  The vicious whispers about religion launched in all regions were 
supplemented in Dixie with wild accusations doused in racist vitriol from figures on both 
sides.  Harangues against the candidates were transmogrified into secondary and even 
tertiary attacks by supporters of one camp against notable supporters of the other.  
Klansmen discharged tirades not only against the pope and Al Smith, but also against 
Clyde Hoey and Cameron Morrison; Carter Glass dueled bitterly with Bishop Cannon 
throughout the fall; former congressman Hallett Ward suggested that Furnifold Simmons 
had “lost his mind and is virtually crazy”; and Josephus Daniels was assailed by an anti-
Smith group based as much on his record as secretary of the navy as on his support for 
his party’s nominee (these critics were in turn condemned by an indignant group of 
Democratic war veterans).
2065
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As passions flared, the campaign devolved from nasty to violent.  In Richland 
County, South Carolina, an anti-Smith Democratic meeting was infiltrated by party 
regulars, who pelted the bolters with eggs during a “five minute period of free-for-all 
fighting.”
2067
  At the Texas State Democratic Convention in Dallas, “eyes were blackened 
and noses bled” as former governor Oscar Colquitt marshaled fellow anti-Smith partisans 
from the hall to jeers of “get out, Republicans” while wrestling with loyalists for 
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  When two Hoover supporters tried to drive their politically 
festooned auto in a Smith parade in Raleigh, “a mob of spectators broke ranks at the curb, 
halted the car, smashed its headlights, wrenched off a door, ripped up the upholstery, 
slashed a tire and plastered the body with Smith stickers,” as the once-audacious pair 
fled.
2069
  In the course of a week in northern Alabama, a Methodist minister’s pro-Hoover 
oration “was greeted by a hail of eggs and oranges,” resulting in “a hasty adjournment”; a 
candidate for alderman was escorted home from a separate meeting by sheriff’s deputies 
after punching a man who had begun cheering for Al Smith; and another clergyman at 
another meeting encountered “a bombardment of eggs” during an anti-Smith speech.
2070
  
A Brooksville, Florida, man was struck with a water pitcher by the town’s former mayor 
after expressing dissent at an anti-Smith meeting.
2071
  A storekeeper in Robinson Station, 
Kentucky, was shot and killed after “an argument over politics and religion.”
2072
  Thomas 
Heflin was egged repeatedly; a policeman was shot to death by his brother-in-law in 
Rocky Mount, North Carolina, during a political argument; and on Election Day, the 
Washington Star would report:  “Man Shot at Polls in West Virginia.  Weather Good.”
2073
  
As “Hambone,” J. P. Alley’s grotesque caricature of a black working man observed: 
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“Atter dis’ heah ‘lection gits over wid, de pahson’s sho gwine hab a time holdin’ big, 
shoutin’ meetin’s so’s to patch folks togedder ag’in!!”
2074
    
The reason for all of this acrimony was that for the first time in decades the many 
important categories of political self-definition for Southern voters were being forced into 
conflict by shifting coalitions and changing national debates.  Southerners who had 
contently marked the straight party ticket as dries, Protestants, whites, farmers, and rock-
ribbed Democrats, were now compelled to make tough choices.  Voters had to decide 
which of these reference groups was most crucial to the maintenance of their personal, 
social, and political worldview; and even if they were able to make such a choice, they 
were often faced with competing importunities for their vote, as both sides tenaciously 
claimed to represent the best interests of most factions.  Therefore, the conclusion to be 
drawn from the Southern experience is that 1928 was a particularly complicated 
campaign; no single factor can explain the results, for there were many motivations 
which had varying degrees of importance to different voters in different regions and 
contexts.  In the South, as in the rest of the nation, the election was too complex for its 
results to be assigned a neat causality.   
In the midst of this chaos, many Democrats saw reasons for hope.  Newspapers 
crowed about the imperturbability of the Solid South, while party operatives exuded 
confidence in public and private.
2075
  This aplomb was unfounded.  For the first time 
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since Reconstruction, the “Solid South” was sundered.  Days after the election, Josephus 
Daniels wrote Franklin Roosevelt that he had “hardly adjusted myself to new conditions,” 
for “I was so confident that Governor Smith would carry . . . North Carolina,” which he 
had considered “perfectly safe.”
2076
  In retrospect there were clear portents of Smith’s 
impending doom in the Tar Heel State; but evidently Daniels could not read the writing 




Fig. 7.17: A sullen Smith backer, resigned to defeat, standing before the Winston-Salem courthouse.
2077
  
                                                                                                                                                 
Chairmen, October 18, 1928, pp. 1-2, John J. Raskob Papers, File 602, Box 1.  The New York World 
likewise had Smith carrying all former confederate states except Tennessee.  “How States Are Likely to 
Vote In Election,” The New York World, November 4, 1928, p. 22.  
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The next Democratic nominee’s fortunes in North Carolina and throughout Dixie 
would be much different from those of Al Smith.  Franklin Roosevelt, a lifelong 
Episcopalian who saw himself as a farmer from bucolic Dutchess County, New York, 
and made Warm Springs, Georgia, into something of a second home, held a strong appeal 
for many Southerners.  Furthermore, by 1932 prohibitionist firebrands had lost the 
attention of the public—bankrupt farmers and unemployed millworkers had other 
concerns.  Indeed, the Great Depression had discredited inchoate Southern 
Republicanism just as it had discredited Hoover across the nation.  The two leading 
voices among the anti-Smith Democratic senators, Alabama’s J. Thomas Heflin and 
North Carolina’s Furnifold M. Simmons, were both denied re-nomination in 1930.
2078
  In 
four presidential contests, Franklin Roosevelt never lost a single Southern state.
2079
  After 
a brief aberration, the Solid South had been restored. 
So it may have appeared; but as a matter of fact that Southern solidity began to 
crack as soon as the name Roosevelt ceased to appear on the ticket.  Even in the heyday 
of the New Deal, Southern politicians had been in the forefront of the conservative 
opposition to the president’s proposals; yet Roosevelt had “struck a responsive chord 
with southerners . . . .  He soon captured the minds and hearts of the southern people . . . .  
During the 1930s his personality and his programs were as popular in the southern states 
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as in other parts of the country.”
2080
  However, there were signs in the later Roosevelt 
years that the Democratic hold on the region’s politics might be weakening—in 1939 and 
again in 1943, a clear majority of Southerners told the Gallup poll that the South would 
be better off with “two political parties . . . of about equal strength, instead of only one 
strong party as at present.”
2081
  In the post-Roosevelt years, the percentage who favored 






Fig. 7.18: Charting the Gallup Poll’s findings on Southern attitudes toward a two-party South. 
 
Not only was there a change in attitude; there was also a change in behavior.  In 
1948, when a liberal civil rights plank in the Democratic platform inspired a Southern 
walk-out at the party’s convention, South Carolina governor J. Strom Thurmond carried 
Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and his home state for the hastily fashioned States’ 
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  The great strength for these insurgents came from the Black 
Belt, upending the trends witnessed in 1928.  Yet, as Grantham notes, “the growth of 
centralized government and the creation of a welfare state” also “disturbed conservative 
southerners”; while “racial fears” fueled this “Dixiecrat revolt,” it “was also a 
manifestation of a broader regional conservatism promoted by rapid economic and social 
change.”
2084
  In the 1950s, the Democrats would begin ceding the outer South to the 
Republicans: in the 1952, 1956, and 1960 elections, West Virginia voted Republican 
once; Kentucky and Texas did so twice; and Florida, Tennessee, and Virginia did so in all 
three contests.  In 1960 the Deep South also caused trouble for the national Democrats, 
with the state of Mississippi as well as the unpledged portion of Alabama’s electors 
casting their votes for Virginia senator Harry Flood Byrd rather than the Democratic 
nominee, Massachusetts senator John F. Kennedy.
2085
  In 1964, Democratic president 
Lyndon Johnson’s relative boldness on civil rights again cost the party the Deep South, 
and from 1968 forward the outer South and the Deep South were Republican as a rule.
2086
  
The issues that propelled these developments were as variegated as those that split 
the Democracy in 1928; civil rights was clearly in the forefront, but fiscal conservatism 
and the attractiveness of the business-minded Republicans to successful urban 
entrepreneurs played significant roles as well.
2087
  Just as had been the case in 1928, it 
was this confluence of cultural, social, and economic factors that made Southern politics 
more complex than it had been since Reconstruction—a development that eventually led 
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to a two-party system and even Republican ascendency.  The kinds of questions that 
divided the Southern Democracy in the post-World War II period found neat parallels in 
the Smith-Hoover bout; and while neither Thomas Heflin nor Furnifold Simmons was 
involved in the Dixiecrat movement, there were clear thematic continuities between the 




Charting Democratic presidential percentages in the South during the twentieth 
century graphically demonstrates the tangible products of these links.  In most states, the 
huge Democratic majorities that were broken in 1928 were restored or even enhanced in 
the FDR years, only to begin a steady decline in the years after Roosevelt’s death.  This 
trend is telling, but the size of a party’s presidential vote in a given state is heavily 
influenced by the national political situation in that particular year, so the numbers can be 
skewed in an election like the 1972 Nixon landslide.  A better method for charting the 
declining strength of Democrats in the South is to subtract the percentage of the national 
popular vote achieved by the party’s nominee from that received in a given state.  This 
measure shows whether a state was especially Democratic, or less Democratic than the 
nation as a whole in a given year.  
This measure demonstrates declining Democratic fortunes in both the Deep South 
(defined here as ex-Confederate states that voted for either Strom Thurmond in 1948 or 
George Wallace in 1968, or both) and the Peripheral South (defined as ex-Confederate 
states that did not vote for either insurgent candidate) in the post-Roosevelt period.  But 
the Roosevelt elections took place under extraordinary circumstances and featured an 
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extraordinary personality at the top of the Democratic ticket.  If the same figures are 
tracked, excluding 1932, 1936, 1940, and 1944, it becomes evident that the trends 
established in 1928 continued once Roosevelt was no longer the nominee.     
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It is significant that the 1928 pattern was more closely resembled in the post-
Roosevelt period among the states of the Peripheral South than in those of the Deep 
South.  In these outer states, “urban and suburban voters, together with Dixiecrats who 
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four states” (Tennessee, Virginia, Florida, and Texas) for Eisenhower in 1952.
2089
  
Similarly, in 1928, Smith was able to hold the entirety of the Deep South, while he lost 
all of the Peripheral South.  Stable and sustained Democratic weakness in the specific 
areas where the Smith campaign had struggled the most suggests that 1928 was the 
election in which this modern pattern first emerged.   
Opposition to African-American civil rights, while a potent force in the periphery, 
was not independently powerful enough in those states to pull them into the column of 
either of the segregationist insurgencies.  Thus, while Democratic fortunes post-FDR in 
the Deep South appear erratic—influenced sharply by factors including civil rights (1948, 
1964, 1968) or the presence of a Southerner at the head of the ticket (1976)—Democratic 
decline in the Peripheral South, while far from uniform, was more steady, and slightly 
cushioned from such factors—although they clearly exerted at least some influence, 
especially in North Carolina and Tennessee and especially during the turbulent 1960s.  A 
possible conclusion is that in the peripheral states, the rising economic conservatism 
which had at least some importance in 1928 exerted an enduring influence on presidential 
voting, as the national Democrats continued to espouse a liberal agenda.  In the Deep 
South, on the other hand, economic struggles and historical partisan loyalties continued to 
keep voters faithful to the Democrats in years when the party did not take a particularly 
aggressive stance on civil rights (1952, 1956, 1960), while the race question drove many 
white voters away from the party in years when the Democratic position was noticeably 
different from that of the Republicans or alternative parties.  By the 1970s and 1980s, the 
growth of the Sun Belt had brought much of the New South dynamism enjoyed by the 
periphery into the Deep South, and election results suggest that in those years there was 
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more unanimity within the region—perhaps signaling that economic and social 
conservatism had blended more evenly across the South by the later decades.
2090
     
While the influence of economic forces on these trends is debatable, what the data 
unquestionably demonstrates is that in 1928, not only did the Southern vote splinter; it 
did so in a way that foreshadowed later patterns.  All of this suggests that the Roosevelt 
years might not have been a simple restoration of the Solid South after an isolated 
aberration prompted by the nomination of a wet Catholic from the Lower East Side.  
Perhaps instead the unique economic situation of the 1930s and the magical personality 
of FDR temporarily postponed the further decomposition of the Democratic South, 
rendering the results in 1932, ’36, ’40 and ’44 the real anomaly.  Viewed in this context, 
1928 was not a misfire for the Solid South; it was a warning shot in a pending revolution.        
 
 
Fig. 7.23: Democratic presidential strength in the former Confederate states, 1896-2008  
(FDR elections excluded). 
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Conclusion: The Happy Warriors 
 
 
“I voted as the other Members of Congress did in those days of honeymoon between the 
Executive and Legislative branches of the Government.  There was this difference 
though:  I was not voting to remedy the new and different onslaught of economic distress 
which seemed suddenly to have descended upon us.  I had come from a little bit of world 
where economic distress had, it seemed, always been a part of life.  What I had known, 
what I had seen in Brownsville, Pitkin Avenue, in the Bushwick section of Brooklyn, in 
the Park Places of Brooklyn, in the markets of Brooklyn, had now become the 
generalized commonplace experience.  I had known people hungry, cold, homeless, 
afraid, insecure.  I was not talking and voting about anything new.  I represented a district 
that had never known leisure, had never known freedom from want and freedom from 
fear.” 
 
-Congressman Emanuel Celler (D-NY), You Never Leave Brooklyn (1953)  
 
 
 After almost two decades of development in New York State, transitional 
progressivism had been presented to the nation in a coordinated fashion by Alfred E. 
Smith and his Democratic allies during the 1928 presidential contest.  In the urban, 
industrial North—particularly in New England and in many of the nation’s great cities—
this unique amalgam of social welfare and labor progressivism, cultural pluralism, and 
political pragmatism, had fueled unprecedented Democratic successes.  Yet faced in 1928 
with the nation’s prevailing economic and cultural conservatism, Al Smith and his ideas 
went down to defeat.    
Though Smith was vanquished, the Republican landslide of 1928 did not halt the 
momentum that the New Yorker’s candidacy had lent to those progressive ideas.  In 
September of that year, syndicated columnist Mark Sullivan had noted the increasingly 
urban cast of the Democratic Party, discussing the influx of ethnic city-dwellers into 
politics and the consequent influence this would exert on debates over prohibition and 





be a permanent transformation:  “Dry Democrats have been telling their followers to sit 
tight and vote straight, as usual; that Smith will be beaten in November and that then the 
old management could resume control.  Of all the vain hopes now current in the political 
world, that is probably the vainest.  In the new Democratic party, the bulk of the votes are 
going to come from the wets in the big cities and the new wet leadership will keep 
control.”
2091
  Sullivan’s headline blared his conclusion:  “New Democratic Party is 
Born.”
2092
     
In fact, a substantive metamorphosis of the Democratic Party had been set in 
motion by Smith’s national campaign.  In its wake, an increasingly influential faction 
within the party began to insist both that their voices be recognized and that their 
proposals be enacted.  During the 1930s, the agenda of transitional progressivism would 
constitute a considerable portion of the liberal Democratic program. 
 
Father of the New Deal? 
 
 While remarkable and even revolutionary, the subtleties of this development must 
be understood in order to define the precise role transitional progressivism (and 
transitional progressives) played in shaping Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal.  There has 
been an understandable tendency to overstate Al Smith’s significance as the inspiration or 
even the progenitor of the liberal program of the 1930s.  A particularly strong exponent 
of this position, historian Paula Eldot, identified “Smith as an important source of the 
New Deal” in her thorough examination of his governorship, concluding that “his career 
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in Albany places Smith in a reform tradition that extends from progressivism to the New 
Deal.”
2093
  Eldot, who rightly identified Smith’s gubernatorial program as that of a 
progressive reformer, pointed to a “continuity of policy” between Smith and Roosevelt in 
areas including administrative reorganization, “humanitarian” government, conservation, 
housing, labor, and water power, to affirm the thesis—set forth by Frances Perkins—that 
the Happy Warrior ought to be remembered as “the forerunner of the New Deal.”
2094
  
Eldot was not the first author to make such observations.  In 1969, Matthew and Hannah 
Josephson asserted that under Smith, “in New York you could find the beginnings of the 
Welfare State which was to reach full bloom later in its federal form under the New Deal 
Administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt.”
2095
  Moreover, this view has commanded 
remarkable staying power.  In 2011, Salon editor-in-chief Joan Walsh went as far as to 
dub Al Smith “the real father of the New Deal.”
2096
    
 Many studies have presented a far different view of the Happy Warrior.  William 
Leuchtenburg suggested that the New Yorker had been a moderate reformer who was 
“from the first fundamentally conservative” and who “never questioned the assumptions 
of capitalist society, certainly not the profit motive or the virtue of success,” pointing out 
that “the notion of a planned society was as repugnant to [Smith] as to Hoover.”
2097
  
Similarly, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., detected an important difference between the New 
Yorker’s beliefs and the influential “economic pseudo-radicalism” of agrarian 
Democrats: “Smith stood for a social welfare liberalism, indifferent to the concentration 
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of wealth, uninterested in basic change, but concerned with protecting the individual 
against the hazards of industrial society.”
2098
   
 Both positions spring from essential truths, yet each errs in its basic premise.  
Historians are correct to recognize the significance of Smith’s governorship to the 
development of a social welfare regime prior to the onset of the Great Depression and the 
consequent establishment of the New Deal state.  However, Smith’s progressivism must 
not be extracted from the world in which it was exercised.  Each facet of his 
gubernatorial agenda was a programmatic manifestation of transitional progressivism—
variously applied in diverse contexts based on specific problems and crafted each time to 
succeed within a unique political environment.  To the extent that Governor and then 
President Roosevelt faced many of the same humanitarian crises that Smith had combated 
at Albany, precedents had been established by the elder Democrat for robust 
governmental intervention on behalf of social welfare.  Moreover, figures who had 
helped to develop Smith’s transitional progressive approach to state governance—most 
notably Frances Perkins and Robert Wagner—would play central roles in determining 
FDR’s approach to many of the problems of the Great Depression.  Because of the 
singularity—in breadth, scale, and success—of Smith’s progressivism during the 1920s, 
and because of the intimate connections between the two New York Democrats, it is only 
logical to perceive a line of development running through Smith to Roosevelt and the 
New Deal.  Yet Smith never faced the Great Depression as an executive; nor did he ever 
have to deal with national problems as anything more than a candidate.  Smith’s 
progressive administration set precedents upon which Roosevelt would build and 
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established a strong social welfare tradition from which Roosevelt would draw, but 
transitional progressivism did not constitute the genesis of the New Deal. 
 On the other side, there is truth to the argument that Al Smith was not particularly 
interested in establishing a “planned society,” especially at the national level.  But 
Smith’s gubernatorial record belies the notion that he instinctively found such planning 
“repugnant.”
2099
  Similarly, while not an anti-corporate crusader or visceral maligner of 
the upper classes, Smith’s record demonstrates a willingness to engage in such class-
based politics in situations where this was a useful political technique for promoting his 
vision of social justice.  Indeed, the very notion that social justice ought to be 
established—and that this usually meant an active government promoting the interests of 
the poor and working classes while infringing on the prerogatives of the wealthy and 
powerful—was a central tenet of Smith’s transitional progressivism, which runs counter 
to the impressions left by Schlesinger and Leuchtenburg.  From the perspective of the 
social workers and machine politicians who had awkwardly aligned to develop this 
transitional progressivism, and most importantly from the perspective of the urban 
workers on whose behalf that progressivism was employed, the assertion that “protecting 
the individual against the hazards of industrial society” did not constitute “basic change” 
would have been absurd.           
 The flaw of both positions is their attempt to understand Smith’s program through 
the prism of the New Deal era.  One looks back to the 1920s and discovers that many of 
the social welfare battles won by New Dealers had earlier been joined by Al Smith; the 
other scours Smith’s progressivism and finds an absence of Tugwellian planning and a 
lack of class rhetoric in the manner of the 1936 Democratic campaign.  What emerges in 
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both cases is a narrative that necessarily discounts the subtleties of Smith’s progressivism 
and risks projecting unique contextual elements such as the Great Depression and the 
Roosevelt landslides into the political reality of the 1920s, thus utilizing anachronistic 
standards for “progressivism,” “conservatism,” “liberalism,” and other concepts which 
were themselves redefined by the upheavals of the 1930s.  Eldot is absolutely correct that 
Smith was a progressive governor, and that many of his achievements can be seen at least 
to have foreshadowed elements of the New Deal; and Leuchtenburg and Schlesinger are 
equally correct that Smith’s progressivism was not New Deal liberalism.  Here J. Joseph 
Huthmacher’s nomenclature is the most precise:  many New Deal programs were “akin to 
those [Smith] had espoused at Albany.”
2100
      
      
Making a New Deal 
 
 In fact, transitional progressivism did serve as a fundamental stage in the 
evolution from Progressivism to New Deal liberalism, both in policy and politics.  In 
New York, the transitional progressives reconciled and then synthesized the social work 
and urban Democratic traditions; they then politicized the resulting new progressivism as 
a partisan agenda, institutionalized that agenda as a comprehensive program for New 
York State, and nationalized their program during the 1928 presidential campaign.  
Simultaneously, Al Smith’s presidential bid precipitated an electoral revolution in key 
regions—especially the industrial Northeast—and the powerful voting bloc that emerged 
would in turn prove an essential component of the Roosevelt coalition. 
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 While cultural factors like religion and prohibition clearly bolstered Smith’s cause 
among these urban ethnic working-class voters, the candidate’s transitional 
progressivism, articulated throughout the campaign by the nominee and his partisans, 
also resonated with those being neglected by Republican economics.  It is widely 
accepted that, irrespective of the cultural controversies surrounding Smith’s candidacy, 
Republican success in 1928 was foreordained by the prosperity being enjoyed by much of 
the nation.
2101
  In fact, this argument is even stronger than its proponents have 
acknowledged, for rather than adopting wholesale a “me too” posture toward Republican 
policies, Smith articulated his alternative, progressive vision of a robust social welfare 
regime at a time when economic conditions left most Americans disinterested in such 
matters.
2102
   
 Yet this program was not universally repulsive.  The experiences of urban ethnic 
workers left these voters more eager to embrace Smith’s policies, and they were 
responsive to the entreaties of the transitional progressives.
2103
  The 1928 campaign thus 
strengthened ties between urban ethnic voters and the Democratic Party.
2104
  This 
invigoration was not merely manifested in the reinforcement of Democratic machines 
with a new infusion of ethnic votes.
2105
  Rather, the nature of the national Democratic 
Party began to change with these developments.  As urban ethnic voters became an 
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increasingly significant bloc within the party, they became increasingly assertive.  In 
Smith’s wake, these voters and their elected leaders became forceful advocates of social 
welfare and labor reforms within the Democratic Party, and in this way helped shape the 
course of New Deal legislation and the development of the American welfare state.  
Before 1928, noted Frances Perkins, this “program of social justice” had been at most a 
marginal priority for Democratic presidential candidates; but those voters who were 
initiated into the party by the Smith candidacy would prioritize such questions, altering 
the parameters of serious public policy debate in the United States.
2106
 
 In 1990, historian Lizabeth Cohen argued in Making a New Deal that common 
cultural experiences among ethnic Chicagoans in the late 1920s and 1930s provided 
diverse workers a common foundation on which to construct class solidarity.
2107
  
Simultaneously, those workers witnessed the impotence of private and local charities in 
the face of the Depression and began demanding federal action on behalf of social 
welfare.
2108
  Galvanized collectively as active Democrats by 1936 and organized as 
enthusiastic unionists shortly thereafter, Chicago’s ethnic workers pressed for public 
policies that reflected their conception of “moral capitalism.”
2109
  In this way, workers 
truly made the New Deal. 
 Cohen’s is a compelling and largely accurate picture of working-class ethnic 
politics during the Great Depression.  However, a crucial addendum to such a narrative is 
recognition that Al Smith’s 1928 campaign, beyond stimulating ethnic city-dwellers over 
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the question of prohibition, as acknowledged by Cohen, helped to activate ethnic workers 
as Democrats who espoused the principles of transitional progressivism on questions of 
social welfare as well as cultural pluralism.
2110
  The tumult of the Depression catapulted 
Franklin Roosevelt into the White House just as urban ethnic workers became a crucial 
bloc within the Democratic Party, and simultaneously these voters’ representatives began 
to express their particular progressive agenda with increasing force and assertiveness.  As 
they did, specific facets of the New Deal would be imbued with the distinctive agenda of 
transitional progressivism. 
 Indeed, those who entered the 1930s espousing that agenda were in many ways 
satiated.  With the New Deal, the engaged state envisioned by social workers and their 
political allies was firmly established.  Female social work progressives found much of 
their specific agenda present in Roosevelt’s program.
2111
  As historian Robyn Muncy 
notes, the 1935 Social Security Act incorporated almost wholesale the programmatic 
recommendations of Children’s Bureau chief Katharine Lenroot and her predecessor 
Grace Abbott—restoring the bureau’s maternal and infant health programs, providing 
programs for crippled and neglected children, and nationalizing mothers’ pensions.
2112
  
Furthermore, as the New Deal bureaucratized and expanded many of these women’s 
initiatives, it offered numerous positions for female progressives who had been trained 
within the social work tradition.
2113
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 Specific national problems that had been identified during the Smith campaign 
and which were made urgent with the onset of the Great Depression were often met 
through amplified, nationalized formulations of transitional progressive proposals.  
Through New Deal agencies including the Civil Works Administration, Public Works 
Administration, and Works Progress Administration, great public works projects were 
initiated to help alleviate unemployment and modernize the national estate.
2114
  
Meanwhile, the Tennessee Valley Authority’s power program firmly established federal 
control over the Muscle Shoals site and demonstrated the potential of public power 
projects to lower electricity rates and improve efficiency.
2115
   
 Housing, the Herculean challenge with which social workers had been contending 
since the Gilded Age and that had become a focus of state policy under Al Smith’s 
Reconstruction Commission, was another area of social welfare taken up by Roosevelt’s 
administration.  In 1933 the New Deal “saved tens of thousands of homes from 
foreclosure” by refinancing mortgages through the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation.
2116
  
The following year, the Federal Housing Authority began encouraging construction of 
private housing by insuring loans.
2117
  By 1937, an even more active role was being 
played in housing thanks to the Wagner-Steagall Act, which created the United States 
Housing Authority and helped finance public housing projects.
2118
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 Industrial life, the evils of which had provided the original impetus for the 
transitional progressive alliance, became the focus of serious federal regulation.  As 
William Leuchtenburg notes, in facilitating the codification of labor practices for major 
industries, the National Recovery Administration “wiped out sweatshops, ended various 
forms of exploitation, and removed some 150,000 child laborers from factories.”
2120
  
Workers were also provided with the means of self-advocacy.  Section 7(a) of the 
National Industrial Recovery Act set the precedent for federal protection of collective 
bargaining rights; and while this would evaporate with the Supreme Court’s 1935 
decision in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States and the resulting demolition of the 
floundering NRA, even stronger and more durable union protections would be 
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established in the wake of the ruling.
2121
  The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 
known colloquially as the “Wagner Act” after the New Yorker who sponsored the bill in 
the Senate, guaranteed collective bargaining rights to duly chosen unions, legalized 
strikes and boycotts, outlawed company unions, yellow-dog contracts, and blacklists, and 
formed a National Labor Relations Board empowered to supervise union representation 
elections and conduct hearings on labor grievances.
2122
  As a result of these protections, 
union membership in the manufacturing sector soared by almost four-fold from 1933 to 
1941.
2123
  Moreover, in the tradition of the state-level labor progressivism of the 1910s 
and 1920s, the federal government now established minimum wages and maximum 
hours, and sought to improve workplace conditions for many workers through such 
legislation as the 1936 Walsh-Healey Act and the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act.
2124
   
 Indeed, the urban ethnic workers who were brought into the Democratic column 
beginning in 1928 could fairly consider the New Deal their deal.  They had gained labor 
protections (under the Wagner Act and Fair Labor Standards Act), unemployment relief 
(through the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, the sundry works programs, and 
later through Social Security), and at least a modicum of financial security (of personal 
savings, through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; of homes, through the 
HOLC; and, eventually, even in retirement through Social Security).  Perhaps as 
significantly for these groups, the Democratic Party of the New Deal era had inherited 
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from transitional progressivism a distaste for social policies based upon proscriptions on 
personal behavior and élitist drives for old-stock cultural domination.  As William 
Leuchtenburg characterized the change:  
The reformers of the thirties had abandoned . . . the old Emersonian hope of 
reforming man and sought only to change institutions.  This meant that they did 
not seek to ‘uplift’ the people they were helping but only to improve their 
economic position. . . .  Reform in the 1930’s meant economic reform; it departed 
from the Methodist-parsonage morality of many of the earlier Progressives, in 
part because much of the New Deal support, and many of its leaders, derived from 
urban immigrant groups hostile to the old Sabbatarianism.
2125
    
 
 On March 22, 1933, less than a month into his presidency, Franklin Roosevelt 
signed legislation amending the Volstead Act to legalize beer with an alcoholic content of 
up to 3.2 percent.
2126
  By December, the Twenty-first Amendment, which had passed 
both houses of Congress prior to FDR’s inauguration, had been ratified.
2127
   Prohibition 
was over. 
 
The Happy Warriors 
 
 Of course, FDR had not ascended to the presidency intent on nationalizing 
transitional progressivism or with a stated goal of instituting the proposals of Alfred E. 
Smith.  His mission was much more straightforward: defeat the Depression.  
Constitutionally, many others shared this responsibility with the new president, and so 
Roosevelt and his “Brains Trust” were compelled to work with Congress in restoring the 
economy and ameliorating the suffering of the American people.   
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 Often, Roosevelt enjoyed the support of a cooperative—in the early days, 
sometimes even pliant—Democratic caucus, which dominated both houses of Congress 
for his first six years in office.  Yet just as often congressional forces insisted on 
promoting their own agendas, and this legislative independence helped shape the course 
of the New Deal.
2128
  Such was certainly the case with the newest major bloc inside the 
Democratic caucus:  representatives of the urban, ethnic, working classes—especially 
those from the Northeast and other areas where Al Smith had made tremendous inroads 






 In general, these Northeastern urban Democrats were among the most loyal 
supporters of New Deal legislation.  In his 1967 study Congressional Conservatism and 
the New Deal, historian James T. Patterson found that of the seventy-seven most 
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conservative House Democrats from 1933 to 1939, eighteen were from the Northeast or 
Midwest, and of these, only ten were from “urban” districts.
2130
  Significantly, only four 
of the seventy-seven conservative Democrats were from urban districts in either southern 
New England or the New York metropolitan region.
2131
  Only one of these conservative 
Democrats was from New York City; there were none from Boston or Jersey City, nor 
were there any from the entire states of Connecticut or Rhode Island.
2132
 
 Put more positively, the Democratic delegations from New York, New Jersey, and 
southern New England, were important congressional partners in much of Roosevelt’s 
program.
2133
  In 1933, these representatives were unanimous in their support for creating 
FERA and the NRA; they gave 85.4 percent support to the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
and 91.7 percent support to the TVA conference report.
2134
  In 1935 they unanimously 
backed the Social Security Act and the conference report creating the Works Progress 
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Administration; and later initiatives including housing legislation (1937 and 1939) and 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (1938) would also attract unanimous support.
2135
       
 As with any collection of politicians, this bloc could be fickle.  Yet the nature of 
their disagreements with the administration elucidates their priorities far better than the 
frequency of their concurrence.  There was regular dissent among these representatives, 
for example, on matters of corporate regulation and taxation.  Only 78 percent of these 
Northeasterners supported creating the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1934.
2136
  
Similarly, 79.5 percent supported the conference report on the so-called “soak the rich” 
Revenue Act in 1935, and 78.6 percent backed the undistributed profits tax the following 
year.
2137
  In each of these cases, the support for the administration’s wishes was still 
slightly above the congressional average—SEC received 77 percent, the Revenue Act 
77.2 percent, and the undistributed profits tax received 69.3 percent—but when 
Republicans are factored into the opposition, the Northeasterners are shown to have been 
among the weaker Democratic supporters of the administration’s more populist 
ambitions.  Certainly this was the case when two-thirds of the Northeastern 
representatives voted to replace the Senate’s public utilities holding company “death 
sentence” provision with a milder House substitute in 1935.
2138
  Indeed, only 55.3 percent 
ultimately supported the conference report on that bill.
2139
  The significance of this 
opposition is revealed further in light of the fact that twenty-eight of the one hundred 
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Democrats who “deserted” the administration on the utilities bill were from the 
Northeast—whereas in 1935 that region provided only 13.7 percent of the entire 
Democratic caucus.
2140
      
 Conversely, Northeastern congressional Democrats sometimes bucked the 
Roosevelt administration in ways that hardly marked them as conservatives.  The first, 
and most noteworthy, was with the Economy Act.  Intent on restoring business 
confidence and moving toward a balanced budget, Roosevelt called for federal 
retrenchment nearly immediately after solving the banking crisis, on March 10, 1933.  
House Democrats initially rebelled, with some portraying the move as a gift to powerful 
business interests and others as simply cold and heartless; yet William Leuchtenburg 
notes that while “at any other time such appeals would have carried both chambers . . . 
they made little headway against the power of the President in a time of crisis. . . .  Under 
the leadership of Franklin Roosevelt, the budget balancers had won a victory for orthodox 
finance that had not been possible under Hoover.”
2141
  Despite the strong support 
Roosevelt had gained for this fiscal maneuver (the bill passed the House 266 to 139), the 
Northeastern bloc proved implacable on the issue, with only 44.7 percent of the region’s 
Democrats supporting the bill.
2142
  Similarly, 83.8 percent of these Democrats voted in 
1936 to override Roosevelt’s veto of a bill to distribute bonuses to World War 
veterans.
2143
  In this case they were joined by overwhelming majorities in both houses of 
Congress, but, like with the Economy Act, the bonus question demonstrated the 
delegation’s willingness to defy Roosevelt and promote more prodigal spending—a 
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temperament that was more often manifested in strong support for New Deal proposals 
reflecting similar goals, including the $1.425 billion deficiency appropriation of 1936 and 
Roosevelt’s “pump-priming” initiative in 1938.
2144
     
 When this sort of welfare spending was attacked by Republicans as 
“socialistic”—as it was during an August, 1935 debate over the president’s proposed tax 
increases, these urban Democrats responded with rhetoric reminiscent of the Happy 
Warrior—who had always fought such criticisms with a two-pronged retort both 
belittling the merits of the charge and extolling his own record.  “This bill opens the door 
to the path that leads straight to . . . a socialistic condition,” warned New York 
Republican Bertrand Snell.
2145
  In response, Chicago Democrat Adolph Sabath presented 
a seventeen-point recitation of the economic and social welfare achievements of 1933 and 
1934, concluding with the declaration that Roosevelt was “the first and only President of 
the United States who has ever insisted upon feeding the hungry and furnishing clothing 
and shelter to the needy.”
2146
  Next, John J. O’Connor of New York asserted that “the 
people of this country from 1929 to 1933 suffered such distress and privation under 
Republicanism that, if a solution to their problems did mean socialism, they would 
welcome it rather than go back to Republicanism.”
2147
 
 Much of this represented political histrionics and campaign bombast from both 
sides.  O’Connor exposed this when he referred to Snell as “the distinguished gentleman 
from New York . . . my good friend, a candidate for president,” as did Sabath when he 
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proclaimed that Roosevelt’s humanitarian record would “go down in history.”
2148
  Even 
still, on seemingly more mundane matters urban Northern Democrats similarly held the 
line.     
 In the House of Representatives on March 22, 1939, Illinois Republican Everett 
Dirksen proposed an amendment to an appropriations bill that would strike out a $60,000 
allocation for a conference to be held by the Children’s Bureau.  By this time, the New 
Deal was already under heavy congressional assault, and even before Dirksen’s proposal, 
the appropriation was reduced by 70 percent in committee.  But this was not enough for 
Dirksen, who queried:  “What good can come of bringing 250 women to Washington to 
sit around a conference table for 2 or 3 days and then bring them back again for another 2 
or 3 days and finally have them draw up 100 pages of conclusions on the position of 
children in a democracy . . . .  That would be $18,000 sheerly wasted.”
2149
  Embedded in 
this obscure congressional action was a direct assault on the premise that the government 
should foster and fund the formulation by experts of aggressive programs to combat 
social inequality—a foundational principle of transitional progressivism and a central 
tenet of the social welfare initiatives of the New Deal era. 
 On this occasion, the first Democratic respondent was Caroline O’Day, a social 
worker and close Roosevelt ally from Westchester County, New York, who had served as 
Commissioner of the New York State Board of Charities under Governor Smith, toured 
the nation with the Smith campaign in 1928, and was elected to Congress in 1934.
2150
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We women, and the men too, should be very much concerned over the plight of 
children in this democracy. . . .  The Federal Government only pays one-third of 
what is paid by the States, in aid of dependent children who have no lobby.  The 
consequence is the dependent children, not your children, not mine, not the 
children of you gentlemen here, but the dependent children are not properly 
looked after, and we women want to get busy on that because the old people will 
die off and those dependent children will be our citizens who will supplant us and 





Dirksen’s amendment was narrowly defeated—167 for, 189 against—and the action, 
while primarily supported by Republicans, received aid from economy-minded 
Democrats.  Among Democrats from the Northeastern districts, however, the Dirksen 
Amendment received but a single vote.
2152
    
 Overall, the agenda of the urban Northeastern Democrats reflected national 
priorities that their constituents had begun to express in 1928 with their embrace of 
transitional progressivism: strong support for social welfare measures—no matter the 
cost; strong support for labor protections; and ambivalence toward strong regulation and 
heavy taxation (usually providing such measures with tepid support).  The other 
ingredient to this progressive formula was support for a pluralistic vision of 
Americanism.  Predictably, therefore, these representatives were also staunch advocates 
of the conception of American society and culture that had been championed by Smith 
and the transitional progressives—and which had fused with issues of economic security 
and social welfare to draw urban ethnic workers into the Democratic Party.    
 This advocacy occurred irrespective of the Roosevelt administration’s wishes.  
The 1930s were not a period of great legislative activity on such issues; however, when 
presented with the opportunity, the heirs of transitional progressivism were unanimous 
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backers of tolerance and pluralism.  The most famous instance was the Beer Bill, backed 
by the president and approved with strong support in both houses of Congress.  This was 
passed with total support from the Democrats of the “wet” Northeast—and indeed largely 




Fig. 8.2: President Roosevelt signs legislation amending the Volstead Act to legalize the sale of 3.2 percent 
beer, March 22, 1933.  Behind him stand major congressional supporters of the bill (left to right): Claude 
V. Parsons (D-IL); John W. McCormack (D-MA); H.V. Hesselman, committee clerk; John J. O'Connor  




 Much more serious—and ultimately less fruitful, at least in terms of immediate 
victories—was the fight for federal anti-lynching legislation.  Bills granting federal 
authorities legal powers to compel local sheriffs to investigate lynching had been 
introduced numerous times in the past.  Such proposals always failed to survive the 
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machinations of filibustering Southern senators.  Previously, these bills had come from 
Republicans—providing Southern Democrats with invaluable campaign fodder.
2154
  By 
the 1930s, however, New York Democrats had taken the reigns.  In 1937, Robert F. 
Wagner introduced an anti-lynching bill in the Senate, which went nowhere; the 
following year, reintroduction of the bill spurred a filibuster that tied up the Senate from 
January 6 through February 21.
2155
  As J. Joseph Huthmacher gloomily concludes:  “the 
Senate’s first major civil rights debate of the New Deal era” had “ended in defeat for the 
proponents of racial justice.”
2156
     
 This was not the case in the House of Representatives, where filibusters were not 
a viable option for recalcitrant Southerners.  There, companion legislation was introduced 
in the spring of 1937 by Joseph Gavagan, a New York City Democrat.  Lacking the 
dilatory powers of their senate brethren, Southern representatives resorted to virulent 
race-baiting in their efforts to stop the Gavagan bill.  While the proposal passed the 
House by a wide margin (277 to 120, including 100 percent of the Northeastern 
Democrats), the floor debate exposed a major ideological rift between Democratic 
congressmen representing the old “Solid South” and those who had been elected from the 
new Democratic strongholds in the urban industrial North. 
 Some Southerners denigrated the plan as a political ploy by Tammany Hall.  After 
all, the Irish Gavagan’s twenty-first congressional district included large swaths of 
Harlem; thus, many snickered that the proposal ought to be entitled “a bill to make 
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Harlem safe for Tammany.”
2157
  Mississippi congressman John E. Rankin went a step 
further:  “I think it should be called ‘A bill to encourage rape.’”
2158
   
 Worse, from Rankin’s perspective, was the fact that the bill fit into a broader 
pattern of Northern Democratic assaults on long-standing racial mores.  “We are told that 
this is just the beginning of a series of drives to destroy the color line and try to force race 
amalgamation on the American people,” he reported.  “One member from Connecticut 
[Hermann Kopplemann], I understand, has already introduced a bill to wipe out 
segregation in the District of Columbia. . . .  Mr. O’Connor of New York stated on the 
floor that he favored such a measure and hoped the gentleman from Connecticut would 
pursue it.”
2159
    
 North Carolina’s Alfred Lee Bulwinkle, among others, agreed.  Southern 
Democrats had been promoting the interests of the party in Congress for decades—and 
now these upstarts from the urban North were shattering partisan traditions and seeking 
to transform the very nature of the Democracy.
2160
  Edward Leo O’Neill, a New Jersey 
freshman representing parts of Newark, retorted that Northern Democrats had been 
hampered in their own electoral sorties by the kind of rhetoric being employed against the 
Gavagan bill—rhetoric that had damaged Democratic credibility in the North and had 
cost candidates votes from African-American citizens.  When Bulwinkle then demanded 
to know if O’Neill meant that “the Negro vote [sent] him here,” the Garden State 
congressman presented a basic articulation of the new, moderate Democratic position on 
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  While hardly a righteous sermon from a bold civil rights pioneer, 
O’Neill’s retort was nevertheless a challenge to old Democratic attitudes—a challenge 
that started from the basic, egalitarian premises of transitional progressivism and pressed 
them toward a more just, more inclusive posture: 
I do not regard lynching as a racial problem, neither do I regard it as a sectional 
problem.  I think it is an entirely American problem. . . .  Lynching is a heinous 
crime against  American concepts and as such alone should it be treated.  The 
gentleman from North Carolina wishes to know whether I represent a Negro 
district.  I represent a number of Negroes, and I am grateful for the suffrage of 
those who voted to send me here, and I intend to represent them as vigorously as I 
would any other person in the district.  I made such a statement during my 
campaign, not to an audience of Negroes but to an audience of whites.
2162
        
 
This speech by a relatively obscure Democratic freshman (O’Neill would not even be 
reelected) reflected the mounting intrapartisan challenge to long-held positions on race 
and inclusion.  The party was beginning to fulfill Al Smith’s private 1928 pledge to 
Walter White, that “the old Democratic Party, ruled entirely by the South, is on its way 






 In his 1993 study The New Dealers, historian Jordan Schwarz profiled numerous 
individuals whose “timely opportunism” allowed them to pursue “permanent 
improvements of America’s capital structure and its standard of living” during the Great 
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  In this view, the New Deal and its enduring legacies were 
shaped by figures with agendas that only sometimes coalesced with the relief, recovery, 
and reform initiatives radiating from the White House.  Others, including Lizabeth 
Cohen, have demonstrated how rank and file workers began to assert themselves to 
define the course of labor and welfare policies in the 1930s.  Somewhere between the 
power players of finance and politics and the increasingly class-conscious working 
masses, there operated the middle ranks of the New Deal Revolution: legislators and 
other key figures who advocated in Washington on behalf of their increasingly assertive 
urban ethnic working-class constituents and who often pushed the Roosevelt 
administration toward stronger positions on the rights of labor and the government’s 
responsibility for promoting social welfare.   
 These figures did not “make” the New Deal, for while they supported a diverse 
set of initiatives, their focus remained on the problems of their own districts.  But they 
did help to shape the New Deal, advocating from within Roosevelt’s coalition on behalf 
of the transitional progressive agenda their constituents had adopted as their own.  Over 
the course of the 1930s and 1940s, the popularity of many New Deal initiatives, as well 
as Roosevelt’s personal appeal to urban workers, would transform these citizens from 
nebulously defined self-advocates into New Deal Democrats; and since FDR had adopted 
the lion’s share of their agenda, it was a relatively small step for these voters to evolve 
from transitional progressives into what Huthmacher has called “modern, urban liberals.”  
The “middle-men” (and women) in this process were the transitional progressives in 
Congress—those legislators who represented the interests of urban workers specifically 
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and who helped shift the focus of the New Deal increasingly toward their own 
constituents.  
 While there can be no ideal-type for these legislators, several cases are instructive 
in understanding their motives and their influence.  A lesser-known congressman who 
exhibited a number of the fundamental characteristics of these members was Hermann 
Kopplemann, a Hartford Democrat who was elected in 1932 after his fellow Democrat, 
Augustine Lonergan, declined to seek reelection in favor of a senatorial bid.  
Kopplemann was of new-stock descent (he was a Jewish immigrant from the Ukraine) 
and represented an urban district in southern New England.
2165
  Prior to his election to 
Congress, Kopplemann had been an advocate of social welfare initiatives:  as a state 
senator in the late 1910s, his “most notable” achievement was his sponsorship of a 
“widows’ aid and children’s dependent act.”
2166
  During the 1928 campaign, Kopplemann 
had been a strong supporter of Al Smith on both cultural and economic issues, and his 
attitudes on these questions remained progressive into the Depression.  Once in 
Washington, Kopplemann consistently favored New Deal social welfare and labor 
programs, and indeed the congressman was a reliable supporter of Roosevelt’s initiatives 
in general.
2167
  Although he produced little legislation of note, three bills he repeatedly 
introduced were an anti-lynching bill, a bill to promote industrial employment by 
enhancing the loaning power of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and a bill to 
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cover emergency medical costs of war veterans whose expenses had been left unpaid 
after Roosevelt initiated his early drive for federal austerity.
2168
    
The unheralded Congressman Kopplemann is a good example of how the 
transitional progressive tradition became influential with the rise of a congressional bloc 
of urban, working-class Democrats in the 1930s—both in his background (he was of 
“ethnic” stock, from an urban district, and with a history of support for social welfare 
generally and Al Smith specifically) and in his activities during the New Deal (he 
compiled a fairly liberal voting record, particularly on questions relating to social 
welfare, labor rights, and cultural pluralism).  Understanding the backgrounds and 
agendas of some of the more noteworthy members of the Northeastern, urban, ethnic, 
working-class Democratic bloc helps furnish a useful profile.  Like Kopplemann, they 
had come to Congress as advocates of labor or of social welfare; they had been strong 
supporters of Al Smith in 1928 and usually in 1932 as well; and they were the most 
strident proponents of labor and welfare legislation in the New Deal era.  In their 
biographies, priorities, and usually in their dispositions, these were the “happy warriors” 




 In his 1953 autobiography You Never Leave Brooklyn, Congressman Emanuel 
Celler identified the most important element in the creation of transitional 
progressivism—an element that made the perspective of these legislators unique within 
the New Deal coalition.  During Roosevelt’s first months in office, Celler recalled, “I 
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voted as the other Members of Congress did in those days of honeymoon between the 
Executive and Legislative branches of the Government.  There was this difference 
though:  I was not voting to remedy the new and different onslaught of economic distress 
which seemed suddenly to have descended upon us.  I had come from a little bit of world 
where economic distress had, it seemed, always been a part of life.”
2169
  Indeed, Celler 
realized:   
What I had known, what I had seen in Brownsville, Pitkin Avenue, in the 
Bushwick section of Brooklyn, in the Park Places of Brooklyn, in the markets of 
Brooklyn, had now become the generalized commonplace experience.  I had 
known people hungry, cold, homeless, afraid, insecure.  I was not talking and 
voting about anything new.  I represented a district that had never known leisure, 




 Moreover, “I had now made a discovery about myself.  For the first ten years of 
my life in Congress, I had been timid.  I had been too timid to tell the truth as I saw it.  In 
a way I had betrayed my trust.”
2171
  While he had “fought against the unjust restriction of 
immigration,” fought prohibition, “advocated the establishment of a Negro industrial 
commission,” mildly opposed “the growth of monopoly power,” and “introduced a few 
civil rights bills,” ultimately the congressman “had driven back all the emotion that rose 
from the Brooklyn streets, so that I could belong unobtrusively to the exclusive club of 
Congress.”
2172
  The Depression, however, “loosened my inhibitions against being 
different.  For the first time in ten years I could be myself.”
2173
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 Conditions now allowed those who, like Celler, had understood the challenges 
facing urban ethnic workers, to present their agenda within a more accommodating social 
context and with a sympathetic executive.  Thus it would be legislators from districts like 
Celler’s, with experiences and agendas similar to his, who would be the strongest forces 
behind most of the social welfare and labor legislation of the New Deal era.  The 
National Labor Relations Act, the Social Security Act, the Public Contracts Act, and the 
Fair Labor Standards Act all were crafted and sponsored by such legislators, and similar 
programs also received their staunch support. 
 The most obvious figure through whom the agenda of transitional progressivism 
influenced the course of the New Deal was Robert F. Wagner—one of the architects of 
that agenda.  Wagner’s legislative prolificity as the sponsor or co-sponsor of New Deal 
staples including the National Industrial Recovery Act, the National Labor Relations Act, 
the Social Security Act, and the National Housing Act of 1937, among many other bills, 
is well known.  Significantly, Wagner was actively pursuing this agenda prior to 
Roosevelt’s “Hundred Days.”  At the time of FDR’s inauguration, the New York senator 
had a bill to strengthen the Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932 pending in 
Congress; as well as a federal-state employment exchange plan, recommendations for 
unemployment insurance, a bill creating retirement insurance for railroad workers, a 
proposal to investigate conditions among African-Americans working on the Mississippi 
River flood control project, and a bill to legalize beer and wine.
2174
  Indeed, notes 
Huthmacher:  “All these Wagner proposals were forerunners of the New Deal that was 
about to begin as Franklin Roosevelt took the oath of office, and they were indicative of 
the groups that would benefit from New Deal policies—the destitute, the unemployed, 
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businessmen shorn of orders and customers, the elderly, exploited minority groups, and 
yes, even those who yearned to take a legal drink.”
2175
   
 Wagner’s experiences in New York imbued his entire agenda with the principles 
of transitional progressivism.  In fact, social welfare advocates who had worked with 
Wagner recognized that his background would help guide his response to the Depression 
and prompt him to direct the New Deal beyond recovery and toward an emphasis on 
economic justice.  In October, 1932, Lilian Wald confidently wrote her senator:  “when 
Mr. Roosevelt enters the White House, your position in Washington and in the Senate 
will make many measures possible. . . . and I feel that . . . courageous men like you who 
have training and the sense of values will push us on.”
2176
 
 Robert Wagner is rightly remembered as the progenitor of numerous key New 
Deal initiatives.  His lesser-known partner in many of those initiatives, particularly the 
National Labor Relations Act, was William Patrick Connery, Jr., a Democratic 
congressman from Lynn, Massachusetts—another legislator whose career reflected the 
rise of transitional progressivism and its significance in shaping the course of the New 
Deal.  After seeing combat in the World War, Connery returned to Massachusetts where 
he took work in a General Electric plant, providing him with experiences “as a laboring 
man” that “were to echo and re-echo throughout the land in years to come.”
2177
  Connery, 
whose mother was an Irish immigrant and whose father had been elected mayor of Lynn 
in 1912, entered political life himself in 1922—running for Congress on the pledge that 
“when I get there I am never going to forget my life’s work.  And that life’s work is to 
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gain for every man and woman in this country a decent living wage.”
2178
  During the 
Coolidge years he plodded away in the minority on the House Labor Committee.  By the 
end of the decade his efforts had already gained him recognition as “a reliable 
Progressive and a good friend of labor” by the Machinists’ Monthly Journal.
2179
  In 1930 
he introduced legislation calling for a thirty-hour work week, and in 1931 he succeeded 
in having measures providing for old age pensions and for $700 million worth of relief 
funding to the states reported out of committee.
2180
     
 Connery’s background among the urban working class consistently shaped his 
response to the Depression.  “When Billy Connery thinks of the depression,” wrote 
Washington reporter Bulkley S. Griffin in 1931, “he does not think so much of banks or 
railroads as of people. . . .  When Connery thinks of the depression he sees hungry 
children and men with their shoes worn through, and gaunt women.”
2181
  Because of this 
perspective, “When he hears the word dole and direct relief . . . he asks if people shall 
starve because of a phrase.”
2182
   
 In 1932, campaigning for reelection as well as for Al Smith’s presidential 
nomination, Connery continued to focus on the human suffering caused by the 
Depression.  “There are thousands of little children all over the United States . . . who 
have not Grade A milk to drink and need it; who have no stockings and who need them; 
who have no clothing and need it; who are starving to death,” he reported, promising to 
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“fight” such conditions as long as he could.
2183
  With the coming of the Roosevelt 
administration, the prospects of successfully undertaking such efforts improved 
dramatically, and several facets of Connery’s 1930 labor legislation—including 
“outlawing the yellow-dog contract, outlawing child labor, insuring labor the right to 
organize and the right . . . to bargain collectively,” were incorporated into the NIRA.
2184
  
When the NRA was dismantled in 1935, labor legislation introduced in Congress to 
entrench those advances (legislation which had initially received a chilly response from 
the White House) became more pressing; and so the National Labor Relations Act, 
sponsored in the House by Connery as chairman of the labor committee, was enacted that 
summer.
2185
  Given the Massachusetts Democrat’s significant influence in drafting and 
passing the legislation, the Wagner Act “should really be known as the Wagner-Connery 
Act,” reflected International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers President 
Paul Jennings in 1965.
2186
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Fig. 8.3: Representative William P. Connery (D-MA, left) and Senator Robert F. Wagner (D-NY, right), 




 Undeterred by any lack of recognition, the congressman sought reelection in 1936 
with the motto “100 per cent for labor. . . . 100 per cent for the veteran,” and “100 per 
cent for social justice for all.”
2188
  These priorities, a reflection of the congressman’s 
working-class background and of his constituency among the laborers of Lynn and 
Lawrence, sometimes placed Connery in conflict with the broader priorities of Franklin 
Roosevelt.  Thus was Connery among the leading voices against one of FDR’s first major 
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initiatives—the Economy Act of 1933; as well as a leader of the forces that overrode the 
president’s veto of the veterans’ bonus payment bill in 1936.
2189
  The nature of Connery’s 
opposition to Roosevelt serves to buttress the conclusions drawn from his support for the 
administration:  he was primarily interested in promoting the rights of labor and 
improving social welfare.  To that end, he set out in his next term in pursuit of legislation 
to develop federal standards on wages, hours, and working conditions.  He would not live 
to see his victory.  Billy Connery died on June 15, 1937, at age 48, in the midst of 




 It was left to Connery’s successor as chair of the labor committee to complete the 
codification of federal labor standards.  As it turned out, she was no less an exemplar than 
Connery of the urban, ethnic, working-class, Northeastern tinge of the new welfare- and 
labor-oriented Democrats now exercising such influence over New Deal policy.  A 
representative from Jersey City, Mary Theresa Norton embodied transitional 
progressivism in both background and agenda as completely as any member of Congress.  
 Norton had been widowed in the 1910s and became active in child welfare and 
health work, spending many years as president of the Day Nursery Association of Jersey 
City and serving as chair of one of the Garden State’s largest Red Cross units during the 
Great War.
2191
  Following a trajectory strikingly similar to New York social workers like 
Frances Perkins and Belle Moskowitz, Norton’s activities gained the attention of Jersey 
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City Democratic boss Frank Hague, who in 1920 presciently suggested that Norton might 
make a good representative of Hudson County women on the State Democratic 
Committee.
2192
  In 1923 Norton was the first Democratic woman elected as a freeholder 
in New Jersey, and in this capacity she used her political connections to pursue her social 
welfare agenda—gaining notoriety with her successful push to construct a maternity 
hospital in Hudson County.
2193
  A decade later this achievement was noted as “the first of 
its kind in this country.”
2194




Fig. 8.4: Rep. Mary T. Norton (D-NJ; center, white dress) is “besieged” by reporters following testimony 
before the House Rules Committee, July 22, 1939.
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 Norton was elected to Congress with Hague’s backing the following year.  She 
quickly gained prominence within the national party, and campaigned actively across the 
nation for Al Smith in 1928, thrashing prohibition and Republican administration more 
broadly while lauding Smith’s record “on legislation for the protection of women and 
children.”
2196
  With the coming of the New Deal, Norton was given the opportunity to 
support such an agenda, and did so consistently—her voting record demonstrates 
particular enthusiasm for bills promoting social welfare, protecting labor rights, and 
bringing a halt to prohibition.  Yet like Connery and many of the New Deal legislators 
who came out of the transitional progressive tradition, Norton was not universally 
supportive of the Roosevelt agenda.  Unlike Connery, Celler, and Wagner, but like many 
Northeastern and especially New York area Democrats, Norton lacked any particular 
enmity toward big business, voting against establishing the SEC in 1934, against the 
public utilities holding company “death sentence” in 1935, and against the undistributed 
profits tax in 1936.
2197
  Again, by understanding the nature of Norton’s occasional 
opposition to the administration, it becomes easier to comprehend the character of her 
progressivism.  Her priorities were those of the transitional progressives:  social welfare, 
labor protections, and cultural pluralism.  This was not necessarily to the exclusion of 
other New Deal priorities, such as economic planning or robust regulation, but neither 
were such priorities essential for the representatives of the urban working classes to 
qualify as important actors within the New Deal coalition.  Upon the death of Billy 
Connery in 1937, Congresswoman Norton inherited the chair of the House Labor 
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Committee, and would play a crucial role in piloting the Fair Labor Standards Act to its 
eventual passage in 1938.
2198
  
 Like Wagner, Connery, and Norton, numerous members of Congress from similar 
Northeastern, urban, working-class districts who had been participants in the Smith 
campaign and who espoused the ideals of transitional progressivism were key figures in 
crafting and passing significant pieces of New Deal legislation in areas of labor and 
welfare.  Arthur D. Healey of Somerville, Massachusetts, had made a series of 
unsuccessful runs for political office in the 1920s, including a bid for Congress on the 
Smith ticket in 1928 which he lost to the incumbent Republican by 643 votes out of over 
100,000 cast.
2199
  Successful in 1932, Healey entered Congress with a mission to pursue 
specific goals of the urban working class.
2200
  In the long New England tradition, this 
sometimes meant advocating protectionism.
2201
  More often it meant work in two specific 
areas: labor regulations and the provision of low-cost housing.   
 While still a freshman in Congress, Healey coauthored legislation that established 
the Federal Housing Administration in 1934.
2202
  After reelection that fall, Healey 
continued to espouse federal aid to housing.  He did this for private home owners with 
attempts to provide the Home Owners Loan Corporation with more robust funding; as 
well as for renters, with the Healey-Russell Bill of 1936, which authorized “the Federal 
Government to pay service charges in lieu of taxes on its low-cost housing projects” in 
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order to “make possible rentals low enough to accomplish the purposes of the housing 
project and at the same time . . . meet objections of other property owners, whose own 
taxes would be increased if the Government paid neither service charges nor taxes.”
2203
   
 
 




Healey was just as active in promoting labor protections.  In early 1936 he was 
point-man in the House Judiciary Committee for the Walsh-Tobey Bill—a minimum 
wage compact between the states of Massachusetts and New Hampshire (and including 
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signatories from Connecticut, Maine, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island).
2205
  
Later that year, he was co-author and House sponsor of his most famous piece of 
legislation—the Public Contracts Act (or Walsh-Healey Act).  This law articulated 
minimum labor standards that must be required of any firm doing business with the 
federal government, threatening “to deprive corporations of government contracts” if 
they failed to comply.
2206
  Both pieces of legislation can be viewed as pragmatic, 
piecemeal forerunners of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
 The records of Healey and Connery fuse with that of Boston’s John W. 
McCormack, whom voters had promoted from the Massachusetts State Senate to the 
Congress in 1928, to produce a useful profile of the priorities of Bay State Democrats in 
this period.  McCormack’s record was slightly less supportive of the Roosevelt 
administration than Healey or Connery—unlike the others he had opposed the Guffey 
Coal Act and the public utilities holding companies death sentence of 1935, and in 1938 
he helped scuttle some of Roosevelt’s more aggressive corporate taxation plans.
2207
  Yet 
McCormack’s votes on questions of housing, work relief, labor standards, and social 
welfare marked him as a strong ally of the liberal administration on these key issues.   
 A more extreme case of such ambivalence was Massachusetts Democratic senator 
David I. Walsh.  Huthmacher noted in his study of Massachusetts political development 
that Walsh’s 1926 bid to return to the United States Senate after being defeated for 
reelection in 1924 “had laid the groundwork for party victory” in the Republican-
dominated state by incorporating “newer nationality groups” into the Democratic 
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  As a young lawyer in Fitchburg practicing in an era before modern 
workmen’s compensation laws, Walsh had sought out cases supporting the interests of 
laborers and specifically of victims of workplace accidents; he had been a progressive 
executive and administrative innovator as the Bay State’s first Irish Catholic governor 
from 1914 to 1916; and as an incumbent senator in 1928, he had been a munificent 
champion of Al Smith’s progressive economic and cultural attitudes.
2209
   
 Walsh’s profile entering the Depression seemingly predisposed him to be a strong 
supporter of the New Deal—and so he was in the early years.  Yet Walsh became 
increasingly estranged from the White House in the wake of Roosevelt’s “court packing” 
plan.  By the end of 1937, the senator’s posture toward the inchoate conservative 
coalition in Congress was rumored to be “sympathetic,” and James T. Patterson’s 
statistical analysis of roll call votes has marked him as the nineteenth most conservative 
Democratic senator of the New Deal years.
2210
  Nevertheless, Walsh’s record was neither 
consistently conservative nor capricious.  He favored relief programs in 1939 just as he 
had in 1933; he repeatedly championed federal housing programs; and he authored and 
promoted numerous labor laws—including sponsoring the public contracts bill in the 
Senate.
2211
  Although the degree to which he objected to some New Deal initiatives was 
more extreme than his House colleagues, Walsh’s background and his discernible pattern 
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of support for liberal social welfare and labor initiatives made him a significant—if 
intractable—voice for the transitional progressive agenda throughout the 1930s.   
 
 




   
 There were other Northeastern Democrats with urban, working-class 
constituencies and backgrounds who supported the lion’s share of the transitional 
progressive agenda during the 1930s and yet frequently ran afoul of the Roosevelt 
administration.  John J. O’Connor, a congressman from Manhattan who had served as 
secretary to Al Smith and the other Democratic delegates at the 1915 New York State 
Constitutional Convention and was the brother of Franklin Roosevelt’s law partner Basil 
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O’Connor, is an especially complex figure.
2213
  He was a consistent supporter of the early 
New Deal and his voting record even into 1935 and 1936 makes him at least superficially 
a “party regular” (indeed he did not qualify as a “conservative” in Patterson’s statistical 
analysis); yet as chairman of the House Rules Committee, O’Connor wielded great power 
to sidetrack New Deal priorities, which he did with increasing zeal as his indignation 
over presidential infringements of congressional prerogatives devolved into a churlish 
territoriality.
2214
  This earned the chairman the political wrath of the White House and, 
ultimately, the dubious distinction of being one of the few targets of Roosevelt’s 1938 
“purge” to be defeated in that year’s Democratic primaries.
2215
  Less potent and thus less 
obnoxious to the White House was Joseph Gavagan—the sponsor of anti-lynching 
legislation in 1937 and a regular supporter of New Deal labor, welfare, and relief 
programs whose constant opposition to major taxation and regulatory initiatives made 
him the only New York City Democrat to vote against the Roosevelt administration on at 
least 25 percent of major roll call votes in the 1930s.
2216
    
 All of these figures represent particular cases in the broader story of Northeastern, 
urban, ethnic Democrats who pursued many of the goals of transitional progressivism 
during the 1930s, and who did this in a way that profoundly influenced the course of the 
New Deal.  There were dozens of such figures, and many, like Hermann Kopplemann, 
did not have a great deal of major legislation to their name.  Indeed while some—like 
Wagner—have rightly gone down in history as crucial architects of important aspects of 
the New Deal, and others—like Connery—ought to be remembered in a similar way, 
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many of these figures were particularly unremarkable members of Congress.
2217
  Yet 
besides their geographic roots in the urban Northeast and their political support among 
the ethnic working classes of the region, these legislators also engaged in a common, 
discernible pattern of support for labor and welfare legislation, and did so at the behest of 
their constituents.  
 One other political characteristic that most of these congressmen shared was their 
strident support for Alfred E. Smith’s presidential ambitions—in 1928 and usually also in 
1932.  The activities of many of these figures during the 1928 presidential campaign have 
already been noted.  Interestingly, many of these same figures remained loyal to the 
Smith cause in the early stages of the 1932 contest.  In February, Congressman Connery 
promised that should Smith run, his “friends, who were always loyal, will now work 
zealously for him not only in Massachusetts but in the New England states.”
2218
  
Congressman McCormack was similarly “pleased” to hear of Smith’s interest in another 
race.
2219
  In April, an all-star slate of Massachusetts politicos described by the Boston 
Globe as “the ‘heavy artillery’ of the Smith campaign” began a blitz in favor of the New 
Yorker’s nomination.
2220
  Connery and McCormack joined other important figures in 
touring greater Boston on Smith’s behalf.
2221
  At an April 24 Smith rally at Boston’s 
Hotel Statler, a crowd of 3,500 women heard Congresswoman Norton denounce anti-
Smith Democrats as “political chameleons and charlatans . . . .  an unprincipled band of 
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  Nor were these speeches all merely the vituperations of “stop 
Roosevelt” conservatives or machine pawns.
2223
  In a rousing address at Lawrence, 
Congressman Connery called for inflationary policies, generous and speedy payment of 
war bonuses, a decrease in the pension age from seventy to sixty-five, and the 
maintenance of current pay rates for federal employees, concluding that “as for Billy 
Connery, I am for Smith to the finish.”
2224
   
Eventually of course all of these figures became New Deal Democrats and 
Roosevelt supporters.  But their loyalty to Smith had been an accurate reflection of their 
constituents’ preferences—at least in the spring of 1932.  At a rally of five hundred in 
Quincy, Massachusetts, on April 24 (featuring, among others, Somerville attorney Arthur 
Healey), Dr. Joseph Santosuosso had declared the Italian vote “100 percent for 
Smith.”
2225
  At least in the urban Northeast, this proved to be the case not only among 
Italians but among most urban ethnic workers.  On April 27, Smith swamped Roosevelt 
three to one in Massachusetts, winning all thirty-nine Bay State cities and even sweeping 
Boston, where Mayor Curley had sided with FDR.
2226
  Indeed, Huthmacher has argued 
that in Massachusetts the 1932 primary “boiled down to a contest between Al Smith and 
James Michael Curley”; the results “demonstrated just how strong a hold the 1928 
candidate retained.”
2227
  With a note of irony, Walter Lippmann suggested that Smith’s 
ability to “overwhelm the Curley machine in Boston itself is clear proof that the 
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‘forgotten men’ intervened in the contest.”
2228
  The same week, in Connecticut’s 
Democratic caucuses, Smith defeated Roosevelt in “virtually all the large cities”; he won 
75 percent of the Hartford County delegates (many of the other 25 percent simply 
remained unpledged); and he captured 375 delegates statewide—to Roosevelt’s 51.
2229
  
Smith went on to wins in New Jersey and Rhode Island, and received strong support 





Fig. 8.7: Cy Hungerford, “The Forgotten Man?” (1932).
2231
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All of this was a temporary condition, however, and it had little influence on the 
eventual nomination.  When Roosevelt emerged victorious, the Democrats feared that 
they might lose the Northeastern urban workers whom Smith had attracted into the 
party—especially in the New England states.  In what would prove a final episode of 
partisan loyalty, Smith spoke on the nominee’s behalf at a major rally in Boston on 
October 27, abandoning the “lukewarmness” of his previous Roosevelt speeches and 
adopting a vigor reminiscent of his own campaigns.
2232
  On his way to the event, Smith 
made several stops in Connecticut, attracting enthusiastic crowds as he had in 1928 and 
remarking, “I feel like I’m running again.”
2233
  Elected to the Senate from the Nutmeg 
State on Roosevelt’s ticket, Augustine Lonergan would reflect that “it was [Smith’s] 
personal magnetism and leadership that brought many thousands of votes to the polls on 
election day allowing the majority of the Democratic candidates to win.”
2234
  Among the 
Democrats who did not win in Connecticut that year was Franklin D. Roosevelt; but by 
1936 he too would carry the state, adding it to the Smith strongholds of Massachusetts 
and Rhode Island, which he had secured in 1932.   
As the New Deal took hold and Roosevelt’s agenda became increasingly palpable, 
the urban ethnic workers who had long espoused Smith’s transitional progressivism 
became the most loyal of New Deal Democrats.
2235
  Al Smith would not participate in 
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this movement.  Instead, the man once known as the Happy Warrior, increasingly bitter 
and increasingly isolated from his old world, launched himself in a strange and discordant 
new direction, hopelessly battling the unstoppable forces which he himself had helped to 
unleash. 
 
Quantum Mutatus Ab Illo 
 
 Shortly after Al Smith’s 1928 defeat, a long-time ally contacted him to propose a 
real estate investment.  On November 20, 1928, Lillian Wald wrote Smith, entreating him 
to come home to the Lower East Side.  “It would be glorious if you and your family 
would return,” she pleaded.  “It would fire the imagination of a people, and our real 
trouble is the lack of imagination.”  Moreover, Wald had identified “a lovely site . . . 
where the river bends at Corlears Point.”  Warning that “if we do not look out, the 
millionaires will capture it,” the social work icon envisaged that “upon this site could be 
built a place dignified and great for you—a home that would become a shrine as Thomas 
Jefferson’s home.”
2236
   
 Smith’s urban Monticello never came to be.  Actually, there is no evidence he was 
even given the letter by his secretary, whom Wald had pragmatically recognized “has to 
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decide between a mountain of letters and correspondences” in the wake of the national 
campaign.
2237
  Rather than return to the Fourth Ward, Al Smith began to drift uptown.     
 Except for a brief, successful stint as head of the United States Trucking 
Company during 1921 and 1922, Smith had spent his entire adult life in the public sector, 
and absent the marauding administrative techniques of his more notorious Tammany 
forebears, this was not a lucrative career path.
2238
  This meant that financial concerns had 
plagued Smith throughout his life.  Nevertheless, during his time in the corporate world 
he had made lifelong connections with New York businessmen—most of them self-made 
Irishmen who shared Smith’s background and his affinity for Tammany Hall.
2239
  His 
increasingly opulent social circle, along with four terms in the executive mansion, left 
Smith with a taste for the high life:   “After I left Albany, after living in a mansion for six 
years I couldn’t see First Avenue very well, so I went over on Fifth Avenue.”
2240
  The 
Smiths settled in a $10,000 a year apartment on Fifth Avenue at Sixty-Third Street, from 
which he was taxied about town in a limousine.
2241
  His new, lavish lifestyle was 
financed through investment help from John Raskob and eventually through Smith’s 
appointment (again by Raskob and his associate Pierre Du Pont) as President of the 
Empire State Building Corporation at an annual salary of $50,000.
2242
   
Yet Smith’s timing could not have been worse.  If he had run for president four 
years too soon, he had arrived in the real estate business four years too late.  The coming 
of the Great Depression made corporate office rentals a tough sell; thus when the Empire 
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State Building opened in 1931, it was three-quarters vacant.
2243
  Meanwhile, his 
investments evaporated with everyone else’s beginning in October 1929, and in the early 
1930s he was “in an extremely bad position” financially, managing dutifully to maintain 
a façade of solvency as he continued his work beseeching struggling businessmen to 
lease space in his empty skyscraper.
2244
    
 Like most Americans, Smith had real problems during the Depression.  
Employed, housed, fed and clothed, the former governor’s challenges did not approach 
those facing many of his countrymen.  Yet having chosen Fifth Avenue over Oliver 
Street, Al Smith’s perspective on the Depression was not that of the urban workers to 
whom he had devoted most of his life, but was rather the perspective of the businessman.  
His understanding of the crisis was increasingly constricted by his own experiences, for 
he was no longer working every day to understand and conquer the problems of ordinary 
citizens.  Smith’s new challenge was to kick-start a business intimately dependent on the 
good fortunes of corporate America.   
This myopia was exacerbated by Smith’s dramatic change in associations in the 
years after he left Albany.  To the end of Smith’s life, Bob Wagner remained one of his 
closest friends—throughout the 1930s, their Sunday evening poker games descended into 
“hotter and hotter” political arguments, but “liquid spirits plus the good spirits invoked by 
reminiscences of times past invariably restored amicability as the two old cronies, arm in 
arm, made their unsteady exit.”
2245
  Yet while he retained cordial relations with figures 
like Wagner, Frances Perkins, Eleanor Roosevelt, and other officials, Smith was 
increasingly detached from their struggles with public policy.  In January 1933, the most 
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prominent of the old voices was silenced when Belle Moskowitz died of an embolism 
while recovering from a bad fall.
2246
  Smith’s views were increasingly shaped not by 
social workers or even Tammany precinct captains, but by the businessmen with whom 
he retained regular professional and social contact.  As H. L. Mencken would later 
conclude, Smith had been “ruined by associating with rich men—a thing far more 
dangerous to politicians than even booze or the sound of their own voices.”
2247
  Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr., proposed a similar thesis:  “Plunged into a world of business against 
which he had no intellectual defense, he rapidly absorbed the Raskob point of view.”
2248
 
This shift in perspective meant that Smith’s 1932 bid for the Democratic 
nomination was not the encore of 1928 that voters in Boston, Hartford, or Scranton—not 
to mention a good many of their political leaders—may have been expecting.  Smith’s ill-
fated 1932 campaign was a conservative affair.  It is true that he had called for a federal 
public works program (Schlesinger called this “a last fling for the old Al Smith”), and he 
even remained steadfast in his commitment to “government ownership and control of all 
electrical power developed,” from federal or state holdings.
2249
  But the heart of his 
program involved calls for retrenchment, budget-balancing, and cuts in business taxes—
to be offset by a sales tax.
2250
  While it is not entirely accurate that Smith’s bid was 
simply a “stop Roosevelt” campaign—he clearly believed he deserved another chance at 
the nomination—it is certainly the case that Smith was the candidate of conservatives like 
Raskob and his Bourbon sidekick Jouette Shouse, and that most of his efforts were 
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devoted to thwarting the ambitions of his gubernatorial successor.
2251
  Indeed, Smith’s 
1932 campaign is best remembered for his vitriolic denunciation of FDR’s “forgotten 
man” speech (“I will take off my coat and fight to the end against any candidate who 
persists in any demagogic appeal to the masses of the working people of this country to 
destroy themselves by setting class against class and rich against poor”).
2252
      
His ambitions thwarted at the party convention in Chicago, Smith grudgingly 
settled into the role of party elder during the fall contest, and eventually even campaigned 
for FDR—most notably with his crucial swing through southern New England.  None of 
this meant that Smith had accepted Roosevelt’s ideas.  “We should stop talking about the 
Forgotten Man and about class distinctions,” he counseled in October; instead, the party 
should advocate fiscal prudence.
2253
  Nor were his views moderated with the conclusion 
of the campaign:  in mid-November, as World War veterans continued demanding bonus 
payments, Smith complained coldly that “the veterans were imposing on the taxpayer 
without real justice for their claims.”
2254
  
Smith’s conservatism of 1932, even his rage against the “forgotten man” speech, 
was but a temperate preview of the unrestrained fury soon to be unleashed by the former 
governor.  As an editorialist in the New Outlook, Smith became increasingly critical of 
the New Deal throughout 1933, decrying its “baloney dollars” and “alphabet soup.”
2255
  
He emerged as the “most vehement” among conservative Democratic critics of the 
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Roosevelt program, denouncing centralization, mocking administration by 
“inexperienced young college professors,” and skewering by name New Dealers like 
Donald Richberg, Harold Ickes, Henry Wallace, Harry Hopkins, and Rexford 
Tugwell.
2256
  When Raskob and Shouse began organizing prominent businessmen from 
Du Pont, General Motors, General Foods, Sun Oil, Montgomery Ward, and other firms 
into a “non-partisan” organization to preserve the Constitution and safeguard Jeffersonian 
government against the machinations of New Deal bureaucrats, Al Smith was among the 
founding members of this “American Liberty League.”
2257
   
Under the auspices of the Liberty League, Smith made his most inflammatory 
speech of the period, on January 25, 1936, from Washington.  The Democratic agenda 
was indistinguishable from a Socialist platform, he fumed.  In fact, communism was 
threatening representative democracy, for the New Dealers were not Democrats at all, but 
rather Marxist ideologues with the temerity to “march under the banner of Jefferson, 
Jackson, [and] Cleveland.”
2258
   
At this point it may have been possible that Smith had forgotten what he had once 
stood for; but others had not.  PWA information director Mike Straus, for one, recalled 
Smith’s 1928 Boston speech defending his own program from Herbert Hoover’s similar 
charges of socialism, reminding his boss, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, that “in 
his reply Smith had said that the cry of socialism had always been raised by powerful 
interests that desired to put a damper upon progressive legislation.  It was raised, 
according to him, by reactionary elements in the Republican party and he had fought it 
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  The next day, before the Washington press corps, Ickes had 
Kentucky senator Alben Barkley question him about Smith’s anti-administration 
tirade.
2260
   In a prepared response, Ickes was able to refute Smith’s contemporary attacks 
by quoting Smith’s 1928 remarks verbatim.
2261
   The pathetic irony was too much—the 
exchange “brought down the house.”
2262
  
Smith’s 1928 running mate found it all quite distressing.  Joe Robinson, still in the 
Senate representing Arkansas, concluded that Smith was now “the unhappy warrior,” a 
sadly diminished sell-out.  “The brown derby has been discarded for the high hat; he has 
turned away from the East Side with those little shops and fish markets, and now his gaze 
rests fondly upon the gilded towers and palaces of Park Avenue.”
2263
  Robinson, who 
believed that Smith had once stood for much of what was being instituted through the 
New Deal, lectured the former nominee in absentia that “it was as difficult to conceive of 
you at the Liberty League banquet as it would be to imagine George Washington waving 
a cheery good-bye to the ragged and bleeding band at Valley Forge while he rode forth to 
dine in sumptuous luxury with smug and sanctimonious Tories in near-by 
Philadelphia.”
2264
    
 The president himself was bemused by the reactionary positions of his erstwhile 
ally, famously lamenting to Frances Perkins, “I just can’t understand it. . . .  Practically 
all the things we’ve done in the Federal Government are like things Al Smith did as 
Governor of New York.  They’re things he would have done if he had been President of 
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the United States.  What in the world is the matter?  Why can’t Al see this is the program 
he ought to be for?”
2265
 
 A number of scholars have struggled admirably to determine the precise reasons 
why Smith had taken this course.
2266
  Ultimately, such explanations are less important to 
this study than the obvious conclusion that there had in fact been a pronounced 
transformation—that these new positions were a departure from the old Al Smith.  The 
Happy Warrior—jaundiced, bitter, resentful—had chosen a new, reactionary path.  But 
his legions of political followers were reluctant to join him.  Indeed, the motivations 
behind Smith’s conversion do not matter much beyond biographical interest, because the 
shift affected so few people.  When Smith helped author a Liberty League manifesto 
demanding that the Democrats dump Roosevelt and cabled it to the party’s 1936 
convention in Philadelphia, the document stirred conversations—but the party simply 
chose not to respond.
2267
  The public reaction was similar to that of Congressman 
O’Connor, who dismissed the Smith telegram as “an impertinence.”
2268
  In October, after 
Smith delivered a radio address for Republican presidential nominee Alfred M. Landon, 
there was no outpouring of urban support for the challenger from Kansas; instead, a 
Democratic club on Second Avenue in Manhattan took Smith’s portrait down from their 
wall.
2269
  The next month, when Smith formally took his “walk” out of the party to which 
he had devoted his life and into a booth to vote Republican for the first time, no one 
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followed.  The working-class, ethnic cities that he had secured for the Democracy in 1928 
became more Democratic in 1936.
2270
       
 Smith’s greatest influence on the politics of the 1930s had been exerted during the 
preceding decade.  As a presidential nominee the Happy Warrior had welcomed millions 
into his party with a straightforward articulation of his progressive vision for 
humanitarian government.  Smith had always held that the Democratic Party was the 
vehicle that would transport “the people” toward a just society, and so he had ushered his 
enthusiastic followers aboard the Democracy for a drive to an America marked by 
cultural tolerance and a strong concern for social welfare.  During a national campaign 
that centered on this particular progressive platform, he helped urban ethnic working-
class Democrats articulate an agenda based on their own definition of progress.  As the 
Great Depression hit and these Smith voters became an increasingly powerful bloc within 
the Democratic coalition, their drive began to pick up momentum:  they were able to 
influence the directions in which Roosevelt would steer his New Deal, leveraging their 
electoral clout and mobilizing their vibrant cohort of political representatives.  In this 
way, working-class urban ethnic Democrats exerted their new-found power and 
institutionalized the most important facets of transitional progressivism. 
 Al Smith had been a hero to many of these voters.  For over a decade he had been 
their foremost champion.  Now their agenda was building steam; but the old conductor 
refused to remain on board.  This baffled many admirers, and broke many hearts—to her 
death, Lillian Wald kept a clipping of a 1936 article from the New York Sunday News 
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that pondered Smith’s renunciation of his former ideals.
2271
  Among urban Democrats 
still struggling to reshape the nation to reflect their conception of social justice, the 
vanquished warrior was reluctantly relegated to irrelevance.  While the working masses 
continued to board the refashioned Democracy in search of a better life in a more 
equitable nation, Smith disembarked—a sad, bitter, increasingly disregarded figure.  As 
the New Deal Express steamed irrepressibly toward the future, Alfred E. Smith was left 
at the station, a surly old man shaking his fist angrily from the platform as history passed 
him by.    
 
 
Fig. 8.8: President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (center) joins former (and future) congressman Hermann 
Kopplemann (D-CT, center-right) at a campaign stop in Connecticut in 1940.  (Courtesy of the Jewish 
Historical Society of Greater Hartford.)
2272
 
                                                 
2271
 Dick Lee, “Brown Derby to High Hat,” The Sunday News, February 23, 1936, pp. 52-53, Lillian Wald 
Papers, Reel 33. 
2272





Appendix I: The 1924 and 1928 Presidential Vote  
in two Midwestern Manufacturing Cities 
 
The following tables are provided to demonstrate the correlation between the La Follette 
vote of 1924 and the Smith vote of 1928 in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania and St. Louis 
City, Missouri, as per discussion in chapter five, footnote 1273. 
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y = 0.7117x + 21.274 
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Appendix II: Presidential Voting in Passaic, New Jersey, 
1916-1948 
 
The following tables are provided to demonstrate the evolution of the presidential vote in 
the city of Passaic, New Jersey, beginning in 1928, as per the discussion in chapter six, 
footnote 1509.  The first graph demonstrates the precipitous increase in the Democratic 
percentage of the vote beginning in that year; the second shows the drastic rise in the 
city’s Democratic Quotient, representing an increase in Passaic’s relative importance to 
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Appendix III: How Did Al Smith Lose  
New York State in 1928? 
  
 The question of why Al Smith lost his home state in 1928 is not especially 
germane to this project.  The state’s vote is significant insofar as Smith’s success in New 
York City, especially in Brooklyn and the Bronx, was unprecedented for a Democratic 
presidential nominee and represented the genesis of a new statewide voting pattern in 
national elections (see chapter five).  Yet his success in the five boroughs was obviously 
not personally unprecedented.  Smith had always carried New York City by spectacular 
margins.  And so it has been assumed by historians that his defeat in New York State in 
1928 was delivered by upstate voters, many of whom had never supported the Happy 
Warrior, and others of whom evidently considered the notion of having a Catholic in the 
White House less tolerable than that of having one in the governor’s mansion.  As Smith 
biographer Robert Slayton concluded:  “In New York State, outside the city . . . voters 




 Yet a closer look at state and city voting statistics complicates these explanations.  
Smith lost New York State in 1928 by just over 103,000 votes; 51 percent to 49 percent.  
He carried New York City by a margin of 453,817, and lost outside of the city by 
557,298.  All of which seems to confirm the thesis that it was “upstate” (defined as 
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 Yet Al Smith had won four statewide races in his career, never having carried the 
upstate vote.  The difference in 1928 was that his success in New York City was not 
enough to overcome his deficit north of the Bronx.  This had happened to Smith once 
before—in 1920, when he lost reelection narrowly to Nathan Miller in a result that has 
always been attributed to increased upstate turnout in the presidential year. 
  
 In that election, Smith lost upstate by 396,700 votes, and won New York City by 
319,875.  This election was much closer than the later presidential contest—the margin of 
defeat in 1920 was a little more than half that of 1928.  Yet Smith’s percentage outside of 
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noticeably weaker—62 percent of the two-party vote in 1928, rather than 65 percent in 
1920.
2278
   
 It could be hypothesized that this is attributable to a stronger anti-Smith turnout 
upstate.   Yet that is not what happened at all.  Indeed, New York City’s proportion of the 
total state vote was remarkably stable throughout the 1920s—always between 42 percent 
and 44 percent of all Empire State ballots.  Moreover, New York City’s turnout in 1928 
actually swelled to a greater degree than that of the rest of the state, which comports with 
my thesis that urban ethnic voters enthusiastically rushed to the polls for Smith, but 
which also defies the notion that the upstate, anti-Smith vote was particularly motivated 
in 1928.
2279
   
 
 In fact, Smith’s statewide victories in 1922, 1924, and 1926, were facilitated by 
two factors.  One was his ability in the non-presidential or “off-year” elections to attract 
large swaths of the rural vote.  In both 1922 and 1926, Smith cracked 40 percent outside 
of New York City; indeed, in 1922, running against an incumbent Republican from 
Onondaga County, he carried 47 percent of the upstate vote.  
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 The more obvious explanation for Smith’s usual statewide success is his 
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 In 1922 and 1926, this urban strength combined with Smith’s relative success 
outside the city in order to produce statewide landslides.  In the presidential year 1924, 
however, Smith did not enjoy the same support upstate.  That election was more similar 
to 1920 beyond the five boroughs:   
  
 In fact, a clear pattern is revealed by tracking voting outside of New York City in 
presidential years: Smith did relatively well in off-year elections, and was beaten more 
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 Clearly, the reason that Smith was able to win in the presidential year 1924, 
despite receiving a percentage of the upstate vote similar to the poor showings of 1920 
and 1928, was his overwhelming victory in New York City—a victory made all the more 
remarkable by the abysmal performance of the Democratic presidential nominee, John 
W. Davis, within the city: 
  
 While Smith’s percentage in 1924 was slightly lower than it was in the off-year 
contests, this deficit was not nearly as pronounced as it had been in 1920 and would be 
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 In 1924, the usual presidential-year Democratic decline in the New York City 
vote was not as pronounced, and so although the “upstate” vote was more Republican in 
that year than in the off-year contests, Smith was able to achieve reelection.  In fact, 
Smith’s percentage of the upstate vote was strikingly consistent across the presidential-
year elections.  Since the upstate/city turnout proportions were also stable throughout this 
period, it is clear that it was Smith’s inability to offset the upstate Republican vote with 
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 Smith’s 1928 plurality in Manhattan was 130,831.
2280
  This was far lower than the 
stunning 201,940-vote margin he had racked up in 1924.
2281
  His plurality of 26,135 in 
Queens was particularly disappointing; it was 32,000 votes shy of his largest plurality for 
that county (achieved in 1926), and it was well short of the 60,000-vote margin 
Democrats had hoped to achieve.
2282
  On Staten Island, Smith’s 1924 plurality had been 
over 9,100; in 1928, it was 3,950.
2283
  Smith lost New York State by 103,481 votes in 
1928; had he merely equaled his best margins in New York, Queens, and Richmond 
counties, he would have gained more than 107,000 votes.   
 None of which should be taken to mean that Smith performed poorly among the 
urban ethnic working-class voters of New York City, for Smith’s performance in the city 
was not uniformly disappointing.  The Democrat’s largest pluralities were in Brooklyn 
(158,771) and the Bronx (134,130).
2284
  These were the widest margins Smith had ever 
achieved in either jurisdiction.  In many of the working-class, ethnic, Tammany-
dominated assembly districts of New York County, Smith’s margins of victory only 
declined slightly from 1924.  In lower Manhattan, Smith’s margin in district one was 
down 283 votes from 1924—only 2.4 percent; in the heavily Jewish district four, his 
margin declined 912 votes (9.8 percent); and in the heavily Italian second assembly 
district, his margin was actually up 1,498 votes from 1924—an improvement of 19.2 
percent.  Conversely, in all of the Manhattan assembly districts that had elected 
Republicans to the state legislature in 1927, Smith’s vote was down markedly.  In the 
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tenth district, Smith’s margin was reduced by 81.1 percent from 1924; in the fifteenth, 
Smith’s 1924 victory of over 2,700 votes was transformed into a defeat by nearly 3,600—
a decline of over 230 percent; in the nineteenth district, a Republican enclave with a large 
African-American population, Smith’s margin declined 173.7 percent.  There was a 
similar story in Queens: Smith’s margins in assembly districts one and two, bordering 
Brooklyn, were improved from 1924; those in the districts farther east on Long Island 
were reduced by thousands of votes.
2285
    
 In all of these districts, Smith ran much stronger than had John W. Davis; but 
Davis had lost the city and state miserably.  In order to transform presidential politics, 
Smith needed to best Davis in a convincing fashion by cobbling together a discernible 
and durable new electoral coalition.  He did.  But in order to win New York State, Smith 
needed to build on his own, already strong majorities—and at that task the Happy 
Warrior failed.   
 In the aftermath of the election, the New York Times identified qualitative trends 
evident within these results.  “Governor Smith carried his old home district in Oliver 
Street [on the Lower East Side] by 610 to 66, but lost the election district in which his 
current residence, the Hotel Biltmore, is located [in Midtown] by 404 to 223.”
2286
  
Hoover had carried “the ‘silk stocking’ districts,” while Smith had run strong with his 
working-class base.
2287
  The home precincts of Charles Evans Hughes and John D. 
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Rockefeller, Jr., voted Republican; those of Jimmy Walker, Robert F. Wagner, and the 
late “Silent Charlie” Murphy went Democratic.
2288
   
 These results are more meaningful in their wider context.  It is true that Smith out-
performed the Democratic gubernatorial nominee, Franklin Roosevelt, in New York City, 
and thus Roosevelt’s victory is appropriately credited to his ability to outperform Smith 
upstate.  But this was not the case with the rest of the Democratic ticket:  Herbert 
Lehman, running for lieutenant governor, Royal Copeland, running for reelection to the 
United States Senate, and Morris Tremaine, running for reelection as state comptroller, 
each outperformed Smith within the city.
2289
  All three of these Democrats were 
victorious.   
 This evidence suggests that Smith’s 1928 defeat in New York State was not the 
result of a new surge in anti-Catholic rural voting.  Instead, the Happy Warrior was 
thwarted by an inability to garner the sort of overwhelming support in New York City 
that had allowed him to overcome upstate Republican strength in the past—particularly in 
1924.  Smith’s weakness was not on his left flank: the nearly fifty thousand city votes 
that went to Socialist Norman Thomas in 1928 were of little significance, considering 
that Socialist gubernatorial nominees (including Thomas himself) had achieved 
comparable totals in 1924 and 1926.
2290
  It was Smith’s inability to retain the allegiance 
of moderate New York City Republicans who had approved of his progressive 
administration of state affairs that played the decisive role in his defeat.   
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Appendix IV: Major Party Presidential Nominees to  
Lose Their Home State in the Post-Reconstruction Period 
 
While it is surprising that Al Smith was not able to carry New York, where he had already 
won four statewide contests, it was not unprecedented for a major party presidential 
nominee to lose their home state.  Below is a table showing all major party nominees to 
lose their home state in the post-Reconstruction period.  All presidential nominees who 
won at least one Electoral College vote were considered “major party” nominees in this 
survey.  Only one nominee, Woodrow Wilson, lost their home state while achieving a 
national victory.  
  
Year   Nominee   Party   State              Outcome 
 
1880   Winfield S. Hancock  Democratic  Pennsylvania    Lost  
1888   Grover Cleveland  Democratic  New York    Lost 
1892   Benjamin Harrison  Republican  Indiana    Lost 
1900   William Jennings Bryan Democratic  Nebraska    Lost 
1904   Alton B. Parker  Democratic  New York    Lost 
1912   William Howard Taft Republican  Ohio     Lost 
1912   Theodore Roosevelt  Progressive  New York    Lost 
1916   Woodrow Wilson  Democratic  New Jersey    Won 
1920   James M. Cox  Democratic    Ohio      Lost 
1924   John W. Davis  Democratic  West Virginia    Lost 
1928   Alfred E. Smith  Democratic  New York    Lost 
1932   Herbert Hoover  Republican  California    Lost 
1936   Alfred M. Landon  Republican  Kansas     Lost 
1944   Thomas E. Dewey  Republican  New York    Lost 
1952   Adlai Stevenson  Democratic  Illinois     Lost 
1956   Adlai Stevenson  Democratic  Illinois     Lost 
1972   George McGovern  Democratic  South Dakota    Lost 
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